Webster J. Arceneaux, III, Esq. Basil R. Legg, Jr., Esq.
Lewis, Friedberg, Glasser, Casey & Rollins David J. Romano, Esq.
Charleston, West Virginia Law Offices of David J. Romano
Attorney for the Appellees Clarksburg, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellant
JUSTICE RECHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
RETIRED JUSTICE MILLER sitting by temporary assignment.
JUSTICE ALBRIGHT did not participate.
1. No deference is given to conclusions of law of an administrative law
judge or a circuit court, so that the standard of judicial review by this Court is de novo.
2. County boards of education have substantial discretion in matters
relating to hiring, assignment, transfer, and promotion of school personnel, as well as matters
involving curricular programs and qualification and placement of personnel implementing
those programs. However, that discretion must be tempered in a manner that is reasonably
exercised, in the best interest of the schools, and in a manner which is not arbitrary and
capricious.
Also during the course of the Level II hearing, testimony developed that at
some time after the Fall 1991 breakfast meeting, a decision was made to implement a
teaching program known as "cross-teaching," where a group of teachers would instruct
students at the sixth grade level, progress with them through the eighth grade, and then begin
instruction on another group of sixth grade students. In order to properly implement this
program, 6-8 Certification was required. The appellees were never informed of the decision
to implement a cross-teaching program between the breakfast meeting in the Fall of 1991 and
the date of the posting of the vacancies on February 25, 1992.
The Level II decision was adverse to the appellees with Superintendent Kittle
finding that the Board did not violate W. Va. Code 18A-4-7a (1993)See footnote 6 because this statute, which establishes the protocols for filling vacant teaching positions, does not expressly
mandate that teaching positions be posted as "grade-specific."
The appellees appealed the Level II decision directly to Level IV,See footnote 7 and in a
decision dated September 18, 1992, the administrative law judge denied the appellees'
grievance by concluding that on the record there was a failure to demonstrate that the Board
acted improperly by requiring all applicants for the middle school positions to have 6-8
Certification.
The appellees then filed an appeal of the administrative law judge's decision
in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County on October 19, 1992, pursuant to the provisions of
W. Va. Code 18-29-7 (1985).See footnote 8
By Order entered July 29, 1994, the circuit court concluded that the Board
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by posting certification requirements more
restrictive than those previously represented to the appellees. The circuit court also found
that the Board was estopped from requiring a 6-8 Certification based upon their
representations that this certification would not be a necessary prerequisite for appointment
to the vacancies at Lumberport Middle School. The circuit court directed the Board to repost
all of the positions at Lumberport Middle School without the 6-8 Certification requirements.
It is from this decision that the Board now appeals.
We have repeatedly recognized that county boards of education have
substantial discretion in matters relating to hiring, assignment, transfer, and promotion of
school personnel. However, that discretion must be tempered in a manner that is reasonably
exercised, in the best interest of the schools, and in a manner which is not arbitrary and
capricious. Syllabus Point 3, Dillon v. Board of Education of County of Wyoming, 177
W. Va. 145, 351 S.E.2d 58 (1986).
We now have no hesitancy in expanding the Dillon standard to matters
involving curricular programs and the qualification and placement of personnel implementing
those programs. See Pauley v. Bailey, 174 W. Va. 167, 324 S.E.2d 128 (1984) (holding that
the West Virginia Board of Education and the State Superintendent of Schools have a duty
to ensure delivery and maintenance of a "thorough and efficient system of free schools" in
West Virginia as embodied in A Master Plan for Public Education).
We are mindful of the delicate balance measuring the extent of judicial
involvement in the public schools of this State and of our obedience to the West Virginia
Constitution, which assures every student in West Virginia a thorough and efficient
education. Id. While we will continue to remain circumspect in our scrutiny of purely
"educational" issues, we will be constantly vigilant in assuring that the constitutional
guarantee of a thorough and efficient education is maintained. Requiring the boards of
education to act in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious in matters of curricular programs and personnel assigned to implement those programs, in our view, maintains the
balance between these goals.
We are informed by the testimony at the Level II hearing that the Board
decided to implement an innovative teaching method known as "cross-teaching" or "cross-
teaming." This method groups teachers into teaching teams that follow one class of students
from sixth grade through eighth grade. Teachers at Lumberport Middle School could be
required to teach eighth grade students, a task exceeding that permitted teachers with 1-6
Certification.
In order for this Court to conclude that the Board acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner in requiring a 6-8 Certification, we must attack the underpinning of that
requirement, namely, the decision to implement a "cross-teaming" or "cross-teaching"
concept at Lumberport Middle School. We are not willing to interfere with a Board's
educational discretion in this regard. Based on the record before us, we are not in a position
to conclude that this method is not in the best interest of the schools of Harrison County, and
certainly without a sufficient record, we are unwilling to label this decision arbitrary and
capricious.See footnote 10
That portion of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County that
concluded that the Board of Education of Harrison County acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner by requiring an Elementary Education 6-8 Certification for the vacant
positions at Lumberport Middle School is reversed. That portion of the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County that concluded that the Board of Education of Harrison
County acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by not permitting the appellees the
opportunity to obtain the necessary certification to be eligible for the vacant positions at
Lumberport Middle School requiring an Elementary Education 6-8 Certification is affirmed,
and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County with directions to enter
an order requiring the Board of Education of Harrison County to repost the positions at
Lumberport Middle School requiring an Elementary Education 6-8 Certification with specific
directions that the appellees be given an adequate and sufficient opportunity to obtain the
necessary certification to be considered as eligible applicants for the vacant positions at
Lumberport Middle School, which opportunity shall not extend later than February 1, 1996.
Reversed, in part;
affirmed, in part; and
remanded with directions.
(b) Level two.
Within five days of receiving the decision of the immediate
supervisor, the grievant may appeal the decision to the chief
administrator, and such administrator or his or her designee
shall conduct a hearing in accordance with section six [§ 18-29-
6] of this article within five days of receiving the appeal and
shall issue a written decision within five days of such hearing.
Such decision may affirm, modify or reverse the decision
appealed from. Level four hearing examiners or the chief
administrator shall have the authority to subpoena witnesses and
documents for level two and level three hearings in accordance
with the provision of section one [§ 29A-5-1], article five,
chapter twenty-nine-a of this code, and may issue a subpoena
upon the written request of any party to the grievance.
Boards shall be required to post and date notices of all openings in established, existing or newly created positions in conspicuous working places for all professional personnel to observe for at least five working days. The notice shall be posted within twenty working days of such position openings and shall include the job description. Any special criteria or skills that are required by the position shall be specifically stated in the job description and directly related to the performance of the job.
(d) Level four.
(1) If the grievant is not satisfied with the action taken by the
chief administrator [at the Level two hearing], or, if appealed to
level three, the action taken by the governing board, within five
days of the written decision the grievant may request, in writing,
on a form furnished by the employer, that the grievance be
submitted to a hearing examiner as provided for in section five
[§ 18-29-5] of this article, such hearing to be conducted in
accordance with section six of this article within ten days
following the request therefor; Provided, That such hearing may
be held within thirty days following the request or within such
time as is mutually agreed upon by the parties, if the hearing
examiner gives reasonable cause, in writing, as to the necessity
for such delay.
(2) Within thirty days following the hearing, the hearing
examiner shall render a decision in writing to all parties setting
forth findings and conclusions on the issues submitted. Subject
to the provisions of section seven of this article, the decision of
the hearing examiner shall be final upon the parties and shall be
enforceable in circuit court.
All information and data generated by the board and in its
custody relative to level four decisions and copies of such
decisions shall be provided at reasonable cost to any individual
requesting it.
The decision of the hearing examiner shall be final upon the
parties and shall be enforceable in circuit court: Provided, That
either party may appeal to . . . the circuit court of Kanawha
County or in the circuit court of the county in which the
grievance occurred within thirty days of receipt of the hearing
examiner's decision. . . .
The court's ruling shall be upon the entire record made before
the hearing examiner, and the court may hear oral arguments
and require written briefs. The court may reverse, vacate or
modify the decision of the hearing examiner or may remand the
grievance to the chief administrator of the institution for further
proceedings.