v.
RANSON INVESTORS, A WEST VIRGINIA LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; GEORGE W. BUSHEY, INDIVIDUALLY;
AND VERNON L. TETLOW, INDIVIDUALLY,
Appellants
John C. Skinner, Jr., Esquire
F. Samuel Byrer, Esquire
Nichols & Skinner, L.C.
Charles Town, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellee
JUSTICE NEELY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1. "Loss of profits can not be based on estimates which
amount to mere speculation and conjecture but must be proved with
reasonable certainty." Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Shatzer v.
Freeport Coal Company, 144 W.Va. 178, 107 S.E.2d 503 (1959).
2. A new business may recover lost profits in a breach
of contract action, but only if the plaintiff establishes the lost
profits with reasonable certainty; lost profits may not be granted
if they are too remote or speculative.
Neely, Justice:
Cell Incorporated, the plaintiff below and appellee in
this Court, entered into a commercial lease with Ranson Investors,
defendant below and appellant in this Court, for commercial space
in Ranson, Jefferson County, West Virginia. The premises to be let
by the appellant were to be used for a grocery store; however, the
shopping center to which the lease related had not yet been
constructed. After the lease was entered into, Ranson demanded
increased rents from Cell on the grounds that they were unable to
obtain financing for the shopping center under the terms of the
lease as written. Ranson never gave Cell possession of the
premises.
Unbeknownst to Cell, Ranson negotiated with a third
party, Roger Barnhart, to lease the grocery store space in the
proposed shopping center. Nonetheless, notwithstanding Ranson's
willingness to double deal, Ranson never built a shopping center in
the location contemplated by their lease with Cell, and the entire
scheme fell through with Ranson barely getting out with a whole
skin. (In other words, we have before us a typical real estate
development dream where everyone thinks big thoughts except the
institutions who are to do the financing.) A shopping center was
ultimately constructed on the property Ranson had bought for the
purpose but later sold and Barnhart's grocery opened in the exact
location that Ranson had promised to Cell, IncorporatedSee footnote 1.
Cell filed suit in 1986 against Ranson alleging damages
for lost profits during the entire twenty year lease term because
Ranson breached their contract. The case was tried in the Circuit
Court of Jefferson County in March, 1991 and Cell presented
evidence of lost profits only for the initial ten years of the
lease (1984-1994). Ranson objected to introduction of the lost
profit evidence but made no effort to rebut the testimony of Cell's
witnesses.
At the close of Cell's case, Ranson moved for a directed
verdict. The circuit court denied the motion for a directed
verdict, but the court limited the jury's consideration of the lost
profits claim to the period from 1 July 1984 through 1991, even
though the court had permitted Cell to present evidence of lost
profits through 1994. In response to the judge's ruling, Cell
limited its closing argument to the computation of lost profits for
the initial seven years of the lease.
Cell's experts' opinions concerning lost profits were
based upon market data, the consumer price index for retail food,
and the actual operating results of Barnhart's grocery. Barnhart's
was the tenant that took roughly the same location that Ranson had
promised to Cell under the lease agreement. Mr. Barnhart testified
about the desirability and profitability of his grocery's location,
and Mr. Barnhart testified that there were no other grocery stores
in the area during the period at issue in the lawsuit. Indeed, Mr.
Barnhart testified that net profits in his store ran anywhere from
$100,000 to $325,000 per year.
The expert witnesses linked Mr. Barnhart's actual
operating data to the market surveys and consumer price index in
arriving at their opinions. After a four day trial, the jury
returned a general verdict in favor of Cell for $510,017, which was
substantially the experts' calculation of lost profits for the
years 1984 through 1991 reduced to their "present value" as of
1984. We reverse.
"Loss of profits can not be based on estimates which
amount to mere speculation and conjecture but must be proved with
reasonable certainty." Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Shatzer v.
Freeport Coal Company, 144 W.Va. 178, 107 S.E.2d 503 (1959); Syl.
pt. 5, Adair v. Motors Insurance Corp., 157 W.Va. 1013, 207 S.E.2d
163 (1974); Syl. pt. 11, Smithson v. USF&G, 186 W.Va. 195, 411
S.E.2d 850 (1991). In Shatzer, this Court described the type of
proof that must be shown before a recovery for lost profits may be
granted:
The proof must not consist of mere conjecture,
speculation, or opinion not founded on facts,
but must consist of actual facts from which a
reasonably accurate conclusion regarding the
cause and the amount of the loss can be
logically and rationally drawn.
Shatzer, 144 W.Va. at 185, 107 S.E.2d at 508. However, in Shatzer
this Court went on to note:
Prospective profits of a new business or
enterprise are generally regarded as too
remote, contingent and speculative to satisfy
the requisite standard of reasonable certainty
in determining the elements of recoverable
damages in an action for breach of contract or
for a tort.
Shatzer, 144 W.Va. at 186, 107 S.E.2d at 508.
Since the time of Shatzer, however, the nationwide trend
has been away from a per se rule against the award of lost profits
to new businesses and towards a rule that requires a strong
evidentiary basis for proving lost profits of a new business before
a court will grant them:
It is impossible for anyone, including an
appellate court, to foresee all the possible
situations in which meritorious claims could
be asserted for lost profits even though the
business to which those profits might accrue
had not yet commenced operation. Nor is any
worthwhile end to be achieved by permitting
one party to breach his contracts with
impunity -- giving him an option, as it were--
because the other party has not yet commenced
operations. The trend of the modern cases is
plainly toward replacing the old rule of law
with a rule of evidence-- the unquestionable
principle that damages for loss of profits
must be proven with reasonable certainty and
that the evidence must support that finding by
trier of fact.
Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits 3d 228 (1987). Although
the courts of most other jurisdictions share our concern for the
risk of allowing speculative loss of profit awards for new
businesses, virtually all believe that those concerns can be
addressed by requiring a high level of proof:
While we agree . . . that lost future profits
are difficult for a new business to calculate
and prove, we are persuaded that there should
be no per se rule against the award of such
damages where they may be shown with the
requisite degree of certainty.
Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, 319 N.C. 534, 546, 356
S.E.2d 578, 585 (1987). Accord, AGF, Inc. v. Great Lakes Heat
Treating Company, 51 Ohio St.3d 177, 555 N.E.2d 634 (1990); W.W.
Gay Mechanical Contractor, Inc. v. Wharfside Two, Ltd., 545 So.2d
1348 (Fla. 1989); Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe Associates, 296 S.C.
207, 371 S.E.2d 532 (1988); Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson,
506 So.2d 317 (Ala. 1987); Short v. Riley 150 Ariz. 583, 724 P.2d
1252 (1986); Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa
1984); Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Hawaii 594, 618 P.2d 283
(1980); Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich. 639, 242 N.W.2d 372
(1976).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §352 cmt. b (1981) states:
The difficulty of proving lost profits varies
greatly with the nature of the transaction.
If, for example, it is the seller who claims
lost profit on the ground that the buyer's
breach has caused him to lose a sale, proof of
lost profit will ordinarily not be difficult.
If, however, it is the buyer who claims lost
profit on the ground that the seller's breach
caused him loss in other transactions, the
task of proof is harder. Furthermore, if the
transaction is more complex and extends into
the future, as where the seller agrees to
furnish all of the buyer's requirements over a
period of years, proof of the loss of profits
caused by the seller's breach is more
difficult. If the breach prevents the injured
party from carrying on a well-established
business, the resulting loss of profits can
often be proved with sufficient certainty.
Evidence of past performance will form the
basis for a reasonable prediction as to the
future. See Illustration 5. However, if the
business is a new one or if it is a
speculative one that is subject to great
fluctuations in volume, costs or prices, proof
will be more difficult. Nevertheless, damages
may be established with reasonable certainty
with the aid of expert testimony, economic and
financial data, market surveys and analyses,
business records of similar enterprises, and
the like. [Emphasis added].
Today, we expressly adopt the rule of the clear majority
of jurisdictions and the Restatement that a new business may
recover lost profits in a breach of contract action, but only if
the plaintiff establishes the lost profits with reasonable
certainty; lost profits may not be granted if they are too remote
or speculative.
The question before us today, then, is whether the
evidence of lost profits submitted by Cell upon which the jury
based its judgment was too speculative to support a jury award. We
find that it was.
The market analysis provided to Mr. Paul Wilson and Mr.
James Wilson who owned Cell, Inc. dated 7 March 1985, by Rich
Foods, a grocery wholesaler, established that a store must contain
no less than 12,000 square feet to be competitive. Roger Barnhart,
who ultimately opened a much larger grocery store constructed by
parties unrelated to this law suit, on the land where Ranson was to
build their shopping center, testified to substantial actual
profits, but his store contained approximately 17,276 square feet.
Based upon Mr. Barnhart's testimony concerning his current sales,
Cell's economist attempted to apply Barnhart's operating results to
the charts and tables in the Operating Results of Independent
Supermarkets for 1989. The statistics used were for conventional
supermarkets in the mid south region of less than 10,000 square
feet. However, there were only eleven stores in that category out
of 19,000 member stores!
Unlike Mr. Barnhart, who already owned several grocery
stores before he took over the location in Ranson, Paul and James
Wilson did not have experience running a grocery store; the
proposed size of the Wilson (Cell's) store was roughly 8,000 square
feet smaller than the successful Barnhart store; and, there was
evidence that a store of less than 12,000 square feet would not be
profitable. Accordingly, the damages evidence was too speculative
to sustain a jury award.
Having decided that the judgment cannot stand, it is
unnecessary to address Cell's cross-appeal alleging error in the
trial court's failure to award pre-judgment interest.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County is reversed and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
At the same time, Mr. Curry had a consulting
agreement with Paul and James Wilson, who later formed Cell, Inc.
Mr. Curry was instrumental in negotiating the lease in question
which provided for a grocery store to be opened by Cell that would
contain 9,216 square feet.
The detailed facts of what happened thereafter are unimportant to the decision of the case, but as we indicated earlier Ranson Investors were unable to secure financing for their proposed shopping center, the deal went sour for everyone concerned, and Ranson Investors made no money from the entire project.