Christopher Chiles
Prosecuting Attorney
Margaret Phipps Brown
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Huntington, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Respondents
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1. "'"When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the
legislative intent is plain the statute should not be interpreted
by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to
construe but to apply the statute." Point 1, syllabus, State ex
rel. Fox v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's Pension or Relief
Fund of the City of Bluefield, et al., 148 W. Va. 369 [135 S.E.2d
262 (1964)].' Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Board of Trustees v.
City of Bluefield, 153 W. Va. 210, 168 S.E.2d 525 (1969)."
Syllabus Point 1, West Virginia Radiologic Technology Board v.
Darby, ___ W. Va. ___, 427 S.E.2d 486 (1993).
2. W. Va. Code, 18-8-2 (1988), provides that any person
who has legal or actual charge of a child and receives due notice
that the child has failed to attend school and fails to cause the
child to attend school is guilty of a misdemeanor. This statute
does not provide that it is a misdemeanor for the student to fail
to attend school.
3. If a student disobeys a school policy, such as by
having unexcused absences, he may be suspended under W. Va. Code,
18-8-8 (1951), and shall not be readmitted to school under W. Va.
Code, 18-5-15(c) (1983), without the approval of the county
superintendent.
4. "'"Prohibition will lie to prohibit a judge from
exceeding his legitimate powers." Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel.
Winter v. MacQueen, 161 W. Va. 30, 239 S.E.2d 660 (1977).'
Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. Maynard, 186 W. Va. 421, 412 S.E.2d 822
(1991)." Syllabus Point 6, State ex rel. Board of Education v.
Perry, ___ W. Va. ___, 434 S.E.2d 22 (1993).
Miller, Justice:
In this original proceeding in prohibition, we are asked
to prevent the prosecution of the relator, Robert J. Estes, in the
Circuit Court of Cabell County on a charge that he had unexcused
absences from school in violation of W. Va. Code, 18-8-2 (1988).
Mr. Estes contends that he cannot be prosecuted under W. Va. Code,
18-8-2, because the statute only applies to an individual having
legal or actual charge over a student and not to the student
himself. We agree and grant the writ.
The facts as alleged in the briefs are that Mr. Estes is
an eighteen-year-old senior at Milton High School in Cabell County.
In September of 1993, Mr. Estes missed five nonconsecutive days of
school without legal excuses.See footnote 1 After Mr. Estes began missing
school, Mark Meadows, an employee of the Cabell County Board of
Education, told Mr. Estes that if he continued to have unexcused
absences from school he could be criminally prosecuted.
Mr. Estes continued to miss school, and on September 29,
1993, Mr. Meadows made a complaint against Mr. Estes in the circuit
court alleging that he had violated W. Va. Code, 18-8-2. Mr. Estes
was appointed counsel and moved the circuit court to dismiss the charge against him asserting that the statute does not apply to
him. The circuit court denied the motion.
Initially, when we address questions relating to the
coverage of a statute, we look to see if the statute's language
with regard to the issue under consideration is clear and
unambiguous. If it is, we then apply the rule contained in
Syllabus Point 1 of West Virginia Radiologic Technology Board of
Examiners v. Darby, ___ W. Va. ___, 427 S.E.2d 486 (1993):
"'"When a statute is clear and
unambiguous and the legislative intent is
plain the statute should not be interpreted by
the courts, and in such case it is the duty of
the courts not to construe but to apply the
statute." Point 1, syllabus, State ex rel.
Fox v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's
Pension or Relief Fund of the City of
Bluefield, et al., 148 W. Va. 369 [135 S.E.2d
262 (1964)].' Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel.
Board of Trustees v. City of Bluefield, 153
W. Va. 210, 168 S.E.2d 525 (1969)."
W. Va. Code, 18-8-2, provides that any person who has
legal or actual charge of a child and receives due notice that the
child has failed to attend school and fails to cause the child to
attend school is guilty of a misdemeanor. This statute does not
provide that it is a misdemeanor for a student to fail to attend school.See footnote 2 Thus, we agree with the relator's claim that the
misdemeanor charge against him under W. Va. Code, 18-8-2, is void.
The prosecuting attorney asserts that the statute applies
to Mr. Estes as an eighteen-year-old adult by virtue of W. Va.
Code, 18-8-1 (1990), and W. Va. Code, 18-8-1a (1988). We disagree.
W. Va. Code, 18-8-1, provides for compulsory school attendance for students between the ages of six and sixteen.See footnote 3 After the age of
sixteen, a student does not have to attend school.See footnote 4 The relevant
section of W. Va. Code, 18-8-1a, adds that "the compulsory school
attendance provision of this article shall be enforced against a
person eighteen years of age or older for as long as the person
continues to be enrolled in a school system, and shall not be
enforced against the parent, guardian or custodian of such person."
This provision is designed to accomplish two objectives. First, it
makes those over eighteen who desire to attend school subject to
the compulsory school attendance law. Second, it exempts the
parent, guardian, or custodian of such student from the compulsory
school attendance law and a prosecution under W. Va. Code, 18-8-2.
There is nothing within the foregoing provisions that even could be
remotely construed as altering the plain language of W. Va. Code,
18-8-2, to impose liability on a nonattending student regardless of
his age.
School officials are not without recourse to deal with
students who are eighteen and older who disobey school attendance
policies. Any student may be suspended from attending school under
W. Va. Code, 18-8-8 (1951), "because of improper conduct or refusal
of such child to comply with the requirements of the school[.]"See footnote 5
Moreover, W. Va. Code, 18-5-15(c) (1993), which recently was
amended,See footnote 6 requires that a student who has been suspended or
expelled to obtain the approval of the county superintendent of
schools before the student can enroll.See footnote 7
Therefore, if a student disobeys a school policy, such as
by having unexcused absences, he may be suspended under W. Va.
Code, 18-8-8, and shall not be readmitted to school under W. Va.
Code, 18-5-15(c), without the approval of the county
superintendent. In addition, a student under the age of eighteen
who habitually misses school without good cause may be adjudicated
delinquent under W. Va. Code, 49-1-4(4) (1978).See footnote 8
The respondent judge exceeded his legitimate authority,
because it is obvious that the underlying criminal proceeding under
W. Va. Code, 18-8-2, cannot be maintained against the relator.
Syllabus Point 6 of State ex rel. Board of Education v. Perry, ___ W. Va. ___, 434 S.E.2d 22 (1993), sets forth the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition:
"'"Prohibition will lie to prohibit
a judge from exceeding his legitimate powers."
Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Winter v.
MacQueen, 161 W. Va. 30, 239 S.E.2d 660
(1977).' Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. Maynard,
186 W. Va. 421, 412 S.E.2d 822 (1991)."
For the foregoing reasons, we issue a writ of
prohibition precluding the prosecution of the relator under W. Va.
Code, 18-8-2. If school officials want to take action against Mr.
Estes, they should suspend him in accordance with W. Va. Code, 18-
8-8, and 18-5-15(c).
Writ granted.
"Any person who, after receiving
due notice as hereinafter provided, shall
fail to cause a child or children in that
person's legal or actual charge to attend
school as hereinbefore provided, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not less than
fifty nor more than one hundred dollars to
gether with the costs of prosecution, or
confined in jail not less than five nor more
than twenty days. The magistrate or judge
may require the parent or parents to bring
the child to school and remain through the
school day until such time as the magistrate
or judge may determine as appropriate. Every
day a child is out of school contrary to the
provisions of this article shall constitute a
separate offense. Magistrates shall have
concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts
for the trial of offenses arising under this
section.
"Whenever a person accused of vio
lating any of the provisions of this article
has been tried and acquitted, the cost of
prosecution shall be paid by the county board
of education out of the maintenance fund of
the county."