6.      “A taxpayer challenging an assessor's tax assessment must prove by clear and convincing evidence that such tax assessment is erroneous.” Syllabus point 5, in part, In re Tax Assessment of Foster Foundation's Woodlands Retirement Community, 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008).

      7.      When a circuit court reviews an appraisal of commercial real property made for ad valorem taxation purposes, the court shall, in its final order, make findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the assessing officer's consideration of the required appraisal factors set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4 (1991).

Davis, Justice:

      Two of the appellants herein and petitioners below, Stone Brooke Limited Partnership and Heathermoor Limited Partnership, appeal from orders entered January 28, 2008, by the Circuit Courts of Brooke and Hancock Counties. By those orders, the circuit courts upheld the respective Assessor's valuation, for ad valorem taxation purposes, of rent- restricted apartment buildings. The additional appellants herein and respondents below, the Honorable Ottie Adkins, Assessor of Cabell County, and the County Commission of Cabell County, appeal from an order entered November 12, 2008, by the Circuit Court of Cabell County. By that order, the circuit court did not uphold the Assessor's valuation, for ad valorem taxation purposes, of rent-restricted apartment buildings. The common issues raised by each of these three consolidated appeals concern the proper method of valuing real property participating in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program.

      Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the records presented for appellate consideration, and the pertinent authorities, we conclude that certain errors were made by each of the circuit courts from which appeals have been taken in this case. Accordingly, we affirm, in part, that portion of the orders entered by the Brooke County Circuit Court, in Case Number 34423, and the Hancock County Circuit Court, in Case Number 34424, upholding the Assessors' selection of the cost approach as the most accurate method of appraising the Stone Brooke and Heathermoor properties. However, we reverse, in part, the orders entered by the Brooke County Circuit Court and the Hancock County Circuit Court insofar as they did not specifically address whether the Assessors had analyzed each factor required to be considered in the appraisal of commercial real property set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4 (1991), and we remand these cases for further proceedings to permit the circuit courts to review the correctness of the Assessors' valuations through the application of these criteria to the Stone Brooke and Heathermoor properties.

      Furthermore, we reverse the order entered by the Circuit Court of Cabell County, in Case Number 34863, because (1) the Assessor presented substantial evidence to support his selection of the cost approach as the most accurate method of appraising the Pine Haven, The Hamlets, and The Parks properties and (2) the circuit court's order did not specifically address whether the Assessor had analyzed each factor required to be considered in the appraisal of commercial real property set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110- 1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4 (1991). Accordingly, we remand this case for further proceedings to permit the circuit court to reinstate the Assessor's cost approach appraisals and to review the correctness of the Assessor's valuations through the application of these criteria to the Pine Haven, The Hamlets, and The Parks properties.

              “'“[a]n assessment made by a board of review and equalization and approved by the circuit court will not be reversed when supported by substantial evidence unless plainly wrong.” Syl. pt. 1, West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization[ of Brooke County], 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S.E. 862 (1932).' Syl. pt. 3, Western Pocahontas Properties, Ltd. v. County Comm'n of Wetzel County, 189 W. Va. 322, 431 S.E.2d 661 (1993).” Syl. pt. 4, In re Petition of Maple Meadow Mining Co. for Relief from Real Property Assessment For the Tax Year 1992, 191 W. Va. 519, 446 S.E.2d 912 (1994).

Syl. pt. 3, In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found.'s Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008). Stated otherwise,

              [i]n a case involving the assessment of property for taxation purposes, which does not involve the violation of a statute governing the assessment of property, or a violation of a constitutional provision, or in which a question of the constitutionality of a statute is not involved, this Court will not set aside or disturb an assessment made by an assessor or the county court, acting as a board of equalization and review, where the assessment is supported by substantial evidence.

Syl. pt. 2, In re Tax Assessments Against the S. Land Co., 143 W. Va. 152, 100 S.E.2d 555 (1957), overruled on other grounds by In re the Assessment of Shares of Stock of the Kanawha Valley Bank, 144 W. Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649 (1959). But see In re Tax
Assessment Against Amn. Bituminous Power Partners, L.P., 208 W. Va. 250, 255, 539 S.E.2d 757, 762 (2000) (“[J]udicial review of a decision of a board of equalization and review regarding a challenged tax-assessment valuation is limited to roughly the same scope permitted under the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act, W. Va. Code ch. 29A. In such circumstances, a circuit court is primarily discharging an appellate function little different from that undertaken by this Court; consequently, our review of a circuit court's ruling in proceedings under [W. Va. Code] § 11-3-25 is de novo.” (footnote and citation omitted)). In keeping with this standard, we proceed to consider the parties' arguments.

        [t]ax assessments of property are required to be proportionate to the property's value: “[A]ll property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law.” W. Va. Const. art. X, § 1. W. Va. Code § 11- 3-1 (1977) (Repl. Vol. 2008) further instructs that “[a]ll property shall be assessed annually . . . at its true and actual value.” We have interpreted the term “value” with respect to tax assessments as meaning “'worth in money' of a piece of property_its market value.” Syl. pt. 3, in part, Killen v. Logan County Comm'n, 170 W. Va. 602, 295 S.E.2d 689 [(1982)][, overruled on other grounds by In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found.'s Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008)]. Furthermore, we have held that “[t]he price paid for property in an arm's length transaction, while not conclusive, is relevant evidence of its true and actual value.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, Kline v. McCloud, 174 W. Va. 369, 326 S.E.2d 715 (1984).

In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found.'s Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 223 W. Va. 14, ___, 672 S.E.2d 150, 169 (2008).

      Furthermore, “[i]n all cases, it is incumbent upon the circuit court, as it is upon the county commission and the assessor, to set the assessed value of all parcels of land at the amount established by the State Tax Commissioner. W. Va. Code § 18-9A-11.” Syl. pt. 5, Tug Valley Recovery Ctr., Inc. v. Mingo County Comm'n, 164 W. Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979). Additionally,

              Title 110, Series 1P of the West Virginia Code of State Rules confers upon the State Tax Commissioner discretion in choosing and applying the most accurate method of appraising commercial and industrial properties. The exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed upon judicial review absent a showing of abuse of discretion.

Syl. pt. 5, In re Tax Assessment Against Amn. Bituminous Power Partners, L.P., 208 W. Va. 250, 539 S.E.2d 757 (2000).

      With respect to the valuation of commercial real property such as the apartment buildings owned by the Taxpayers herein, the Tax Commissioner has determined that three different types of appraisal methods may be used.

              Generally accepted appraisal methods used to establish the value of industrial and commercial real properties.

              In determining an estimate of fair market value, the Tax Commissioner will consider and use where applicable, three (3) generally accepted approaches to value: (A) cost, (See footnote 7) (B) income, (See footnote 8)
and (C) market data. (See footnote 9)

              . . . .

              Correlation. _ Once generated, the various estimates of value may be considered in determining a final value estimate. . . .

              When possible, the most accurate form of appraisal should be used, but because of the difficulty in obtaining necessary data from the taxpayer, or due to the lack of comparable commercial and/or industrial properties, choice between the alternative appraisal methods may be limited.
W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.2, 110-1P-2.2.1, & 110-1P-2.2.2 (1991) (footnotes added).

Thus, the Tax Commissioner has permitted an assessor to select any one of these three methods by which to value commercial real property for ad valorem taxation purposes, with a preference not for any one particular method but only for “the most accurate form of appraisal.” W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.2.2.

      Although the Taxpayers have urged this Court to adopt the income approach as the only method by which LIHTC properties may be appraised, we are rather reluctant to do so in light of the Tax Commissioner's discretion to “choos[e] and apply[] the most accurate method of appraising commercial . . . properties.” Syl. pt. 5, in part, American Bituminous Power Partners, 208 W. Va. 250, 539 S.E.2d 757. Our reluctance to select a preferred appraisal method is threefold. First, the Taxpayers have not demonstrated that the Tax Commissioner has abused his discretion in adopting a regulation that permits an assessing officer to consider the circumstances of a particular case and, based upon such considerations, to select the “most accurate form of appraisal.” W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P- 2.2.2.

      Second, it is irresponsible and unrealistic for this Court to select a preferred appraisal method and then to require that that solitary appraisal method be used to appraise every parcel of LIHTC property. Not only would such action by this Court usurp the Tax Commissioner's discretion when no abuse thereof has been shown, but a unitary appraisal method would not be appropriate in those cases in which the data for the application of the preferred method is not available. For example, in the case of Shepherds Glen Limited Partnership v. Bordier, No. 03-C-71 (Jefferson County, W. Va., Cir. Ct. Sept. 22, 2003), from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, the court considered which appraisal method should be applied to value the LIHTC property at issue therein. The court, in upholding the Assessor's use of the cost and market data approaches, specifically rejected the taxpayer's request to apply the income method in that case because the taxpayer's “'economic rent' data [wa]s not available to the assessor” and because “nowhere in the Code of West Virginia or the applicable rules are taxpayers required to furnish to assessors rental data.” Id. at ¶¶ 15 & 16. See also Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Comm'r, 223 W. Va. 38, __, 672 S.E.2d 174, 190 (2008) (per curiam) (rejecting taxpayers' request to apply particular appraisal method where taxpayers had not provided data necessary to apply that appraisal method because taxpayers' corporate financial structure did not produce that type of data). Therefore, while the Taxpayers herein have urged this Court to adopt the income approach as the sole method by which to value LIHTC properties, they have not appreciated that such properties will not be able to be valued at all if the LIHTC property's income data is not available.

      Lastly, we hesitate to usurp the discretion afforded to the Tax Commissioner to “choos[e] and apply[] the most accurate method of appraising commercial . . .properties,” Syl. pt. 5, in part, American Bituminous Power Partners, 208 W. Va. 250, 539 S.E.2d 757, when there has not been a clear and definite statement of Legislative intent to override such discretion with respect to the valuation of LIHTC properties. Although the Legislature passed legislation that would have required the use of the income approach for the valuation of LIHTC properties, the Governor vetoed this legislation, and the Legislature has not attempted to address the Governor's concerns. Accordingly, because “[t]he Legislature, when it enacts legislation, is presumed to know of its prior enactments,” Syllabus point 12, Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953), it may conversely be presumed that when the Legislature fails to re-enact vetoed legislation, it tacitly approves of the status quo. Thus, it may be inferred, in the cases sub judice, that the Legislature, by failing to reintroduce its vetoed legislation, approves of the present method of assessing LIHTC, as well as all commercial, properties by deferring to the assessing officer to select the most accurate appraisal method.

      Having concluded, then, that the Tax Commissioner has afforded discretion to the assessing officer to select the most accurate appraisal method for the commercial property under consideration, we must consider whether the Assessors properly valued the LIHTC properties at issue herein. Once an assessor has selected an appraisal method and applied it to appraise a parcel of commercial real property, 

        the valuation placed upon the property by the assessor is accorded great deference and is presumed to be correct. “As a
general rule, there is a presumption that valuations for taxation purposes fixed by an assessor are correct. . . . The burden is on the taxpayer challenging the assessment to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the tax assessment is erroneous.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, Western Pocahontas Props., Ltd. v. County Comm'n of Wetzel County, 189 W. Va. 322, 431 S.E.2d 661. Accord Syl. pt. 7, In re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Co., 172 W. Va. 53, 303 S.E.2d 691 (“It is a general rule that valuations for taxation purposes fixed by an assessing officer are presumed to be correct. The burden of showing an assessment to be erroneous is, of course, upon the taxpayer, and proof of such fact must be clear.”). Cf. Syl. pt. 2, In re Tax Assessments Against the S. Land Co., 143 W. Va. 152, 100 S.E.2d 555 (1957) (“In a case involving the assessment of property for taxation purposes, which does not involve the violation of a statute governing the assessment of property, or a violation of a constitutional provision, or in which a question of the constitutionality of a statute is not involved, this Court will not set aside or disturb an assessment made by an assessor or the county court, acting as a board of equalization and review, where the assessment is supported by substantial evidence.”), overruled on other grounds by In re the Assessment of Shares of Stock of the Kanawha Valley Bank, 144 W. Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649 (1959).
Foster Found., 223 W. Va. at ___, 672 S.E.2d 169-70.

      To overturn the Assessors' appraisals of the LIHTC properties at issue herein, the Taxpayers must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the assessments resulting from such appraisals were wrong: “A taxpayer challenging an assessor's tax assessment must prove by clear and convincing evidence that such tax assessment is erroneous.” Syl. pt. 5, in part, Foster Found., 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150. From the records of the underlying proceedings, it is clear that the Assessors' appraisals, all of which were
conducted pursuant to the cost approach, were supported by substantial evidence and, thus, that the ad valorem tax assessments based upon such appraisals were not plainly wrong. See Syl. pt. 3, Foster Found., 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (“'“'An assessment made by a board of review and equalization and approved by the circuit court will not be reversed when supported by substantial evidence unless plainly wrong.' Syl. pt. 1, West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization[ of Brooke County], 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S.E. 862 (1932).” Syl. pt. 3, Western Pocahontas Properties, Ltd. v. County Comm'n of Wetzel County, 189 W. Va. 322, 431 S.E.2d 661 (1993).' Syl. pt. 4, In re Petition of Maple Meadow Mining Co. for Relief from Real Property Assessment For the Tax Year 1992, 191 W. Va. 519, 446 S.E.2d 912 (1994).”).

       1. Case Number 34423 _ Stone Brooke. In the proceedings before the Circuit Court of Brooke County, the Assessor appraised the Stone Brooke property using the cost approach and obtaining a value of $1,784,100.00. Upon a challenge by the Taxpayer, the Assessor consulted the State Tax Commissioner who, using the income approach calculated a value of $1,971,000.00 for the Stone Brooke property. Rather than automatically adopting the higher appraised value suggested by the Tax Commissioner, the Assessor remained firm in her belief that the cost approach represented the more accurate method by which to appraise the subject property. In its order of January 28, 2008, the circuit court recognized that (1) W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.2.1 vests assessing officers with
the discretion to select the most accurate method of appraisal; (2) the regulations do not “state[] that one approach should be utilized to the exclusion of the others in valuing property that is utilized in the LIHTC program”; and (3) the Assessor in this case provided substantial evidence to support her appraisal pursuant to the cost approach. In this regard, the Assessor explained that “the cost method is appropriate because the [Stone Brooke] building was recently built, therefore, the cost method would be the most accurate assessment of true and actual value.” Because the appraisal of the Stone Brooke property rendered by the Brooke County Assessor is supported by substantial evidence, Syl. pt. 3, in part, Foster Foundation, 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150, and the Taxpayers have not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that such appraisal is erroneous, Syl. pt. 5, in part, Foster Foundation, 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150, we find that the circuit court's decision upholding such appraisal is not plainly wrong. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the Brooke County Circuit Court's January 28, 2008, order upholding the Assessor's appraisal of the Stone Brooke property pursuant to the cost approach.

       2. Case Number 34424 _ Heathermoor. Likewise, in the proceedings before the Circuit Court of Hancock County, the Assessor appraised the Heathermoor property using the cost approach and obtaining a value of $3,963,500.00. Upon a challenge by the Taxpayer, the Assessor consulted the State Tax Commissioner who, using the income approach calculated a value of $2,924,000.00 for the Heathermoor property. Rather than automatically adopting the appraised value suggested by the Tax Commissioner, the Assessor remained firm in his belief that the cost approach represented the more accurate method by which to appraise the subject property. In its order of January 28, 2008, the circuit court recognized that (1) W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.2.1 vests assessing officers with the discretion to select the most accurate method of appraisal; (2) the regulations do not “state[] that one approach should be utilized to the exclusion of the others in valuing property that is utilized in the LIHTC program”; and (3) the Assessor in this case provided substantial evidence to support his appraisal pursuant to the cost approach. In this regard, the Assessor explained that “the cost method is appropriate because the [Heathermoor] building was recently built, therefore, the cost method would be the most accurate assessment of true and actual value.” Because the appraisal of the Heathermoor property rendered by the Hancock County Assessor is supported by substantial evidence, Syl. pt. 3, in part, Foster Foundation, 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150, and the Taxpayers have not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that such appraisal is erroneous, Syl. pt. 5, in part, Foster Foundation, 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150, we find that the circuit court's decision upholding such appraisal is not plainly wrong. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the Hancock County Circuit Court's January 28, 2008, order upholding the Assessor's appraisal of the Heathermoor property pursuant to the cost approach.

       3. Case Number 34863 _ Pine Haven, The Hamlets, and The Parks. Lastly, in the proceedings before the Circuit Court of Cabell County, the Assessor appraised the properties using the cost approach, checked his calculations with the income approach, and obtained appraised values of $2,017,000.00 for Pine Haven; $3,015,000.00 for The Hamlets; and $2,952,100.00 for The Parks. Unlike the Brooke and Hancock County Assessors, though, the Cabell County Assessor did not consult the State Tax Commissioner when the Taxpayers challenged his appraisals. In its order of November 12, 2008, the Circuit Court of Cabell County did not uphold the Assessor's appraisals because it concluded that the Assessor had not produced substantial evidence to support his appraisals. The circuit court also did not appreciate either the discretion afforded to assessing officers by W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.2.1 to select among three appraisal methods for commercial real property or the fact that these regulations do not specify the use of any particular method by which to appraise LIHTC properties. In support of his use of the cost approach, the Assessor indicated that although he had based his calculations upon the cost approach, he also had considered the income approach based upon “the market rents in the area,” commenting that “[h]ow the[] [Taxpayers] finance [their properties] is not really our concern. It's the value of the buildings” that is being appraised.

      Thus, while the circuit court may have gleaned from the Taxpayers' expert evidence that the income approach is the preferred method of appraisal, the Assessor nevertheless presented substantial evidence to support his use of the cost approach. See Syl. pt. 3, in part, Foster Found., 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150. Moreover, given the Assessor's discretion to select the most accurate method of appraisal, W. Va. C.S.R. § 110- 1P-2.2.2, and the lack of a statutory or regulatory requirement to prefer the income approach when valuing LIHTC properties, the Taxpayers have not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Assessor's appraisals pursuant to the cost approach were erroneous. Syl. pt. 5, in part, Foster Found., 223 W. Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150. Therefore, the circuit court's order adopting the Taxpayers' appraisals is plainly wrong because the Assessor's appraisals should have been upheld. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the Cabell County Circuit Court's November 12, 2008, order adopting the Taxpayer's income approach appraisals and remand this case for reinstatement of the Assessor's cost approach appraisals of the Pine Haven, The Hamlets, and The Parks properties.

              [t]he appraised value (market value) of commercial and industrial real property is the price at or for which the property would sell if it was sold to a willing buyer by a willing seller in an arms-length transaction without either the buyer or the seller being under any compulsion to buy or sell. In determining appraised value, primary consideration shall be given to the trends of price paid for like or similar property in the area or locality wherein such property is situated. Additionally, for purposes of appraisal of any tract or parcel of real property used for commercial or industrial purposes, including chattels real, the appraisal shall consider the following factors:

              The location of such property;

              Its site characteristics;

              The ease of alienation thereof, considering the state of its title, the number of owners thereof, and the extent to which
the same may be the subject of either dominant or servient easements;

              The quantity of size of the property and the impact which its sale may have upon the surrounding properties;

              If purchased within the previous eight years, the purchase price thereof and the date of each such purchase;

              Recent sale of, or other transactions involving, comparable property;

              The value of such property to its owner;

              The condition of such property;

              The income, if any, which the property actually produces and has produced within the next preceding three (3) years; and

              Any commonly accepted method of ascertaining the market value of any such property, including techniques and method peculiar to any particular species of property if such technique or method is used uniformly and applied to all property of like species.

              There are two (2) types of improvements which are considered in the appraisal process; these are improvements to the land and improvements on the land.

              Improvements to the land are land improvements, the value of which are included in the value of land. Some examples of these improvements include privately owned drainage systems, driveways, walks, etc.

              Improvements on the land are buildings and structures. They are valued separate and apart from the land.

              In addition to improvements, other important considerations affecting the value of land, excluding farm land,
are:

              Location,

              Size,

              Shape,

            Topography,

              Accessibility,

              Present use,

              Highest and best use,

              Easements,

              Zoning,

              Availability of utility,

              Income imputed to land and

              Supply and demand for land of a particular type.

              Each of these factors should be considered in the appraisal of a specific parcel. Some, however, may be given more weight than others.

W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4 (emphasis added).

      In this Court's recent opinion in Foster Foundation, the Taxpayer complained that the Assessor had not considered its unique status as a § 501(c)(3) corporation in appraising its property for ad valorem taxation purposes. Examining the above-quoted
regulations, we determined that several of the factors that are required to be considered in a commercial real property appraisal encompassed the unique § 501(c)(3) characteristics of the Foster Foundation's property without specifically denominating them as such. See Foster Found., 223 W. Va. at __, 672 S.E.2d at 171-72. Likewise, with respect to the LIHTC properties at issue herein, several of their unique characteristics are included within the rubric of factors required to be considered in their appraisals. For example, W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.1.1.9 requires the consideration of “[t]he income, if any, which the property actually produces and has produced within the next preceding three (3) years”; this factor, then, would require a valuation of LIHTC property to use the property's actual, restricted rents rather than comparable market rents of unrestricted property. Moreover, W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.1.1.7 requires consideration of “[t]he value of such property to its owner” and W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.1.3.11 requires consideration of the “[i]ncome imputed to land,” both of which criteria would encompass the LIHTC tax credits allocated to such properties insofar as these tax credits add value to these properties by enabling them to charge the restricted rents requisite to participation in the LIHTC program. Therefore, the legislative regulations already mandate the consideration of the unique LIHTC property characteristics sought by the Taxpayers in this case without specifically referring to such criteria by name or through reference to the LIHTC Program.

      Despite the clear directive in W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.1.4 that “each of these factors should be considered in the appraisal of a specific parcel” of commercial real property, this Court rarely is presented with a record from which we can determine whether each of the enumerated factors has been thoroughly considered. Of the three circuit court orders from which appeals have been taken in the cases sub judice, only one order mentions these criteria, and it does so only by acknowledging the existence of such criteria without determining whether the Assessor performed a complete analysis of these factors. See Pine Haven Limited Partnership v. Adkins, Nos. 08-C-223, 08-C-224, & 08-C-225 (Cabell County, W. Va., Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 2008) (mentioning appraisal factors set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4, but failing to determine whether Assessor had performed complete analysis of these factors). (See footnote 12) But see Stone Brooke Limited Partnership v. Sisinni, No. 06-P-5 (Brooke County, W. Va., Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 2008) (not mentioning or reviewing Assessor's consideration of appraisal factors set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to
2.1.4); Heathermoor Limited Partnership v. Alongi, No. 06-AA-2 (Hancock County, W. Va., Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 2008) (same). Similarly, of the remaining three circuit court orders addressing the ad valorem taxation of LIHTC real properties, only one mentions the regulatory factors requisite to an appraisal of commercial real property, but does not thoroughly consider such factors in reviewing the correctness of the appraisal. See Providence Green LLC v. Assessor, et al., Nos. 07-CAP-7 & 08-CAP-14 (Ohio County, W. Va., Cir. Ct. Apr. 22, 2008) (mentioning appraisal factors set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4, but failing to determine whether Assessor had performed complete analysis of these factors). (See footnote 13) But see In re: 1994 Property Tax Assessment of Twin Oaks Plaza, No. 94-C-78 (Fayette County, W. Va., Cir. Ct. Feb. 8, 1999) (not mentioning or reviewing Assessor's consideration of appraisal factors set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4); Shepherds Glen Limited Partnership v. Bordier, No. 03-C-71 (Jefferson County, W. Va., Cir. Ct. Sept. 22, 2003) (same).

      Therefore, it is quite apparent to this Court that, despite the fact that all of the factors set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4 are required to be considered when appraising commercial real property, such an analysis is rarely completed. Considering only the orders at issue in the cases sub judice, rarely are the requisite criteria mentioned in the circuit court's order and, even if these factors are mentioned, there is no indication that the assessing officer has thoroughly considered these criteria as required by W. Va. C.S.R. § 110-1P-2.1.4. Accordingly, to ensure that this Court has a complete record from which to review future appeals of ad valorem tax assessments of commercial real property, we hold that when a circuit court reviews an appraisal of commercial real property made for ad valorem taxation purposes, the court shall, in its final order, make findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the assessing officer's consideration of the required appraisal factors set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4 (1991). (See footnote 14) Because all three of the circuit court orders that have been appealed from in the cases sub judice have failed to indicate whether the Assessors considered the requisite factors in their appraisals of the subject commercial real property pursuant to W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-1P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4, we reverse the orders entered by the Brooke County Circuit Court, the Hancock County Circuit Court, and the Cabell County Circuit Court. We further remand each of these cases back to their respective circuit courts for further proceedings to conduct an analysis of whether the Assessors properly considered the requisite factors to determine whether the actual amount of the Assessors' cost approach appraisals of the Taxpayers' LIHTC properties is correct. (See footnote 15)