No. 22881 - State ex rel. Omarri Hill v. The Honorable
Paul Zakaib, Jr., Judge of the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County: and Larry F. Parsons
Administrator, South Central Regional Jail.
Workman, Justice, concurring:
I regret that I must concur in the majority opinion. It is
tragic that the murder of a completely innocent young man costs the
perpetrator no more than the loss of freedom for a very brief
period in his life.
The office of the prosecuting attorney made a grievous error in recommending this lenient disposition for Omarri Hill and indeed in preparing the order which set forth such lenient treatment. It is necessary that that be said clearly, not in the finger-pointing sense, but in order to set the public record straight. Otherwise, we will in all likelihood see the prosecuting attorney himself on the evening news castigating the State Supreme Court as being too soft on criminals.See footnote 1 1 Unfortunately, they did not realize their
mistake until it was time under their recommended order for Mr.
Hill to be released, at which time they sought to clothe their
position in obscure and dubious constitutional grounds. This Court
is without authority to "clean up" mistakes of this magnitude for
reasons well-stated in the majority opinion.
It should be made clear that in 1994, when Mr. Hill reached
his eighteen birthday, several options were open to the State. The
State could have sought the transfer of Mr. Hill to the
penitentiary under West Virginia Code § 49-5-16(b) 1982,See footnote 2 if such transfer was appropriate "in the judgment of the commissioner of
the department of Corrections and the court which committed such
child."See footnote 3 Id. The State did not exercise this option. Instead, it
sought the transfer of Mr. Hill to a center under West Virginia
Code §§ 49-5-16 (b) and 25-4-6 (1975).See footnote 4 In a letter dated May 24, 1994, Nicholas J. Hun, Commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety and James, J. Ielapi, Superintendent of the W. Va.
Industrial Home for Youth recommended the Mr. Hill "serve the
remainder of his sentence at a minimum security adult facility,
such as the Anthony Center in Neola, West Virginia." They further
suggested that Mr. Hill service "at least the remainder of the
minimum sentence . . . [to] allow more time for adjustment and
counseling, as well as time for some type of vocational training to
be implemented."
However, the State and the Court did not follow that
recommendation, opting for another, more lenient, option outlined
in West Virginia Code § 25-4-6.See footnote 5 This six-month training option was adopted by the circuit court after it was proposed by the
State, which now complains about the sentence. The sentence was
very specifically set forth in the order prepared by the State.
For sake of completeness, it should be noted that if Mr. Hill
fails to meet the conditions of his probation and if his probation
is revoked, West Virginia Code § 25-4-6 provides that "he shall be
given the sentence he would have originally received had he not
been committed to the center and subsequently placed on probation."
Id. The nature of this offense together with the leniency the
State and the court below have accorded this Defendant would seem
to justify the circuit court in imposing stringent conditions of probation. As distasteful as I find such a lenient sentence for
such a tragic and violent crime, I concur with the majority that we
are without authority to alter it.
If one looked at only the opinions of the
Supreme Court, one might assume it reverses a
relatively high percentage of criminal
convictions. For example, over the twelve-
year period of 1983 to 1994, the Court granted
some relief, which might have been only
partial reversal or remand for correction of
sentence, in 49[] percent of the opinions
filed in criminal appeals. What this fails to take into account,
however, is that the Court grants review in relatively few of the
criminal appeals presented for its consideration. For example,
since 1990, the Court has never granted more thatn 1 in 4 criminal
appeals in any calendar year, and from 1990-1992 never granted more
than 1 in 5 criminal appeals in any calendar year. Consequently,
as indicated in the table below, the reversal rate for criminal
appeals including summary affirmances, i.e., appeals in which the
petition was denied without further review, over the same twelve-
year period was only 12%, with no more than 1 in 10 criminal
appeals reversed, even partially, since 1990.
2 Supreme Court Journal, July 5, 1995, No. 7, at 24.