(footnote omitted). See also Silk v. Flat Top Construction, Inc., 192 W. Va. 522, 453 S.E.2d 356 (1994); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W. Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986) (This case originally set forth the above general principles and is a good source for case law and treatises which more fully explain the above principles).
        Additionally, "if part of the claims against an insured fall within the coverage of a liability insurance policy and part do not, the insurer must defend all of the claims, although it might eventually be required to pay only some of the claims." Leeber, 180 W. Va. at 378, 376 S.E.2d at 584 (citing Donnelly v. Transportation Insurance Co., 589 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1978), as amended on denial of rehearing, Jan. 30, 1979). However, "a liability insurer need not defend a case against the insured if the alleged conduct is entirely foreign to the risk insured against." Id.
        This Court is also mindful that "'"[w]here the provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended." Syllabus, Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co., 153 W. Va. 813, 172 S.E.2d 714 (1970).' Syl. pt. 1, Russell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992)." Syl. pt. 1, Miller v. Lemon, 194 W. Va. 129, 459 S.E.2d 406 (1995). See also syl. pt. 4, Cox, supra. "'"Language in an insurance policy should be given its plain, ordinary meaning." Syl. Pt. 1, Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 176 W. Va. 430, 345 S.E.2d 33 (1986).' Syl. pt. 2, Russell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W. Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992)." Syl. pt. 2, Miller, supra. See also syl. pt. 5, Cox, supra.
        However, if the language in an insurance policy is ambiguous, then the doctrine of reasonable expectations applies: "With respect to insurance contracts, the doctrine of reasonable expectations is that the objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." Syl. pt. 8, National Mutual Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 177 W. Va. 734, 356 S.E.2d 488 (1987). See also Silk, 192 W. Va. at 526 n. 4, 453 S.E.2d at 360 n. 4 (The doctrine of reasonable expectations only applies in West Virginia when the policy language in ambiguous). Lastly, "'[w]here the policy language involved is exclusionary, it will be strictly construed against the insurer in order that the purpose of providing indemnity not be defeated.' Syl. pt. 5, National Mutual Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 177 W. Va. 734, 356 S.E.2d 488 (1987)." Syl. pt. 1, Marshall v. Fair, 187 W. Va. 109, 416 S.E.2d 67 (1992).
        With the above principles in mind, we must examine the provisions of Aetna's and USF&G's coverages A and B of the CGL policies, Aetna's excess policy, and USF&G's umbrella policy to determine whether any of the allegations in the Tymans' complaint are "reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that the claim may be covered by the terms of the insurance policy." Leeber, 180 W. Va. at 378, 376 S.E.2d at 584. At the outset, we note that as often happens in cases that require a detailed reading of an insurance policy, the parties are forced to articulate in an abbreviated fashion extensive policy provisions of a lengthy insurance policy which are not easily susceptible to being explained to the reader of a brief. In the case before us, not only are there two lengthy insurance policies which must be discussed, but, there are also several different causes of action which must be examined in order for this Court to determine whether the insurance policies at issue potentially provided coverage.

Harrison Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. New Hampshire Insurance Group, 681 P.2d 875, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted). See also Travelers Ins. Companies v. P.C. Quote, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) ("An accident is defined as 'an unforeseen occurrence of untoward or disastrous character' or 'an undesigned sudden or unexpected event.'" (citation omitted)); Arco Industries Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 531 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Mich. 1995).
        As some courts have recognized, a breach of contract which causes "bodily injury" or "property damage" is not an event that occurs by chance or arises from unknown causes, and, therefore, is not an "occurrence" as that word is defined in Aetna's and USF&G's CGL policies. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Gary C. Wyatt, Inc., 540 So.2d 688 (Ala. 1988) (The insurer had no duty to defend because the breach of contract was not an "occurrence" resulting in bodily injury or property damage under the definitions within the general liability insurance policy); Kema Steel, Inc. v. Home Insurance Co., 736 P.2d 798 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (An employer's failure to procure medical insurance for its employee is a breach of contract claim and is not covered by the employer's comprehensive general liability coverage policy which provides coverage for bodily injury caused by an occurrence); Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co. v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 872 P.2d 230 (Hawaii 1994) (The underlying suit for breach of contract and fraud did not trigger an insurer's duty to defend under a comprehensive general liability insurance policy which provided coverage for property damage caused by an occurrence); Travelers Ins. Companies, supra (The breach of contract allegations in the complaint are not "occurrences" under the general liability coverage of the policy); Pyles v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Ins. Co., 600 A.2d 1174, 1177 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), cert. denied, 607 A.2d 7 (Md.) (This case states that a number of courts in other jurisdictions have held that "an insured who has incurred liability in an earlier action as a result of breach of contract . . . is not covered under a general business liability insurance policy which extends to liability for damages due to property damage or bodily injury."); Harrison Plumbing & Heating, Inc., supra (A breach of contract is not an occurrence; thus, the insurer had no duty to defend under the provisions of the comprehensive general liability policy). Thus, the breach of contract allegation in the Tymans' complaint is entirely foreign to the risk insured against in coverage A of Aetna's and USF&G's CGL policies. See Leeber, 180 W. Va. at 378, 376 S.E.2d at 584 ("[A] liability insurer need not defend a case against the insured if the alleged conduct is entirely foreign to the risk insured against."). The circuit court, therefore, erred in concluding that Aetna and USF&G had a duty to defend the appellees on the basis that the breach of contract allegation was potentially covered under coverage A of the CGL policies.See footnote 8
        Likewise, we find the remaining counts in the Tymans' complaint, the tort of outrage, the tort of civil conspiracy, and the violation of state banking laws, to allege allegations entirely foreign to the risk insured against in coverage A of Aetna's and USF&G's CGL policies. See Leeber, supra. The common theme of these counts is that the appellees intentionally engaged in an outrageous conspiracy or scheme to defraud the Tymans out of their property. As we previously explained, the Tymans' allege that the scheme began when the appellees deliberately made a bad loan to them "contrary to accepted credit and banking standards, . . . forcing them into bankruptcy and misleading the bankruptcy court for the purpose of acquiring . . . [their] property[.]" The Tymans further allege that after the appellees knowingly made bad loans to them, the appellees conspired with their attorney, Keith Pappas, to ensure that the Tymans' property would be sold far below the fair market value at the foreclosure sale. Moreover, the Tymans state that the appellees then deliberately sold their property to Mr. Pappas "far below the fair market value, and less than the . . . [appellee Bruceton Bank] paid for it at the foreclosure sale, so that . . . [appellee] Paul Thomas [the President of Bruceton Bank] could develop the property for his own personal gain, in violation of state banking laws[.]"
        As indicated above, the Tymans asserted the following three counts in their complaint: the tort of outrage, the tort of civil conspiracy, and the violation of state banking laws. These three counts are rooted in the Tymans' allegation throughout their complaint that the appellees engaged in an intentional, outrageous scheme with Mr. Pappas so that the appellee, Paul Thomas, could gain control of the Tymans' property for his own personal gain.
         As indicated above, the definition of an "occurrence" does not include actions which are intended by the insured. See LaFever v. Whitely, 613 So.2d 1007 (La. Ct. App. 1992), writ denied by 614 So.2d 64 (La.) (Bodily injury sustained from a fight did not arise out of an "occurrence" because the conduct in the fight was intentional); Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 376, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]here is a conscious, decisionmaking element that takes civil conspiracies out of the range of behavior encompassed within the meaning of an 'occurrence.'"). Moreover, coverage A expressly excludes intentional acts from coverage: "This insurance does not apply to . . . '[b]odily injury' or 'property damage' expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured."
        Clearly, the facts alleged in the complaint which form the basis of the tort of outrage, tort of civil conspiracy, and violation of state banking laws counts are intentional acts of the insured. Thus, we conclude that the Tymans' allegation of the intentional scheming by the appellees to gain control of the Tymans' property is not reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that the claims are covered under the provisions of coverage A. See Leeber, supra.See footnote 9

        a.    Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services;

        b.    Oral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of privacy;

        c.    Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business; or

        d.    Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.

The appellees do not argue nor do we find that the Tymans' complaint alleges an "advertising injury" as it is defined in coverage B of the CGL policies.
        The appellees argue that the Tymans allege that they suffered a "personal injury"as that term is defined in the CGL policies:
        'Personal injury' means injury, other than 'bodily injury', arising out of one or more of the following offenses:

        a.    False arrest, detention or imprisonment;

        b.    Malicious prosecution;

        c.    Wrongful entry into, or eviction of a person from, a room, dwelling or premises that the person occupies;

        d.    Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services; or

        e.    Oral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of privacy[.]

The appellees maintain that the Tymans have accused them of committing the offenses described in "c." (wrongful eviction) and "d." (publication of material that slanders).
        We first address the appellees' argument that the Tymans' complaint alleges that they suffered a "personal injury" caused by their "[w]rongful . . . eviction." We note that even if the allegations in the Tymans' complaint could be interpreted as alleging that the Tymans suffered a "personal injury" as a result of their wrongful eviction from their property at the conclusion of the foreclosure proceeding brought by the appellees, neither Aetna's nor USF&G's policy was in effect when this eviction occurred. The Tymans' complaint indicates that the trustee's sale of the Tymans' property occurred on November 5, 1990. Aetna provided coverage from October 23, 1988 to October 23, 1989. USF&G provided coverage from October 23, 1989 to October 23, 1990.
        Coverage B of the CGL policies expressly states that "[t]his insurance applies to 'personal injury' only if caused by an offense: . . . [c]ommited . . . during the policy period[.]" (emphasis added). Thus, it is the date when the offense occurs that triggers the coverage rather than the date of the injury. See General Accident Ins. Co. v. West American Ins. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 603, 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("'In the world of liability insurance, personal injury coverage applies to injury which arises out of the commission of certain enumerated acts or offenses. . . . Coverage thus is triggered by the offense, not the injury or damage which a plaintiff suffers.'" (citations omitted)). The alleged offense in this case would have occurred, at the earliest, on November 5, 1990, when the trustee sale took place. Thus, even if the allegations of the Tymans' complaint could reasonably be interpreted as a "personal injury" caused by the appellees in wrongfully evicting the Tymans from their property,See footnote 10 neither Aetna nor USF&G's policies were in effect when the offense occurred.
        Next, we address whether the allegations in the complaint alleged that the Tymans have suffered a "personal injury" caused by the "[o]ral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services[.]" The Tymans' complaint alleges that Mr. Pappas, Bruceton Bank's attorney, deliberately wrote a letter to the bankruptcy court in order to maliciously and falsely discredit the Tymans with the bankruptcy court. While this allegation may be interpreted as Mr. Pappas writing material that libels the Tymans, coverage B expressly excludes "personal injury" "[a]rising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity[.]" Therefore, we conclude that any "personal injury" inflicted by the appellees by the submission of the above letter was intentional and, is therefore, expressly excluded from coverage.
        Accordingly, we conclude that the allegations in the Tymans' complaint are not reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that the complaint is covered within the terms of coverage B of Aetna's or USF&G's CGL policies. See Leeber, 180 W. Va. at 397, 376 S.E.2d at 584.

We conclude, as we did in our discussion of Aetna's excess policy, that because the language above is clear and because there is no potential coverage under the underlying CGL policy, there is no potential coverage for the appellees under USF&G's excess coverage provision.

         b.    With respect to 'bodily injury' to your employees arising out of and in the cause of their employment by you, the accident or disease which causes the 'bodily injury'; and

         c.    With respect to offenses committed by the insured resulting in 'personal injury' or 'advertising injury,' all such 'injury' sustained by any one person or organization.

(emphasis added).
        The ordinary meaning of the word "accident" as it is used in "a." and "b." above, is that it is "an event occurring by chance or arising from unknown causes[.]" Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 7 (1981). As we concluded when discussing whether the Tymans' complaint alleged an "occurrence" which was defined as an "accident" in coverage A of the CGL policies, the Tymans' complaint does not allege any injuries caused by an "accident." Therefore, none of the injuries alleged in the Tymans' complaint were caused by an incident as it is defined in a. and b. above.
        Furthermore, "incident" is defined in "c." as "personal injury" caused by an "offense." The "offenses" enumerated under the definitions of "personal injury" and "advertising injury" in USF&G's umbrella coverage are the same as those enumerated in coverage B of the CGL policies which we have previously discussed. See pp. 17-20, infra. Therefore, for the same reasons given in our discussion of coverage B of the CGL policies, we find that the Tymans' complaint does not allege an "incident," as it is defined in "c.," which is potentially covered under USF&G's umbrella coverage. Accordingly, we conclude that USF&G's umbrella coverage does not potentially cover the allegations in the Tymans' complaint.

        The appellees assert that neither Aetna nor USF&G may argue that coverage should have been provided by Progressive because neither sought to join Progressive in the declaratory judgment action nor did they offer Progressive's policy into evidence in the court below. USF&G, however, asserts that it offered the Progressive Policy to the trial judge; however, the trial judge declined the offer. In any event, this Court need not address whether
the Progressive policy provides coverage, or whether it should be considered, given our ultimate resolution of the issues raised in this appeal.

        However, in the case before us, we need not delve into the type of intent that is necessary for the "intentional injury" exclusion to apply, because under any of the above tests, the "intentional injury" exclusion in the policies at issue in this case apply. It is clear that the Tymans' complaint alleges that the appellees specifically intended for their acts to injure the Tymans in the manner in which the Tymans were injured.

(emphasis added). However, we find the above language inapplicable to the case before us because, as we have previously explained, we do not find that the Tymans' complaint alleges damages which are potentially payable under coverages A or B of Aetna's CGL policy.

Syllabus, F & M Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Hutzler, 191 W. Va. 559, 447 S.E.2d 22 (1994). However, in the case before us, we could not find nor did the parties point to the existence of any facts outside of the complaint which could have been discovered had Aetna and USF&G conducted a reasonable inquiry as required by Hutzler. Thus, even if Aetna and USF&G did not conduct a reasonable inquiry as required by Hutzler, our holding on whether Aetna and USF&G had a duty to defend based on the facts before us would not be affected.