On October 12, 1999, Mr. Robinson filed a divorce petition in West Virginia. He alleged irreconcilable differences as grounds for the divorce. Ms. Coppala filed an answer admitting irreconcilable differences. Hearings were held and evidence was taken before a family law master.   (See footnote 3)  On February 22, 2001, the family law master filed a recommended decision with the circuit court. The two relevant recommendations made by the family law master were: (1) that Ms. Coppala receive alimony in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for 36 months; and (2) that Mr. Robinson maintain life insurance on himself under a policy that made his daughter an irrevocable beneficiary of $250,000.00.   (See footnote 4) 

         1. Authority to require life insurance by a child support obligor. The issue of requiring a child support obligor to maintain an existing life insurance policy, with the child as beneficiary, is one of first impression for this Court. The parties have pointed out that there is a split of authority among other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. However, it appears that “a majority of jurisdictions . . . permit the court to secure child support payments by ordering the obligor parent to maintain . . . life insurance for as long as the support obligation remains in effect, generally until the children reach the age of majority.” Knowles v. Thompson, 697 A.2d 335, 338 (Vt. 1997). See also Jordan v. Jordan, 688 So. 2d 839, 842 (Ala. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding there was no abuse of discretion in requiring child support obligor to maintain life insurance); In re Marriage of O'Connell, Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 337 (1992) (holding that in a divorce action the court can order a spouse to maintain life insurance to benefit a minor child); Carroll v. Carroll, 737 A.2d 963, 966 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (finding an order of life insurance to very often be an appropriate and necessary component of a judgment of dissolution of marriage); Bissell v. Bissell, 622 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the trial court's direction that the husband maintain a life insurance policy as security for the payment of child support and alimony); In re Estate of Downey, 687 N.E.2d 339, 342 (Ill. App. 1997) (holding that the court may require a spouse to maintain life insurance policy and name the child as irrevocable beneficiary of such policy); In re Marriage of Mayfield, 477 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (finding no error in trial court's order that husband maintain his life insurance policy payable to his children); Allison v. Allison, 363 P.2d 795, 802 (Kan. 1961) (ruling that court has the discretion to require father to maintain life insurance with child as beneficiary); Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (approving life insurance by child support obligor); Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 769 (Miss. 1989) (concluding that parent can be required to absorb insurance expenses and maintain a life insurance policy on his/her own life with the child named as beneficiary); Thiebault v. Thiebault, 421 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that court has authority to require child support obligor to obtain life insurance); Jantzen v. Jantzen, 595 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Neb. 1999) (approving property settlement agreement requiring child support obligor to maintain life insurance with child as beneficiary); Bailey v. Bailey, 471 P.2d 220, 223 (Nev. 1970) (holding that a court can require the father to maintain or purchase life insurance with the child as beneficiary); Zaragoza v. Capriola, 492 A.2d 698, 700 (N.J. Super. 1985) (requiring father maintain life insurance with children as beneficiaries); Kosovsky v. Zahl, 684 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (1999) (approving life insurance policy of $750,000 to secure defendant's child support obligation); Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 644 N.W.2d 197, 209 (N.D. 2002) (holding that a court can require child support obligor maintain a life insurance policy until child is eighteen); Yery v. Yery, 629 P.2d 357, 363 (Okla. 1981) (approving life insurance by child support obligor); Matter of Marriage of Willey, 963 P.2d 141, 144 (Or. Ct. App) (relying on statutory authority to require life insurance policy be procured); Fender v. Fender, 182 S.E.2d 755, 759 (S.C. 1971) (finding court has discretion to require life insurance policy); Young v. Young, 971 S.W.2d 386, 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (observing that statute authorized court to require life insurance); Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978) (ruling that child support obligor was required to maintain life insurance until daughter reached eighteen); In re Marriage of Sievers, 897 P.2d 388, 398 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that trial court had authority to secure the child support with decreasing term life insurance); Foregger v. Foregger, 162 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Wis. 1969) (finding that trial court has the power to order a father to continue in force life insurance policies for the benefit of his children).   (See footnote 10) 

        Both parties agree that there is no express statutory authority that specifically permits a court to require a child support obligor to maintain a life insurance policy with the child as the beneficiary. However, Ms. Coppala contends that the family law master had implied discretion to impose the requirement under W. Va. Code § 48-2-16(b)(20), which provision was in effect at the time of the divorce.   (See footnote 11)  Under this “catchall” provision, a family law master may consider “[s]uch other factors as the court deems necessary or appropriate . . . in order to arrive at a fair and equitable grant of . . . child support[.]” W. Va. Code § 48- 2-16(b)(20). We commented on this provision in syllabus point 3 of Bridgeman v. Bridgeman, 182 W. Va. 677, 391 S.E.2d 367 (1990), where we stated, in part, that the statute “is not a license to engage in creative jurisprudence, but it does require trial courts to consider the unusual facts of specific marriages.”   (See footnote 12)  We believe W. Va. Code § 48-2- 16(b)(20) is broad enough to permit the recommendation made by the family law master. Moreover, even without the authority of W. Va. Code § 48-2-16(b)(20), our decision in Scott v. Wagoner, 184 W. Va. 312, 400 S.E.2d 556 (1990), supports a rule allowing a family law master the discretion to require a child support obligor to maintain a life insurance policy benefitting the obligor's child[ren].

        Scott asked this Court to determine whether a child support obligation extended beyond the death of the obligor. Prior to Scott, our cases had held that child support payments terminated with the death of the obligor. We overruled prior decisions in Scott and held that “a court has the authority to enforce the child support obligation as a lien against the deceased obligor's estate.” Scott, 184 W. Va. at 316, 400 S.E.2d at 560. The Scott Court sought to prevent the financial hardship that could befall a child should the child support obligor die.

        Here, the family law master sought to assure that the child's standard of living would not diminish should Mr. Robinson suffer an untimely death. The remedy chosen by the family law master was consistent with, and an extension of, Scott. Indeed, it has been recognized that “[w]hen a trial court orders a parent to maintain a life insurance policy on his life for the child's benefit, the court is ensuring future support is available for the child in the event that the parent dies.” Capehart v. Capehart, 705 N.E.2d 533, 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Further, the life insurance mechanism chosen by the family law master provides greater security than Scott, because under Scott a child support obligor could die penniless, thereby leaving nothing for which a lien could be imposed.

        In view of the foregoing, we hold that a child support obligor may be required to maintain or acquire a life insurance policy, with the obligor's child[ren] as beneficiary, when unusual facts of a particular case make it necessary or appropriate in order to arrive at a fair and equitable grant of child support. Having so held, we likewise hold when a child support obligor has been required to maintain or acquire a life insurance policy with the obligor's child[ren] as the beneficiary, generally the duration of the life insurance policy imposed upon the obligor may not be required to extend beyond the child[ren]'s age of majority.

        In the instant case, the unusual facts that caused the family law master to make the life insurance recommendation, concerned the age of Mr. Robinson and his daughter. Mr. Robinson is age fifty-two, while his daughter is only four years old. As a result of Mr. Robinson's age and the tender age of his daughter, the family law master recommended the life insurance requirement as a way of assuring continued adequate support for the child in the event Mr. Robinson should die before she reached majority. We agree with the family law master that the age disparity made it appropriate to require Mr. Robinson to maintain the life insurance policy. We therefore reverse the circuit court's ruling on this issue.   (See footnote 13) 

         2. Premium costs and income deduction. The circuit court ruled that the family law master failed to make findings as to the premium cost for maintaining the life insurance policy, and further failed to make a deduction in the child support calculation based upon such premium payments. We agree with the circuit court that these issues should have been addressed by the family law master. This Court has recognized that, as an incident to child support, “all premium payments made by the [obligor] for . . . insurance are to be deemed child support in such proportion as the court shall direct.” Kathy L.B. v. Patrick J.B., 179 W. Va. 655, 662, 371 S.E.2d 583, 590 (1988).

        Although we agree with the circuit court on the above issues, we disagree with the circuit court's use of those issues as a basis for rejecting the recommendation regarding life insurance. We have previously held that “if a circuit court believes a family law master failed to make findings of fact essential to the proper resolution of a legal question, it should remand the case to the family law master to make those findings.” Stephen L.H., 195 W. Va. at 396, 465 S.E.2d at 853. Consequently, we remand these issues for the family law master to address.   (See footnote 14) 

Footnote: 1