2.    “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law . . . we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syllabus point 1, in part, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

        3.    West Virginia state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over federal preemption defenses.

        4.    The continuation of health insurance coverage provisions of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300bb-1 to -8 (2000), do not preempt W. Va. Code § 8-12- 8 (1986) (Repl. Vol. 1998).

        5.    “'“A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.” Syllabus point 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951).'

Syllabus point 1, State v. Jarvis, 199 W. Va. 635, 487 S.E.2d 293 (1997).” Syllabus point 4, Daily Gazette Co. v. West Virginia Development Office, 206 W. Va. 51, 521 S.E.2d 543 (1999).

        6.    The plain language of W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 (1986) (Repl. Vol. 1998) requires municipalities, which provide health care coverage to retired municipal employees, to provide continuation coverage to a deceased retired municipal employee's spouse and dependent(s) without temporal limitation. To maintain such continuation coverage, the deceased retired municipal employee's spouse and dependent(s) must pay the premium required therefor.

        7.    “'Mandamus will lie to compel performance of a nondiscretionary duty of an administrative officer . . . , where it appears that the official, under misapprehension of law, refuses to recognize the nature and scope of his duty and proceeds on the belief that he has discretion to do or not to do the thing demanded of him.' Syllabus point 4, in part, Walter v. Ritchie, 156 W. Va. 98, 191 S.E.2d 275 (1972).” Syllabus point 6, in part, Mountaineer Disposal Service, Inc. v. Dyer, 156 W. Va. 766, 197 S.E.2d 111 (1973).

Davis, Chief Justice:

        The City of Wheeling, appellant/respondent below (hereinafter “the City”), appeals a decision of the Circuit Court of Ohio County granting Sharon Orlofske (hereinafter “Ms. Orlofske”); others similarly situated; Local 12 of the International Association of Firefighters; and Lodge 38 of the Fraternal Order of Police, appellees/petitioners below, a writ of mandamus. By so ordering, the circuit court compelled the City to accept from Ms. Orlofske premiums for continued coverage under the City's health insurance benefits plan for her lifetime. The City objects and asserts that its duty to accept such premiums is limited by federal and state law to a maximum of thirty-six months. Having reviewed the briefs, heard the arguments of counsel and analyzed the pertinent authorities, we affirm the circuit court's ruling.

            The issues raised by the City in this appeal are subject to our plenary review. We typically review de novo a circuit court's decision to grant mandamus relief. In this regard, we previously have held that “[t]he standard of appellate review of a circuit court's order granting relief through the extraordinary writ of mandamus is de novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Staten v. Dean, 195 W. Va. 57, 464 S.E.2d 576 (1995). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Rollyson v. Jordan, 205 W. Va. 368, 518 S.E.2d 372 (1999).

    Furthermore, we specifically have been asked to determine whether the circuit court possessed subject matter jurisdiction in this case. “Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an issue is a question of law.” Snider v. Snider, 209 W. Va. 881, 888, 551 S.E.2d 693, 699 (2001). Thus, we also review anew the circuit court's ruling on this point. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law . . . we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 1, in part, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). Having identified the standards governing our review, we turn now to our decision of this appeal.

        Under the dual system of sovereignty established by the United States Constitution, state courts are presumed to enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal questions. E.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 1568, 108 L. Ed. 2d 834, 839 (1990). Because state and federal courts share jurisdiction over federal claims, “when a state proceeding presents a federal issue, even a pre- emption issue, the proper course is to seek resolution of that issue by the state court.” Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149-50, 108 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 100 L. Ed. 2d 127, 138 (1988). See also Catepillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398 n.13, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2433 n.13, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318, 331 n.13 (1987) (recognizing that preemption claims would have to “be addressed in the first instance by the state court in which respondents filed their claims.”). Thus, we agree that “[s]tate courts are perfectly competent to evaluate federal preemption defenses[,]” Doyle v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 149 F. Supp. 2d 427, 434 (N.D. Ill. 2001),   (See footnote 7)  and hold that West Virginia state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over federal preemption defenses.

        We reject the City's claim that the COBRA amendments that were substantially identical to both ERISA and PHSA on the issue of continuing coverage somehow imported ERISA preemption into the PHSA. “It is clear . . . that under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1), none of the ERISA provisions applies to a government employee benefits plan.” Williams v. New Castle County, 970 F.2d 1260, 1265 (3d Cir. 1992). In essence, “[n]otwithstanding ERISA's clear exclusion of governmental plans, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(1) & 1002(32), [the City] urges the court to ignore the statute and apply ERISA to [t]his case.” Mansfield v. Chicago Park Dist. Group Plan, 946 F. Supp. 586, 591 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The City's reliance on ERISA preemption is misplaced. ERISA simply does not apply to municipal, or state, government plans. If preemption is to be found, it must be found in the federal statute applicable to municipal governments--the PHSA.

        Federal preemption of state law is either express -- if the federal statute contains an express statement preempting state law -- or implied -- if compliance with state and federal law is a physical impossibility or state law frustrates the purpose of the federal law. Hartley Marine, 196 W. Va. at 674, 474 S.E.2d at 604. The PHSA does not contain an express preemption provision. See Bigelow v. United Health Care of Mississippi, 220 F.3d 339, 344 n.8 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We are not aware of any preemption provision in the PHSA like the express, total preemption provision of ERISA.”). In fact, none of the eight sections comprising the PHSA contain words of exclusivity. Furthermore, the House of Representatives and Senate Reports dealing with the PHSA's continuing coverage provisions are silent on preemption. Radici v. Associated Ins. Co., 217 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the PHSA does not expressly preempt state law, we next turn to the question of implied preemption.

        Construing this language in conjunction with the governing federal law, we find there is no conflict between the provisions of W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 and the goal of continuing health insurance coverage for government employees the PHSA seeks to accomplish. The PHSA provides, in pertinent part, that continuation coverage “must extend for at least the period beginning on the date of the qualifying event^[   (See footnote 8)  ^] and ending not earlier than [a maximum of thirty-six months later].” 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-2(2) (2000) (footnote added). Nothing in the PHSA suggests that a state cannot be more beneficent than the PHSA requires, as long as the state is not less generous than the PHSA mandates. Because W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 provides lifetime coverage for retirees' survivors or dependents, it most certainly provides coverage for the requisite period of thirty-six months.

        W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 (1986) (Repl. Vol. 1998) provides:

            Every municipality shall have plenary power and authority to negotiate for, secure and adopt for the regular employees thereof (other than provisional, temporary, emergency and intermittent employees) who are in employee status with such municipality on and after the effective date of this section and for their spouses and dependents, a policy or policies of group insurance written by a carrier or carriers chartered under the laws of any state and duly licensed to do business in this state and covering life; health; hospital care; surgical or medical diagnosis, care and treatment; drugs and medicines; remedial care; other medical supplies and services; or any other combination of these; and any other policy or policies of group insurance which in the discretion of the governing body bear a reasonable relationship to the foregoing coverages. The provisions and terms of any such group plan or plans of insurance shall be approved in writing by the insurance commissioner of this state as to form, rate and benefits.

            The municipality is hereby authorized and empowered to pay the entire premium cost, or any portion thereof, of said group policy or policies. Whenever the above-described regular employees shall indicate in writing that they have subscribed to any of the aforesaid insurance plans on a group basis and the entire cost thereof is not paid by the municipality, the municipality is hereby authorized and empowered to make periodic premium deductions of the amount of the contribution each such subscribing employee is required to make for such participation from the salary or wage payments due each such subscribing employee as specified in a written assignment furnished to the municipality by each such subscribing employee.

            When a participating employee shall retire from his employment, he may, if he so elects, remain a member of the group plan and retain coverage for his spouse and dependents, by paying the entire premium for the coverage involved. Spouses and dependents of any deceased member may remain a member of the group plan by paying the entire premium for the coverage: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting the municipality from paying a portion or all of the cost of any coverage. In the event that a municipality changes insurance carriers, as a condition precedent to any such change, the municipality shall assure that all retirees, their spouses and dependents, and the spouses and dependents of any deceased member are guaranteed acceptance, at the same cost for the same coverage as regular employees of similar age groupings, their spouses and dependents.

        Furthermore, the PHSA's legislative history supports our reading of this statutory language. The House of Representative's Report on the COBRA continuing coverage amendments addressed a “special rule” rendering liable persons other than employers, if such persons fail to comply with an employer's request for action:

            When an employer changes from one insurance company to another, State law often imposes similar requirements on the new insurance company to continue to provide coverage to the employer's existing insures. As is the case generally with respect to the health care continuation rules, these State laws are not affected by the special rule described above. The special rule and the State laws are to apply concurrently so that in any specific instance, the more extensive requirements will apply. Thus, for example, if under State law the qualified beneficiaries are entitled in one respect to greater rights than under the health care continuation rules such that compliance with State law automatically means compliance with the health care continuation rules, the State law rule becomes the operative rule with respect to that aspect.

H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, at 59, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1096, 1951 (emphasis added).

        Thus, it is evident that a state law that is more generous than the PHSA is not preempted. As one court has similarly recognized, “[i]n the passage emphasized . . ., the House report states that the 'general' approach of the continuation coverage provisions would not preempt state lawmaking efforts.” Radici v. Associated Ins. Cos., 217 F.3d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 2000).   (See footnote 9)  Therefore, the provision in W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 of lifetime coverage clearly requires coverage “for at least” the period required by PHSA, which ends “not earlier than” thirty-six months later. Consequently, we hold that the continuation of health insurance coverage provisions of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300bb-1 to -8 (2000), do not preempt W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 (1986) (Repl. Vol. 1998).   (See footnote 10) 

        2. W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 does not limit continuing insurance coverage. Because we find that W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 is not preempted by federal law, we must examine its provisions to determine if they impose a temporal limit on continuing health insurance coverage. W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 provides, in pertinent part:

        Spouses and dependents of any deceased member may remain a member of the group plan by paying the entire premium for the coverage: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting the municipality from paying a portion or all of the cost of any coverage. In the event that a municipality changes insurance carriers, as a condition precedent to any such change, the municipality shall assure that all retirees, their spouses and dependents, and the spouses and dependents of any deceased member are guaranteed acceptance, at the same cost for the same coverage as regular employees of similar age groupings, their spouses and dependents.

        We have long held, “'“[a] statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.” Syllabus point 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951).' Syllabus point 1, State v. Jarvis, 199 W. Va. 635, 487 S.E.2d 293 (1997).” Syl. pt. 4, Daily Gazette Co. v. West Virginia Dev. Office, 206 W. Va. 51, 521 S.E.2d 543 (1999). There is no language in W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 that creates any temporal limitation on the City's duty to provide insurance to the spouses or dependents of deceased members who choose to continue coverage. Likewise, this Court is not authorized to read such language into the statute. See State ex rel. Frazier v. Meadows, 193 W. Va. 20, 24, 454 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1994) (“Courts are not free to read into the language what is not there, but rather should apply the statute as written.”).   (See footnote 11) 

        The City posits, however, that because W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 was amended in 1986, the same year Congress passed the COBRA amendments to the PHSA, the legislative intent was to limit the duty of municipalities to provide coverage for spouses and dependents of deceased members to thirty-six months--the maximum the PHSA requires. The Legislature passed the 1986 amendment to W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 on March 8, 1986. 1986 W. Va. Acts 868. COBRA's continuation of coverage amendments to the PHSA were passed by Congress on April 7, 1986. 100 Stat. 82. We cannot attribute to our Legislature an intent to follow a Congressional enactment that did not exist at the time it passed the aforementioned amendment.   (See footnote 12)  Consequently, we further hold that the plain language of W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 (1986) (Repl. Vol. 1998) requires municipalities, which provide health care coverage to retired municipal employees, to provide continuation coverage to a deceased retired municipal employee's spouse and dependent(s) without temporal limitation. To maintain such continuation coverage, the deceased retired municipal employee's spouse and dependent(s) must pay the premium required therefor.

        3. The plain statutory language of W. Va. Code § 8-12-8 is controlling. Lastly, the City argues that significant harm will befall municipalities if we affirm the circuit court's ruling. While we appreciate the City's position, we have emphasized that we are not plenipotentiaries in the realm of statutory interpretation. “'[T]he judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.'” State ex rel. Blankenship v. Richardson, 196 W. Va. 726, 735, 474 S.E.2d 906, 915 (1996) (quoting Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 185 W. Va. 684, 692, 408 S.E.2d 634, 642 (1991)). Even in the face of sound policy arguments, “'[i]t is not the province of the courts to make or supervise legislation, and a statute may not, under the guise of interpretation, be modified, revised, amended, distorted, remodeled, or rewritten[.]'” State v. Richards, 206 W. Va. 573, 577, 526 S.E.2d 539, 543 (1999) (quoting State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, 144 W. Va. 137, 145, 107 S.E.2d 353, 358 (1959) (citation omitted)). It is only in rare instances that we will negate the meaning of a plain and unambiguous statute,   (See footnote 13)  and the City raises none of these exceptions.   (See footnote 14)  Indeed, “[w]hile it is unfortunate that the legislature did not foresee the situation now before us, we cannot rewrite the statute so as to provide relief . . . nor can we interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.” Van Kirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 20, 375 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1988).