Menis E. Ketchum
Greene, Ketchum, Bailey & Tweel
Huntington, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellee
R. Carter Elkins
Laura L. Gray
Campbell, Woods, Bagley, Emerson, McNeer & Herndon
Huntington, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellants
JUSTICE BROTHERTON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1. West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(b) provides that
employees of political subdivisions are immune from personal tort
liability unless "(1) [h]is or her acts or omissions were
manifestly outside the scope of employment or official
responsibilities; (2) [h]is or her acts or omissions were with
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;
or (3) [l]iability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a
provision of this code."
2. A sheriff is an employee of a political subdivision,
the county commission, and is therefore immune from personal tort
liability for acts occurring within the scope of employment, unless
one of the exceptions noted in W.Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b) is
applicable.
3. The phrase "the method of providing police, law
enforcement or fire protection" contained in W.Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a)(5) refers to the formulation and implementation of policy
related to how police, law enforcement or fire protection is to be
provided.
4. Resolution of the issue of whether a loss or claim occurs as a result of "the method of providing police, law enforcement or fire protection" requires determining whether the allegedly negligent act resulted from the manner in which a formulated policy regarding such protection was implemented.
Brotherton, Justice:
On October 15, 1989, Trooper Danny G. Beckley, a member
of the West Virginia Department of Public Safety, assisted the
Sheriff of Wayne County, Bernie R. Crabtree, and other Wayne County
deputy sheriffs who arrested Thomas Wayne Graham on charges of
brandishing a weapon and discharge of a firearm. After Graham was
placed in the back seat of a sheriff's department vehicle, Sheriff
Crabtree attempted to place a shotgun in the trunk of the car, and
the shotgun accidentally discharged, injuring Trooper Beckley.See footnote 1
Trooper Beckley filed suit against Sheriff Crabtree in
the Circuit Court of Wayne County on September 10, 1991. In his
complaint, Beckley alleged that Crabtree's negligent handling of
the shotgun caused it to accidentally discharge and injure Beckley.
Sheriff Crabtree denied negligence and moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that he was an employee of a political subdivision -- the Wayne County Commission -- and, as such, was immune from tort
liability under provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act, W.Va. Code § 29-12A-1, et seq. The circuit
court denied the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment.
Trooper Beckley moved for leave to amend his complaint on
May 1, 1992. He then added a second count naming the Wayne County
Commission as an additional defendant. Trooper Beckley alleged
that Sheriff Crabtree was an employee of the Wayne County
Commission within the meaning of W.Va. Code § 29-12A-3(a), and the
Wayne County Commission was therefore liable for damages for
injuries caused by the Sheriff's negligence pursuant to W.Va. Code
§ 29-12A-4(c).
The Circuit Court of Wayne County certified the following
questions to this Court, pursuant to W.Va. Code § 58-5-2 and Rule
13 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Can the defendant, Bernie R. Crabtree, the
duly elected and serving Sheriff of Wayne
County, be liable when sued in his official
capacity for his actions as Sheriff of Wayne
County for alleged negligence in the discharge
of a shotgun while acting in his capacity as
Sheriff of Wayne County, West Virginia under
the provisions of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(b)?
Can the Wayne County Commission be held liable
under the provisions of West Virginia Code
§29-12A-4(c) for the alleged negligence of its
employee, the defendant, Bernie R. Crabtree,
the duly elected and serving Sheriff of Wayne
County, West Virginia, for Crabtree's actions
as Sheriff of Wayne County, West Virginia, or
does West Virginia Code §29-12A-5(a) provide
immunity to the Wayne County Commission when
liability is sought to be imposed based upon
the actions of the duly elected and serving
Sheriff of Wayne County?
The circuit court answered both questions in the affirmative.
The appellants, Sheriff Crabtree and the Wayne County
Commission, now argue that the sheriff is entitled to immunity
under the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance
Reform Act, W.Va. Code § 29-12A-1, et seq., either as an employee
of a political subdivision or as a separate political subdivision.
We agree with the appellants' contention that Sheriff
Crabtree is immune from personal tort liability because he is an
employee of the Wayne County Commission, which is a political
subdivision. West Virginia Code § 29-12A-3(c) (1992) defines a
political subdivision as follows:
[A]ny county commission, municipality and
county board of education; any separate
corporation or instrumentality established by
one or more counties or municipalities, as
permitted by law; any instrumentality
supported in most part by municipalities; any
public body charged by law with the
performance of a government function and whose
jurisdiction is coextensive with one or more
counties, cities or towns; a combined city-county health department created pursuant to
article two [§ 16-2-1 et seq.], chapter
sixteen of this code; public service
districts; and other instrumentalities
including, but not limited to, volunteer fire
departments and emergency service
organizations as recognized by an appropriate
public body and authorized by law to perform a
government function: Provided, That hospitals
of a political subdivision and their employees
are expressly excluded from the provisions of
this article.
West Virginia Code § 29-12A-3(a) states that an employee
is:
[A]n officer, agent, employee, or servant,
whether compensated or not, whether full-time
or not, who is authorized to act and is acting
within the scope of his or her employment for
a political subdivision. "Employee" includes
any elected or appointed official of a
political subdivision. "Employee" does not
include an independent contractor of a
political subdivision. (Emphasis added.)
Finally, W.Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b) provides that employees
of political subdivisions are immune from personal tort liability
unless "(1) [h]is or her acts or omissions were manifestly outside
the scope of employment or official responsibilities; (2) [h]is or
her acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or
in a wanton or reckless manner; or (3) [l]iability is expressly
imposed upon the employee by a provision of this code."
None of the three exceptions in W.Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b)
which would impose personal liability upon the sheriff are
applicable in this case. The sheriff's actions in effectuating the
arrest of a criminal suspect were clearly within the scope of his
employment. Moreover, there is no indication that the sheriff
committed any acts with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a
wanton or reckless manner. No other statutory provision would
impose liability upon Sheriff Crabtree.
In response to the second certified question, the
appellants argue that because the Wayne County Commission is a
political subdivision, it is also immune from liability. West
Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(5) provides that "[a] political
subdivision is immune from liability if a loss or claim results
from: Civil disobedience, riot, insurrection or rebellion or the
failure to provide, or the method of providing, police, law
enforcement or fire protection." The appellants maintain that
Sheriff Crabtree was engaged in a method of providing law
enforcement protection when the October 15, 1989, accident
occurred, and thus the political subdivision is immune from
liability.
The appellee disagrees and maintains that this is a
simple negligence claim, and he alleges that the Sheriff was
negligent in the handling of the shotgun. The appellee further
states that the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act clearly imposes liability in situations
involving the negligence of employees acting within the scope of
their employment. West Virginia Code § 29-12A-4(c)(2) provides
that "[p]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or
loss to persons or property caused by the negligent performance of
acts by their employees while acting within the scope of
employment."
The appellee correctly argues that W.Va. Code § 29-12A-4(c)(2) would impose liability upon the Wayne County Commission for the negligence, if any, of its employee, Sheriff Crabtree. However, because it is a political subdivision, the Wayne County Commission would be immune from liability if Trooper Beckley's injury resulted from "the method of providing police, law enforcement or fire protection." W.Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a)(5).
Thus, a separate question exists which relates to the "method" of
providing such law enforcement protection.
In Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dept., 186 W.Va. 336,
412 S.E.2d 737 (1991), this Court addressed the alleged failure to
provide adequate police protection. Although W.Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a) was discussed in Randall, we have not had the occasion to
define the phrase "the method of providing police, law enforcement,
or fire protection." We note, however, that § 14 of the Texas Tort
Claims Act is similar to our § 29-12A-5(a),See footnote 2 and appeals courts in
Texas have addressed this issue on several occasions.
In a leading case, State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784, 787
(1979), the Supreme Court of Texas stated that "[t]he clause
exempting governments from liability for injuries arising out of
the failure to provide police or fire protection is clearly
designed to avoid judicial review of the policy decisions that
governments must make in deciding how much, if any, police or fire
protection to provide for a community." The state argued that the
clause was a general exclusion for any act or omission that occurs
while an officer is providing police or fire protection to the
public. However, the Court did not believe that the Legislature
intended to create an exclusion so broad that it excluded liability
for any act occurring while an officer provides police protection.
Id.
While defining the phrase "the method of providing police
or fire protection," the Supreme Court of Texas stated:
The term "method" is defined as "a
procedure or process for attaining an object"
and as an "orderly arrangement, development or
classification." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1422-23 (1966). The
term is synonymous with the words "mode,"
"plan," "design," or "system." Id. Thus, the
"method" of performing an act refers to the
decision or plan as to how the act is to be
performed. Similarly, the "method of
providing police or fire protection" refers to
the governmental decisions as to how to
provide police or fire protection.
Id. at 788. Terrell involved the Texas Highway Department's policy
of detecting and apprehending motorists who exceed the speed limit
by use of radar and motor vehicles, pursuant to a statute fixing
maximum speeds. The Supreme Court of Texas stated:
Such a policy decision is not subject to an
attack of negligence under this Act. This
policy, however, obviously does not include
directing the officer to strike any vehicle in
his path in apprehending a speeder. The
accident which occurred in this case was not a
part of the formulated policy. Therefore, the
State is subject to liability for injuries
resulting from the negligence, if any, of the
highway patrolman in colliding with Mr.
Terrell's vehicle.
Id.
The Court concluded that the Legislature "intended to
exclude from the [Texas Tort Claims] Act only those acts or
omissions which constitute the execution of or the actual making of
those policy decisions." Id. Further, the Court stated that, "if
the negligence causing an injury lies in the formulating of policy
-- i.e., the determining of the method of police protection to
provide -- the government remains immune from liability. If,
however, an officer or employee acts negligently in carrying out
that policy, government liability may exist under the Act." Id.
We agree with the reasoning in Terrell and believe that
this type of analysis is applicable to the facts now before us.
The phrase "the method of providing police, law enforcement or fire
protection" contained in W.Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a)(5) refers to the
formulation and implementation of policy related to how police, law
enforcement or fire protection should be provided. Resolution of
the issue of whether a loss or claim occurs as a result of the
method of providing law enforcement protection requires determining
whether the allegedly negligent act resulted from the manner in
which a formulated policy regarding such protection was
implemented.
In this case, Trooper Beckley's injury did not result
from the implementation of a formulated policy. The methods
employed by the law enforcement officers who detained and arrested
the suspect were complete before the gun discharged. Sheriff
Crabtree was simply returning a shotgun to the trunk of the car
when the accident occurred. Although this incidental action
occurred within the scope of employment, it was not so closely
related or necessary to effectuating the arrest as to be considered
a component of "the method of providing law enforcement
protection."
Thus, to summarize our conclusions, we find that a
sheriff is an employee of a political subdivision, the county
commission, and is therefore immune from personal tort liability
for acts committed within the scope of employment, unless one of
the exceptions noted in W.Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b) is applicable. In
this case, W.Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b) would not impose personal
liability upon Sheriff Crabtree for the alleged negligent discharge
of a shotgun which occurred while he was acting in his official
capacity as the Sheriff of Wayne County. Thus, the answer to the
first certified question is "no."
However, our response to the second certified question is
"yes." The Wayne County Commission can be held liable for injuries
arising out of the negligence, if any, of its employee, Sheriff
Crabtree, if such negligence occurred while he was performing
duties within the scope of his employment as Sheriff of Wayne
County. West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a) provides immunity from
tort liability to the Wayne County Commission only under certain
limited circumstances which are not present in this case, i.e., if
the loss or claim results from "civil disobedience, riot,
insurrection or rebellion or the failure to provide, or the method
of providing, police, law enforcement or fire protection."
Having answered the questions certified by the Circuit
Court of Wayne County, this case is ordered dismissed from the
docket of this Court.