No. 33383
State of West Virginia ex rel. Lambert Turner Jones, II, and Red Jones
Auto Mart, Incorporated, a corporation, v. Arthur M. Recht, Judge of
the Circuit Court of Ohio County, and George P. Naum and Joan
Naum
Benjamin, Justice, concurring:
I write separately to make clear that,
so long as an adequate foundation is
established for his opinion, Dr. Peter E. Shepek (hereinafter Dr. Shepek) may testify as
a qualified neurological expert regarding his opinion as to whether the automobile collision
at issue in the underlying litigation might cause the kind of neurological injuries claimed by
George P. Naum.
(See footnote 1) I therefore agree with the majority opinion that the trial court erred and
that Dr. Sheptak's testimony may not be excluded in its entirety, at least to the extent his
testimony is restricted to medical issues. I must disagree, however, with my colleague, Chief
Justice Davis, in her partial dissent to the extent that she would permit Dr. Sheptak to testify
regarding the 'biomechanics' of the underlying accident and the effects thereof. Davis,
concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part, p. 10.
Under Rule 702 of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence, [i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Additionally, Rule 703 of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
Moreover, this Court has previously held that [a]ny physician qualified as an expert may
give an opinion about the physical and medical cause of injury[.] Syl. Pt. 5, in part,
State
v. Jackson, 171 W. Va. 329, 298 S.E.2d 866 (1982); Syl. Pt. 3, in part,
State v. McKenzie,
197 W. Va. 429, 475 S.E.2d 521 (1996)(
per curiam)(same).
Undoubtedly, Dr. Shepek is familiar with the types of neurological injuries
which can be expected to be sustained in various types of collisions by virtue of his
knowledge, skill, experience and training. As such, if the proper foundation were
established, it would be perfectly acceptable for him to provide his opinion on whether it is
possible for a neurological injury such as that claimed by Dr. Naum to be sustained in a
collision having characteristics similar to the collision at issue herein. For example, once
evidence has been introduced regarding the speed and impact of the collision, a series of
hypothetical questions could properly be posed to Dr. Shepek inquiring based upon his
experience as to the type of neurological injury he would expect to see under such
conditions, whether he believes the neurological injury claimed by Dr. Naum is possible
under such conditions and/or whether something else is more likely to have caused the
neurological injury claimed. What Dr. Shepek may properly be prohibited from testifying
about, however, is the actual biomechanics of the accident itself;
i.e., whether the
mechanics of the accident were sufficient to create some level of force and whether that
force would cause an occupant to strike his head on the roof of the car. Dr. Shepek is
qualified to render an opinion regarding Dr. Naum's alleged neurological injury. He has not
been qualified to render an opinion on biomechanics.
Footnote: 1
Dr. Sheptak's proposed testimony, however, went further. In his correspondence and
deposition testimony, Dr. Sheptak stated that from his reading of the accident report and
other history, the accident had caused no discernible damage to either vehicle, had an
extremely low level impact, and lacked sufficient force to make it highly unlikely that the
accident had caused Naum to strike his head on the roof of his automobile and to suffer a
concussion. In its order excluding Dr. Sheptak's testimony, the trial court held that because
the neurological issues . . . are enmeshed . . . inextricably entwined, with biomechanical
aspects of which he's not qualified. And it is not possible to demarcate that part of his
testimony from the neurosurgery.