Maynard, Justice, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it is obvious the
majority considered only one factor in reversing the order of the circuit court, the income of
Dr. Josimovich, and ignored the remaining factors that are enumerated in W.Va. Code § 48-
2-16 (1999).
The majority states that [t]he earning abilities of the parties . . . are quite
disparate[,] but then refuses to consider the earning ability of Ms. Howes. The majority
ignores the fact that Ms. Howes graduated with two degrees, a B.S. in nursing and a B.S. in
Health Care Administration. The Human Resources Employment Specialist at the local
hospital testified that job openings exist in the immediate area that Ms. Howes is qualified
to fill. Her minimum wage would be $14.00 per hour if she chose to go to work. The
majority ignores the fact that Dr. Josimovich put his education on hold so Ms. Howes could
complete her education first. The majority ignores the fact that the financial history of the
parties is debt-ridden, and they declared bankruptcy in 1999. Both parties were responsible
for accumulating the remaining debt, and both should be responsible for retiring the debt.
As justification for refusing to attribute income to Ms. Howes, the majority
states, As the spouse of a medical doctor earning more than $14,000.00 per month, a
reasonable, similarly-situated spouse would likely have remained in the home and devoted
her time to the care of the children. Quite frankly, I believe many working women will be
offended by the majority's reasonable, similarly-situated spouse standard. If this opinion
had been written in 1945, the standard used by the majority would probably be right on track.
However, this is 2002, nearly 2003, and the fact is that millions of American women married
to professional men, doctors, lawyers, corporate presidents, etc., want and choose to use their
talents, skills, and education in the workplace. The fact that a woman has children no longer
dictates that she remain in the home devoting her time to the care of the children. Many
women believe that their children receive superior care due to the fact that they work outside
the home.
Rather than seeking employment, Ms. Howes sought to bolster her stay-at-
home position by pulling the younger child out of school on a half-day basis for home
schooling while Natalie was attending first grade in public school. I cannot tell if this plan
was ever implemented or how long it may have lasted. The fact is that both girls are school
age, ten and eight, and the evidence indicates that both perform well in public school.
Moreover, Ms. Howes would have this Court believe that her four-day hospitalization for
partner relational problem fourteen months after the marital separation prohibits her from
working. The evidence does not indicate as much. Therefore, I do not believe the circuit
court abused its discretion by attributing monthly income to Ms. Howes.
If Ms. Howes is to receive $2,900.00 for alimony in addition to child support
from her ex-husband every month, then surely she can afford to pay one-half of her
attorney's fees. But no, here again the majority places the full responsibility on Dr.
Josimovich. Lastly, in her petition for appeal to this Court, Ms. Howes does not request a
recalculation of child support. Nonetheless, in its plethora of relief, with no explanation
whatsoever, the majority opinion orders a recalculation.
The majority ignores the figures used in Ms. Howes' financial disclosures. In
her first disclosure, she listed monthly expenses of $5,608.86. Ms. Howes amended the
disclosure on March 14, 2001, showing that her monthly expenses increased to $6,680.63.
Six days later, on March 20, 2001, she filed a second revised disclosure, maintaining that her
monthly expenses had escalated to $12,112.22. If Ms. Howes wishes to further her education
so that she might increase her earning ability to support her lifestyle, I would not be averse
to awarding rehabilitative alimony. However, I believe permanent alimony should not be
awarded when Ms. Howes is a young, healthy, educated woman with job opportunities
imminently available. The factors enumerated in W.Va. Code § 48-2-16 (1999) dictate
against awarding permanent alimony under the circumstances of this case.
I do not believe the circuit court erred in the relief that it granted to Ms. Howes
in the final divorce order. Therefore, I would affirm the order of the Circuit Court of
Randolph County which was entered on August 29, 2001.