IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 1994 Term
___________
No. 21921
___________
RAYMOND J. KEEGAN AND ARGENT RESEARCH
AND RECOVERY, LTD.,
Plaintiffs Below, Appellees
v.
LARRIE BAILEY, AS HE IS THE
TREASURER OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Defendant Below, Appellant
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
Honorable John Hey, Judge
Civil Action No. 92-C-5322
AFFIRMED
___________________________________________________
Submitted: January 25, 1994
Filed: April 22, 1994
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.
Attorney General
Barry L. Koerber
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellant
Jill M. Jerabek
Flaherty, Sensabaugh & Bonasso
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellees
JUSTICE McHugh delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
Unless records of stale dated warrants are presumed to be
abandoned property as defined by W. Va. Code, 36-8-8b(a) [Supp.
1990], such records of stale dated warrants are subject to
disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, W. Va.
Code, 29B-1-1, et seq.
McHugh, Justice:
This case is before this Court upon the May 5, 1993,
order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County which entered judgment
on the appellees', Raymond J. Keegan and Argent Research and
Recovery Ltd. (hereinafter "Argent"), complaint for declaratory
relief requested under the Freedom of Information Act, W. Va. Code,
29B-1-1, et seq. Specifically, the circuit court ordered the
appellant, Larrie Bailey, the Treasurer of the State of West
Virginia (hereinafter "Treasurer"), to release certain information
relating to stale dated warrants.See footnote 1 On appeal, the Treasurer
requests that the ruling of the circuit court be reversed.
I
Argent is in the business of researching governmental
records in all fifty states in an attempt to locate money owed to
individuals and corporations. Argent attempts to recover the money
owed to those parties, and in return, Argent receives a 10% fee
from any funds recovered as payment for services rendered.
On December 31, 1991, Argent requested from the Treasurer
the opportunity to inspect and review "records of outstanding
vendor checks [stale dated warrants] that were issued during the
past six years by the state to individuals and corporations, in payment for goods and services." However, by letter dated January
23, 1992, the Treasurer denied Argent's request.
As a result of the Treasurer denying Argent access to the
requested information, Argent filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with the circuit court. The evidence indicated that the
Treasury Department receives a list of stale dated warrants from
the Board of Investments. Further evidence indicated that if a
warrant is not presented for payment within six months from its
date of issuance, the money is deposited by the Board into the
Treasurer's Unclaimed Property account.See footnote 2
By order dated May 6, 1993, the circuit court concluded,
in relevant part, that Argent was entitled access to the records
they requested relating to the stale dated warrants. It is from
this order of the circuit court that the Treasurer appeals to this
Court.
II
We begin by recognizing that the Freedom of Information
Act, W. Va. Code, 29B-1-3(1) [1992] provides that, "[e]very person
has a right to inspect or copy any public record of a public body in this state, except as otherwise expressly provided by section
four [§ 29B-1-4] of this article."
The primary issue in this case is whether the records of
the stale dated warrants are abandoned property as defined by
W. Va. Code, 36-8-8b(a) [Supp. 1990] and thus exempt from
disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, W. Va. Code,
29B-1-1, et seq.See footnote 3
The Treasurer contends that the records of the stale
dated warrants are abandoned property and exempt from disclosure as
set forth in the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act,
specifically, W. Va. Code, 36-8-12a [1983], which states, in part:
"Records of abandoned property kept by the State treasurer are
available for inspection and copying only by an owner of such
property as to the particular property he owns . . . . These
records are exempt from the provisions of chapter twenty-nine-B [§
29B-1-1 et seq.] of the Code." (emphasis added).
W. Va. Code, 36-8-8b(a) [Supp. 1990] sets forth criteria
so as to determine what is abandoned property and when such
property is to be presumed abandoned:
All tangible personal property or
intangible personal property, including . . . all debts owed, entrusted funds or other
property held by any . . ., state . . .
government or governmental subdivision,
agency, entity, officer or appointee thereof,
shall be presumed abandoned in this state if
the last-known address of the owner of the
property is in this state and the property has
remained unclaimed for seven years[.]
(emphasis added).See footnote 4 The records requested by Argent were in
reference to warrants that had been issued within the past six
years. The statute clearly indicates what is abandoned property.
No further analysis is needed. See Kosegi v. Pugliese, 185 W. Va.
384, 407 S.E.2d 388 (1991).
We are of the opinion that the requested records are not
exempt from disclosure pursuant to W. Va. Code, 36-8-8b(a) [Supp. 1990] and W. Va Code, 36-8-12a [1983], because the records within
the Treasurer's possession are not yet abandoned property as seven
years have yet to elapse since the warrants have been issued.
Accordingly, unless records of stale dated warrants are presumed to
be abandoned property as defined by W. Va. Code, 36-8-8b(a) [Supp.
1990], such records of stale dated warrants are subject to
disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, W. Va.
Code, 29B-1-1, et seq.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1 What constitutes a stale dated warrant is explained in
W. Va. Code, 12-3-1 [1990]: "No state depository shall pay a check
unless it is presented within six months after it is drawn and
every check shall bear upon its face the words, 'Void, unless
presented for payment within six months.'"
Footnote: 2 Further background regarding the chain of custody of the
unclaimed warrants, as explained by Argent in its brief, is as
follows: One Valley Bank, a statewide bank, acts as the depository
for monies held in the State Treasury. The bank provides, to the
Board, a list of warrants not presented for payment within six
months from their date of issuance. The Board generates the
computer list and sends such list and receipt of deposit to the
Treasurer's office.
Footnote: 3 The second issue raised by the Treasurer on appeal is
that the circuit court erred in determining that Argent's Freedom
of Information Act request reasonably specified the information
sought in the complaint for declaratory judgment. After a thorough
review of the record before us, we do not believe that the circuit
court committed any error with regard to its findings with respect
to this issue.
Footnote: 4 W. Va. Code, 36-8-8b(a) [Supp. 1993] was amended in
1993. The amendment substituted "five years" for "seven years."
On March 12, 1994, the legislature passed Enr. Com. Sub.
for S.B. 55, 2d Reg. Session, 71st Legislature (1994). The
legislature in Enr. Com. Sub. for S.B. 55 amended W. Va. Code, 36-
8-8 with such amendments to become effective June 10, 1994. The
amendments to subsection (a) of the statute specifically state that
stale dated warrants are intangible personal property: "All
intangible personal property, including stale dated checks, held
for the owner by any state or federal court, public corporation,
public authority or public officer in this state, or a political
subdivision thereof, that has remained unclaimed by the owner for
more than five years is presumed abandoned[.]" (emphasis added).
Therefore, as of June 10, 1994, the appellees herein would be
precluded from gaining access to records regarding stale dated
warrants that have remained unclaimed for more than five years as
such property would be considered abandoned and thus exempt from
disclosure to Argent pursuant to W. Va. Code, 36-8-12a [1983].
Because the above-mentioned amendments are to become
effective after this action was instituted, the amendments have no
bearing on the outcome of this case.