672 S.E.2d 389
The Opinion of the Court was delivered Per Curiam.
JUSTICE ALBRIGHT not participating.
2. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).
3. “Notwithstanding the broad language of the Workers' Compensation Act § 23-2-1(a) [1991], uniformed members of the West Virginia Division of Public Safety, who are covered under the Death, Disability and Retirement Fund, are not eligible for coverage under the Workers' Compensation System.” Syllabus Point 1, Beckley v. Kirk, 193 W.Va. 258, 260, 455 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1995).
4. “Where a statute is of doubtful meaning, the contemporaneous construction placed thereon by the officers of government charged with its execution is entitled to great weight, and will not be disregarded or overthrown unless it is clear that such construction is erroneous.” Syllabus Point 7, Evans v. Hutchinson, 158 W.Va. 359, 214 S.E.2d 453 (1975).
5. “Interpretations as to the meaning and application of workers'
compensation statutes rendered by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner, as the
governmental official charged with the administration and enforcement of the workers'
compensation statutory law of this State, pursuant to W.Va. Code § 23-1-1 (1997)
(Repl.Vol.1998), should be accorded deference if such interpretations are consistent with the
legislation's plain meaning and ordinary construction.” Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. ACF
Industries, Inc. v. Vieweg, 204 W.Va. 525, 514 S.E.2d 176 (1999).
Per Curiam: (See footnote 1)
In this appeal from the circuit court of Kanawha County, we are asked to
consider whether the West Virginia State Police (See footnote 2) has immunity from negligence-based
lawsuits by its uniformed members for injuries sustained in the course of and as a result of
their employment. The circuit court below concluded that the State Police does have such
immunity, and dismissed a lawsuit filed by a uniformed state trooper who alleged he was
injured on the job as a result of his employer's negligence.
As set forth below, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal order.
Sergeant Hawkins was assigned to an anti-drunk driving unit, and was working in a mobile office called the “Batmobile.”
Sergeant Hawkins alleges that the Batmobile has a defective door latch that protrudes appoximately 1 ½ inches into the doorway at elbow level. The latch _ of which there is one at each of the four doors on the Batmobile _ is shaped like a hook, such that it routinely snagged the shirt sleeves of persons exiting the mobile office. Sergeant Hawkins and other state troopers had complained to their superiors, asking that the latches be modified.
On the day in question, Sergeant Hawkins was routinely exiting the Batmobile with a case slung over his shoulder. The case caught on the hook-shaped latch, yanking him backward and herniating three discs in his back. Sergeant Hawkins required emergency surgery, and now has permanent nerve damage. He was forced to take a disability retirement from the State Police.
Sergeant Hawkins filed a lawsuit against the appellee West Virginia State Police alleging that his employer's negligence in failing to repair or replace the door latch had contributed to his injuries. (See footnote 3) The State Police responded by filing a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that as a matter of law, the State Police was entitled to the immunity provided under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, W.Va. Code, 23-2-6 [2003]. (See footnote 4)
In an order dated April 19, 2007, the circuit court granted the State Police's
motion to dismiss the appellants' lawsuit. The circuit court concluded that the appellants'
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because, as Sergeant
Hawkins' employer, “the West Virginia State Police can not be subjected to common law
claims sounding in negligence by its employees for injuries sustained on the job.”
The appellants now appeal the circuit court's April 19, 2007 order.
The parties' arguments on the immunity question therefore revolve around competing interpretations of various statutes in different chapters of the West Virginia Code.
The appellants' argument begins by noting that the Workers' Compensation
Act declares that:
The state of West Virginia and all governmental agencies or
departments created by it . . . are employers within the meaning
of this chapter and are required to subscribe to and pay premium
taxes into the workers' compensation fund for the protection of
their employees and are subject to all requirements of this
chapter[.]
W.Va. Code, 23-2-1 [2005]. In exchange for paying workers' compensation premiums, the
appellants note that employers are statutorily entitled to immunity from suit, and that
workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy for employees of employers who
subscribe to the workers' compensation system. W.Va. Code, 23-2-6 [2003] states in part:
Any employer subject to this chapter who subscribes and pays
into the workers' compensation fund the premiums provided by
this chapter or who elects to make direct payments of
compensation as provided in this section is not liable to respond
in damages at common law or by statute for the injury or death
of any employee, however occurring, after so subscribing . . .
and during any period in which the employer is not in default in
the payment of the premiums . . .
The appellants argue that W.Va. Code, 23-2-6 is clear that there are only two
ways for the State of West Virginia and its agencies, as an “employer,” to be immune from
suit: either subscribe and pay premiums into the workers' compensation fund, or make direct
payments of compensation to injured workers using a self-insured system that conforms to
the Workers' Compensation Act. (See footnote 6)
The appellants argue that the State Police did not subscribe to the Workers'
Compensation Fund at the time Sergeant Hawkins was injured, and that the State Police has
never subscribed or paid premiums into the fund. Furthermore, the appellants argue that the
State Police never established a self-insured workers' compensation system that complies
with the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, the appellants argue
that the State Police is not statutorily entitled to immunity for work-related injuries
negligently caused to its employees.
The appellee State Police concedes _ as once did this Court _ that “on its face” the statutes cited by the appellants would appear to require the State Police to subscribe to the workers' compensation fund. See Beckley v. Kirk, 193 W.Va. 258, 260, 455 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1995). However, the appellee argues that the Death, Disability and Retirement Fund for state troopers (“the DDR Fund”), found in W.Va. Code, 15-2-26 [2007] (See footnote 7) , is a statutorily- created fund that allows the State Police to make “direct payments of compensation” to troopers injured on the job _ and therefore, the State Police should be immune from suit under the provisions of W.Va. Code, 23-2-6. Supporting this conclusion, the State Police argues that the legislative history behind the creation of the DDR Fund, and the concomitant failure of the Legislature to budget for and require the State Police to pay premiums into the Workers' Compensation Fund, makes it clear that the Legislature intended for the State Police to be immune from suit for on-the-job injuries negligently caused to a state trooper, when the state trooper is eligible for benefits from the DDR Fund.
The appellee argues that this Court's discussion of the history surrounding the DDR Fund in Beckley v. Kirk, supra, provides a foundation for a decision in the instant appeal. In Beckley v. Kirk, this Court was asked to examine the circumstances of several state troopers who were injured in the line of duty. The troopers sought to compel the West Virginia State Police _ then known as the Division of Public Safety _ to participate in the workers' compensation system. The Court found that state troopers had traditionally received compensation for work-related injuries solely from the DDR Fund, and never the Workers' Compensation Fund. The issue before the Court was “whether state troopers are also covered under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act.” 193 W.Va. at 260, 455 S.E.2d at 819. The Court concluded, in Syllabus Point 1, that:
Notwithstanding the broad language of the Workers'
Compensation Act § 23-2-1(a) [1991], uniformed members of
the West Virginia Division of Public Safety, who are covered
under the Death, Disability and Retirement Fund, are not
eligible for coverage under the Workers' Compensation System.
To reach that conclusion, the Court in Beckley v. Kirk examined the legislative
history behind the adoption of the DDR Fund and its interaction with the Workers'
Compensation Fund, and reasoned that the Legislature had repeatedly considered the precise
question at hand, and had repeatedly decided that the DDR Fund should be the exclusive
remedy for state troopers. As the Court stated:
The West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Fund, adopted
in 1913, was amended in 1919 to allow all governmental
agencies to participate. 1919 Acts of the Legislature, Regular
Session, c. 131, § 9. The Department of Public Safety, however,
was either excluded by legislative intent or declined to
participate. In 1922 the Superintendent of State Police, in his
report to the Governor, complained that there was no pension
provision or any other fund to provide troopers disabled in the
line of duty a living allowance. Jackson Arnold, Report to the
Governor, 8 (30 June 1922).
In 1923, apparently in response to the 1922 report, the
Legislature authorized the Superintendent to compensate injured
troopers from the DPS operating budget. 1923 Acts of the
Legislature, Regular Session, c. 147, § 58. The 1924 report of
the Superintendent complained that the funds budgeted by the
1923 Legislature would soon expire, again leaving disabled
members without benefits. Jackson Arnold, Biennial Report of
the West Virginia State Police, 12 (1924). In 1925, the
Legislature created the Death and Disability Fund. 1925 Acts of
the Legislature, Regular Session, c. 4, §§ 1, 2, 3. The purpose
of the Death and Disability Fund was, and is, to provide
compensation to injured state troopers.
The DPS Superintendent once again complained to the
Governor in his 1928 report. This time the Superintendent
expressly stated that state troopers did not receive the protection
of the Workers' Compensation Fund and requested legislation
to place members under such protection (although troopers
would have been much less generously compensated under
Workers' Compensation than under their own system, the Death
and Disability Fund.), R.E. O'Connor, Fifth Biennial Report of
the Department of Public Safety, 16 (1928). Subscription to the
WC Fund became mandatory for state agencies in 1937, yet no
effort was made to compel subscription by the DPS. 1937 Acts
of the Legislature, Regular Session, c. 104, § 1. Moreover, the
Legislature has never appropriated funds for the DPS to pay
Workers' Compensation premiums.
. . . When viewing the history of the Death, Disability and
Retirement Fund in conjunction with the history of the Workers'
Compensation Fund, it becomes clear that the Legislature
intended the DDR Fund to be a comprehensive system of
compensation and never intended for state troopers to be
covered under the Workers' Compensation Fund.
If state troopers had been covered under the WC Fund it would
not have been necessary to create the DDR. The reports of the
DPS superintendents reinforce this conclusion. Obviously, if
the WC Fund covered state troopers, the superintendents would
not have complained of the lack of coverage for disabled
troopers or specifically have requested coverage under the WC
Fund years ago before the contours of the two systems were
firmly established. That state troopers are not covered by the
WC Fund is also the opinion of the administrators of the WC
Fund, who have repeatedly declined to process the claims of
state troopers, and the opinion of the West Virginia State Police
Academy, which informs trainees that the WC Fund does not
apply to state troopers. This Court has held that “ '[w]here a
statute is of doubtful meaning, the contemporaneous
construction placed thereon by the officers of government
charged with its execution is entitled to great weight, and will
not be disregarded or overthrown unless it is clear that such
construction is erroneous.' Syllabus point 7, Evans v.
Hutchinson, 158 W.Va. 359, 214 S.E.2d 453 (1975).” Syl. pt.
8, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 159
W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361, 367 (1975).
193 W.Va. at 260-61, 455 S.E.2d at 819-20 (footnotes omitted).
The Court in Beckley v. Kirk concluded that “allowing troopers coverage under
both systems would frequently result in a trooper's receiving benefits in an amount that
exceeds his or her salary” _ a result which the Court believed would be “absurd.” 193
W.Va. at 262, 455 S.E.2d at 821. “Where a particular construction of a statute would result
in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce such absurdity,
will be made.” Syllabus Point 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350
(1938). Accordingly, the Court concluded in Beckley v. Kirk that uniformed troopers injured
in the course of their employment were only entitled to benefits from the DDR Fund, and not
the Workers' Compensation Fund.
The appellee asserts that while the Legislature has required most state agencies
to pay premiums into the workers' compensation system since 1919, the Legislature has
never budgeted money for the State Police to pay workers' compensation premiums.
Further, the appellee points out that the DDR Fund is better for troopers than
the workers' compensation system because it covers both work- and non-work-related
injuries, and provides state troopers with their full salary when they cannot work.
Additionally, state troopers continue to accrue annual and sick leave, and are not charged for
sick leave while absent from duty, when receiving benefits from the DDR Fund. As this
Court acknowledged in Beckley v. Kirk, “[b]enefits under the DDR Fund are superior to the
WC Fund.” 193 W.Va. at 261, 455 S.E.2d at 820.
In sum, the appellee State Police argues that the same reasoning used by the
Court in Beckley v. Kirk applies to the instant case. We agree.
Our law is clear that the construction placed on a statute by the government
officers charged with executing the statute is entitled to great weight, and will not be
dispensed with unless clearly erroneous. See Syllabus Point 7, Evans v. Hutchinson, 158
W.Va. 359, 214 S.E.2d 453 (1975) (“Where a statute is of doubtful meaning, the
contemporaneous construction placed thereon by the officers of government charged with
its execution is entitled to great weight, and will not be disregarded or overthrown unless it
is clear that such construction is erroneous.”); Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Brandon v.
Board of Control, 84 W.Va. 417, 100 S.E. 215 (1919) (“Where a statute is of doubtful
meaning, the contemporaneous construction placed thereon by the officers of government
charged with its execution is entitled to great weight, and will not be disregarded or
overthrown, unless it is clear that such construction is erroneous.”); Syllabus Point 4, Security Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. First W. Va. Bancorp., Inc., 166 W.Va. 775, 277 S.E.2d
613 (1981) (“Interpretations of statutes by bodies charged with their administration are given
great weight unless clearly erroneous.”). See also, Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. ACF
Industries, Inc. v. Vieweg, 204 W.Va. 525, 514 S.E.2d 176 (1999) (“Interpretations as to the
meaning and application of workers' compensation statutes rendered by the Workers'
Compensation Commissioner, as the governmental official charged with the administration
and enforcement of the workers' compensation statutory law of this State, pursuant to W.Va.
Code § 23-1-1 (1997) (Repl.Vol.1998), should be accorded deference if such interpretations
are consistent with the legislation's plain meaning and ordinary construction.”).
Since 1919, when the Legislature first required state agencies to pay premiums
into the workers' compensation system, the Legislature has never budgeted funds for the
appellee State Police to pay premiums on behalf of its uniformed troopers. Instead, the
Legislature created, and has continuously budgeted funds for, the DDR Fund. Neither the
State Police nor the Workers' Compensation Commissioner has ever interpreted any
legislative enactment as requiring the State Police to subscribe to the workers' compensation
system, or interpreted the existing DDR Fund as being inadequate to provide uniformed state
troopers with sufficient direct compensation for work-related injuries. W.Va. Code, 23-2-6
provides that an employer, who “elects to make direct payments of compensation” to
employees injured in the course of and as a result of their employment, is not liable to
respond in damages at common law for injuries negligently caused by the employer to an
employee.
Accordingly, we believe that the circuit court correctly found that a uniformed
state trooper who receives benefits from the DDR Fund is barred by W.Va. Code, 23-2-6
from bringing a negligence action against his or her employer, the West Virginia State Police,
for injuries caused by the employer's ordinary negligence in the course of and as a result of
the trooper's employment.