For Jeffrey D.:
Randy Dean Gossett
Guardian Ad Litem
Wheeling, West Virginia

For Barbara J.:
Gregory A. Gellner
Artimez & Gellner
Wheeling, West Virginia

For West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources
George P. Surmaitis
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia

JUSTICE WORKMAN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON and JUSTICE RECHT did not participate.
JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary assignment.

    1. "In a child abuse and neglect hearing, before a court can begin to make any of the dispositional alternatives under W. Va. Code, 49-6-5, it must hold a hearing under W. Va. Code 49-6-2, and determine 'whether such child is abused or neglected.' Such a finding is a prerequisite to further continuation of the case." Syl. Pt. 1, State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983).

    2. "Under W. Va. Code, 49-6D-3 (1984), the Department of Human Services is required to prepare a family case plan with participation by the parties and their counsel and to submit it to the court for approval within thirty days." Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cheryl M., 177 W. Va. 688, 356 S.E.2d 181 (1987).

    3. "The purpose of the family case plan as set out in W. Va. Code, 49-6D-3(a) (1984), is to clearly set forth an organized, realistic method of identifying family problems and the logical steps to be used in resolving or lessening these problems." Syl. Pt. 5, State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cheryl M., 177 W. Va. 688, 356 S.E.2d 181 (1987).

    4. "In formulating the improvement period and family case plans, courts and social service workers should cooperate to provide a workable approach for the resolution of family problems which have prevented the child or children from receiving appropriate care from their parents. The formulation of the improvement period and family case plans should therefore be a consolidated, multi-disciplinary effort among the court system, the parents, attorneys, social service agencies, and any other helping personnel involved in assisting the family." Syl. Pt. 4, In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991).

    5. "Child abuse and neglect cases must be recognized as being among the highest priority for the courts' attention. Unjustified procedural delays wreak havoc on a child's development, stability and security." Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991).

    6. "The guardian ad litem's role in abuse and neglect proceedings does not actually cease until such time as the child is placed in a permanent home." Syl. Pt. 5, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991).

    7. Cases involving children must be decided not just in the context of competing sets of adults' rights, but also with a regard for the rights of the child(ren).

    8. "When the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources seeks to terminate parental rights where an absent parent has abandoned the child, allegations of such abandonment should be included in the petition and every effort made to comply with the notice requirements of W. Va. Code, 49-6-1 (1992)." Syl. Pt. 6, In re Christina L., Nos. 22803 and 22804, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (filed July 11, 1995).

    9. "In cases where there is a termination of parental rights, the circuit court should consider whether continued association with siblings in other placements is in the child's best interests, and if such continued association is in such child's best interests, the court should enter an appropriate order to preserve the rights of siblings to continued contact." Syl. Pt. 4, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991).

     10. "When parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the circuit court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether continued visitation or other contact with the abusing parent is in the best interest of the child. Among other things, the circuit court should consider whether a close emotional bond has been established between parent and child and the child's wishes, if he or she is of appropriate maturity to make such request. The evidence must indicate that such visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to the child's well being and would be in the child's best interest." Syl. Pt. 5, In re Christina L., Nos. 22803 and 22804, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (filed July 11, 1995).         

Workman, Justice:

    Appellant Barbara Johnson appeals from the May 6, 1993, order of the Circuit Court of Ohio County terminating her parental rights to her son, Jeffrey D.See footnote 1 Given the lengthy and convoluted procedural history of this case, we ordered on January 27, 1995, that an immediate home study be completed and returned to this Court by February 10, 1995. We further ordered that telephone communication between Jeffrey and Appellant be immediately restored and suggested that supervised visitation be arranged, provided that the home study did not indicate that visitation would be harmful to Jeffrey.See footnote 2 After reviewing this matter in full, we reverse the termination order and remand this case to the court below to consider fashioning a meaningful improvement period and ultimately to determine whether it is in the best interests of Jeffrey to be returned to his mother's custody.

     In his concurring opinion in In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991), Justice Thomas B. Miller called the majority opinion "the bible not only for our circuit courts, but for all who are involved in this sensitive and difficult field." Id. at 633, 408 S.E.2d at 385 (Miller, J., concurring). The protracted procedural history of this case, as well as its substantive disregard of the rights of all the parties, could make the record below the bible for how not to handle an abuse and neglect case. Furthermore, the muddled state of the record in this matter has made this case difficult to sort out. It is especially troubling that although there are strong intimations of significant neglect and possible abuse, the only allegation of neglect or abuse ever formally alleged was truancy from kindergarten. Yet this matter has now lingered in the court system for almost seven years, without any permanent resolution for Jeffrey.
    
    On December 8, 1988, John Nanny, the director of attendance for the Ohio County schools filed a petition against the AppellantSee footnote 3 pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 49-6-1 to -11 (1992 & Supp. 1994),See footnote 4 alleging neglect on the grounds that Jeffrey had missed twenty-four days of kindergarten out of a possible thirty-two days as of mid-October.See footnote 5 On December 9, 1988, a hearing was held on the neglect petition which resulted in the entry of an order directing that psychological evaluations be performed on Appellant, as well as her four children. The circuit court held a status hearing on the petition on January 27, 1989, and concluded that because Jeffrey was not emotionally ready for kindergarten, his attendance was voluntary pursuant to state law.See footnote 6 Rather than dismissing the petition as to Jeffrey, however, the court delayed its ruling pending receipt of the previously-ordered psychological evaluation.

     A status hearing was held on February 17, 1989, at which time the court ordered that a court summary prepared by a protective service worker for the West Virginia Department of Human Services (hereinafter referred to as "DHS")See footnote 7 be filed and scheduled a hearing on June 2, 1989, for the purpose of reviewing the written psychological evaluations.See footnote 8 At the June 2, 1989, hearing, the court heard the testimony of John Nanny and the DHS protective service worker. The DHS worker asked the court to extend the improvement periodSee footnote 9 through November 1989 on the grounds that he had seen no indication that Jeffrey was going to start attending kindergarten in the fall.See footnote 10 He further testified that parenting classes had not been offered to Appellant as the examining psychologist had not felt that she would benefit from such classes.See footnote 11 The hearing was continued until June 30, 1989, to permit the State to call Corey Roman, the psychologist who performed the evaluations.

    The prosecutor chose not to call Mr. Roman at the June 30, 1989, hearing,See footnote 12 but Mr. Nanny informed the court that Jeffrey had successfully begun attending a summer school session.See footnote 13 The court opined that the improvement period "is probably bearing fruit" and continued the matter until September 28, 1989, with the comment that "if the children's attendance is reasonable during that month then we could just dismiss this action . . . ."

    The record reflects that the next action taken in connection with this case was the court's entry of an order on August 2, 1989, terminating the "paternal parental rights of Wilbur White and of any person claiming to be the father of any or all of said children . . . ."See footnote 14 A review of the record suggests that the impetus for terminating Mr. White's parental rights was a motion seeking to be relievedSee footnote 15 by counsel originally appointed to represent the rights of the unknown father.See footnote 16

    The record is unclear as to whether the scheduled hearing for September 28, 1989, ever took place. Two documents in the file, however, were obviously prepared in anticipation of such a hearing. First, a court summary bearing the date of September 20, 1989, by the DHS worker was ordered filed by Judge Callie Tsapis on September 25, 1989. Interestingly, that summary contains the recommendation that "[t]he Court order that the educational neglect petition against Barbara Johnson be dismissed." Second, a letter which is dated September 28, 1989, from John Nanny to Judge Tsapis states that: "I am pleased to share with the Court the improved attendance pattern of the . . . [D.] children as of this date. I would like to see an informal, unsupervised improvement period throughout the current school year."

    The record suggests that this neglect case languished for almost two years before any further action was taken. The next entry in the abuse and neglect case court file pertaining to Jeffrey is a "Petition for Review of Custody," which was filed by the DHS on July 2, 1991. This petition indicates that Jeffrey had been residing at the St. John's Home for Children "continuously from March 16, 1990." The petition further reflects that Jeffrey "is in foster care by virtue of a Court order of the Juvenile Referee through the Circuit Court of Ohio County dated March 16, 1990." While the court record is completely devoid of any order bearing the date of March 16, 1990, counsel for Appellant obtained a copy of an order dated March 19, 1990, signed by George J. Fahey as Juvenile Referee, which directed that Jeffrey be "placed in the temporary custody of the West Virginia Department of Human Services, with said Department given the necessary authority to place the juvenile at St. John's Home for ChildrenSee footnote 17 . . . ." The order states no basis for Jeffrey's placement.See footnote 18

    On August 2, 1991, a hearing was held before the circuit court on the petition for review filed in connection with Jeffrey's placement for more than a year at St. John's.See footnote 19 The October 4, 1991, order reflecting this proceeding indicates that due to the necessity of appointing new counselSee footnote 20 to represent Appellant, a new hearing date was scheduled on the petition for August 9, 1991. The order further reflects that by mutual agreement of the parties the court included a directive restraining Wilbur White from being present at the home of Appellant until further order of the court.
    The August 9, 1991, hearing was an evidentiary proceeding which resulted in the entry of an order, entered on October 4, 1991, finding the children of Appellant to be abused "in that the . . . [Appellant] is unable to cope with or to supervise them or control them[.]"See footnote 21 The testimony proffered at this hearing included that of Daniel Tennant, a family therapist at St. John's, who stated that Appellant required individual counseling and that he could not provide the same as his job was limited to family counseling. During the testimony of Mr. Tennant, reference was made to possible physical abuse in the nature of corporal punishment by Wilbur White.See footnote 22 This issue, however, was addressed only in passing and without any specific testimony offered to support the allegations. The only specific problem identified by protective services worker Timothy Randolph was "an inability [on Appellant's part] . . . to cope with the demands of the children and an apparent need of avoiding confrontations with them[.]" The court granted a six-month improvement periodSee footnote 23 as to Jeffrey and a three-month improvement period concerning Appellant's three other children. Jeffrey's placement at St. John's was continued, whereas the three older children were permitted to remain in the custody of Appellant. The order also directs that Jeffrey cannot continue with overnight home visitation "until Wilbur White . . . leaves the home of" Appellant. The order further continues and encourages Appellant's regular visitation of Jeffrey at St. John's.

     During a status conference held on November 15, 1991, Mr. Nanny moved for the termination of Appellant's parental rights. Because the record does not include a transcript from this proceeding, it is unclear as to what specifically prompted the motion for termination of parental rights.See footnote 24 The only reference to Jeffrey in the order concerning the conference is a ruling that his placement at St. John's is to continue.

    A hearing was held on January 24, 1992, for the purpose of permitting evidence to be presented with regard to Mr. Nanny's motion for termination of parental rights. As a result of this hearing, the court entered an order dated March 6, 1992, finding that any neglect by Appellant towards her children was of a passive nature and further finding that Appellant "has made progress toward improvement of her passivity."See footnote 25 The court continued Jeffrey's placement at St. John's, but ordered home visits every other weekend. The order further enjoined Mr. White "from having any contact with . . . [Appellant's] children and from being present in the home of the children at any time while they are there. . . ." The court scheduled a review proceeding for May 1, 1992, which resulted in a further continuation of Jeffrey's placement at St. John's as well as the alternating weekend home visits.

    On May 18, 1992, a hearing was held during which the court entertained Appellees' motion to place Jeffrey in foster care. Jeffrey's guardian ad litem interjected that "the counselors at St. John's believe that Jeffrey would be better off in a less restrictive environment[]" as the basis for such motion. After considering testimony regarding Jeffrey's progress, the court ruled that foster care arrangements should be arranged to commence on June 8, 1992. The court stated that after sixty days of foster care, it would review the situation and consider permitting him to live at home with Appellant if the foster care situation was working. The court further ordered that Appellant's home visits with Jeffrey were to continue.

    At the sixty-day follow-up to Jeffrey's foster-care placement on August 6, 1992, the court directed that Jeffrey was to be returned to Appellant for a ninety-day trial visit.See footnote 26 The order directing the trial visit expressly forbade Appellant from permitting Wilbur White from having any contact with her family and directed her to contact her attorney in the event Mr. White showed up at the family's residence. The record in this case indicates that Mr. White was present in the home during several of Jeffrey's home visits prior to the ninety-day trial visit.

    As a result of Jeffrey missing three of the first six days of school in September 1992, the parties returned to court on September 9, 1992. After hearing testimony from John Nanny regarding his discovery of Wilbur White in an alley behind Appellant's residence when he visited the home because of Jeffrey's absence from school, the court revoked the trial home visit and ordered that Jeffrey be returned to "whatever facility or foster home [the DHS] deemed to be best for said child."See footnote 27

    A hearing was held on November 6, 1992, and Appellant was, for the first time, permitted to testify regarding the problems she had in trying to keep Wilbur White away from her family and home.See footnote 28 By order entered January 28, 1993, the court stopped all but supervised visitation pending proof that Wilbur White had left the area.See footnote 29 The court did order that Jeffrey be permitted to telephone Appellant "when he so desires, within reasonable limitations." The court obviously was reluctant to accept that Mr. White had indeed left the area, as the order directs the family to seek group counseling and to invite Mr. White to participate in the sessions. Because Judge Tsapis was leaving the bench at the end of 1992, the case was transferred to Judge Broadwater.

    On February 16, 1993, Judge Broadwater held his first hearing in this case and endeavored to bring focus and direction to this case. He indicated that the case was ready for disposition, and the guardian ad litem again recommended termination of Appellant's parental rights. A dispositional hearing was then scheduled for March 4, 1993.

    The dispositional hearing began initially on March 4, 1993, and was then continued to March 24, 1993. At the first hearing, the State proffered the testimony of Dr. Maceiko, a psychologist who had seen Jeffrey approximately forty times; John Nanny, and Donna Frader, a DHS protective services worker. Dr. Maceiko testified that his recommendation was to permit Jeffrey to continue in foster care and that he not be returned to Appellant based on her pattern of passive neglect. John Nanny testified that he never intended that Appellant's rights should be terminated but that if forced to make a recommendation, he would choose termination. He further stated that he would have no problem with supervised visitation even at the post-dispositional stage. Ms. Frader agreed with Dr. Maceiko's recommendation that Jeffrey not be returned to Appellant's home. At the continuation of the dispositional hearing on March 24, 1993, Jeffrey testified that he wanted to return home and that he is attached to Appellant. Evidence was proffered that Jeffrey called and spoke to Appellant almost every night. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court directed the parties to return on April 5, 1993.

    At the proceeding held on April 5, 1993,See footnote 30 the guardian ad litem renewed his motion for termination of Appellant's parental rights while the State did not render any recommendation. Appellant asked the court for additional help, but the court indicated that it intended to terminate her parental rights as to Jeffrey.

    By order entered on May 6, 1993, the court terminated Appellant's parental rights, finding that Appellant was unable to provide the continuity of care required by Jeffrey due to her lack of mental capacity and parenting skills. The court found that Appellant was unable to respond adequately or follow through with the DHS care plan by acquiring adequate parenting skills or conforming her behavior to such plan. The court further observed that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglectful behavior could be substantially corrected and, noted additionally, the absence of a less restrictive alternative to termination. Finally, the order noted that the "[r]eunification of the child Jeffrey D. with his . . . mother [wa]s not in the best interests of the child[.]" The court's termination ruling also reflects its dissatisfaction with Appellant for her failure to comply with court directives to keep Wilbur White away from her home and Jeffrey.

    By order entered on December 30, 1993, the court stayed the enforcement of the termination order pending the outcome of her appeal of said order, but denied visitation rights to Appellant during the stay. Appellant filed her petition for appeal seeking a reversal of the termination order on July 13, 1994. This Court granted the petition on October 13, 1994, and placed the matter on an expedited briefing schedule. Although this matter was originally scheduled for oral argument before this Court on November 29, 1994, a motion to continue was made due to the failure of the State and the guardian ad litem to file briefs,See footnote 31 and the matter was continued to the January 1995 term of this Court.

    Appellant protests initially that the court did not have jurisdiction over Jeffrey at the time the order finding neglect was issued. She maintains that once the circuit court concluded in its order of April 5, 1989, that Jeffrey's kindergarten attendance was voluntary pursuant to state law,See footnote 32 the court no longer had jurisdiction over Jeffrey since the only ground alleged in the petition was truancy. As the State correctly explains, the circuit court properly had jurisdiction over Jeffrey following the entry of the April 5, 1989, order under the authority of West Virginia Code § 49-6-3. That statute provides, in pertinent part:
            Upon the filing of a [neglect or abuse] petition, . . . [i]n a case where there is more than one child in the home, . . . the petition shall so state, and notwithstanding the fact that the allegations of abuse or neglect may pertain to less than all of such children, each child in the home for whom relief is sought shall be made a party to the proceeding.

W. Va. Code § 49-6-3(a) (emphasis supplied).

    Accordingly, Jeffrey was properly under the court's continuing jurisdiction at the time the neglect order was entered since the neglect petition at issue also named Jeffrey's siblings. By virtue of the court's continuing jurisdiction over his brothers and sister, the court had the authority to monitor the welfare of Jeffrey. See W. Va. Code § 49-6-3.

    Appellant next alleges that the circuit court failed to follow the statutory framework for terminating her rights. In syllabus point one of State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983), this Court held that:
            In a child abuse and neglect hearing, before a court can begin to make any of the dispositional alternatives under W. Va. Code, 49-6-5, it must hold a hearing under W. Va. Code 49-6-2, and determine 'whether such child is abused or neglected.' Such a finding is a prerequisite to further continuation of the case.

Id. at 48, 303 S.E.2d at 686. Appellant finds fault with Judge Tsapsis' finding of neglect on the sole grounds that the State was the only party which offered testimony at the hearing on August 9, 1991, at the conclusion of which the finding of neglect was made. Upon review of the record, we observe that Appellant was represented by counsel at this hearing, albeit newly appointed,See footnote 33 and that Appellant was not prevented from offering evidence during this hearing, from raising any objections to the testimony elicited at such hearing, or from seeking a continuance if more time was needed to prepare her case. Appellant further argues that she was not notified that the August 9, 1991, hearing was to be adjudicatory in nature. The record, however, does not reflect any objection raised by Appellant regarding this issue.

    The next assignment Appellant raises is the failure of the State to prepare a written case plan prior to the dispositional hearing held on May 3, 1993. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49- 6-5(a),
            [f]ollowing a determination pursuant to section two [§ 49-6-2] of this article wherein the court finds a child to be abused or neglected, the department shall file with the court a copy of the child's case plan, including the permanency plan for the child. The term case plan means a written document that includes, where applicable, the requirements of the family case plan as provided for in . . . [§ 49-6D-3], . . . and that also includes at least the following: A description of the type of home or institution in which the child is to be placed, including a discussion of the appropriateness of the placement and how the agency which is responsible for the child plans to assure that the child receives proper care and that services are provided to the parents, child and foster parents in order to improve the conditions in the parent(s) home, facilitate return of the child to his or her own home or the permanent placement of the child, and address the needs of the child while in foster care, including a discussion of the appropriateness of the services that have been provided to the child. . . . Copies of the child's case plan shall be sent to the child's attorney and parent, guardian or custodian at least five days prior to the dispositional hearing. The court shall forthwith proceed to disposition giving both the petitioner and respondents an opportunity to be heard.

W. Va. Code § 49-6-5(a).

    The obligation to formulate a case plan arises upon the granting of an improvement period under West Virginia Code § 49-6- 2(b). See Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cheryl M., 177 W. Va. 688, 356 S.E.2d 181 (1987). We expounded on the time period permitted statutorily for preparing case plans and the purpose of such plans in syllabus points four and five of Cheryl M.:
            Under W. Va. Code, 49-6D-3 (1984), the Department of Human Services is required to prepare a family case plan with participation by the parties and their counsel and to submit it to the court for approval within thirty days.

            The purpose of the family case plan as set out in W. Va. Code, 49-6D-3(a) (1984), is to clearly set forth an organized, realistic method of identifying family problems and the logical steps to be used in resolving or lessening these problems.

177 W. Va. at 688-89, 356 S.E.2d at 181-82, syl. pts. 4, 5.

    More recently, we have enunciated, at length, the critical importance of developing and complying with meaningful improvement periods and family case plans in Carlita B. See 185 W. Va. at 624- 29, 408 S.E.2d at 376-81. We explained in syllabus point four of Carlita B. that,
         [i]n formulating the improvement period and family case plans, courts and social service workers should cooperate to provide a workable approach for the resolution of family problems which have prevented the child or children from receiving appropriate care from their parents. The formulation of the improvement period and family case plans should therefore be a consolidated, multi- disciplinary effort among the court system, the parents, attorneys, social service agencies, and any other helping personnel involved in assisting the family.

Id. at 616, 408 S.E.2d at 368. We further explained:
        The goal [of improvement periods and case plans] should be the development of a program designed to assist the parent(s) in dealing with any problems which interfere with his ability to be an effective parent and to foster an improved relationship between parent and child with an eventual restoration of full parental rights a hoped-for result. The improvement period and family case plans must establish specific measures for the achievement of these goals, as an improvement period must be more than a mere passage of time. It is a period in which the D.H.S. and the court should attempt to facilitate the parent's success, but wherein the parent must understand that he bears a responsibility to demonstrate sufficient progress and improvement to justify return to him of the child.

Id. at 625, 408 S.E.2d at 377. In this case, the Appellees readily concede that the statutorily-required case plan was not filed prior to or at the time of the dispositional hearing.See footnote 34

    The only term imposed by the circuit court in connection with the six-month improvement period ordered at the August 9, 1991, hearing and reflected by an October 4, 1991, order was that "the children and the respondent [Appellant] shall attend family counseling and such individual counseling as is appropriate and recommended by the Department of Health and Human Resources and the staff at St. John's Home[.]" The record reflects that a family therapist at St. John's testified at the August 9, 1991, hearing that Appellant's primary problem was her nonassertiveness. Mr. Tennant testified:
            Since Jeffrey has come to Saint John's last June, Barbara J., Jeffrey's mom, has been the only family member to attend family therapy. She's attended one time weekly faithfully. Unfortunately, family therapy can be done with one person but, unfortunately, not with Barbara. She lacks the ability to learn to take charge and control her family, regardless of her coming to therapy. Her family situation hasn't changed at all since I met them, because of her inability -- it's no fault of hers. I think that this is just one of her problems that she has; being nonassertive. That can be worked out in individual counseling, but my job at Saint John's is family counseling. (emphasis supplied)

    
    At the August 9, 1991, hearing Mr. Tennant explained his recommendation of another six-month improvement periodSee footnote 35 by stating, "I think that Barbara is willing to change. I think that the change can occur in six months." However, despite the recognized need for individualized counseling for Appellant, the record does not reflect that Appellant ever received this type of specialized help during this six-month improvement period. We cautioned against improvement periods being nothing but a "mere passage of time" in Carlita B., yet it appears that this is exactly what occurred in the instant case. See 185 W. Va. at 625, 408 S.E.2d at 377.
    
    We recognized in Cheryl M. that Appellant "was entitled to a meaningful improvement period to demonstrate her ability to care for her child as required by W. Va. Code, 49-6-2." 177 W. Va. at 695, 356 S.E.2d at 188. Given the failure of the State to provide Appellant with any individualized counseling aimed at addressing her lack of assertiveness, plus the absence of any additional measures taken to assist Appellant "in dealing with any problems which interfere[d] with . . . [her] ability to be an effective parent[,]" the various improvement periods cannot be viewed as meaningful consistent with this Court's rulings in Cheryl M. and Carlita B. See 177 W. Va. at 695, 356 S.E.2d at 188; 185 W. Va. at 625, 408 S.E.2d at 377. Accordingly, we reverse on the grounds that Appellant was not provided the meaningful improvement period to which she was entitled.