Michael R. Whitt Joseph K. Reeder
Lewisburg, West Virginia Timbera C. Wilcox
Attorney for the Appellants Rose & Atkinson
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellee,
Roy Keys
The Opinion of the Court was delivered Per Curiam.
2. 'To show an accord and satisfaction, the person asserting the defense must
prove three elements: (1) Consideration to support an accord and satisfaction; (2) an offer
of partial payment in full satisfaction of a disputed claim; and (3) acceptance of the partial
payment by the creditor with knowledge that the debtor offered it only upon the condition that
the creditor accept the payment in full satisfaction of the disputed claim or not at all.'
Syllabus Point 1, Charleston Urban Renewal Authority v. Stanley, 176 W.Va. 591, 346
S.E.2d 740 (1985). Syl. Pt. 5, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
Per Curiam:
Appellants Leon Richards and Elaine Richards appeal from the August 28, 2001,
order of the Circuit Court of Fayette County granting summary judgment to Appellees Roy
Kees and Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). At issue below was whether the transmittal
of a $200 check by Allstate to Mr. Richards and the cashing of that check, which contained
words indicating that it was in final settlement of any bodily injury claims arising from an
automobile accident, constituted an accord and satisfaction. The circuit court based its grant
of summary judgment on its decision that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction was met
under the facts of this case. We disagree and, accordingly, reverse.
Following the accident, Mr. Richards began negotiations with Allstate, Mr. Kees'
liability insurer, in connection with the property damage his vehicle sustained as a result of the
accident. During the course of those negotiations, Mr. Richards was advised by Dave Danner, the Allstate insurance adjuster, that a $200 check would be forthcoming in
addition to the separate payment for their property damage claim in the amount
of $1600. Mr. Richards testified that his understanding concerning the issuance
of the $200 check was payment for his good leg work
(See footnote 1) and
to cover the costs of the long distance phone bills he had incurred in communicating
with the adjuster.
A check issued by Allstate dated January 11, 1999, for the amount of $200, was
transmitted to Mr. Richards. On the top left hand corner of the face of the check there was a
notation indicating the following: FINAL SETTLEMENT OF ANY AND ALL CLAIMS
ARISING FROM BODILY INJURY CAUSED BY ACCIDENT ON 12/30/98. Mr. Richards
received the check and presented the same for payment. When he later attempted to advance
a claim for bodily injury arising from the accident, Allstate denied the claim, asserting that an
accord and satisfaction had occurred based on Mr. Richards' cashing of the $200 check.
The Richards instituted a cause of action against
Mr. Kees and Allstate following the denial of their bodily injury claim.
(See footnote 2) In
response to the lawsuit, Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment on the
grounds of accord and satisfaction. Appellants responded to the
summary judgment motion by arguing that Mr. Richards, who has an eighth grade education,
is functionally illiterate and that there had been no discussions between Mr. Richards and
Allstate concerning the settlement of a bodily injury claim. The circuit court granted summary
judgment on the grounds of accord and satisfaction, and Appellants seek a reversal of that
decision.
Appellees suggest that just as in Peavy, the facts of this case demonstrate the
three elements necessary to find an accord and satisfaction. Appellees contend that the
language conspicuously written on the face of the check clearly constitutes the offer; the check
was the consideration; and the cashing of the check constituted Mr. Richards' acceptance of
the offer. In response to Mr. Richards' claim of cashing the check totally unaware of the final
settlement language or its significance, Appellees argue that the court in Peavy prevented
the plaintiff in that case from claiming the status of a wary person, ignorant of the law and its
consequences.
Appellees misconstrue the Peavy case and its application to the case sub judice.
There are several significant distinctions between the facts presented in Peavy and the facts
involved in the present case. Critically, the plaintiff in Peavy did not cash the check herself;
she transmitted it to her attorney who cashed it with the notation deposited under protest on
the back of the check. In recognition of the attorney's involvement in the check cashing at
issue in Peavy, this Court observed: This is not a case where a wary person, ignorant of the
law, made a mistake. 192 W.Va. at 194, n. 9, 451 S.E.2d at 760, n. 9. We did not, however,
as Appellees suggest, indicate that ignorance or unawareness of the settlement language would
have no bearing on the issue of accord and satisfaction in other cases.
Another critical distinction between Peavy and this case is the submission of
medical bills prior to the transmittal of the partial settlement check. In Peavy, the plaintiff had
submitted receipts reflecting medical treatment in the amount of $708.60 prior to the
transmittal of the $750 settlement check. In stark contrast, Mr. Richards had not submitted
any medical bills at the time of his receipt of the $200 check, and there had been absolutely
no discussion whatsoever between Mr. Richards and Allstate with regard to a medical claim
related to the accident.
Unlike the cashing of the check in Peavy, there was no notation made by Mr.
Richards upon his cashing of the check. In Peavy, we viewed the notation that the $750
settlement check was being presented for payment under protest as further evidence that the
plaintiff in that case was aware of the condition upon which the check was being offered. 192
W.Va. at 193, 451 S.E.2d at 759. There is no comparable evidence in this case to demonstrate
an awareness on Mr. Richards' part with regard to the condition of full settlement of his bodily
injury claims.
Upon a full review of the facts involved in this case, we simply cannot conclude
that the critical third element of the accord and satisfaction test was met: the acceptance with
knowledge that the debtor offered it only upon the condition that the creditor accept the
payment in full satisfaction of the disputed claim. Peavy, 192 W.Va. at 190, 451 S.E.2d at
756, syl. pt. 5, in part. The absence of any submitted medical bills; the complete absence of
any discussion regarding a bodily injury claim; and the evidence of Mr. Richards' limited
education and understanding all point to the fact that Mr. Richards' cashing of the $200 check
did not constitute an accord and satisfaction under the facts of this case.
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Circuit Court of Fayette County is
hereby reversed.