Joshua I. Barrett, Esq.
Stephen R. Brooks, Esq.
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
Per Curiam: This case is before this Court
upon appeal of a final order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County entered
on August 6, 2001. In that order, the circuit court granted summary judgment
in favor of the appellee and defendant below, West Virginia University Hospitals,
Inc., a West Virginia corporation, d/b/a Ruby Memorial Hospital (hereinafter
WVUH), in this medical malpractice action filed by the appellants
and plaintiffs below, Jerry and Kathy Withrow, individually and as the natural
parents and guardians of Rebekah Lynn Withrow.
(See footnote 1) In this appeal, the Withrows contend that
genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment.
This Court has before it the petition for appeal, the entire record, and the
briefs and argument of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the circuit court's final
order is affirmed.
In 1992, Rebekah Lynn Withrow was treated for Hodgkin's lymphoma. She
was eleven years old. In 1995, Rebekah suffered a recurrence of Hodgkin's lymphoma
and was admitted to WVUH in Morgantown, West Virginia, for care and treatment.
Rebekah's primary physician was Marie Steiner, M.D., a faculty physician at the West
Virginia University School of Medicine and an employee of the University of West
Virginia Board of Trustees.
Dr. Steiner performed an allogenic bone marrow transplant on Rebekah in
October 1995. On December 2, 1995, while still hospitalized, Rebekah suffered a right
periototemporal hemorrhage (a stroke). It is alleged that Rebekah's stroke occurred as
a result of her blood platelet count falling to 13,000.
The record indicates that Rebekah's platelet count was monitored every
twelve hours following her bone marrow transplant because one of the complications
associated with the procedure is difficulty in producing platelets which can lead to other
serious problems. Dr. Steiner entered a series of orders indicating the level at which
Rebekah's platelet count was to be maintained. If Rebekah's platelet count fell below the
specified level, the nursing staff was instructed to give Rebekah a transfusion to bring her
platelet count back up to the designated level. Dr. Steiner changed Rebekah's required
platelet count on one occasion because she was taking a certain medication, heparin. Her
level was adjusted on another occasion because she was having her menses.
On December 1, 1995, Rebekah's platelet count fell to 32,000. When her
platelet count was checked twelve hours later, at 3:00 a.m. on December 2, 1995, it was
13,000. Upon learning of Rebekah's low platelet count, an order for one unit of platelets
was entered by the WVUH nursing staff. However, while the platelets were being
prepared, Rebekah suffered a stroke.
On March 7, 1997, the Withrows filed this action in the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County against WVUH and the University of West Virginia Board of Trustees.
The Withrows alleged, inter alia, that Rebekah suffered a stroke because the WVUH
nursing staff allowed her platelet count to fall below the level specified by her treating
physician. The Withrows claimed that Rebekah was permanently physically and mentally
impaired as a result of the stroke.
Following discovery, the defendants filed separate motions for summary
judgment. On June 13, 2001, the circuit court issued an order granting summary judgment
in favor of WVUH. The summary judgment motion filed by the University of West
Virginia Board of Trustees was denied. Thereafter, the Withrows filed a motion
requesting the circuit court to amend its findings of fact and the order granting summary
judgment to WVUH. The motion was denied in the final order entered on August 6, 2001.
This appeal followed.
The record shows that following Rebekah's bone marrow transplant, Dr.
Steiner entered a protocol order which required Rebekah to be transfused with platelets
if her platelet count reached or fell below 20,000. On November 24, 1995, Dr. Steiner
entered a temporary order requiring a transfusion of platelets for Rebekah if her platelet
count fell below 30,000. This order was put in place because Rebekah was taking heparin.
On November 25, 1995, Dr. Steiner entered another temporary order requiring Rebekah
to be given platelets if her platelet count fell below 40,000 because she was having her
menses. The circuit court found that the November 25, 1995 order was discontinued on
November 30, 1995, and that the original protocol order requiring a tranfusion if
Rebekah's platelet count reached or fell below 20,000 was in place on December 2, 1995,
when Rebekah suffered a stroke.
In the final order granting summary judgment to WVUH, the circuit court
concluded that the Withrows failed to offer expert testimony to prove that there had been
a breach of the applicable standard of care by the WVUH nursing staff. The circuit court
stated:
After reviewing the record, we believe the evidence supports the circuit court's conclusion
that the Withrows failed to present evidence establishing that WVUH breached the
applicable standard of care. This Court has stated that
[w]hen the principles of summary judgment are applied in a medical malpractice
case, one of the threshold questions is the existence of expert witnesses
opining the alleged negligence. Neary v. Charleston Area Medical
Center, Inc., 194 W.Va. 329, 334, 460 S.E.2d 464, 469 (1995). This question
must be answered because [i]t is the general rule that in medical malpractice
cases negligence or want of professional skill can be proved only by expert
witnesses. Syllabus Point 2, Roberts v. Gale, 149 W.Va. 166,
139 S.E.2d 272 (1964).
(See footnote 2) In this regard, W.Va. Code
§ 55-7B-7 (1986) provides, in pertinent part, The applicable standard of care and a
defendant's failure to meet said standard, if at issue, shall be established in medical
professional liability cases by the plaintiff by testimony of one or more knowledgeable,
competent expert witnesses if required by the court. Consequently, if a plaintiff is unable
to produce an expert witness to testify to the applicable standard of care and a breach
thereof, he or she cannot establish a prima facie case of medical negligence and summary
judgment is proper. See Goundry v. Wetzel-Saffle, 211 W.Va. 698, --- n.10, 568 S.E.2d
5, 8-9 n.10 (2002) ([O]nce a trial court makes the discretionary determination that a
plaintiff must produce a qualified medical expert in a medical malpractice case, underlying
disputed material issues of fact cannot be reached until the plaintiff has produced a
qualified medical expert.).
In this case, the Withrows designated Barry Singer, M.D., as their expert
witness. Dr. Singer is board-certified in internal medicine, hematology, and oncology.
Although he has no certification in pediatrics or pediatric oncology, he has cared for
pediatric patients in his practice. Having reviewed Dr. Singer's deposition which was
submitted with the motion for summary judgment, we find that Dr. Singer failed to render
an opinion regarding a breach of the applicable standard of care by WVUH.
During his deposition, Dr. Singer testified that the WVUH nurses would have
breached the standard of care if Dr. Steiner had ordered that platelets be given to Rebekah
and they failed to do so. However, Dr. Singer was unable to say that the nurses had failed
to follow Dr. Steiner's orders. Initially, Dr. Singer testified that he believed Dr. Steiner
intended that Rebekah receive a transfusion if her platelet count fell below 40,000.
However, when presented with Rebekah's medical chart, Dr. Singer admitted that he was
unfamiliar with WVUH's computerized ordering system and he did not know which order
was in place with respect to Rebekah's platelet count on December 1, 1995. Thus, he was
unable to say the WVUH nursing staff failed to follow Dr. Steiner's orders. Furthermore,
when Dr. Singer was asked, What about the hospital itself, its policies, procedures, the
way its lab operated, do you have any sort of opinions about a breach of the standard of
care at level, he replied, [n]o, not specifically, no.
In sum, the Withrows were unable to establish by expert testimony that
WVUH breached the applicable standard of care. Consequently, they lacked evidence to
prove an essential element required to establish a prima facie case of medical negligence
against WVUH. Therefore, WVUH was entitled to summary judgment.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the final order of the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County entered on August 6, 2001, is affirmed.
In medical malpractice cases where lack of care or want of
skill is so gross, so as to be apparent, or the alleged breach
relates to noncomplex matters of diagnosis and treatment
within the understanding of lay jurors by resort to common
knowledge and experience, failure to present expert testimony
on the accepted standard of care and degree of skill under such
circumstances is not fatal to a plaintiff's prima facie showing
of negligence.
In Syllabus Point 8 of McGraw, we determined that [a] trial court is vested with
discretion under W.Va.Code § 55-7B-7 (1986) to require expert testimony in medical
professional liability cases, and absent an abuse of that discretion, a trial court's decision
will not be disturbed on appeal. In the instant
case, the circuit court determined that
expert testimony was necessary.
L. Dante DiTrapano, Esq.
Mary S. Blaydes, Esq.
DiTrapano, Barrett & DiPiero
Charleston, West Virginia
and
Richard D. Lindsay, Esq.
Tabor, Lindsay & Associates
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Withrows
Christine S. Vaglienti, Esq.
Flaherty, Sensabaugh & Bonasso
Morgantown, West Virginia
Attorneys for West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.
JUSTICE STARCHER dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE MCGRAW dissents.
1. A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
2. A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is
clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is
not desirable to clarify the application of the law. Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).
3. Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence
presented, the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,
such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of the case that it has the burden to prove. Syllabus Point 2, Williams v.
Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).
4. It is the general rule that in medical malpractice cases negligence or
want of professional skill can be proved only by expert witnesses. Syllabus Point 2,
Roberts v. Gale, 149 W.Va. 166, 139 S.E.2d 272 (1964).
As noted above, the Withrows appeal an order granting summary judgment
to WVUH. In Syllabus Point 1 of Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755
(1994), this Court held that: A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. This Court has also held that, A motion for summary judgment should be
granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry
concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law. Syllabus Point
3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133
S.E.2d 770 (1963). In Syllabus Point 2 of Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va.
52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995), this Court explained that,
Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the
evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.
With these principles in mind, we now consider the parties' arguments.
DISCUSSION
The Withrows contend that a genuine issue of material fact exists in this case
regarding the platelet level ordered to be maintained just before Rebekah suffered a stroke.
They assert that the evidence is conflicting with respect to which platelet count order given
by Dr. Steiner was in effect on December 1, 1995. Thus, the Withrows maintain that
there is a factual dispute, and the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to
WVUH.
The uncontroverted evidence in the record is that on
December 2, 1995, the order that was in place respecting
Rebekah's platelet count was the protocol order. The protocol
order required a transfusion only if Rebekah's platelet count
fell below 20,000. From the standpoint of the nursing staff,
Dr. Steiner's orders were clear. It was the protocol order that
was in place and it was clear. The plaintiff has not presented
any evidence which would show that, on December 2, 1995,
the nursing staff knew or had reason to believe that Dr. Steiner
intended that Rebekah be transfused when her platelet count
was at a higher level.
In light of the evidence that the nursing staff acted in
accordance with the protocol order in effect on December 2,
1995, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the nursing staff,
and its employer, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.,
breached the applicable standard of care.
CONCLUSION
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1
Footnote: 2
Syllabus Point 4, Totten v. Adongay, 175 W.Va. 634, 337 S.E.2d 2 (1985). In addition, we have held that, [t]he standard of nonmedical, administrative, ministerial or routine
care in a hospital need not be established by expert testimony, because the jury is
competent from its own experience to determine and apply a reasonable care standard.
Syllabus Point 9, McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 200 W.Va. 114, 488 S.E.2d 389 (1997).