Starcher, Justice, concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part:
I write to concur with the majority opinion's decision to grant the plaintiff/appellant a new trial, but I dissent to that part of the decision affirming the granting of summary judgment to Wheeling Hospital.
In Syllabus Point 2 of Thomas
v. Raleigh General Hospital, 178 W.Va. 138, 358 S.E.2d 222 (1987), this
Court held that:
Where a patient goes to a
hospital seeking medical services and is forced to rely on the hospital's
choice of physician to render those services, the hospital may be found vicariously
liable for the physician's negligence.
In the instant case, Charles Hicks did not choose to go to Wheeling Hospital;
he was admitted on an emergency basis, and remained there for his continued
treatment. He did not pick and choose his treating physicians, but rather
the doctors just showed up on an as needed basis and treated his
ailments.
These treating physicians
were in the Wheeling Hospital, using the hospital's facilities, presumably
at the request _
or certainly at the sufferance _
of the hospital. Normal thinking would suggest that the physicians were staff
at the hospital. Wheeling Hospital would rather have us believe
these physicians were interlopers or trespassers, roaming the halls at will
to make money from patients who showed up at the hospital requesting medical
services.
Any patient _
and, had not a summary judgment been granted, any juror _ would have believed
these physicians were working for the hospital, not just at
the hospital.
This Court has gradually expanded
hospital liability for malpractice by doctors practicing in the hospital's facilities
using numerous legal theories. Hospitals are vicariously liable for doctors
who are directly employed by the hospital. Thomas v. Raleigh General Hospital,
178 W.Va. 138, 358 S.E.2d 222 (1987). Agency liability has been imposed upon
hospitals for doctors who provide essential or emergency services for the hospital.
Torrence v. Kusminsky, 185 W.Va. 734, 408 S.E.2d 684 (1991). And hospitals
have been found to be directly liable for negligently giving privileges
or credentials to, and thereafter monitoring, its physicians. See,
e.g., Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hospital, Inc., 176 W.Va. 492, 345
S.E.2d 791, 797 (1986) (Whether the hospital allowed a known incompetent
to continue to enjoy hospital privileges was a major point to be decided in
determining the hospital's negligence.)
I believe the time has come
to dispose of these multiple legal theories for medical malpractice liability.
Instead, some other mechanism _ either based in statute or in the common law
_ should be developed to impose liability upon hospitals, rather than the individual
doctors and nurses who happen to work there. A likely mechanism would be the
doctrine of respondeat superior, a doctrine which focuses legal
responsibility for personal injury on the enterprise in the best position to make risk/safety tradeoffs[.]
Kenneth S. Abraham and Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability
and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 Harv.L.R.
381, 384 (1994). By making the enterprise or organization liable, the hospital
_ not the negligent employee _ would be liable for the malpractice.
Doctors would be treated as employees, even if the hospital characterizes
them as independent contractors.
If a truck driver
(See footnote 2)
causes an accident, we allow a lawsuit against the trucking company that
employed the driver because the trucking company is better equipped to spread
the cost of the accident, and the trucking company is better positioned to ensure
that future truck drivers do not cause similar accidents. The truck driver is
not expected to carry insurance, and regardless of the technical legal rights
of the trucking company, it simply would not seek indemnity from a negligent
truck driver. Why should doctors and hospitals be treated differently?
The result would be that doctors
would not have to be named as individual defendants for malpractice committed
in a hospital _ or, if they were, the hospital would be responsible for any
judgment and the doctor would be sued in name only. Doctors would therefore
never need to buy individual malpractice insurance to cover medical services
rendered in hospitals.
(See footnote 1) And hospitals are better equipped than
doctors to pass along the costs of malpractice insurance to patients, and
better equipped to construct systems of overall patient care which will prevent
future incidents of malpractice.
The current system wastes an
enormous amount of resources. The focus is too often on the legal relationships
between the defendant doctors, hospitals, nurses and hospital staff workers,
and not on the basic question that is at the root of the matter: was the plaintiff
injured as a proximate cause of someone's carelessness? Massive amounts of time
and money are spent, lots of finger pointing is done, lots of egos and friendships
are bruised, and all too often the doctor is left holding the bag. Doctors must
spend thousands of dollars buying malpractice insurance to protect against claims
which would be much more efficiently covered by one, hospital-bought policy.
I concur in the majority opinion's
decision to send this case back for trial _ but I would have also included the
defendant hospital in that trial. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Footnote: 1