4. “Whether an extrajudicial inculpatory statement is voluntary or the result
of coercive police activity is a legal question to be determined from a review of the totality
of the circumstances.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v.Bradshaw, 193 W.Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456 (1995).
5. “Misrepresentations made to a defendant or other deceptive practices by
police officers will not necessarily invalidate a confession unless they are shown to have
affected its voluntariness or reliability.” Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Worley, 179 W. Va. 403, 369
S.E.2d 706 (1988).
Per Curiam:
This case involves the direct criminal appeal of Roger Eric Jones (hereinafter
referred to as “Appellant”) from the order entered on July 7, 2005, in the Circuit Court of
Roane County whereby he was resentenced for appeal purposes for his jury conviction of
the offense of felony murder. (See footnote 1) Although Appellant maintained several trial errors in his
petition for appeal, this Court accepted the petition to address a single assignment of error:
whether the trial court was correct in denying Appellant's motion to suppress out-of-court
statements made after he was arrested, while en route and at the Grantsville State Police
Detachment for processing. After duly considering the arguments as briefed, the certified
record and applicable law, we find no error and affirm the decision of the circuit court.
On January 4, 2003, the body of Oral Jett, the victim in the present case, was
discovered on a secluded road in Roane County, West Virginia. There were visible bruises
and lacerations on the victim's head and face and there was evidence of a struggle both
inside and outside the victim's nearby car. Based upon a tip received in an anonymous
phone call, police interviewed several people having ties to Appellant. Information from
the interviews eventually led Roane County Sheriff Todd Cole to file a criminal complaint
in magistrate court naming Appellant as the perpetrator of the Jett murder. Based upon the
facts set forth in the complaint, the magistrate issued an arrest warrant on January 8, 2003,
which states: “[T]his court has found probable cause to believe that the defendant, Roger
Eric Jones, . . . “did feloniously, willfully, maliciously, deliberately and unlawfully slay, kill,
and murder Oral W. Jett.” This same recitation of the crime charged appears on the criminal
complaint underlying the issuance of the arrest warrant.
According to the State, Sheriff Cole and State Police Trooper Dale Fluharty (See footnote 2) executed the arrest warrant by going to the home of Appellant in Calhoun County, West
Virginia, at approximately 2:00 a.m. on January 8, 2003. It is undisputed that Trooper
Fluharty advised Appellant of his Miranda rights at the time of the arrest and that Appellant
waived his rights. After the arrest, the law enforcement officers transported Appellant to the
Calhoun County State Police Detachment in Grantsville, West Virginia. (See footnote 3) During the
transport, Trooper Fluharty began a discussion with Appellant about the Moorehead murder.
After Appellant made an oral statement denying any involvement with the Moorehead
murder, Sheriff Cole interrogated Appellant about the Jett case. The record reflects that the
questioning about the Jett murder commenced when the trio was close to arriving at the
police barracks. As a result, the officers and Appellant remained in the parked police
vehicle several minutes after their arrival at the police barracks in order to conclude the Jett
murder interrogation. Once inside the police station, Trooper Fluharty again advised
Appellant of his Miranda rights and Appellant completed a written form waiving his rights.
The waiver form indicated that Appellant was under arrest for murder, but did not specify
a murder victim. In the questioning which followed, Trooper Fluharty first interviewed
Appellant about the Moorehead murder and reduced Appellant's oral statement denying
involvement in the crime to writing for Appellant's signature. Sheriff Cole next interviewed
Appellant about the Jett murder and likewise reduced oral statements to writing which
Appellant signed. In Appellant's statement about the Jett case, he confessed to stealing from
the victim and hitting the victim several times with a rock.
Appellant moved the trial court to suppress the statement he made regarding
the Jett murder claiming that his statement was not intelligently and voluntarily made.
Appellant maintained that he was misled by the police in giving the statement because while
he was questioned and gave statements regarding two murders, he was not separately
advised of his Miranda rights for each crime and he signed only one waiver form which
generically stated that the charge was murder without specifying a victim name or names.
Both Trooper Fluharty and Sheriff Cole testified at the suppression hearing and related that
Appellant was informed that his arrest was only for the murder of Oral Jett as reflected on
the arrest warrant and that they used no trickery in obtaining Appellant's admission in the
Jett murder. The defense presented no evidence to the court at the suppression hearing.
According to the June 24, 2004, order denying the motion to suppress, the lower court
concluded from the evidence before it that
“[n]o promises or threats were made to the defendant . . . [when
he] made voluntary oral statements to Sgt. Fluharty and Sheriff
Todd Cole regarding his involvement in the death of Oral Jett
. . . . after the defendant made an intelligent waiver of his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel. At the Grantsville
Office of the WVSP, the defendant was again advised of his
Miranda rights in writing. The defendant understood his rights
and made an intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent and
his right to counsel . . . . In the taking of the written statement,
neither Sheriff Todd Cole nor Sgt. Fluharty made any threats or
promises to the defendant.”
The statement was admitted into evidence during the jury trial. Appellant
testified at the trial, stating that he and Mr. Jett were drug runners. He admitted to being
with Mr. Jett when he was murdered and claimed that two drug dealers were responsible for
killing Mr. Jett. Appellant went on to explain that the out-of-court statement he made to law
enforcement regarding the murder contained lies because one of the murderers threatened
to harm Appellant and his family if he revealed their involvement in the crime.
Appellant was found guilty of felony murder (See footnote 4) by the jury who, after
subsequent deliberation, did not recommend mercy in sentencing. By sentencing order
entered September 20, 2004, Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole. The trial court resentenced Appellant for purposes of appeal by order entered July 7,
2005. This Court granted the appeal on May 10, 2006, solely for review of the trial court's
ruling denying suppression of the out-of-court statement.
This Court is constitutionally obligated to give plenary,
independent, and de novo review to the ultimate question of
whether a particular confession is voluntary and whether the
lower court applied the correct legal standard in making its
determination. The holdings of prior West Virginia cases
suggesting deference in this area continue, but that deference is
limited to factual findings as opposed to legal conclusions.
Our deference to the factual determinations of the trial court regarding suppression matters
was further addressed in syllabus point one of State v. Lacy, 196 W. Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d
719 (1996), in which we stated:
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an
appellate court should construe all facts in the light most
favorable to the State, as it was the prevailing party below.
Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a motion to
suppress, particular deference is given to the findings of the
circuit court because it had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to hear testimony on the issues. Therefore, the
circuit court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
We proceed now to apply these standards in examining the circumstances
surrounding the suppression ruling in the instant case.
Appellant contends that the signed statement he made at the state police
detachment was not voluntarily given. He argues that the involuntariness is evidenced by
the fact that he signed only one statement of rights form and that form only indicated the
charge of murder without specifying whose murder was under investigation. Appellant
further maintains that had he been informed that more than one charge possibly existed he
may have requested an attorney or invoked his right to silence. According to Appellant's
argument, the method of interrogation that the law enforcement officers used was intended
to mislead him and lull him “into a sense of security in discussing the Moorehead
investigation which he denied . . . [in order to] lead [him] into the guilty confession in the
Jett case.”
Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a criminal defendant
must be fully informed of his or her constitutional rights before he or she can fairly waive
them. The United States Supreme Court has further established that for a waiver of rights
to be valid it must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
421 (1986); see also Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Goff, 169 W.Va. 778, 289 S.E.2d 473 (1982) (“A
confession that has been found to be involuntary in the sense that it was not the product of
the freewill of the defendant cannot be used by the State for any purpose at trial.”) “Whether
an extrajudicial inculpatory statement is voluntary or the result of coercive police activity
is a legal question to be determined from a review of the totality of the circumstances”
surrounding the confession. Syl. Pt. 2, State v.Bradshaw, 193 W.Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456
(1995). However, even when the totality of circumstances shows that “[m]isrepresentations
. . . or other deceptive practices [were employed] by police officers. . .[, a confession will
not be invalidated unless it is shown that the deception] affected . . . [the] voluntariness or
reliability [of the statement].” Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Worley, 179 W. Va. 403, 369 S.E.2d 706
(1988); see also Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Farley, 192 W.Va. 247, 452 S.E.2d 50 (1994).
In this case, nothing in the record counters the conclusion that Appellant was
told when arrested that he was charged with the murder of Oral Jett. This occurred before
Appellant was informed of his Miranda rights at the arrest scene and before any police
questioning occurred. Even though the Moorehead murder was the first subject of the
questioning both during transport and at the police station, nothing in the record, including
his own testimony, even suggests that Appellant was surprised or confused when the officers
afterward questioned him about the Jett murder. The only evidence of coercion or duress
expressed in Appellant's testimony was that which stemmed from the “real murderers” rather
than law enforcement. We further observe that Appellant never questioned nor sought
clarification from the officers about the charges and never indicated confusion about which
murder was under discussion. We also find no evidence that Trooper Fluharty's questions
regarding the Moorehead investigation played any part in Appellant's decision to admit his
involvement in the Jett murder. And while we do not condone the interrogation technique
employed, there is simply no indication in this case that the method of questioning
influenced the voluntariness or reliability of Appellant's statement regarding his
involvement in the Jett murder. In short, we find no error. There is no evidence that the trial
court applied improper legal standards in this case, nor do we find that the record reveals
clear error in the lower court's factual determinations. Accordingly, we affirm.
For the above-stated reasons, the order entered on July 7, 2005, in the Circuit
Court of Roane County is hereby affirmed.
Footnote: 2
Footnote: 3
Footnote: 4