Maynard, Justice, dissenting:
I would have affirmed the
defendant's first-degree murder conviction and subsequent life-without-mercy
sentence because I do not believe that the trial judge abused
his discretion in denying the defendant a new trial on competency grounds.
This Court has explained:
Because a trial court is able to observe the
demeanor of the defendant and consequently has a better
vantage point than this Court to make determinations
regarding mental competency, we will disturb a lower
court's ruling denying a psychiatric examination and
related proceedings only where there has been an abuse
of discretion.
State v. Sanders, 209 W.Va. 367, 379, 549 S.E.2d 40, 52 (2001) (citation omitted). In his
order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial judge found:
During the trial, the Court observed that the
defendant's demeanor was normal and he exhibited no
unusual behavior. The Court also observed no evidence
of irrational behavior or any other indications whatsoever
that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial.
Further, the Court personally observed the defendant
communicate with defense counsel on several occasions
and he appeared to have a rational understanding of the
proceedings against him. Throughout the course of the
trial the Court was convinced that the defendant was
competent to stand trial and no evidence or suggestions
to the contrary were presented until after the defendant
was convicted. In considering the circumstances
retrospectively, the Court is still convinced that the
defendant was competent to stand trial throughout the
duration of his trial.
Further, said the trial judge,
During the trial, the defendant's demeanor was not
unusual or extraordinary and the Court observed no
evidence of irrational behavior or any other indications
whatsoever that the defendant was incompetent to stand
trial. In fact, the Court personally observed the
defendant communicate with defense counsel on several
occasions and he appeared to have a rational
understanding of the proceedings against him.
Apparently the Court was not alone in its belief
that the defendant was competent to stand trial because
no one, particularly defense counsel, informed the Court
of any suspicions or conclusions that the defendant may
be incompetent until after the defendant was convicted.
. . . [I]t seems peculiar that, if the defendant was
exhibiting signs of incompetency during the trial, defense
counsel never noticed his incompetency until after the
defendant had been convicted of first degree murder and
received no recommendation of mercy. The Court is of
the opinion that it would be a miscarriage of justice to
grant the defendant a new trial on the basis that he was
incompetent to stand trial during the trial when the
defendant failed to inform defense counsel that he was
not being provided his medication at the jail and when
defense counsel waited until after the verdict is returned
to inform the Court of their suspicions that the defendant
was incompetent to stand trial.
The majority opinion contains a great deal of information about the defendant's
mental health history. However, the trial judge had access to all of the defendant's previous
psychiatric evaluations when he made his decision. Also, the majority opinion asserts that
“[d]uring the trial, the appellant rarely spoke with his counsel[,]” Slip op. at 5, which is
directly at odds with the trial judge's finding that “the Court personally observed the
defendant communicate with defense counsel on several occasions[.]” Since the trial judge
was actually at the defendant's trial, and the members of this Court were not, I will take the
trial judge's word for it. Finally, the majority apparently accepts defense counsel's claims
that the defendant behaved irrationally at trial. Defense counsel's word, however, quite
frankly is incredible due to the fact that he never mentioned the defendant's irrational
behavior until after the jury verdict.
The Supreme Court has established that a State may presume that the defendant
is competent to stand trial and require him to prove his incompetence by a preponderance of
the evidence. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992).
See also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996). The
trial judge expressly found “that the defendant has failed to prove that, at the time of his trial,
he was 'more likely than not' incompetent to stand trial.” The trial judge's findings are
supported by Dr. Adamski's determination both pre- and post- trial that the defendant was
competent to stand trial; the trial judge's own observations of the defendant during the trial;
and the fact that defense counsel never alerted the trial judge during the trial of any
suspicions that his client was incompetent. In light of this evidence, I fail to understand how
the majority can find that the trial judge abused his discretion. Accordingly, I dissent.