Belinda A. Haynie, Esq.
Morgantown, West Virginia
Attorney for Kerry Diane Delapp
William C. Brewer, Esq.
Bader C. Giggenbach, Esq.
Brewer & Giggenbach, PLLC
Morgantown, West Virginia
Attorneys for John David Delapp
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
1. “A motion to vacate a judgment made pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.Va.R.C.P., is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court's ruling on such motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of an abuse of such discretion.” Syllabus Point 5, Toler v. Shelton, 157 W.Va. 778, 204 S.E.2d 85 (1974).
2. “Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides a basis for relieving a party from a final judgment upon the following grounds: (1) mistake, surprise, excusable neglect, or unavoidable cause; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied or vacated; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. The motion for relief must be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (6) not more than [one year] after the judgment order was entered.” Syllabus Point 1, Savas v. Savas, 181 W.Va. 316, 382 S.E.2d 510 (1989).
3. “When a court undertakes to analyze a Rule 60(b) motion based on grounds (1), (2), (3), or (6) of the Rule, it must determine first if the motion has been filed within [one year] after the judgment was entered and then determine, under all the circumstances, if it was filed within a reasonable time.” Syllabus Point 2, Savas v. Savas, 181 W.Va. 316, 382 S.E.2d 510 (1989).
4. “A court, in the exercise of discretion given it by the remedial provisions
of Rule 60(b), W.Va.R.C.P., should recognize that the rule is to be liberally construed for the
purpose of accomplishing justice and that it was designed to facilitate the desirable legal
objective that cases are to be decided on the merits.” Syllabus Point 6, Toler v. Shelton, 157
W.Va. 778, 204 S.E.2d 85 (1974).
Per Curiam:
John David Delapp, the appellant herein and respondent in the divorce action
below, appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County that denied the
appellant's Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the circuit court's bifurcated order on property
distribution, child support, alimony, and expert and attorney fees.
(See footnote 1)
In this appeal, the
appellant asserts that the circuit court erred in finding that it lacked authority to grant relief
from its March 7, 2001, final order because the appellant failed to timely file his petition for
review of the family law master's recommended order. For the reasons set forth below, we
agree with the appellant. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to consider
on the merits the appellant's petition for review.
On that date, the appellant's counsel, Mr. William Brewer, filed a request for a ten-day extension in which to file the petition, which was granted. At about 9:30 a.m. on March 7, 2001, an employee of Mr. Brewer attempted to file the appellant's petition for review in the circuit clerk's office, and was informed that the final order had already been signed and entered by the circuit court.
On March 9, 2001, the appellant filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, to set aside the final order of the circuit court due to inadvertence or excusable neglect in the untimely filing of the petition for review. A memorandum of law in support of the Rule 60(b) motion was filed on March 27, 2001. The motion was denied by the circuit court by order dated December 28, 2001. Thereafter, on January 11, 2002, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. A full evidentiary hearing was held on this motion on February 8, 2002.
At this hearing, the appellant's counsel, Mr. Brewer, testified that he and his law partner, Bader C. Giggenbach, had calculated the filing deadline for the petition for review to be March 6, 2001. (See footnote 3) However, due to previous confusion in the circuit clerk's office regarding calculation of a proper filing date in an earlier case, Mr. Brewer instructed his office manager to confirm the filing deadline with the circuit clerk's office. Mr. Brewer's office manager testified that she and a deputy clerk had several conversations, and she understood the deputy clerk to indicate that March 7, was the correct filing deadline, and that the deputy clerk had confirmed this date with the circuit judge. The deputy clerk testified, however, that she did not recall saying that March 7, was the filing deadline but rather that the recommended order would “go up to the judge on the 7th.” She admitted, however, that such language “could be confused” by Mr. Brewer's office manager. Finally, the deputy clerk testified that she confirmed the March 7, date with the circuit judge's clerk, not the circuit judge.
By
order of March 1, 2002, the circuit court denied the appellant's motion for reconsideration.
First, the circuit court found that it is undisputed that the ten-day extension
gave the appellant until March 6, 2001, to file a petition for review of the
final order. Also,
the court found “that the neglect of the [appellant's] counsel in filing
the petition in a timely [sic] manner was excusable neglect. . . .
due to the fact that, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the mistake
on part of counsel was clearly an honest, good faith mistake of
fact.”
(See footnote 4)
The court concluded, however, that, pursuant to this Court's holding in Czaja v. Czaja,
208 W.Va. 62, 537 S.E.2d 908 (2000), it had “absolutely no discretion to accept, and
review on the merits, a petition for review when the party attempting to submit the petition
fails to do so within the temporal confines of [W.Va. Code] § 48A-4-17 (1999).” The
appellant now appeals the March 1, 2002, order.
A court, in the exercise of discretion given it by
the remedial provisions of Rule 60(b), W.Va.R.C.P.,
should recognize that the rule is to be liberally construed
for the purpose of accomplishing justice and that it was
designed to facilitate the desirable legal objective that
cases are to be decided on the merits.
Syllabus Point 6, Toler v. Shelton, supra.
In his sole assignment of error, the appellant argues that the circuit court erred
in determining that our holding in Czaja, supra, precluded it from providing relief to the
appellant under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). We agree with the
appellant.
According to Syllabus Point 1 of Czaja:
The provisions of West Virginia Code § 48A-4-17
(1999)
(See footnote 5)
are clear in their intent. Failure to comply with the ten-day period for filing exceptions to a
recommended order of a family law master, barring a
timely filing of and approval of one ten-day extension
period, is fatal with regard to preserving those exceptions
for appeal.
This Court has indicated, however, that “the statement contained in a syllabus is to be read
in the light of the opinion.” Jones v. Jones, 133 W.Va. 306, 310, 58 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1949),
citing Koblegard, Trustee v. Hale, 60 W.Va. 37, 41, 53 S.E. 793, [794] [1906]. See also
State v. Franklin, 139 W.Va. 43, 79 S.E.2d 692 (1953), Cupano v. W.Va. Ins. Guaranty
Assoc., 207 W.Va. 703, 536 S.E.2d 127 (2000). The facts of Czaja differ considerably from
the facts of the instant case. We conclude, therefore, that Syllabus Point 1 of Czaja is not
applicable to the instant facts.
In Czaja, the family law master entered a recommended order on November
23, 1998, concerning the appellee's visitation rights. The due date for the filing of
exceptions to the recommended order was December 7, 1998, at which time the appellant
filed notice of her request for a ten-day extension. The circuit court granted the extension
which meant that the appellant now had until December 17, 1998, to file exceptions.
However, the appellant did not file her exceptions until December 28, 1998. She contended
that the filing was not untimely because the guardian ad litem initially was not served with
the notice and recommended order and, as a result, the parties were re-served along with the
guardian ad litem on December 3, 1998, with an indication that December 17, 1998, was the
deadline for filing exceptions. According to the appellant, her extension allowed her ten days
from December 17, to file, which made the correct deadline December 27.
In rejecting the appellant's reasoning, we noted that both named parties were served with the notice and the recommended order on November 23, 1998, and that the filing date for exceptions pursuant to the first notice was December 7, 1998. After reviewing all of the facts of the case, this Court was “left with a palpable sense that Appellant's counsel was trying to 'buy' time in any fashion possible for filing Appellant's exceptions.” Czaja, 208 W.Va. at 69, 537 S.E.2d at 915 (footnote omitted). In contrast, in the instant case, the circuit court found that the appellant's failure to timely file his petition for review was due to a good faith mistake which amounted to excusable neglect. Accordingly, we conclude that the rule set forth in Syllabus Point 1 of Czaja does not prevent the circuit court from granting relief to the appellant from the March 7, 2001, order pursuant to Rule 60(b).
Applicable, rather, to the present case is this Court's decision in State ex rel. Bess v. Berger, 203 W.Va. 662, 510 S.E.2d 496 (1998) (per curiam). (See footnote 6) In Bess, the petitioner's counsel failed to submit proposed findings of fact within the thirty-day period set by the family law master. Also, the petitioner asserted her exceptions to the family law master's ruling two weeks after the ten-day exception filing period had expired. The circuit court refused to consider the exceptions and subsequently also refused to consider the petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the final order. The petitioner thereafter sought a writ of mandamus from this Court to compel the circuit court to consider her grounds for seeking modification of the recommended order.
The circuit court in Bess refused to consider the petitioner's exceptions for much the same reason that the circuit court below refused to grant relief to the appellant.
The circuit court took the position that it had no
discretion with regard to Petitioner's late filing of
exceptions and subsequent attempts at review before the
circuit court due to the temporally constrictive language
of West Virginia Code § 48A-4-17(a). The circuit court
looked specifically to the statutory language that states:
“Failure to timely file the petition shall constitute a
waiver of exceptions, unless the petitioner, prior to the
expiration of the ten-day period, moves for and is granted
an extension of the time from the circuit court.” W.Va.
Code § 48A-4-17(a).
Bess, 203 W.Va. at 665, 510 S.E.2d at 499. This Court rejected the circuit court's reasoning,
granted the writ as moulded, and instructed the circuit court to hold a hearing on the merits
of the petitioner's motion for relief under Rule 60(b). Further, we opined that,
Since Rule 60(b) is routinely applied to a
multitude of case scenarios involving time deadlines,
there appears to be no sound basis for determining that it
should not apply to this case merely based on the
language of West Virginia Code § 48A-4-17(a) that
imposes a ten-day period, absent a request for an
extension, for filing exceptions to family law master's
recommended orders.
Bess, 203 W.Va. at 666-67 n.11, 510 S.E.2d at 500- 01 n.11 (citations omitted). In accord
with our reasoning in Bess, we find that Rule 60(b) applies in the instant case to grant relief
to the appellant from the March 7, 2001, order of the circuit court.
According to Syllabus Point 1 of Savas v. Savas, 181 W.Va. 316, 382 S.E.2d
510 (1989):
Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure provides a basis for relieving a party from a
final judgment upon the following grounds: (1) mistake,
surprise, excusable neglect, or unavoidable cause; (2)
newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation,
or misconduct; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied or vacated; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief. The motion for relief must be made
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
and (6) not more than [one year]
(See footnote 7)
after the judgment
order was entered.
(footnote added). We have described excusable neglect as requiring “a demonstration of
good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement and some reasonable basis for
noncompliance within the time specified in the rules.” Bailey v. SWCC, 170 W.Va. 771, 777
n.8, 296 S.E.2d 901, 907 n.8 (1982), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Fucillo v. Workers' Compensation Com'r, 180 W.Va. 595, 378 S.E.2d 637 (1988).
As noted by the appellee, in White v. Berryman, 187 W.Va. 323, 332, 418
S.E.2d 917, 926 (1992), this Court said that “[i]t is generally held that an attorney's
negligence will not serve as the basis for setting aside a default judgment on grounds of
'excusable neglect.'” However, subsequent to this statement, in Pioneer Investment Services
Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d
74 (1993), the United States Supreme Court found that “at least for purposes of Rule 60(b),
'excusable neglect' is understood to encompass situations in which the failure to comply with
a filing deadline is attributable to negligence.” 507 U.S. at 394, 113 S.Ct. at 1497, 123
L.Ed.2d at 89. The Court explained that the determination of excusable neglect “is at bottom
an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's
omission,” 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498, 123 L.Ed.2d at 89 (footnote omitted), and
listed four factors to assist courts in making that determination. These factors are “the danger
of prejudice to the [other party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial
proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control
of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at
1498, 123 L.Ed.2d at 89-90 (footnote omitted).
In Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996), the
court utilized these factors where judgment was entered against the plaintiff, Cheney, after
he filed his demand for a trial de novo following an arbitration award six days after the
deadline had passed and three days after the trial court had entered judgment against him.
The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside its judgment
because the Pioneer factors weighed in the plaintiff's favor. The court explained:
The reason for the delayed filing was a failure in
communication between the associate attorney and the
lead counsel. The circumstances of the error were
obviously within counsel's control, but their
noncommunication and resulting inaction amounts only
to an “omission[] caused by carelessness.” See
[Pioneer], at ---, 113 S.Ct. at 1495. In other words, their
failure to comply with the filing deadline is attributable
to negligence. There is no indication that counsel
deliberately disregarded Local Rule 8.06. Anchor Glass
has not argued that Cheney intended to delay the trial, or
that he sought an advantage by filing late. The nonfiling
was simply an innocent oversight by counsel. We find
no bad faith that would warrant forfeiture of Cheney's
right to a full trial of his cause.
On balance, the lack of prejudice to Anchor Glass,
the minimal degree of delay and the reason therefor, and
the lack of impact on the judicial proceedings, when
coupled with the lack of bad faith on the part of Cheney,
require a finding by the district court that the neglect of
Cheney's counsel was “excusable.”
Cheney, 71 F.3d at 850.
After considering the facts before us in light of the factors set forth in Pioneer,
we agree with the circuit court that the appellant's untimely filing of his petition for review
was due to excusable neglect. The facts show that, even though the appellant's counsel, Mr.
Brewer, had determined that the deadline for the filing of the petition was March 6, 2001,
because of confusion concerning the proper date in an earlier proceeding, he decided to
confirm the March 6, date with the circuit clerk's office. The deputy clerk with whom Mr.
Brewer's office manager spoke testified that she informed Mr. Brewer's office manager that
the order would “go up to the judge on the 7th,” and that she informed Mr. Brewer's office
manager that she confirmed this date with the circuit judge's clerk. Mr. Brewer's office
manager testified, on the other hand, that she understood the deputy clerk to say that the
correct deadline for filing the petition was March 7, and that this date was confirmed with
the circuit judge. The deputy clerk admitted that it “could be confused” whether the
deadline was March 6, as opposed to March 7.
We conclude from this evidence that the reason for the untimely filing of the
petition for review was an honest miscommunication between the circuit clerk's office and
Mr. Brewer's office. Although Mr. Brewer had previously calculated the deadline as March
6, and he testified that he was glad to have the extra day, we find no evidence that Mr.
Brewer deliberately disregarded the proper deadline or intentionally sought to gain additional
time. In fact, Mr. Brewer testified that the petition was actually finished on March 5th. In
other words, we find no bad faith on Mr. Brewer's part. Further, we fail to see how the filing
of the petition one day late worked prejudice to the appellee or had a detrimental effect on
the proceedings.
Concerning the assessment of a Rule 60(b) motion, this Court has also held:
When a court undertakes to analyze a Rule 60(b)
motion based on grounds (1), (2), (3), or (6) of the Rule,
it must determine first if the motion has been filed within
[one year] after the judgment was entered and then
determine, under all the circumstances, if it was filed
within a reasonable time.
Syllabus Point 2, Savas v. Savas, supra. The facts show that the appellant filed his Rule
60(b) motion to set aside the March 7, 2001, order just two days later on March 9, 2001. He
filed his memorandum in support of this motion on March 27, 2001. These filings were
obviously within one year after the judgment was entered, and we find that they were clearly
within a reasonable time.
Finally, the appellee cites several cases in support of her argument that the
appellant's untimely filing was not due to excusable neglect. We do not find these cases
apposite to the instant facts. In White v. Berryman, supra, this Court held that the failure to
set aside a default judgment was not an abuse of discretion. In that case, however, the
appellant filed no responsive pleading to the complaint and did not file his motion to set aside
the default judgment until nearly two months after he first became aware of the default
judgment and over three months after the default judgment order was entered. In two other
cases cited by the appellee, Johnson v. Nedeff, 192 W.Va. 260, 452 S.E.2d 63 (1994) and
Perdue v. Hess, 199 W.Va. 299, 484 S.E.2d 182 (1997), this Court refused, as a matter of
law, to apply Rule 60(b) to provide relief where parties failed to comply with the applicable
statutes of limitation for instituting suit. The policies underlying statutes of limitation do not
apply to the present facts.
Reversed and remanded.
According
to the W.Va. Supreme Court, there is no provision in the Court Rules which
allow [sic] for a “motion to reconsider.” See Rowan v. McKnight, 403
S.E.2d 780 (W.Va. 1991), FN 2. . . .
In light
of the fact that the respondent's original 60(b) motion was already denied by
this Court, it had concerns about hearing another 60(b) motion, because its denial
of the first 60(b) motion, according to the Supreme Court, was “final and
appealable.” However, after considering all the circumstances of this case
and reading the somewhat persuasive brief of the respondent, this Court decided
to allow the respondent to reargue his 60(b) motion so that, at the very least,
a more developed record could be made regarding the motion.
Rule
22. The ten-day period for filing a petition for review under Chapter 48A,
article 4, section 17 of the Code of West Virginia shall commence on the date
on which the parties are served with the notice and recommended order. When
service is had by first-class mail, three (3) days shall be added to the time
period, as provided by Rule 6(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule
23. A party seeking review of a recommended order may, prior to the expiration
of the ten-day period for filing a petition for review, file with the circuit
clerk a notice for extension of time. Upon such filing, an additional ten (10)
days shall be granted in which to file a petition for review. Only one ten-day
extension may be granted. A copy of a request for an extension shall be served
upon all parties.
As a
result of the Legislature's revamping of the family court system as stated in
footnote 2, supra, W.Va. Code § 48-4-17, and Rules 22 and 23 are
no longer in effect.