Howard J. Blyler
Cowen, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellee

Paul E. Jordan
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellant

JUSTICE CLECKLEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON did not participate.
JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary assignment.

         1. "W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, provides for a mandatory revocation of an operator's license upon receipt of a record of conviction of a specified offense when that conviction has become final. That section does not provide for an administrative hearing either before or after the revocation, but, rather, for 'forthwith' revocation." Syllabus Point 1, in part, Wells v. Roberts, 167 W.Va. 580, 280 S.E.2d 266 (1981).
    
         2. "Mandatory administrative revocation of an operator's license, without an administrative hearing, under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, where there has been a prior hearing and conviction on the underlying criminal charge, does not deny the person whose license is so revoked due process of law." Syllabus Point 2, Wells v. Roberts, 167 W. Va. 580, 280 S.E.2d 266 (1981).

         3.    A prior criminal adjudication in another state establishing driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs satisfies the same function of the administrative hearing described in W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2 (1986).

         4.    "The proper forum for attacking the constitutional validity of a prior traffic offense conviction when that offense is the foundation for adverse administrative action by the commissioner of motor vehicles is the county in which such a conviction was initially rendered if the conviction is a West Virginia conviction, or the state courts of the state in which the conviction was initially rendered if it is an out-of-state conviction." Syllabus, in part, Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168 W. Va. 593, 287 S.E.2d 166 (1982).

        The respondent below and appellant, Jane L. Cline, Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), appeals the January 28, 1994, order of the Circuit Court of Braxton County which concluded that the petitioner below and appellee herein, Leonard Sniffin, was entitled to an administrative hearing because his driver's license was being revoked for a second offense of driving under the influence (DUI) under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5 (1986),See footnote 1 as the result of an out-of-state conviction.

        Upon receiving notice of Mr. Sniffin's convictions for DUI, the DMV revoked his driver's license for a period of ten years. After the DMV refused Mr. Sniffin's request for a hearing, Mr. Sniffin successfully petitioned the circuit court, which found that he was entitled to an administrative hearing. By order dated January 28, 1994, the circuit court required the DMV to provide an administrative hearing before the revocation became effective. The DMV appeals the circuit court's order contending that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, does not require a hearing and that the circuit court exceeded its authority. We agree with the DMV and find that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, does not require a hearing. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court.

        In response to this information, by administrative order dated March 4, 1991, the DMV revoked the driver's license of Mr. Sniffin pursuant to W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, for six months and thereafter until he had successfully completed a required safety and treatment program and paid a $15.00 reinstatement fee. He was eligible for reinstatement in ninety days upon completion of the program and payment of the reinstatement fee.

        Subsequently, the DMV received notice from Virginia that the Mr. Sniffin again was arrested on January 6, 1990, and convicted on April 10, 1990, for driving under the influence of alcohol in the State of Virginia. Mr. Sniffin pleaded guilty to this second offense. After receiving notice of this second offense, the DMV ordered the revocation of Mr. Sniffin's driver's license for ten years with eligibility for reinstatement in five years upon successful completion of the safety and treatment program and payment of the $15.00 reinstatement fee. The DMV issued this second order on June 13, 1991.

        On October 15, 1991, Mr. Sniffin wrote the DMV and requested a hearing on the June 13, 1991, revocation. He was informed that because his convictions occurred outside West Virginia, pursuant to W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, he was not entitled to an administrative hearing on the revocation. Mr. Sniffin was later arrested for driving on a revoked driver's license.

        On June 18, 1992, Mr. Sniffin brought an action in the Circuit Court of Braxton County alleging that he was entitled to an administrative hearing on his out-of-state offenses pursuant to W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6 (1989).See footnote 2 After conducting a hearing on January 28, 1994, the circuit court found that Mr. Sniffin was entitled to an administrative hearing on his second revocation and ordered the DMV to provide such a hearing. The DMV now appeals the circuit court's order.

        The DMV asserts that under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5(6),See footnote 3 a driver's license must be revoked "forthwith" upon receiving notice of a final out-of-state DUI conviction provided the offense contains the same elements as W. Va. Code, 17C-5-2 (1986).See footnote 4 The DMV further argues the revocation is mandatory and the statute does not provide for an administrative hearing. On the other hand, Mr. Sniffin contends a hearing is required pursuant to W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, and W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-1, et seq.,See footnote 5 if requested, before his license can be revoked.

        The primary issue in this appeal, as formulated by the parties, is whether Mr. Sniffin is entitled to an administrative hearing prior to the revocation of his driver's license.See footnote 6 In deciding whether the DMV's position should be sustained, we apply the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We first ask whether the Legislature has "directly spoken to the precise [legal] question at issue." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d at 702-03. "If the intention of the Legislature is clear, that is the end of the matter." Id. If it is not, we may not simply impose our own construction of the statute. "Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the [DMV's] answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d at 703. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696-98, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 2534, 115 L.Ed.2d 604, 623-25 (1991). In the present case, it is clear that the Legislature has not spoken to the precise question at issue. Therefore, we review the DMV's decision to determine whether its construction is one the Legislature would have sanctioned. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 1560-61, 6 L.Ed.2d 908, 915 (1961).

        The circuit court's adjudicatory interpretation of these statutes is entitled to no special deference and is subject to our independent review. Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 22037 12/8/94). See also Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Barnard, 933 F.2d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 1991). However, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, we afford deference to a reasonable and permissible construction of the statute by the DMV because it has policymaking authority with regard to the statute.See footnote 8

        Here, the DMV's construction, as reflected in its brief submitted in this case, is reasonable, supported by the law, not contrary to legislative intent, and is consistent with this Court's prior decisions. We further find that the DMV's answer is a reasonable accommodation of potentially conflicting policies that were committed to the DMV by the statute. Because we find DMV's construction is one the Legislature would have sanctioned, we defer to that interpretation and, accordingly reverse the circuit court.         

        In Wells v. Roberts, 167 W. Va. 580, 280 S.E.2d 266 (1981), this Court determined that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, and W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, were two separate sections that did not control each other. In Syllabus Point 1, in part, of Wells, we stated:
                "W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, provides for a mandatory revocation of an operator's license upon receipt of a record of conviction of a specified offense when that conviction has become final. That section does not provide for an administrative hearing either before or after the revocation, but, rather, for 'forthwith' revocation."

In recognizing the differences between these two Code sections, this Court noted that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, covers discretionary revocations when there has "not been a prior judicial determination that the licensee is guilty of a vehicular offense that would justify a finding that he is a present danger to the public using the roads". 167 W. Va. at 584, 280 S.E.2d at 269. On the other hand, W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, provides for revocations "only after there has been a judicial determination of guilt as evidenced by a record of conviction". 167 W. Va. at 584, 280 S.E.2d at 269. Additionally, we stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Wells, supra:
                "Mandatory administrative revocation of an operator's license, without an administrative hearing, under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, where there has been a prior hearing and conviction on the underlying criminal charge, does not deny the person whose license is so revoked due process of law."

        Considering the significant differences between W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, and W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, and our holding in Wells v. Roberts, supra, we expressly find that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, does not create a right to an administrative hearing under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5. Thus, the circuit court was in error when it granted Mr. Sniffin an administrative hearing based on W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6.

        Although portions of W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-1 and -2, are relevant to our construction of W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, they do not create a right of hearing for an individual whose license is revoked pursuant to W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5. As argued by Mr. Sniffin, W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2(d), gives a right to a hearing if requested before a license suspension becomes final, but the scope and purpose of this hearing are limited to:
        "whether the person did drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs, or did drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration in his blood of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight, or did refuse to submit to the designated secondary chemical test."See footnote 9

        As we stated in Wells and reaffirm here, W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, applies only to administrative revocations after a prior judicial determination of whether a person drove under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Unlike W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, where there has not been a prior judicial determination, a hearing under W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2 is designed solely to establish whether a person was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol before revoking such person's driver's license. It is unclear what Mr. Sniffin believes he would accomplish through an administrative hearing considering the primary purpose of the hearing has already been answered and satisfied through his DUI convictions in Virginia. An administrative hearing in this State following a conviction in another state would serve no purpose. To resolve any future doubt, we now make explicit what the Legislature has implicitly provided: A prior criminal adjudication in another state establishing DUI satisfies the same function of the administrative hearing described in W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2. See Wells v. Roberts, supra (holding that a state can use a prior criminal adjudication as the basis for an administrative revocation).

        It is clear that the constitutional guarantee of due process is satisfied by West Virginia's mandatory license revocation procedures. A seminal case on due process rights in the context of a driver's license revocation is Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). In Bell, the Supreme Court held that a person could not be deprived of his driver's license without being afforded a modicum of procedural due process.See footnote 10 The Supreme Court of Arizona subsequently explained that "the purpose of the hearing mandated by Bell v. Burson . . . is to allow a motorist an opportunity to demonstrate that he is free from fault and, therefore, his license should not be revoked." State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 93, 722 P.2d 258, 261 (1986). In Jennings, the Arizona Court rejected a due process challenge to a mandatory driver's license revocation based on procedures similar to that presented in the instant case. Holding that the purpose of a Bell v. Burson hearing in such a case was satisfied by the statutory procedure, the Arizona court emphasized: "Revocation, pursuant to this section, occurs only after a conviction has become final for one of the enumerated offenses. The driver has already had the opportunity for a full trial before the mandatory provision of A.R.S. § 28-445 applies."See footnote 11 150 Ariz. at 93, 722 P.2d at 261.

        Once the major purpose of the administrative hearing is satisfied, the only justification for having an additional hearing would be to permit collateral attacks on the validity of the out- of-state conviction. However, in the Syllabus, in part, of Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168 W. Va. 593, 287 S.E.2d 166 (1982), we established that collaterally attacking a conviction is an impermissible objective of administrative actions:
                "The proper forum for attacking the constitutional validity of a prior traffic offense conviction when that offense is the foundation for adverse administrative action by the commissioner of motor vehicles is the county in which such a conviction was initially rendered if the conviction is a West Virginia conviction, or the state courts of the state in which the conviction was initially rendered if it is an out-of-state conviction." (Citations omitted).See footnote 12

        Finally, Mr. Sniffin points to the fact that W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, does not provide a specific revocation period and that Virginia treated both his DUI convictions as first offenses. The relevance of this information is not discussed by the parties. Presumably, Mr. Sniffin believes that this additional information bolsters his argument that he is entitled to a hearing because there is no definite period of revocation provided under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, and West Virginia treated him differently than he would have been treated in Virginia. This argument is also unpersuasive. We believe it is irrelevant that W. Va. Code, 17B-3- 5 itself does not provide for a specific length of time for revocation because this section must be read in concert with other Code provisions.

        Article III of the Drivers' License Compact indicates that the "licensing authority" of one state will report convictions of the licensee to the "licensing authority" of the home state of a licensee. W. Va. Code, 17B-1A-1 (1972).See footnote 13 Additionally, Article IV(a)(2) of W. Va. Code, 17B-1A-1 (1972), provides that the home state will treat any conviction for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs occurring in another state as if it had occurred in the home state.See footnote 14 On two separate occasions, the DMV revoked Mr. Sniffin's driver's license under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, after it received conclusive proof that Mr. Sniffin had been convicted for DUI in a foreign state while holding a West Virginia driver's license. As required by W. Va. Code, 17B- 1A-1, a licensee convicted for an out-of-state driving infraction will be treated as if the incident occurred in West Virginia. W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2(i), requires the DMV to revoke "the person's license for a period of ten years" if that person's license previously had been revoked.See footnote 15 Thus, the DMV appropriately revoked Mr. Sniffin's license for ten years. The sentence or sanction imposed upon Mr. Sniffin by Virginia is not controlling, and it is equally irrelevant that Virginia treated both Mr. Sniffin's DUI convictions as first offenses. If Mr. Sniffin had been driving under the influence in West Virginia, he would have been convicted of a second offense and, ultimately, his driver's license would have been revoked for a second time under W. Va. Code, 17C-5A- 2(i).See footnote 16 Engaging in this analysis, we do not find W. Va. Code, 17B- 3-5, to be flawed because it does not provide a revocation period. Clearly, the Legislature intended the Drivers' License Compact and W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, to work with other statutes concerning driving offenses.

        In conclusion, after reviewing in pari materia, W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-1, et seq., and W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, we find W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, does not require an administrative hearing prior to revoking a driver's license if there has been a prior adjudication establishing that the licensee is guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The circuit court's order granting a hearing under W. Va. Code, 17B-3-5, through either W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-1, or W. Va. Code, 17B-3-6, constitutes an abuse of the circuit court's authority and requires reversal. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Circuit Court of Braxton County is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                    Reversed and Remanded.

                "(6) Driving under the influence of alcohol . . . outside the state of West Virginia which conviction is under a municipal ordinance or statute of the United States or any other state of an offense which has the same elements as an offense described in section two [§ 17C-5-2], article five, chapter seventeen-c of this code[.]"

State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. at 93, 722 P.2d at 261, quoting Dixon v. Love, supra.

                "(2) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug, or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle."

W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2, was amended in 1992 and 1994. W. Va. Code, 17C-5A-2(i), remained substantially the same after the two amendments.