Joseph W. Wagoner
Haller & Wagoner
Weston, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellants
Robert J. Wallace
Coleman & Wallace
Buckhannon, West Virginia
Attorney for Union Drilling
Benjamin N. Snyder
R. Neal Pierce
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Columbia Natural Resources
Alexander M. Ross
Buckhannon, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellee Robert Vincent
JUSTICE WORKMAN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON did not participate.
JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary assignment.
1. "Where the language of a statute is clear and without
ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to
the rules of interpretation." Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.
Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
2. The provisions of West Virginia Code § 22C-9-7 (1994),
concerning application to the Oil and Gas Conservation Commissioner
upon the drilling of one deep well for the establishment of
drilling units and the pooling of interests in drilling units, are
discretionary only. The invocation of those statutory provisions
can only be sought through express application to the Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission.
3. "The owner of a minority interest in the oil and gas
underlying a tract of land, the other interests in which are under
lease, who refuses to execute the lease binding his cotenants and
a unitization agreement embracing the tract mentioned and an
adjoining boundary in which he has no interest and which is under
lease to the same lessee, neither the lease nor the unitization
agreement being under attack, has no equitable interest in the
production of a well drilled by the lessee upon the adjoining
boundary." Syllabus, Boggess v. Milam, 127 W. Va. 654, 34 S.E.2d
267 (1945).
AppellantsSee footnote 1 challenge an adverse summary judgment ruling
entered by the Circuit Court of Upshur County on December 13, 1993,
dismissing their action to recover damages for trespass against
Appellees Union Drilling, Inc.See footnote 2 and Columbia Gas Transmission
Corporation ("Columbia Gas") in connection with oil and gas rights
owned by Appellants and the two individually-named Appellees.See footnote 3
After examining the issues presented, we affirm the lower court's
ruling.
The following facts are undisputed. By deed dated November
17, 1977, Rosetta Wimer conveyed unto Appellants and the
individually-named Appellees two adjoining tracts of land. One of
the tracts contained 18 acres and the other tract was comprised of
89 acres. Mrs. Wimer reserved for herself a life estate and life
interest in the two tracts. The deed referencing this transaction was properly recorded and indexed on December 8, 1977. Mrs. Wimer
died on January 14, 1987.
Prior to her death, however, Mrs. Wimer had executed an oil
and gas lease with Appellee Union Drilling which covered both the
18-acre and 89-acre tracts now owned by Appellants and the
individually-named Appellees. This lease was executed on August
31, 1981, and required Union Drilling to engage in development
within 2 years from the date of execution to extend the term of the
lease. The oil and gas lease provided for pooling with other
contiguous lands and for royalty payments based on the ratio of the
number of acres owned compared to the total number of acres
included in the pooled acreage. Mrs. Wimer's royalty payment under
the pooling arrangement was calculated by multiplying the standard
1/8th royalty payment by 107/238.See footnote 4
In reliance on the August 31, 1981, lease agreement, Union
Drilling and Columbia Gas filed a declaration of pooling in the
office of the Upshur County Commission Clerk. The original pooling
declaration included the 89-acre tract now owned by the Appellants
and adjoining tracts not owned by Appellants of 81 acres and 50
acres for an aggregate unit of 220 acres. Later, this pooling declaration was amended to include the 18-acre tract also owned by
Appellants, making the pooled unit 238 acres as of September 27,
1982.
Union Drilling and Columbia Gas obtained a drilling permitSee footnote 5
from the state to drill a deep wellSee footnote 6 and later completed a gas well
upon the 50-acre tract that was not owned by the Appellants. This
well was drilled in the Oriskany formation to a depth of more than
6000 feet and began gas production on March 26, 1982. This well
is still being operated as of this date. No other wells have been
drilled on the 238-acre tract. Additionally, no oil or gas wells
have been drilled on the Appellants' 89-acre or 18-acre tracts.
Appellants are the vested owners of an undivided interest in
the 107 acres of oil and gas. They are not parties to any lease
agreement with Union Drilling or Columbia Gas. Additionally,
Appellants have not granted to Union Drilling or Columbia Gas a
right to operate and produce with regard to their 107 acres. Moreover, Appellants do not claim to have any interest in the L. F.
Simons tract--the 50-acre tract on which the only operating well is
situated.
Like Appellants, Appellees Beulah Mullins and Robert Vincent
are vested owners of the combined 107-acre tract. They, however,
have ratified the lease agreement entered into between Mrs. Wimer
and Union Drilling. Appellants were similarly provided with an
opportunity to ratify the lease agreement, but have opted not to do
so. Appellants have not filed any protest to the drilling or
operation of the well at issue although they were aware of the well
since before it went into operation.
On April 4, 1988, Appellants filed a complaint in circuit
court alleging trespass against Appellees and seeking damages.See footnote 7
The theory alleged in the complaint is that the absence of a lease
agreement between Appellees and Appellants compelled a trespass
when gas was recovered from the pooled drilling unit, even though
the well from which the gas was recovered was not on land owned by
Appellants. Appellants' trespass argument is predicated on a
belief that the an oil and gas operator should be held liable for oil and gas drainage via a well that is situated on another's
property. Upon review of the pleadings and memoranda of the
parties, the circuit court determined that there were no genuine
issues of material fact and granted summary judgment by order dated
December 13, 1993, to Appellees. This appeal challenges the trial
court's granting of summary relief.
Appellants frame the issue presented as:
Whether the creator of an oil and gas
unit (pooling) who does not hold the leasehold
operating rights to part of the acreage placed
in the unit, is a trespassser as to the oil
and gas upon the acreage upon which it does
not have a valid lease; and further what
remedy is available to . . . [Appellants] for
the wrongful taking of their oil and gas.
Appellants contend that the absence of a lease agreement between
themselves and Union Drilling impelled the occurrence of a trespass
when gas was removed from the pooled unit. In support of their
position, Appellants rely heavily on the enactment of certain oil
and gas conservation statutes in 1972. See W. Va. Code §§ 22C-9-1
to -16 (1994) (formerly W. Va. Code §§ 22-4A-1 to -15 (1972)).
They advance the argument that these conservation statutes
supersede the common law relied on by Appellees.
Appellees observe that the circuit court had to make two
separate inquiries in resolving the entitlement of a summary
judgment award. First, the court had to determine whether the
Appellees were required to include the lands owned by Appellants in
a unitization or pooling. Then, if the first question was resolved
in the negative, the court had to decide whether the Appellees had
any liability in trespass to the Appellants as land owners whose
property may have been subject to drainage from a well located
on property belonging to other individuals. In resolving the
issues before us, we similarly follow this two-pronged analysis.
The first issue requires analysis of the language set forth in
West Virginia Code § 22C-9-7 (formerly W. Va. Code § 22-4A-7) to
determine whether the issue of pooling is voluntary or mandatory as
Appellants contend. The relevant portions of West Virginia Code §
22C-9-7 provide:
(a) Drilling units.
(1) After one discovery deep well has
been drilled establishing a pool, an
application to establish drilling units may be
filed with the commissioner by the operator of
such discovery deep well or by the operator of
any lands directly and immediately affected by
the drilling of such discovery deep well, or
subsequent deep wells in said pool, . . .
. . . .
(b) Pooling of interests in drilling
units.
(1) When two or more separately owned
tracts are embraced within a drilling unit, or
when there are separately owned interests in
all or a part of a drilling unit, the
interested persons may pool their tracts or
interests for the development and operation of
the drilling unit. In the absence of
voluntary pooling and upon application of any
operator having an interest in the drilling
unit, and after notice and hearing, the
commissioner shall enter an order pooling all
tracts or interests in the drilling unit for
the development and operation thereof and for
sharing production therefrom. . . .
W. Va. Code § 22C-9-7(a)(1), (b)(1) (emphasis supplied).
Much of Appellants' argument is predicated on an assumption
that the statutory provisions above-quoted are compulsory in
nature. According to Appellants, the procedures of West Virginia
Code § 22C-9-7 "provide[] for forced inclusion in a unit." We do
not reach the same conclusion. As Appellees emphasize, neither in
1982 nor currently, have the provisions found in West Virginia Code
§§ 22C-9-1 to -16 contained any provisions making it mandatory for
an oil and gas developer to establish a drilling unit or pool
pursuant to statute before it can drill a well.See footnote 8
The language of West Virginia Code § 22C-9-7(a)(1) with regard
to drilling units is clearly stated in discretionary terms. That
subsection provides that "[a]fter one discovery deep well has been
drilled establishing a pool, an application to establish drilling
units may be filed with the commissioner. . . ." W. Va. Code
§ 22C-9-7(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). The legislators' choice of
the term "may" leaves no doubt that availment of the procedures for
establishing drilling units was intended to operate in a
discretionary, rather than an obligatory, manner. See id. As this
Court has repeatedly recognized, "[w]here the language of a statute
is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted
without resorting to the rules of interpretation." Syl. Pt. 2,
State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968). Thus, we
agree with Appellees that no compulsory unitization is mandated by
West Virginia Code § 22C-9-7(a).
Similarly, the language found in West Virginia Code § 22C-9-
7(b)(1) which addresses the pooling of interests in drilling units
is also stated in voluntary, as opposed to, mandatory terms.
Again, the statutory drafters chose the term "may" rather than
shall with regard to pooling of interests. See W. Va. Code § 22C-
9-7(b)(1). Moreover, as Appellees have observed, the language of
West Virginia Code § 22C-9-7(b)(1) expressly provided Appellants
with an opportunity of which they chose not to avail themselves.
Appellees could have applied to the Oil and Gas Conservation Commissioner ("Commissioner") to seek an order pooling the tracts
in which they had an ownership interest with the lands on which the
operating well was placed. The statute permits an "operator" to so
apply and the term "operator" is defined as including the owner of
oil and gas rights in the event there is no oil and gas lease in
existence with respect to a specific tract. See id. and W. Va.
Code § 22C-9-2(a)(4).
After examining these statutory provisions, we conclude that
the provisions of West Virginia Code § 22C-9-7, concerning
application to the Commissioner upon the drilling of one deep well
for the establishment of drilling units and the pooling of
interests in drilling units, are discretionary only. The
invocation of those statutory provisions can only be sought through
express application to the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
("Commission").
The second issue concerns whether a trespass occurred by
virtue of possible drainage from Appellants' lands attendant to the
removal of gas from the L. F. Simons tract. An analogous issue was
addressed in Boggess v. Milam, 127 W. Va. 654, 34 S.E.2d 267
(1945), in which we reversed an award of summary judgment to an
individual claiming an equitable interest in connection with the removal of oil and gas from an adjacent 116-acre tract of land.
The plaintiff owned a one-tenth mineral interest in a 53-acre
tract, but refused to grant a lease to the operator or to
participate in the unitization agreement signed by the owners of an
adjacent 116-acre tract. After considering two divergent theoriesSee footnote 9
on the ownership of mineral rights, we stated:
It is difficult to perceive how the
complainant, under either of the divergent
theories that this Court has applied to the
ownership of oil and gas, can claim a legal or
an equitable interest to the oil and gas
produced from the fifty-three acre tract. As
a matter of fact, his actual ownership of oil
and gas underlying the one hundred sixteen
acre tract must be regarded as conjectural
because in the absence of actual production
nothing beyond a high degree of likelihood is
shown. . . . We have been unable to find a
case in which, with no contractual obligation
to be considered, the owner of land has been
held to have an interest, legal or equitable,
in the oil and gas underlying adjoining or
adjacent lands in which he holds no title.
On the contrary, the recent decisions are
all to the effect that the owner of the fee is
vested with title in the oil and gas
underlying the boundary to which he holds
title, although it is admitted that due to the
nature of both or either they may not remain
in place and are not the subject of actual
possession until brought to the surface,
because until that occurs there is no way to
determine positively that oil or gas does, in
fact, lie under a designated boundary.
Id. at 659-60, 34 S.E.2d at 269-70.
We announced in Boggess, what is referred to as the common law
rule of capture, in holding that:
The owner of a minority interest in the
oil and gas underlying a tract of land, the
other interests in which are under lease, who
refuses to execute the lease binding his
cotenants and a unitization agreement
embracing the tract mentioned and an adjoining
boundary in which he has no interest and which
is under lease to the same lessee, neither the
lease nor the unitization agreement being
under attack, has no equitable interest in the
production of a well drilled by the lessee
upon the adjoining boundary.
Id. at 654, 34 S.E.2d at 267, syllabus.
As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Trent v.
Energy Development Corp., 902 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1990),
West Virginia recognizes the venerable common
law doctrine of capture: '[Oil and gas]
belong to the owner of the land, and are part
of it, so long as they are on it or in it
subject to his control; but when they escape
and go into other land, or come under
another's control, the title of the former
owner is gone. If an adjoining owner drills
his own land, and taps a deposit of oil or
gas, extending under his neighbor's field, so
that it comes into his well, it becomes his
property.'
Id. at 1147 (quoting Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 670 (1895))
(emphasis supplied).
Appellants argue that with the enactment of the oil and gas
conservation statutes now found in Chapter 22C of the West Virginia
Code, the applicability of the common law rule of capture
enunciated in Boggess is "highly suspect." We disagree. The rule
of capture has a long-standing history in West Virginia and the
statutory provisions enacted in Chapter 22C of the West Virginia
Code do not supersede or eviscerate this common law rule. What the
statutes do is to provide individuals like Appellants with a
mechanism by which they can participate in oil and gas removal from
a deep well which is located on adjacent property and may affect
their interests through possible drainage. Appellees concede that
once the Commissioner has been requested to establish a pool and
subsequent pooling and spacing rules are established pursuant to
West Virginia Code § 22C-9-7, the rule of capture is suspended.
Appellants, however, chose not to avail themselves of their right
to petition the Commissioner for the purpose of seeking to invoke
the provisions of West Virginia Code § 22C-9-7. Rather than
seeking administrative remedies set forth in Chapter 22C or
participating voluntarily in the lease or pooling agreements by
ratification, the Appellants chose to bring suit under a trespass
theory. In doing so, they voluntarily subjected themselves to the
common law rule of capture.
After fully examining the issues at hand, we conclude that the
circuit court correctly determined that no trespass occurred by virtue of possible drainage of Appellants' mineral interests from
a well located on property separate from that owned by Appellants.
Appellants were provided with the same opportunity to ratify the
terms of the lease and pooling agreements entered into between
Union Drilling and Mrs. Wimer. They opted not to do so, apparently
under the mistaken notion that they would be able to bargain for an
increased royalty payment.See footnote 10
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Circuit Court of
Upshur County is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.