James B. Lees, Jr.
James A. McKowen
Hunt, Lees, Farrell & Kessler
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellant

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.
Attorney General
Silas B. Taylor
Managing Deputy Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellee

CHIEF JUSTICE McHUGH delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE ALBRIGHT did not participate.
RETIRED JUSTICE MILLER sitting by temporary assignment.

        1. "'"'"Failure to make timely and proper objection to remarks of counsel made in the presence of the jury, during the trial of a case, constitutes a . . . [forfeiture] of the right to raise the question thereafter in the trial court or in the appellate court." Point 6, Syllabus, Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W. Va. 299 [36 S.E.2d 410 (1945)].' Syllabus point 7, State v. Cirullo, 142 W. Va. 56, 93 S.E.2d 526 (1956)." Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Davis, 180 W. Va. 357, 376 S.E.2d 563 (1988).' Syllabus Point 1, Daniel B. by Richard B. v. Ackerman, 190 W. Va. 1, 435 S.E.2d 1(1993)." Syl. pt. 5, Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., ___ W. Va. ___, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995).
        2. "'An objection to an adverse ruling on a motion in limine to bar evidence at trial will preserve the point, even though no objection was made at the time the evidence was offered, unless there has been a significant change in the basis for admitting the evidence.' Syllabus Point 1, Wimer v. Hinkle, 180 W. Va. 660, 379 S.E.2d 383 (1989)." Syl. pt. 6, Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 180 W. Va. 665, 379 S.E.2d 388 (1989).
        3. "To trigger application of the 'plain error' doctrine, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Syl. pt. 7, State v. Miller, ___ W. Va. ___, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).
        4. "To prove the corpus delicti in a case of homicide two facts must be established: (1) The death of a human being and (2) a criminal agency as its cause." Syl. pt. 4, State v. Hall, 172 W. Va. 138, 304 S.E.2d 43 (1983).
        5. The corpus delicti may not be established solely with an accused's extrajudicial confession or admission. The confession or admission must be corroborated in a material and substantial manner by independent evidence. The corroborating evidence need not of itself be conclusive but, rather, is sufficient if, when taken in connection with the confession or admission, the crime is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
        6. "'"Upon motion to direct a verdict for the defendant, the evidence is to be viewed in light most favorable to prosecution. It is not necessary in appraising its sufficiency that the trial court or reviewing court be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant; the question is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury might justifiably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. West, 153 W. Va. 325, 168 S.E.2d 716 (1969).' Syl. pt. 1, State v. Fischer, 158 W. Va. 72, 211 S.E.2d 666 (1974)." Syl. pt. 10, State v. Davis, 176 W. Va. 454, 345 S.E.2d 549 (1986).
        7. "'"This Court will not pass on a nonjurisdictional question which has not been decided by the trial court in the first instance." Syllabus Point 2, Sands v. Security Trust Co., 143 W. Va. 522, 102 S.E.2d 733 (1958).' Syl. pt. 2, Duquesne Light Co. v. State Tax Dept., 174 W. Va. 506, 327 S.E.2d 683 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029, 105 S. Ct. 2040, 85 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1985)." Syl. pt. 2, Crain v. Lightner, 178 W. Va. 765, 364 S.E.2d 778 (1987).
        8. "The general rule is that a party may not assign as error the giving of an instruction unless he objects, stating distinctly the matters to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." Syl. pt. 3, State v. Gangwer, 169 W. Va. 177, 286 S.E.2d 389 (1982).
        9. "Assignments of error that are not argued in the briefs on appeal may be deemed by this Court to be waived." Syl. pt. 6, Addair v. Bryant, 168 W. Va. 306, 284 S.E.2d 374 (1981).
        10. "Under the provisions of W.Va. Code, 52-2-12, an indictment will not be quashed or abated on the ground that one member of the grand jury is disqualified." Syl. pt. 4, State v. Bailey, 159 W. Va. 167, 220 S.E.2d 432 (1975).
        11. "It is the extremely rare case when this Court will find ineffective assistance of counsel when such a charge is raised as an assignment of error on a direct appeal. The prudent defense counsel first develops the record regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding before the lower court, and may then appeal if such relief is denied. This Court may then have a fully developed record on this issue upon which to more thoroughly review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Syl. pt. 10, State v. Triplett, 187 W. Va. 760, 421 S.E.2d 511 (1992).

            . . . .
            A. He told me, he said, 'I'm at Linda's.' He said, 'I shot Linda.'

            Q. Did he say anything else? Did you say anything?
            A. I said, 'Oh, my God, you didn't.' And he said, 'Yes, I did.' I said, 'Where is she at?' He said, 'I picked her up and took her around back and laid her.'

            Q. Did he say what he shot her with?
            A. A .6 mm.
            Q. Did you take that to be a kind of gun or what?
            A. I don't know anything about guns, sir, I don't know what kind it is. He said --

            Q. Just .6 mm.
            A. Yes.
            Q. Was that the end of the phone call?
            A. No. He said that she was getting her breath hard now. And then he talked and he said, 'Her breath is getting shorter and shorter.' And he said, 'She's soon going to be gone.' He said she asked him to take her to the hospital and he said, 'There's no use.'

            . . . .
            Q. This man just told you he shot probably your best friend. Did you ask him why?

            A. I got to crying and upset and he said he was jealous, is why.

        According to Mrs. Strickland, at approximately 5:00 the following morning, the appellant, with what appeared to be blood stains on his pants, drove to her home, alone, in the victim's truck:
            [Mrs. Strickland] Well, he came on in and I said, 'Rusty, did you really kill Linda?' He said, 'Yes, Jewell, I did.'
            . . . .
            Q. [by the State] Did he tell you how he went about shooting her?

            A. He said he knew we always talked, Linda and, I about that time of a morning and he said he thought he would let us talk our last talk. So he -- when we got done talking, the way everything looks, she walked out and then's when he shot her.

            Q. Where did he shoot her?

            A. In the stomach, he said.

            . . . .

            Q. After he said he shot her, did he say he said anything to her or talk to her or anything like that?

            A. Yes, he said that he talked to her and he told her, he said, 'What you've done, your courting around didn't pay, did it?' He said she said, 'Rusty, I've never been with nary other man but you.' And said that she told him said, 'Take me to the hospital.' And he said, 'There's no use.' She said, 'I love you.' And --

            . . . .

            Q. Well, if he told you he killed her, did you ask him what he did with her body?

            . . . .

            A. He wouldn't tell me. He said, 'I won't tell you.' And I said, 'Will they ever find her?' And he said, 'It will be a while, but they finally will find her.'

            . . . .

            Q. What was he going to do?

            A. He said he was going to Kentucky, and then he was going on somewhere else, but he wasn't going to tell me where.

            . . . .
            A. He said he had Linda's purse with him and he asked me for some money.

        Other evidence presented at trial also revealed that on the night before the appellant shot the victim, Charles Greathouse gave him a ride to a location not far from the victim's home. According to Mr. Greathouse, the appellant was carrying a rifle, a handgun and a trash bag of beer.
        Connie Nichols, the victim's neighbor, testified that at approximately 9:00 am on May 15, 1990, the day the victim disappeared, she had seen the victim and an unidentified man walking across the victim's front yard towards the victim's house. Mrs. Nichols further testified that at approximately 11:15 am, she heard "the crack of a high- powered rifle" from the direction of the victim's house. About forty-five minutes later, Mrs. Nichols, who had gone down the road to collect her mail, observed the victim's truck as it came out of the hollow where her home and the victim's home were located. Mrs. Nichols noticed that the truck was being driven by an unidentified man, that she could see no one else in the truck and that the truck, which usually turned right towards town, instead turned left.
        Thomas Jackson Leslie of Olive Hill, Kentucky, testified that in early June of 1990, Larry Wayne Porter, Mr. Leslie's friend and with whom the appellant was also acquainted,See footnote 4 had driven to his home a red and gray Chevrolet pick-up truck with no license plate. According to Mr. Leslie, the two men rode around in the truck all night and again the next day. At trial, Mr. Leslie was shown a picture of the victim's truck and identified it as the same truck in which he and Mr. Porter rode in June of 1990.
        The appellant's cousin, Jeffrey Garrett, testified that in January or February of 1992, the appellant had telephoned him from a town in Kentucky and asked him to meet him there.See footnote 5 Mr. Garrett gave police a statement in which he stated, in reference to the victim's death, that "[i]t did not happen the way they think. It did not happen like that. It was accidental."
        Prior to trial, the appellant's counsel filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from eliciting testimony "in reference to a 'possible' murder or homicide" from its expert forensic pathologist, Dr. Irvin Sopher, Chief Medical Examiner for the State of West Virginia. In the Opinion section of the Postmortem Examination Findings prepared by Dr. Sopher, he had previously stated:
        The skeletal remains are identified as Linda Lou Carpenter, a 47 year old White female. Identification is accomplished on the basis of circumstances of death, personal effects, [( ] jewelry and clothing), corroborative anthropologic features as well as consistent dental characteristics. As usual, a specific cause of death is not indicated by the skeletal remains. The possibility of gunshot injury cannot be included or excluded. In consideration of the circumstances surrounding disappearance and death, the case is considered as homicide unless proven otherwise.

        At proceedings on the motion in limine held on July 20, 1993, the trial judge indicated that "[t]he issue here is, whether or not Dr. Sopher should be allowed to give his opinion that this was a homicide based on hearsay statements or should his opinion be limited to what he observed and saw when he examined the skeletal remains." Dr. Sopher was permitted to testify "about what he observed in the [postmortem] examination and give what opinions he can give based upon his examination." An order reflecting this ruling was entered on July 23, 1993.
        At trial, Dr. Sopher testified that the skeletal remains presented to him for examination were those of the victim in this case, Linda Lou Carpenter, based upon examination of the skeletal remains, which he determined to be those of a white female, approximately 45 years old and between 5' 4" and 5' 6" tall. Dr. Sopher considered these physical findings, which were strikingly similar to the victim's physicalities, as well as dental informationSee footnote 6 and the clothing and jewelrySee footnote 7 found on and around the skeletal remains . Also significant to Dr. Sopher's identification of the remains was the fact that the time frame in which the recovered skeleton died coincided with the time frame of Linda Lou Carpenter's mysterious disappearance.         Dr. Sopher also testified that the ovoid defect found in the right iliac (hip) bone was consistent with a bullet defect and, more specifically, would be consistent with a 6 millimeter rifle bullet. However, Dr. Sopher went on to testify, repeatedly, that he could not be certain that the ovoid defect was a bullet defect. Thus, based upon the postmortem examination, Dr. Sopher was unable to determine the cause of death. However, Dr. Sopher did testify that based upon the ovoid defect in the victim's right hip bone, which was possibly a bullet defect, statements from law enforcement regarding the scenario of the death, the disappearance of the body and the location of the skeletal remains, the manner of death in this case, in his opinion, was homicide.See footnote 8
        Though the appellant offered an alibi defense, he was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the recommendation of mercy. It is from this conviction that he now appeals.

         The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit a witness to testify as to his opinion or conclusions. A so- called 'expert witness' is an exception to this rule. A witness who by education and experience has become as expert in any art, science, profession, or calling may be permitted to state his opinion as to a matter in which he is versed and which is material to this case. He may also state the reasons for such opinions. You should consider each expert opinion received in this case and give it such weight as you think it deserves, and you may reject it entirely if you conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinion are unsound. And, if you find that the facts upon which a particular expert relied are not sufficient to support the opinion or that the facts relied upon are erroneous, you may reject the opinion.

         In this regard, the court instructs the jury that they are to disregard any testimony and opinion of Dr. Sopher which was based on hearsay information he may have received from law enforcement officers and are to limit their consideration of this evidence, testimony, and opinions to those based upon his scientific and professional examinations of the remains and clothing of the alleged victim.See footnote 11

        We find that appellant's counsel failed to timely object to the introduction of Dr. Sopher's testimony and has, thus, failed to preserve the record for appeal on this issue. See Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., ___ W. Va. ___, ___, 459 S.E.2d 374, 391 (1995). As we have previously held:
             '"'"Failure to make timely and proper objection to remarks of counsel made in the presence of the jury, during the trial of a case, constitutes a . . . [forfeiture] of the right to raise the question thereafter in the trial court or in the appellate court." Point 6, Syllabus, Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W. Va. 299 [36 S.E.2d 410 (1945)].' Syllabus point 7, State v. Cirullo, 142 W.Va. 56, 93 S.E.2d 526 (1956)." Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Davis, 180 W.Va. 357, 376 S.E.2d 563 (1988).' Syllabus Point 1, Daniel B. by Richard B. v. Ackerman, 190 W.Va. 1, 435 S.E.2d 1(1993).

Syl. pt. 5, Tennant, supra. See W. Va. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (requiring timely and specific objection or motion to strike where there is an error in the admission of evidence.)
        On appeal, appellant's counsel maintains that his motion in limine to limit Dr. Sopher's testimony was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. In syllabus point 6 of Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 180 W. Va. 665, 379 S.E.2d 388 (1989), this Court held that "'[a]n objection to an adverse ruling on a motion in limine to bar evidence at trial will preserve the point, even though no objection was made at the time the evidence was offered, unless there has been a significant change in the basis for admitting the evidence.' Syllabus Point 1, Wimer v. Hinkle, 180 W. Va. 660, 379 S.E.2d 383 (1989)."
        We find appellant's contention to be without merit. Our review of the record reveals that appellant did not receive an adverse ruling on his motion in limine. As previously indicated, the trial judge ruled in a July 23, 1993 order that Dr. Sopher would be permitted "to testify as to his personal observation during examination." Though the trial judge did not explicitly state that the appellant's motion in limine was "granted," we consider his ruling to have been favorable to the appellant. We can only logically assume that the appellant likewise viewed the ruling as favorable considering he made no objection to the court's in limine ruling. We recently explained in Tennant, ___ W. Va. ___, 459 S.E.2d at 391-92 that our decision in Bennett, supra,
        was designed to eliminate the requirement of repeating objections to preserve an issue for appeal only in the limited situation when a litigant has objected to and received an adverse ruling. We neither considered nor intended that this narrow proposition should be extended to include litigants who received a favorable ruling. Furthermore, we have consistently stressed that litigants have a continuing obligation to draw the attention of the circuit court to the opposing party's violation of any favorable rulings. Extending Bennett would only serve to undermine trial court proceedings and the appeal process by permitting litigants to appeal on barren records when their trial court strategies fail to produce a desirable verdict. . . . Counsel for litigants have the responsibility [to] bring any violations to the court's attention. Without generalizing too broadly, it is normally the case that [monitoring an in limine order after it is entered] is the job of counsel and not an already burdened circuit judge.

        Accordingly, we conclude that appellant's motion in limine did not preserve this issue for appeal.

Under W. Va. R. Evid. 702, an expert "may testify . . . in the form of an opinion or otherwise." (emphasis added). See also United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1411 (9th Cir. 1993). "Thus, not every expert need express, nor even hold, an opinion with regard to the issues involved in a trial . . . . [T]he decision whether to admit expert testimony does not rest upon the existence or strength of an expert's opinion. Rather, the key concern is whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact, in drawing its own conclusion as to a 'fact in issue.'" Id. (emphasis provided). The inconclusiveness and "imprecision of the expert opinion goes to the weight of evidence for the jury, not admissibility of the evidence." State v. Smith, 715 P.2d 1301, 1308 (Mont. 1986). Moreover, any flaws in the expert testimony can be subject to the cross-examination of its declarant. People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 952 (Colo. 1987). See 2 Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers, § 7-2(A)(3) at 43 (3d ed. 1994) ("[a]bsolute certainty is not prerequisite to the admission of an expert's opinion. A qualified opinion may nonetheless assist the jury. Thus, the degree of the expert's certainty normally goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility."). See also United States v. Baller , 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019; United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 ("Absolute certainty of result is not required for admissibility." Instead, certainty of expert's opinion goes to the weight of testimony, not admissibility.) We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to strike Dr. Sopher's testimony.See footnote 13

Syl. pt. 1, State v. Blackwell, 102 W. Va. 421, 135 S.E. 393 (1926). See syl. pt. 2, State v. Taylor, 174 W. Va. 225, 324 S.E.2d 367 (1984); syl. pt. 3, State v. Dean, 178 W. Va. 581, 363 S.E.2d 467 (1987). See also State v. Mason, 162 W. Va. 297, 304, 249 S.E.2d 793, 798 (1978); 1 Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on West Virginia Criminal Procedure, I-510 (2d ed. 1993). Other jurisdictions have stated that an accused's extrajudicial admission, in and of itself, is likewise not sufficient to establish the corpus delicti.See footnote 17 See State v. Aten, 900 P.2d 579, 584 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) ("[t]he corpus delicti rule requires corroboration of any statement made by the defendant, whether confession, admission, or even neutral description."); Armstrong v. State, 502 P.2d 440, 447 (Alaska 1972); Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 6 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 364, 130 L. Ed. 2d 317 ("A defendant's confession or statement 'may be considered in connection with the other evidence,' but 'the corpus delicti cannot rest upon the confession or admission alone.'" (citation omitted)); Turner v. State, 877 S.W. 2d 513, 515 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) ("The State may not establish the corpus delicti solely with the defendant's extrajudicial admission. However, proof of the corpus delicti need not be made independent of an extrajudicial admission. If there is some evidence corroborating the admission, the admission may be used to aid in the establishment of the corpus delicti. The corroborating evidence is sufficient if it permits a rational finding of guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, when joined with the extrajudicial admission." (citations omitted)); State v. Vangerpen, 888 P.2d 1177, 1185 (Wash. 1995). See also 1 McCormick on Evidence, § 145 at 557 (John William Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992); 7 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2071 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
        We find it only logical to require a criminal conviction to rest on firmer ground than an accused's uncorroborated extrajudicial confession or admission. See Armstrong, supra. We hold, therefore, that the corpus delicti may not be established solely with an accused's extrajudicial confession or admission. The confession or admission must be corroborated in a material and substantial manner by independent evidence. The corroborating evidence need not of itself be conclusive but, rather, is sufficient if, when taken in connection with the confession or admission, the crime is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
        Applying the aforementioned principle to the facts before us, we find that there was independent evidence presented at trial which corroborated the appellant's extrajudicial admission to Mrs. Strickland. The evidence established that the victim disappeared on the day her neighbor, Connie Nichols, heard "the crack of a high-powered rifle" from the direction of the victim's home. There was also testimony that, on the night before the murder, the appellant was dropped off near the victim's home, carrying a rifle and a handgun and, on the following day, was seen driving the victim's truck with bloodstains on his pants. Furthermore, Dr. Sopher testified that the ovoid defect in the victim's hip bone was consistent with a .6 millimeter bullet. We hold that this evidence corroborates, in a material and substantial manner, the appellant's admission that he shot and killed the victim and when viewed in connection therewith, establishes the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
        Finally, motions for judgment of acquittal are to be reviewed under the following standard:
             '"Upon motion to direct a verdict for the defendant, the evidence is to be viewed in light most favorable to prosecution. It is not necessary in appraising its sufficiency that the trial court or reviewing court be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant; the question is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury might justifiably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. West, 153 W.Va. 325, 168 S.E.2d 716 (1969).' Syl. pt. 1, State v. Fischer, 158 W.Va. 72, 211 S.E.2d 666 (1974).

Syl. pt. 10, State v. Davis, 176 W.Va. 454, 345 S.E.2d 549 (1986). Consistent with our conclusion above, we find that the evidence in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for a jury to justifiably find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to deny appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

Id. at ___, 459 S.E.2d at 125-26 (footnote omitted).
         As we held in syllabus point 10 of State v. Triplett, 187 W. Va. 760 , 421 S.E.2d 511 (1992),
            [i]t is the extremely rare case when this Court will find ineffective assistance of counsel when such a charge is raised as an assignment of error on a direct appeal. The prudent defense counsel first develops the record regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding before the lower court, and may then appeal if such relief is denied. This Court may then have a fully developed record on this issue upon which to more thoroughly review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

        Moreover, as reflected in this opinion thus far, the performance by counsel at trial was not error in every instance alleged by appellate counsel.See footnote 28 In any event, this Court cannot intelligently evaluate appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as an adequate record has not been developed reflecting trial counsel's explanation of their actions below. Miller, ___ W. Va. at ___, 459 S.E.2d at 128. Should appellant wish to pursue his ineffective assistance claim, he is not foreclosed from more properly developing it on a post-conviction collateral attack.See footnote 29 Id. See also Miller at syl. pts. 5 and 6 (outlining how ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be reviewed).

            So I don't see any problem with his testimony on that. I thought it was very candid and straightforward and very professional.

        We disagree with appellant's contention that Dr. Sopher's testimony was based upon mere speculation and was in contradiction of the evidence. As we indicated above, Dr. Sopher testified that he based his opinion that the manner of death in this case was homicide upon the ovoid defect in the hip bone, which was possibly a bullet defect, statements from law enforcement regarding the scenario of the death, the disappearance of the body and the location of the body recovery. In Mayhorn, ___ W. Va. at ___, 454 S.E.2d at 91, we indicated that W. Va. R. Evid. 703 has been interpreted "to allow experts to rely on the reports and observations of others even though this might mean the expert is basing his opinion on hearsay." (citing 3 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein's Evidence § 703[01] at 703-11 (1994)). Clearly, then, the propriety of the trial court's in limine order which limited Dr. Sopher's testimony to his observations at the postmortem examination is called into question. However, in light of our discussion above, it is not necessary to address that issue.

Syl. pt. 1, Luff, supra.

            It is not necessary that malice must have existed for any particular length of time and it may first come into existence at the time of the act or at any previous time.

        Upon review of the entire malice instruction at issue, which this Court previously approved in State v. Bongalis, 180 W. Va. 584, 588 n. 1, 378 S.E.2d 449, 453 n. 1 (1989), we find that the jury was specifically instructed that malice "may be inferred or implied by you from all of the evidence in this case if you find such inference is reasonable from facts and circumstances in this case which have been proven to your satisfaction beyond all reasonable doubt[.]" (emphasis added). This instruction sufficiently required the jury to find that malice must be shown by the appellant against the victim in this case.

        Appellant's trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the photographs and videotape as well as to the State's closing argument, thereby failing to preserve this error, if it was error, for appellate review. Syl. pt. 3, O'Neal v. Peake Operating Co., 185 W. Va. 28, 404 S.E.2d 420 (1991) ("'Where objections were not shown to have been made in the trial court, and the matters concerned were not jurisdictional in character, such objections will not be considered on appeal.'" (citation omitted)). Moreover, we note that on appeal, appellant's counsel failed to provide any argument in support of this assignment of error. Accordingly, this assignment of error is deemed waived. Syl. pt. 6, Addair v. Bryant, 168 W. Va. 306, 284 S.E.2d 374 (1981) ("Assignments of error that are not argued in the briefs on appeal may be deemed by this Court to be waived.")

        I said, 'Well, what's going to kill you, Linda?' And she said, 'Rusty.' Said, 'He told me he was going to kill me.' I said, 'Well, if he told you he was going to kill you, why don't you do something about it?' And she said, 'I have told some of them,' but she didn't say who it was.