Garry G. Geffert, Esq. John M. Simpson, Esq.
WEST VIRGINIA LEGAL SERVICES Jacqueline R. Depew, Esq.
PLAN, INC. FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI
Martinsburg, West Virginia Washington, D.C.
and and
Bruce Goldstein, Esq. Mark Jenkinson, Esq.
FARMWORKER JUSTICE FUND, INC. HUNT, LEES, FARRELL & KESSLER
Washington, D.C. Martinsburg, West Virginia
Attorneys for Rowe, Lewis, et al. Attorneys for Dirting, Ellis,
Huyett, Kilmer and Lutnam
Richard G. Gay, Esq.
Berkeley Springs, West Virginia
Attorney for Leavitt Orchard
CHIEF JUSTICE NEELY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON did not participate.
JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary assignment.
1. The West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act,
W. Va. Code 21-5-1 [1987], et seq. is applicable to any firm that
suffers or permits a person to work; therefore, when foreign
agricultural workers are recruited by a corporation whose only
activity is the hiring, transporting, feeding, housing and payment
of workers who perform all their services for individual growers,
the individual growers are joint employers of the workers for the
purposes of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act.
2. When the agent of an employer enters into a written
contract with a worker and the object of the written contract is to
provide labor to the employer, the ten-year statute of limitations
for an action on a written contract, W. Va. Code 55-2-6 [1923],
applies to an action against both the employer and the agent.
This appeal is from a summary judgment entered by the
Circuit Court of Berkeley County. Although the underlying case is
complex both factually and legally, the narrow issues before us
today are extraordinarily simple: (1) Did the circuit court err by
granting summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on
the grounds that the individual defendants in this case were not
"employers" under the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection
Act, W. Va. Code 21-5-1 [1987], et seq. and (2) did the circuit
court err in granting summary judgment on the grounds that insofar
as it concerned the individual defendants, Count III of the
plaintiffs' complaint is subject to the five-year statute of
limitations set forth in W. Va. Code 55-2-6 [1923]. We conclude
that the circuit court erred in both these legal rulings and,
therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiffs in this case are foreign nationals who, at
various times, worked temporarily as apple pickers in West Virginia
from 1983 through 1989 pursuant to the United States Department of
Labor's temporary foreign worker program. Plaintiffs were hired by
Tri-Country Growers, Inc., a predecessor of defendant Grapevine
Corporation (hereafter collectively referred to as "Grapevine").
Grapevine is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
West Virginia. The individual defendants are orchardists who were shareholders in Grapevine during the 1983 through 1989 period.
Plaintiffs picked apples in the orchards of the individual
orchardist defendants.
Plaintiffs' employment relationship with Grapevine was
contractual. The only signatories to the employment contracts at
issue in this case were plaintiffs, Grapevine and a representative
of the West Indies Central Labour Organization. None of the
shareholders of Grapevine who are defendants in these cases was a
signatory to those contracts. Plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that
certain monies deducted from their pay were invalid wage
assignments because they allegedly did not meet the requirements of
the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act (hereinafter
WPCA), W. Va. Code 21-5-1 [1987] et seq. For example, plaintiff
Pinnock claims that defendants Charles and Dorothy Leavitt and Del
Orchard, Inc., violated the WPCA by withholding $6.17 for meals and
$12 for insurance in 1989. Plaintiff Thomas makes a similar claim
against the Leavitt defendants and Del Orchard, Inc. of $6.17 for
meals and $4 for insurance in 1989.
The wage withholdings at issue were made by Grapevine
pursuant to written instruments signed by Grapevine and each
plaintiff. None of the individual defendants, namely, Dirting,
Ellis, Huyett, Kilmer, Lutman, Charles and Dorothy Leavitt or Del
Orchard, Inc., was a signatory to any withholding document. None of the individual defendants received any of the sums that were
deducted.
During the period at issue in this case, Grapevine
recruited and hired plaintiffs, sending a representative to Jamaica
for that purpose. None of the individual defendants made such
trips. Grapevine had all of the authority and did all of the work
regarding payment to the plaintiffs. The individual defendants'
only responsibility was to keep track of the hours worked by each
worker. This information was provided to Grapevine, which
determined how often and in what manner plaintiffs were paid, paid
all taxes and made all the deductions required by law. For the
purposes of this appeal, we assume that the individual defendants,
Dirting, Ellis, Huyett, Kilmer, Lutman, Charles and Dorothy Leavitt
and Del Orchard, Inc., had no role whatsoever in the withholding of
any funds from the plaintiffs and, in particular, said defendants
had no involvement in the deductions of any amounts for insurance,
transportation, meals or otherwise. The individual defendants paid
a fee to Grapevine out of which Grapevine paid the plaintiffs.
Grapevine arranged for and paid the cost of transporting
the plaintiffs to the United States. Grapevine provided meals and
housing to the plaintiffs in facilities owned, operated and
maintained by Grapevine, and Grapevine appeared as the employer on
forms filed with the federal government in connection with the temporary foreign worker program. Grapevine was the employer that
obtained workers' compensation coverage for the plaintiffs and paid
the premiums rather than the individual defendants.
However, and this is the cynosure of our ruling today,
the individual defendants supervised plaintiffs when plaintiffs
worked in the individual defendants' orchards. Grapevine also had
supervisory authority and exercised it by sending a representative
to the orchards, but if an individual defendant was dissatisfied
with a worker's performance, his only recourse was to complain to
Grapevine. Only Grapevine had the authority to fire the worker.
Plaintiffs' complaints in these cases all concern alleged
acts or omissions on the part of Grapevine relating to invalid wage
assignments and other matters pertaining to plaintiffs' pay. But,
unfortunately for the individual defendants involved in this case,
a careful reading of the record reveals that it was, indeed, the
individual defendants who took primary responsibility for the day-
to-day supervision and management of the plaintiffs when they were
employed in the orchards of West Virginia and it was on behalf of
the individual defendants that Grapevine exerted itself. The
individual defendants transported workers to the fields of the
individual defendants, supervised the workers during all the hours
that the workers picked the crops, and transported the workers back
to the labor camp in the evening. Furthermore, the workers performed all of their tasks on the individual defendants' property
with the enthusiastic cooperation, knowledge, and encouragement of
the individual defendants.
W. Va. Code 21-5-1 [1987] defines "employee" as ". . .
any person suffered or permitted to work by a person, firm or
corporation."See footnote 1 Our simple conclusion in this case is that the plaintiffs were "suffered or permitted" by the individual
defendants to work on individual defendants' property and thus the
individual defendants are joint employers of the plaintiffs along
with Grapevine. Amoroso v. Marion County Comm'n, 172 W. Va. 342,
305 S.E.2d 299 (1983); McCarty v. Harless, 181 W. Va. 719, 384
S.E.2d 164 (1989); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722
(1947); Purtell v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 256 Ill.
110, 99 N.E. 899 (1912). Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen,
Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819
(1973) quoting, Rutherford Food Corp., supra, 331 U.S. at 730
(determination of who is "an employer of harvest workers does not
depend on technical or 'isolated factors but rather on the
circumstances of the whole activity.'") Indeed, it is undisputed
that Grapevine was the employing agent of the individual defendants
and that its activities were undertaken for and on behalf of the
individual defendants in this case.See footnote 2
We find that the West Virginia Wage Payment and
Collection Act, W. Va. Code 21-5-1 [1987], et seq. is applicable to
any firm that suffers or permits a person to work; therefore, when
foreign agricultural workers are recruited by a corporation whose
only activity is the hiring, transporting, feeding, housing and
payment of workers who perform all their services for individual
growers, the individual growers are joint employers of the workers
for the purposes of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection
Act.
When the agent of an employer enters into a written
contract with a worker and the object of the written contract is to
provide labor to the employer, the ten-year statute of limitations
period for an action on a written contract, W. Va. Code 55-2-6
[1923], applies to an action against both the employer and the
agent.See footnote 3
If, then, Grapevine is the employing agent of the
individual defendants, the written contract between Grapevine and
the workers was entered into by the individual defendants' agent
for the benefits of the individual defendants and it is the ten-
year contract statute of limitations that applies to this case.See footnote 4
Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Berkeley County is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
As used in this article:
(a) The term "firm" includes any
partnership, association, joint-stock company,
trust, division of a corporation, the
administrator or executor of the estate of a
deceased individual, or the receiver, trustee,
or successor of any of the same, or officer
thereof, employing any person.
(b) The term "employee" or "employees"
includes any person suffered or permitted to
work by a person, firm or corporation.
(c) The term "wages" means compensation for
labor or services rendered by an employee,
whether the amount is determined on a time,
task, piece, commission or other basis of
calculation. As used in sections four
[§§ 21-5-4, 21-5-5, 21-5-8a, 21-5-10, and
25-5-12], five, eight-a, ten and twelve of
this article, the term "wages" shall also
include then accrued fringe benefits capable
of calculation and payable directly to an
employee: Provided, That nothing herein
contained shall require fringe benefits to be
calculated contrary to any agreement between
an employer and his employees which does not
contradict the provisions of this article.
(m) The term "employer" means any person,
firm or corporation employing any employee.
(n) The term "doing business in this state" means having employees actively engaged in the intended principal activity of the person firm or corporation in West Virginia.
Every action to recover money, which is
founded upon an award, or on any contract
other than a judgment or recognizance, shall
be brought within the following number of
years next after the right to bring the same
shall have accrued, that is to say: . . . [I]f
it be upon any other contract in writing under
seal, within ten years; if it be upon an
award, or upon a contract in writing, signed
by the party to be charged thereby, or by his
agent, but not under seal, within ten
years . . . .
Agency has been defined as the relationship
which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to
his control, and the agreement by the other so
to act . . . . The law indulges no
presumption that an agency exists. On the
contrary one is legally presumed to be acting
for himself and not as the agent of another.
See also 1A Michie's Juris., Agency § 23 (1993); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 147, 148 and 149 (1957).