Albright, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I concur with the decision of the majority reversing the judgment as a matter
of law on the issue of liability entered by the lower court contrary to the verdict of the jury.
(See footnote 1)
The reason for the trial court's action does not satisfactorily appear on the record.
I dissent from the decision of the majority to require the lower court to reinstate
the verdict without offering the trial court an opportunity to amend its order of a new trial to
include the issue of liability and state with particularity the trial court's reasons, if any, for
awarding such a new trial on all issues. This Court's celeritous reinstatement of the jury
verdict without affording such an opportunity is, in my view, shortsighted and in violation
of precedents meticulously fashioned by the Court over the years.
It is abundantly clear that the trial court perceived something in the evidence
and its consideration by the jury that generated the judge's lack of confidence in the verdict.
In reacting to that lack of confidence, the trial court awarded judgment as a matter of law on
the issue of liability and a new trial on the issues of damages, both of which are the subject
of this appeal. Having found that judgment as a matter of law is not justified, the majority
has failed to fairly consider whether the lesser remedy of a new trial on the issue of liability
might be in order. Instead, the majority has substituted its own judgment without soliciting
further input from the trial court. In doing so, I believe the majority has failed to consider
the essential differences between the standard of review for a judgment as a matter of law
and the standard of review for the granting of a new trial. In Gonzalez v. Conley, 199 W. Va.
288, 484 S.E.2d 171 (1997), this Court identified this significant distinction and explained
as follows:
The distinction between the effect of entering a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict as opposed to granting a
new trial is substantial and thus, warrants a different standard of
review. . . . When a trial judge vacates the jury verdict by
entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial judge is
entering a final judgment which ends litigation on the issue upon
which judgment has been entered. “In performing this analysis,
the credibility of the witnesses will not be considered, conflicts
in testimony will not be resolved, and the weight of the evidence
will not be evaluated.” Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193
W. Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995). See also Alkire
v. First National Bank of Parsons, 197 W. Va. 122, 128, 475
S.E.2d 122, 128 (1996). . . .
Conversely, when a trial judge vacates a jury verdict and
grants a new trial, he or she does not enter a final judgment.
Thus, a trial judge granting a new trial has more discretion in
determining whether such action is warranted. . . . In
[weighing evidence and considering credibility], the trial judge
does not invade the function of the fact finder because the trial
judge granting a new trial is simply sending the issue back to the
fact finder. Though this Court has made clear that the power to
grant a new trial should be used sparingly, this Court will not
review a trial judge's decision to grant a new trial unless the trial
judge abuses his or her discretion.
199 W. Va. at 291-92, 484 S.E.2d at 174-75 (internal citations omitted).
This Court has previously vested substantial discretion in trial judges to
consider granting a new trial, observing that a judge may set aside a jury verdict, provide
reasons for that determination, and order a new trial. In syllabus point three of Young v.
Duffield, 152 W. Va. 283,162 S.E.2d 285 (1968), overruled on other grounds, Tennant v.
Marion Health Care Found., 194 W. Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995), this Court held: “The
judgment of a trial court in setting aside a verdict and awarding a new trial is entitled to
peculiar weight and its action in this respect will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly
unwarranted.” Syllabus point four of Young explained: “An appellate court is more disposed
to affirm the action of a trial court in setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial than
when such action results in a final judgment denying a new trial.” Syllabus point five
continued: “Courts are not required to believe that which is contrary to physical facts and if
the verdict of the jury is based upon testimony which is contrary to physical facts, it will be
set aside and a new trial awarded.”
In Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 194 W. Va. 97, 459
S.E.2d 374 (1995), this Court explained the standard of review for the grant of a new trial
as follows:
[I]n reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a
circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of
review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning a
new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible
error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the
circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly
erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo
review.
194 W. Va. at 104, 459 S.E.2d at 381.
In In re State of West Virginia Public Building Asbestos Litigation, 193 W. Va.
119, 454 S.E.2d 413 (1994), cert. denied sub nom., W.R. Grace & Co. v. West Virginia, 515
U.S. 1160 (1995), this Court explained as follows:
Although the trial judge should rarely grant a new trial,
the trial judge, nevertheless, has broad discretion to determine
whether or not a new trial should be granted: “Courts do not
grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error
has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been
done. . . . Ultimately the motion invokes the sound discretion of
the trial court, and appellate review of its ruling is quite
limited.” Wright & Miller, supra at § 2803 at 32-33 (footnotes
omitted). However, it has been pointed out:
There are few subjects in the entire field of
procedure that have been subject to so much
change and controversy in recent years as the
proper scope of review of an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial. The trial court
has very broad discretion and the appellate courts
will defer a great deal to his exercise of this
discretion. This much is settled.
Wright & Miller, supra at § 2818 at 118.
193 W. Va. at 124, 454 S.E.2d at 418.
In the syllabus of Cook v. Harris, 159 W. Va. 641, 225 S.E.2d 676 (1976),
explained the rationale for such conclusions, as follows:
A trial judge is not merely a referee but is vested with
discretion in supervising verdicts and preventing miscarriages
of justice, with the power and duty to set a jury verdict aside and
award a new trial if it is plainly wrong even if it is supported by
some evidence, and when a trial judge so acts, his decision,
being in discharge of his power and duty to pass upon the
weight of the evidence to that limited extent, is entitled to
peculiar weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless
clearly unwarranted.
This Court has also recognized that “[t]he trial court has opportunities to observe many
things in the course of a trial which the printed record presented to an appellate court does
not disclose . . . .” Browning v. Monongahela Transp. Co., 126 W. Va. 195, 203, 27 S.E.2d
481, 485 (1943).
While the majority in the case sub judice premises its conclusions upon error
regarding the granting of the judgment as a matter of law, the preferred resolution of this
matter would entail a reversal of the judge's entry of the liability verdict in favor of the
plaintiff and a remand for further consideration and articulation of grounds for a new trial.
On remand, the rationale for any action regarding the grant of a new trial could be explained
with specificity.
By simply reversing the lower court's determination, the majority has ignored
the reality that the judge likely observed some discrepancy or inconsistency that in his view
merited a new trial. The majority chose to focus its entire attention upon the error in granting
the judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability and ignored the broader issue. By
reinstating the jury verdict, the majority has violated the spirit, if not the letter, of this Court's
own rule that we shall give deference to the judge's determinations on the issue of granting
new trials. More importantly, we have substituted our judgment for that of the trial court on
issues about which the trial court is likely better informed.
While I cannot express an opinion on the ultimate liability issue without knowing the judge's reasons for setting aside the jury verdict, I vehemently disagree with the majority's decision that the trial court's action justifies reinstatement of the jury verdict. A remand with instructions would have been a more appropriate resolution and would have served the purpose acclaimed by Justice Cleckley in his concurring opinion in In re State Public Bldg. Asbestos Litigation, that “[b]y broadening the authority of trial courts [to grant new trials] and limiting that of the appellate court [to review the same], we strike a decent note for judicial restraint and judicial economy.” 193 W. Va. at 132, 454 S.E.2d at 426.