James M. Barber
Hunt & Barber
Frank T. Litton, Jr.
Litton & Litton
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

Mary H. Sanders
James Stebbins
Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Federal Kemper Insurance Company

CHIEF JUSTICE McHUGH delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE BROTHERTON AND JUSTICE RECHT did not participate.
JUDGE FOX and RETIRED JUSTICE MILLER sitting by temporary assignment.

        1. "'Where the provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended.' Syllabus, Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co., 153 W. Va. 813, 172 S.E.2d 714 (1970)." Syl. pt. 1, Russell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992).
        2. "'Language in an insurance policy should be given its plain, ordinary meaning.' Syl. Pt. 1, Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 176 W. Va. 430, 345 S.E.2d 33 (1986)." Syl. pt. 2, Russell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992).
        3. "'Insurers may incorporate such terms, conditions and exclusions in an automobile insurance policy as may be consistent with the premium charged, so long as any such exclusions do not conflict with the spirit and intent of the uninsured and underinsured motorists statutes.' Syl. Pt. 3, Deel v. Sweeney, 181 W. Va. 460, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989)." Syl. pt. 4, Russell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992).
        4. Anti-stacking language in an automobile insurance policy is valid and enforceable as to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage where the insured purchases a single insurance policy to cover two or more vehicles and receives a multi-car discount on the total policy premium. If no multi-car discount for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage is apparent on the declarations page of the policy, the parties must either agree or the court must find that such a discount was given. In such event, the insured is not entitled to stack the coverages of the multiple vehicles and may only recover up to the policy limits set forth in the single policy endorsement.

        By settlement agreement dated June 23, 1993, Federal Kemper paid to the Millers the sum of $25,000 in uninsured motorist benefits, pursuant to the terms of the policy which provided for uninsured motorist bodily injury coverage in the amount of $25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident. Left in dispute then was the issue of whether the Millers are entitled to stack uninsured motorists coverage in order to claim an additional $25,000 of uninsured coverage under the policy.
        The Millers instituted a declaratory judgment actionSee footnote 3 in the Circuit Court of Ritchie County seeking a determination of the amount of uninsured motorist coverage available to them from Federal Kemper. By order dated May 2, 1994, the circuit court concluded that
        the 'anti-stacking' language in the instant automobile insurance policy is void as to uninsured coverage under West Virginia Code 33-6-31See footnote 4 as said policy contains no multi-car discount with respect to uninsured motorists coverage in spite of the fact that said policy contains a multi-car discount with regard to other coverages thereunder and therefore, the Court concludes that the uninsured motorists coverage can be stacked. It is therefore ORDERED that there is an additional $25,000.00 of uninsured motorists coverage available to the plaintiffs under the terms of Federal Kemper's policy with the [Millers].

(footnote added).
        The following question was subsequently certified to this Court:
            Is the anti-stacking language in a policy of automobile insurance, which insures two cars, valid and enforceable with respect to uninsured motorist coverage when there is no multi-car discount indicated by the declarations page but a comparison of the total premiums charged for separate policies shows that a discount is given for multiple cars on one policy though such discount is not specifically shown in connection with uninsured motorist coverage?

The circuit court answered this question in the negative. For the reasons discussed herein, we disagree with the circuit court's resolution of the certified question and find the anti-stacking language to be valid and enforceable.

Syl. pt. 3, Russell, supra. (emphasis added). However, in Youler, there existed two policies and there was no issue raised "regarding the premiums paid for the two policies as compared with the premium costs if only one policy had been issued." Russell, 188 W. Va. at 84, 422 S.E.2d at 806 (citing Youler, 183 W. Va. at 559 n. 2, 396 S.E.2d at 740 n. 2). Moreover, as plainly stated in syllabus point three above, anti-stacking language is ineffective where an "insured [is] covered simultaneously by two or more uninsured or underinsured motorist policy endorsements[.]" Syl. pt. 3, in part, Youler, supra (emphasis added). See Russell, 188 W. Va. at 84, 422 S.E.2d at 806. Therefore, as we concluded in Russell, our holding in Youler "does not govern the instant situation where only one policy is involved." Russell, 188 W. Va. at 84, 422 S.E.2d at 806.
        Furthermore, we held in syllabus point 4 of Russell, supra, that "'[i]nsurers may incorporate such terms, conditions and exclusions in an automobile insurance policy as may be consistent with the premium charged, so long as any such exclusions do not conflict with the spirit and intent of the uninsured and underinsured motorists statutes.' Syl. Pt. 3, Deel v. Sweeney, 181 W. Va. 460, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989)." See syl. pt. 1, Thomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 640, 425 S.E.2d 595 (1992). As previously indicated, the anti-stacking language does not compromise the spirit and intent of the uninsured motorist statute, W. Va. Code, 33-6-31(b) [1988]. As we held in syllabus point 5 of Russell, supra:
        West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 (1992) does not forbid the inclusion and application of an anti-stacking provision in an automobile insurance policy where a single insurance policy is issued by a single insurer and contains an underinsured endorsement even though the policy covers two or more vehicles. Under the terms of such a policy, the insured is not entitled to stack the coverages of the multiple vehicles and may only recover up to the policy limits set forth in the single policy endorsement.

        Though a multi-car discount is not apparent on the declarations page in this case, the Millers do not dispute that they received such a discount. Similarly, the insured in Russell received a multi-car discount in return for taking out one policy instead of two. Russell, 188 W. Va. at 85, 422 S.E.2d at 807. In the present case, however, the Millers maintain that, because they received no discount specifically for uninsured motorist coverage, the anti-stacking provision is ineffective as to that coverage. We disagree.
        Having contracted for only one policy of insurance, the Millers likewise bargained for only one uninsured motorist coverage endorsement. Id. In return, Federal Kemper "assum[ed] an increased risk of injury which could occur while [the Millers were] occupying the second vehicle as consideration for the second premium. [The Millers were] therefore receiving the benefit of that which [they] bargained for and should not receive more." Id. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ashley, 833 F.Supp. 583 (S.D. W. Va. 1993), aff'd 37 F.3d 1492 (4th Cir. 1994).
        We conclude, therefore, that anti-stacking language in an automobile insurance policy is valid and enforceable as to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage where the insured purchases a single insurance policy to cover two or more vehicles and receives a multi-car discount on the total policy premium. If no multi-car discount for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage is apparent on the declarations page of the policy, the parties must either agree or the court must find that such a discount was given. In such event, the insured is not entitled to stack the coverages of the multiple vehicles and may only recover up to the policy limits set forth in the single policy endorsement. Thus, the certified question is answered in the affirmative.
        Having answered the certified question, we dismiss this case from the docket of this Court and remand the case to the Circuit Court of Ritchie County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

            The term 'proof of financial responsibility' as used in this chapter shall mean: Proof of ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of accident occurring subsequent to the effective date of said proof, arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. . . in the amount of twenty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death
of one person in any one accident, and, subject to said limit for one person, in the amount of forty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and in the amount of ten thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident.

See Russell, 188 W. Va. at 83, 422 S.E.2d at 805.