Davis, Chief Justice:

(Emphasis added). (See footnote 13) See also W. Va. R. Crim. P. 34 (stating, in part, that “[t]he court on motion of a defendant shall arrest judgment if the indictment or information does not charge an offense or if the court was without jurisdiction of the offense charged”). It is further provided by Rule 12(f) that “[f]ailure by a party to raise defenses or objections . . . which must be made prior to trial, . . . may constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown should grant relief from the waiver.” (See footnote 14)

      Reading these provisions together, we now hold that, for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(f) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, if a defect in a charging instrument does not involve jurisdiction or result in a failure to charge an offense, a defendant must raise the issue prior to trial or the defect will be deemed waived absent a showing of good cause for failing to timely raise the issue. (See footnote 15)

      Here, Tommy concedes that, prior to trial, he did not raise the issue of the petition being defective on venue grounds. Thus, in order for the venue issue not to be deemed waived, we must find that (1) venue is jurisdictional, (2) the absence of a statement of venue means an offense was not charged, or (3) good cause was shown for failing to timely raise the issue. (See footnote 16) See State v. Eddie Tosh K., 194 W. Va. 354, 357 n.4, 460 S.E.2d 489, 492 n.4 (1995) (“[Rule] 12(b)(2) states that the defenses and objections based upon defects in an indictment or information must be raised prior to trial. The same reasoning should be applicable to a petition filed in a juvenile proceeding.”). We will address each nonwaiver issue separately.

       1. Venue is not jurisdictional. It has been recognized “that jurisdictional errors are not waived, because they affect the basic authority of a court to hear and decide a case.” United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 587, 590 (2^nd Cir. 2001). Thus, if venue is jurisdictional, it may be raised at any time, even on appeal. See Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on West Virginia Criminal Procedure, p. I-687 (1993) (“[A] jurisdictional defect cannot be waived[.]”). In State v. Dennis, 216 W .Va. 331, 607 S.E.2d 437 (2004), this Court made the following distinction between venue and jurisdiction:

              Although at times related, [venue and jurisdiction] are hardly synonymous. In the context of a criminal case, jurisdiction involves the inherent power of [a] court to decide a criminal case, whereas venue relates to the particular county or city in which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case. Thus, any court authorized by the [state] Constitution, or a statute enacted pursuant thereto, to hear and determine a case involving a criminal act has jurisdiction thereof.

Dennis, 216 W. Va. at 342, 607 S.E.2d at 448 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See Willis v. O'Brien, 151 W. Va. 628, 630-31, 153 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1967) (“Jurisdiction is a constitutional endowment of power to hear and determine a cause. Thus, any court authorized by the Constitution, or a statute enacted pursuant thereto, to hear and determine a case involving a criminal act has jurisdiction thereof. Venue, on the other hand, is merely the place of trial. It designates the particular county in which a court having jurisdiction may properly hear and determine the case.”). (See footnote 17)

      In the case of State v. Haase, 446 N.W.2d 62 (S.D. 1989), the Supreme Court of South Dakota addressed the distinction between venue and jurisdiction as follows:
 
             Jurisdiction is made up of two components, i.e., (a) personal jurisdiction and (b) subject-matter jurisdiction. . . .  A court must have both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction before it may act on a criminal charge. . . .  A court acquires personal jurisdiction by the accused's presence before the court, irrespective of the events procuring his presence. . . .  Subject-matter jurisdiction entails the power of a court to hear a case, determine the facts, apply the law and set a penalty. . . .  Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement, consent, or waiver. . . .  A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction to pronounce it is wholly void and
without any force or effect whatever. . . .  Jurisdiction may be challenged at any time during the pendency of the proceedings and for the first time on appeal. . . .

              Venue is another matter. It refers to the county in which the prosecution is to be brought. . . .  Generally, this will be the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. . . .  However, unlike jurisdiction which cannot be conferred by waiver, . . . the right to venue of a prosecution in the county where the offense was committed can be waived by a defendant and the prosecution may proceed in another county. . . .  Were the rule otherwise, a change in venue would not be possible. . . .  In summation, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, but venue can be waived.               

              . . .To be sufficient, a venue allegation must appear in an indictment or information that the offense charged was committed in the county in which the prosecution is instituted. . . .  Thus, if an indictment or information fails to contain such an allegation, the defect must be raised prior to trial or is deemed waived. . . . 

Haase, 446 N.W.2d at 64-65 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

      In the context of criminal litigation, federal courts have taken the position that “[v]enue is not jurisdictional[.]” United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 587, 590 (2^nd Cir. 2001). See also United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9^th Cir. 1995) (“Strictly speaking, this is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction, because this constitutional right can be waived.”); Wilkett v. United States, 655 F.2d 1007, 1011 (10^th Cir. 1981) (“Venue in federal criminal cases . . . is not jurisdictional.”); United States v. Walden, 464 F.2d 1015, 1016 n.1 (4^th Cir. 1972) (“[I]mproper venue is not a jurisdictional defect[.]”). Consequently, all federal appellate courts hold that the issue of venue is waived if not raised prior to trial. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 372 F.3d 629, 633 (4^th Cir. 2004); United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 328 (3^rd Cir. 2002); United States v. Delgado-Nunez, 295 F.3d 494, 496 (5^th Cir. 2002); United States v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 845, 861 (9^th Cir. 2002); United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1151-52 (11^th Cir. 2002); United States v. LiCausi, 167 F.3d 36, 44 (1^st Cir. 1999); United States v. Cordova, 157 F.3d 587, 597 n.3 (8^th Cir. 1998); United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747, 750 (10^th Cir. 1997); United States v. Brandon, 50 F.3d 464, 469 (7^th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d 142, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93 (2^nd Cir. 1987); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 996 (6^th Cir. 1974).

      Consequently, we hold that, for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, venue is not jurisdictional; therefore, a defect in a charging instrument involving venue is subject to waiver if not asserted prior to trial. See Dean v. State, 414 So. 2d 1096, 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“[I]nsufficient allegations of venue in an information are subject to being waived[.]”). Insofar as venue is not jurisdictional, Tommy cannot rely upon the jurisdictional exception to waiver contained in Rule 12(b)(2).

       2. The absence of a statement of venue does not mean that an offense was not charged. Under Rule 12(b)(2), if a charging instrument fails to set out an offense for which a defendant is prosecuted, such a defect may be raised at any time. See Cleckley, Criminal Procedure, p. I-687 (“Rule 12(b)(2) properly interpreted means that an objection to an information or indictment on the ground that it fails to charge an offense may be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Tommy takes the position that failure to set out venue in the petition was tantamount to failing to state an offense. We disagree.

      In State v. Burton, this Court stated “that venue is not a fact which relates to the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is therefore not a substantive element of the crime[.]” 163 W. Va. 40, 59-60, 254 S.E.2d 129, 141 (1979). See also United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 421 (6^th Cir. 2003) (“[V]enue is not properly considered a true 'element' of a criminal offense.”); United States v. Carreon-Palacio, 267 F.3d 381, 391 (5^th Cir. 2001) (“[V]enue differs in substance from statutory offense elements.”); Wilkett v. United States, 655 F.2d 1007, 1011 (10^th Cir. 1981) (“Venue is wholly neutral; it is a question of procedure, more than anything else, and it does not either prove or disprove the guilt of the accused.”). In finding that venue was not a substantive element of an offense, Burton went on to hold that “[t]he State in a criminal case may prove the venue of the crime by a preponderance of the evidence, and is not required to prove the same beyond a reasonable doubt.” Syl. pt. 5, Burton, 163 W. Va. 40, 254 S.E.2d 129. Federal courts also hold that “when proving a non-essential element of a crime, like venue, the government need only meet the preponderance of evidence standard.” United States v. Stickle, 454 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11^th Cir. 2006). Accord United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 524 (4^th Cir. 2005); United States v. Strain, 396 F.3d 689, 692 n.3 (5^th Cir. 2005); United States v. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 330 (3^rd Cir. 2002); United States v. Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234, 1246 (11^th Cir. 1999); United States v. Josleyn, 99 F.3d 1182, 1190 (1^st Cir. 1996); United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1541 (2^nd Cir. 1994); United States v. Delgado, 914 F.2d 1062, 1064 (8^th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 549 n.19 (7^th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rinke, 778 F.2d 581, 584 (10^th Cir. 1985); United States v. Powell, 498 F.2d 890, 891 (9^th Cir. 1974); United States v. Charlton, 372 F.2d 663, 665 (6^th Cir. 1967).

      The above authorities support and we accordingly hold that, for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, venue is not an essential element of an offense; therefore, a defect in a charging instrument involving venue is subject to waiver if not asserted prior to trial. This does not, however, relieve the State of its burden of proving venue at trial in every case by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Powell, 498 F.2d 890, 891 (9^th Cir. 1974) (“[V]enue, since it may be waived, is not an essential fact constituting the offense charged.”). In the instant proceeding, the absence of a statement of venue in several of the counts in the petition did not mean that the State failed to charge an offense. (See footnote 18) Consequently, Tommy cannot rely upon the offense charged exception to waiver contained in Rule 12(b)(2). (See footnote 19)

       3. Good cause was not shown. Rule 12(b)(2) grants trial courts discretion, upon a showing of good cause, to allow a defendant to raise an otherwise untimely challenge to a charging instrument. Tommy failed to present the trial court with any reason for failing to timely move to dismiss the petition. Indeed, Tommy has failed to proffer in this appeal any reason for failing to timely challenge the petition on the issue of venue. Therefore, the good cause exception of Rule 12(b)(2) has no application in this case. (See footnote 20)

      In sum, “[a]s to the first point on appeal we [conclude] that [Tommy] may not now challenge his [adjudication and disposition] on the grounds that [the petition] fails to allege venue because he failed to raise the issue by pre-trial motion.” Tucker v. State, 417 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).

Marlow, 888 S.W.2d at 420 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Daniels v. State, 275 So. 2d 169, 172 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973) ( “[F]ailure of the appellants to raise the question of the disqualification of the juror . . . before trial by advising the court or making some appropriate objection or motion to invoke a ruling by the court, was a waiver.”); People v. Henry, 627 N.E.2d 225, 227-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“[T]he defendant did not ask the court to disqualify [the juror]. . . . Accordingly, he waived his statutory right to such a challenge.”); Langston v. State, 791 So. 2d 273, 281 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (“If a party fails to object to a juror before the jury is empaneled, that party waives any right to complain of the jury's composition at a later time.”); Syl. pt. 2, State v. Harris, 167 N.W.2d 386 (Neb. 1969) (“A defendant who fails to challenge jurors for disqualification and passes the jurors for cause waives his right to object to their selection and cannot later object after receiving an unfavorable verdict.”); Childress v. State, 1 P.3d 1006, 1016 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (“[A]ny objection to the trial court's refusal to remove prospective juror . . . for cause is waived, because defense counsel did not renew his challenge for cause prior to passing the jury.”); Gaona v. State, 733 S.W.2d 611, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (“[A]ppellant waived any error by failing to inquire about the juror's qualifications during voir dire examination and by failing to assert his challenge at that time.”); In re Nash, 614 A.2d 367, 372 (Vt. 1991) (“The right to challenge a juror is waived by a failure to object before the jury is impaneled if the basis for the objection is known or might, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered during voir dire.”); State v. Brunette, 583 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] defendant waives an objection to a juror's bias if no motion is made to the trial court to remove the juror for cause.”); Munoz v. State, 849 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1993) (“Appellant waived his claim to reversible error with respect to his challenges [for cause] . . . by passing the jury panel for cause.”).      

      In the instant case, “[b]y failing to challenge [for cause] when requested, [Tommy] waived his right thereto.” State v. Cooper, 74 W. Va. 472, 474-75, 82 S.E. 358, 359 (1914). Therefore, we need not determine whether the jurors should have been removed for cause.