Davis, J., concurring:
I fully
concur with the majority's Opinion in this case. Nevertheless, I feel compelled
to write separately to reiterate my concern enunciated in my dissent in State
ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 209 W. Va. 752, 766, 551 S.E.2d 674, 688
(2001) (Davis, J., dissenting), that, once a child has been adopted, such adoption
severs all ties between the child and the child's biological and/or former adoptive
relatives (See footnote 1) so
as to foreclose the right to grandparent visitation otherwise permitted by statute. See W. Va.
Code § 48-10-902 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (“If a child who is subject
to a grandparent visitation order under this article is later adopted, the order
for grandparent visitation is automatically vacated when the order for adoption
is entered, unless the adopting parent is a stepparent, grandparent or other
relative of the child.”). In short, I wish to repeat my earlier admonition
that the central aim of adoption is finality, finality in the severance of pre-existing
relationships and finality
in the creation of new adoptive relationships, which breeds certainty for adopted
children and their adoptive parents, alike, in their new adoptive relationship. See Brandon
L., 209 W. Va. at 766, 551 S.E.2d at 688 (Davis, J., dissenting) (“'Finality
is of the utmost importance in an adoption.'” (quoting State ex rel.
Smith v. Abbot, 187 W. Va. 261, 266, 418 S.E.2d 575, 580 (1992))).
Moreover,
I applaud the majority's recognition and application of these principles in the
case sub judice, and encourage my brethren to continue to proceed with
caution where claims for grandparent visitation have been tainted by the subject
child's adoption and the grandparents' resultant divestiture of their grandparental
status and attendant standing to seek visitation in such capacity.
For the
foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur with the Opinion of the Court.