672 S.E.2d 297
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Thomas L. Craig
Rebecca C. Brown
David D. Amsbary
Bailes, Craig & Yon
Huntington, West Virginia
Counsel for the Appellee,
Cabell Huntington Hospital, Inc.
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
JUSTICE ALBRIGHT not participating.
SENIOR STATUS JUSTICE McHUGH sitting by temporary assignment.
Per Curiam: (See footnote 1)
This case involves the appeal of Jeanne Cartwright (hereinafter “Appellant”),
as guardian and mother of her minor daughter, Tiffany Cartwright (hereinafter referred to
individually as Tiffany), from the July 3, 2007, order of the Cabell County Circuit Court
granting summary judgment in a medical malpractice action for one of the defendants
below (See footnote 2) and sole appellee herein, Cabell Huntington Hospital (hereinafter “CHH”).
Appellant maintains that the lower court incorrectly terminated her ostensible agency claim
against CHH on the grounds that the cause of action was barred by a statutory amendment
even though her daughter's right to bring suit had vested under the provisions of an earlier
enacted statute. More specifically, Appellant argues that her daughter's cause of action was
a vested property interest before the amendment limiting the manner in which ostensible
agency suits may arise under the Medical Professional Liability Act ( hereinafter “MPLA”)
took effect. Appellant asserts that applying the later-enacted statutory amendment so as to
destroy this vested property interest violates due process guarantees of the West Virginia
Constitution. Appellant further asserts that applying a later-enacted amendment of the
MPLA to her daughter's ostensible agency claim is contrary to the intent of the Legislature.
Upon careful consideration of the briefs and arguments of counsel, the record
accompanying the appeal, the pertinent facts and the relevant law, we reverse the order of
the lower court on the basis of plain error and remand the case for reinstatement to the
docket.
On July 3, 2007, the circuit court entered an order granting summary judgment
in favor of CHH. The order reflects the following findings of the lower court:
5. No witness or treating physician named by any party
to this cause of action has opined that an employee of Cabell
Huntington Hospital deviated from the acceptable standard of
care causing harm to Tiffany Cartwright.
6. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that employees of
Cabell Huntington Hospital were negligent in the care of
Tiffany Cartwright.
7. Section § 55-7B-9(g) of the MPLA III,[ (See footnote 5) ] states that
a health care provider may not be held vicariously liable for the
acts of a non-employee pursuant to a theory of ostensible
agency unless the alleged agent does not maintain professional
liability insurance covering the medical injury which is the
subject of the action in the aggregate amount of at least one
million dollars.
8. Carl McComas, M.D. is an employee of Tri-State
Neuroscience Center and not an employee of Cabell Huntington
Hospital.
9. Carl McComas maintained professional liability
insurance covering the medical injury which is the subject of
the Cartwright litigation in the aggregate amount of one million
dollars. Therefore Cabell Huntington Hospital is not
vicariously liable for the actions or omissions of Dr. McComas
in this cause of action.
Appellant appealed to this Court for review of the summary judgment order,
which request was granted by order dated February 28, 2008.
This case requires us not only to examine the propriety of a summary judgment
decision but also to analyze a lower court's interpretation of a statute upon which the
summary judgment was based. The standard of review in both instances is de novo. Syl.
Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A circuit court's entry of
summary judgment is reviewed de novo.”); Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. V. Charlie A.L., 194
W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) (“Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is
clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.”).
Appellant raises three assignments of error. The first of these is that the trial
court erred when it granted CHH's motion for summary judgment because it failed to
recognize that Appellant's ostensible agency claim against CHH in a medical malpractice
action is a protected property interest under the due process clause of the West Virginia
Constitution. Building on this premise, Appellant's second assertion is that the decision to
retroactively apply the 2003 amendments to West Virginia Code §55-7B-9 to this case is
unconstitutional because Tiffany's ostensible agency claim against CHH is a vested property
interest subject to due process safeguards. The third alleged error is that the trial court's
application of the 2003 version of West Virginia Code §55-7B-9 to Tiffany's ostensible
agency claim is contrary to legislative intent.
Based upon the facts and record before us, we find it unnecessary to venture
into a constitutional analysis in order to resolve the matter presented. Instead we find that
the lower court's summary judgment ruling represents plain error and warrants reversal on
that ground. We reach this conclusion fully aware that plain error was not raised by
Appellant on appeal. However, it is within the authority of this Court to “sua sponte, in the
interest of justice, notice plain error.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Myers, 204 W.Va. 449, 513
S.E.2d 676 (1998); accord W.Va. R. Evid. 103(d) (“Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the
attention of the court.”). See also 2A Fed. Proc., L.Ed. § 3:860 (acknowledging the power
of federal courts to apply the plain error doctrine in appeals of civil as well as criminal
cases).
The necessary elements of plain error are present in this case. As we reiterated
in syllabus point twelve of Keesee v. General Refuse Service, Inc., 216 W.Va. 199, 604
S.E.2d 449 (2004), in order
“'[t]o trigger application of the “plain error” doctrine there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.'
Syllabus point 7, State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114
(1995).” Syllabus Point 7, Page v. Columbia Natural
Resources, Inc., 198 W.Va. 378, 480 S.E.2d 817 (1996).
We explained in State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995), the reason why it is
only in rare cases that the plain error doctrine is invoked and when straying from this
position is necessary.
“One of the most familiar procedural rubrics in the
administration of justice is the rule that the failure of a litigant
to assert a right in the trial court likely will result” in the
imposition of a procedural bar to an appeal of that issue. United
States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, [513] U.S. [1196], 115 S.Ct. 1266, 131 L.Ed.2d
145 (1995). As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392,
80 L.Ed. 555, 557 (1936), “[t]his practice is founded upon
considerations of fairness to the court and to the parties and of
the public interest in bringing litigation to an end after fair
opportunity has been afforded to present all issues of law and
fact.” The “plain error” doctrine grants appellate courts, in the
interest of justice, the authority to notice error to which no
objection has been made.”
Id. at 17-18, 459 S.E.2d at 128-29. The facts of this case justify assertion of this authority,
particularly because, as explained below, a fair opportunity has not been extended to protect
the substantial rights of a minor child under the law in order to properly resolve the
malpractice claim raised.
The four elements necessary to apply the plain error doctrine are present in this
case. The first two predicates of “plain” and “error” appear on the face of the summary
judgment order and involve the date that the case was filed. The “Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law” of the summary judgment order begins with the following findings:
1. On October 29, 2002, this case was filed against Carl
McComas, M.D., under the Medical Professional Liability Act
2002 (“MPLA II”).
2. The Medical Professional Liability Act 2003
(“MPLA”) applies to all causes of action alleging medical
professional liability which are filed on or after the first day of
July two thousand three. W.Va. Code § 55-7B-1, et seq.
3. On June 15, 2005, this case was filed against Cabell
Huntington Hospital, Inc., under the MPLA III.
As recounted earlier in this opinion, Appellant initially filed this case on April
23, 2003, with Dr. McComas named as the sole defendant. (See footnote 6) On June 15, 2005, Appellant
raised the ostensible agency claim against CHH by obtaining leave of court (See footnote 7) to amend the
original complaint filed on April 23, 2003, in accord with the provisions of section (a) of
Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “Rule 15”). (See footnote 8) Misstatements regarding filing dates of the pleadings aside, plain and
reversible error exists in this case in the lower court's implicit determination that the
ostensible agency claim against CHH did not relate back to the date that the original
complaint was filed in 2003.
We have long recognized that the problems associated with amendments to
complaints relating back to the date of the original pleading arise when the amendments are
filed outside of the limitations period. See, e.g. Plum v. Mitter, 157 W.Va. 773, 204 S.E.2d
8 (1974). The operation of the components of Rule 15 regarding how amendments to
complaints are treated was addressed in Peneschi v. National Steel Corporation, 170 W. Va.
511, 295 S.E.2d 1 (1982). In Peneschi, this Court explained that the general objective of
Rule 15 of allowing the liberal use of amendments to implement the policy of encouraging
litigation on the merits was necessarily tempered by the provisions of Rule 15(c) (See footnote 9) in order
to give deference to the equally important purposes served by a statute of limitations. Id.
at 523, 295 S.E.2d at 13. Thus, amendments filed after a statute of limitations period has
expired require courts to consider additional factors when determining whether the
amendments relate back to the original filing date. See, e.g. Syl. Pt. 4, Brooks v. Isinghood,
213 W.Va. 675, 584 S.E.2d 531(2003) (listing considerations under Rule 15(c)(3)governing
when an amendment changing a defendant or naming a new defendant will relate back to
the date of the original complaint). No such considerations or conditions are relevant in the
case sub judice because the statute of limitations governing the cause of action of a minor
had not expired at the time the amended complaint was filed.
This leads to our discussion of the final two components of plain error present
in the facts of the case before us that: Tiffany has a substantial right in pursuing her claim
against the hospital, and the failure to act to preserve the child's right would call into
question the fairness and integrity of the judicial process.
The statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions is set forth
in West Virginia Code § 55-7B-4 (1986) (Repl. Vol. 2000), which in pertinent part provides:
(a) A cause of action for injury to a person alleging
medical professional liability against a health care provider
arises as of the date of injury, except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section, and must be commenced within two years of
the date of such injury, or within two years of the date when
such person discovers, or with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered such injury, whichever last
occurs: Provided, That in no event shall any such action be
commenced more than ten years after the date of injury.
(b) A cause of action for injury to a minor, brought by or
on behalf of a minor who was under the age of ten years at the
time of such injury, shall be commenced within two years of the
date of such injury, or prior to the minor's twelfth birthday,
whichever provides the longer period.
The enlarged filing period the Legislature has provided for minors under the age of ten at
the time of injury is unquestionably applicable to Tiffany since she was only four years old
when the alleged acts of malpractice occurred in 1999. Thus, under the terms of the statute,
the limitations period for filing suit did not expire until Tiffany's twelfth birthday in 2007.
In the absence of any other reason reflected in the record, since the original complaint was
filed on April 23, 2003, and the amended complaint was filed on June 15, 2005, the statute
of limitations restrictions imposed by Rule 15(c) with regard to the amendment of a
complaint by adding a new defendant are irrelevant and inapplicable. Consequently, in
furtherance of the general policy behind Rule 15 _ promoting litigation on the merits _ the
amendment to the complaint filed by leave of court on June 15, 2005, naming CHH in the
malpractice suit on the theory of ostensible agency, relates back to the date on which the
original complaint was filed. The expanded period of time the Legislature has expressly
extended to minors for filing malpractice claims is a substantial right we simply cannot
ignore. (See footnote 10)
The Legislature expressly and unambiguously provided when the 2003
amendments to the MPLA are to be applied. As stated in West Virginia Code § 55-7B-10(b)
(2003) (Supp. 2008), “The amendments to this article provided in Enrolled Committee
Substitute for House Bill No. 2122 during the Regular Session of the Legislature, two
thousand three, apply to all causes of action alleging medical professional liability which are
filed on or after the first day of July, two thousand three.” We are undoubtedly bound to
adhere to such a direct expression of legislative intent. (See footnote 11)
In order to preserve the legislatively established right extended to minors under
the age of ten to file claims beyond the usual two year statute of limitations and to maintain
the fairness and integrity of the judicial process under the facts of this case, the summary
judgment order of the trial court must be reversed and the case be permitted to proceed under
the provisions of the MPLA in effect at the time the original complaint was filed on April
23, 2003. (See footnote 12) This result is in keeping with our finding that “an error may be plain under
existing law, which means that the plainness of the error is predicated upon legal principles
that the litigants and trial court knew or should have known at the time of the prosecution
[of the case].” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State v. Myers, 204 W.Va. 449, 513 S.E.2d 676 (1998).