W. Gus Saines
McDermott, Bonenberger, McDermott & Galloway
Wheeling, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellant Rodney A. Sleeth

Robert P. Fitzsimmons

Russell J. Guthrie
Fitzsimmons Law Offices
Wheeling, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellee Paula Ann Witt

This Opinion was delivered PER CURIAM.

JUDGE RECHT sitting by temporary assignment.

        1. "A motion for a new trial is governed by a different standard than a motion for a directed verdict. When a trial judge vacates a jury verdict and awards a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial judge has the authority to weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses. If the trial judge finds the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, is based on false evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice, the trial judge may set aside the verdict, even if supported by substantial evidence, and grant a new trial. A trial judge's decision to award a new trial is not subject to appellate review unless the trial judge abuses his or her discretion." Syl. pt. 3, In re State Public Building Asbestos Litigation, 193 W. Va. 119, 454 S.E.2d 413 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995).
        2. "Although the ruling of a trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial is entitled to great respect and weight, the trial court's ruling will be reversed on appeal when it is clear that the trial court has acted under some misapprehension of the law or the evidence." Syl. pt. 4, Sanders v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 159 W. Va. 621, 225 S.E.2d 218 (1976).

        Upon a review of that testimony, the circuit court granted the motion for a new trial. As the final order of June 9, 1995, states: "Based upon the testimony of the defendant [Mr. Sleeth], it appears that there was an indirect method of obtaining information relating to the defendant's financial status by his employment which was irrelevant and inadmissible at the trial and which was properly objected to by plaintiff's counsel." This appeal followed.

See also syl. pt. 1, Toothman v. Brescoach, 195 W. Va. 409, 465 S.E.2d 866 (1995); Coleman v. Sopher, 194 W. Va. 90, 96, 459 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1995); Maynard v. Adkins, 193 W. Va. 456, 459, 457 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1995).
        In language comparable to the above holding in Asbestos Litigation, this Court observed in syllabus point 4 of Young v. Duffield, 152 W. Va. 283, 162 S.E.2d 285 (1968), overruled on other grounds in Tennant, supra, that "[a]n appellate court is more disposed to affirm the action of a trial court in setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial than when such action results in a final judgment denying a new trial." Nevertheless, as this Court acknowledged in Maynard, supra, "consistent with Asbestos Litigation, on the other hand, is the general principle that the judgment of a trial court in awarding a new trial should be reversed . . . if a consideration of the evidence shows that the case was a proper one for jury determination." 193 W. Va. at 459, 457 S.E.2d at 136. Accordingly, we also note syllabus point 4 of Sanders v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 159 W.Va. 621, 225 S.E.2d 218 (1976), which holds:
            Although the ruling of a trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial is entitled to great respect and weight, the trial court's ruling will be reversed on appeal when it is clear that the trial court has acted under some misapprehension of the law or the evidence.

See also Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., 172 W. Va. 769, 774, 310 S.E.2d 835, 840-41 (1983).
        Here, the appellant, Mr. Sleeth, contends that the verdict of the jury was consistent with the evidence and that the granting of a new trial constituted an abuse of discretion. In particular, Mr. Sleeth asserts that the testimony set forth above was merely elicited to provide background information to the jury. Moreover, Mr. Sleeth asserts that, although the circuit court found that the testimony was irrelevant as to the issue of Ms. Witt's damages, the circuit court failed to make any finding that the admission of that testimony actually prejudiced Ms. Witt's case.
        The appellee, Ms. Witt, on the other hand, contends that the circuit court acted within its discretion in granting the new trial because the testimony in question did, in fact, suggest to the jury that Mr. Sleeth lacked sufficient wealth to pay a substantial jury award. In that regard, Ms. Witt cites Wheeler v. Murphy, 192 W. Va. 325, 452 S.E.2d 416 (1994), which was relied upon by the circuit court. The Wheeler case indicates that, although evidence of a defendant's lack of wealth may be relevant and admissible to rebut a claim of punitive damages, such evidence is usually inadmissible in an action, such as this one, which does not involve punitive damages.
        Here, the testimony set forth above constituted the sole basis for the granting of a new trial. The matters set forth therein, concerning Mr. Sleeth's residence and employment, were not mentioned again during the trial and were not raised in closing argument. Specifically, no references to insurance or to amounts regarding Mr. Sleeth's salary or financial worth were ever made before the jury. Moreover, testimony comparable to that set forth above was elicited from other witnesses at trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court instructed the jury that its award was not to be influenced by "sympathy or prejudice" in favor of, or against, either party. Accordingly, upon a careful review of the record, this Court is of the opinion that, although the testimony may have tangentially reflected upon Mr. Sleeth's financial status, Mr. Sleeth is correct in his assertion that the testimony constituted nothing more than background information for consideration by the jury.
        As this Court stated in Kaiser v. Hensley, 173 W. Va. 548, 550, 318 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1983): "It is a common practice for trial attorneys to introduce a client to the jury, and elicit from the client his or her age, address, family situation and employment. We do not condemn this practice." See also 1 F. D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers § 4-2(C) (3rd ed. 1994); W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Counsel's Appeal in Civil Case to Wealth or Poverty of Litigants as Ground for Mistrial, New Trial, or Reversal, 32 A.L.R.2d 9 (1953).
        Finally, as an examination of the record makes clear, Mr. Sleeth is also correct in his assertion that the circuit court failed to make a finding that the admission of the testimony in question prejudiced Ms. Witt's case. Generally, an error at trial which has not been found to be prejudicial cannot form the basis for granting a new trial under Rule 59.See footnote 3 Here, the circuit court focused upon the relevancy of Mr. Sleeth's testimony, and did not specifically address the issue of the possible prejudicial impact of the testimony upon the jury. In Lagoni v. Holiday Inn Midway, 262 Ill. App. 3d 1020, ___, 200 Ill. Dec. 283, ___, 635 N.E.2d 622, 631 (1994), the Appellate Court of Illinois stated: "Not every reference to a party's proprietary interest or occupation which touches on the party's financial status constitutes reversible error. . . . The reference must be reasonably understood to refer to the financial status of the parties and must also be so harmful and prejudicial that it resulted in an improper verdict."
        For the above reasons, therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Ms. Witt a new trial. Consequently, the final order of the Circuit Court of Ohio County, entered on June 9, 1995, is reversed, and this action is remanded to that court for reinstatement of the jury verdict.