Darrel V. McGraw, Jr., Esq.
Brian C. Dempster, Esq.
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
1. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question
of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.”
Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).
Per Curiam:
The appellant, Ottis Ray Euman, appeals the September 21, 2000 order of the
Circuit Court of Wood County which denied his motion to dismiss a citation for driving a
motor vehicle while his privilege to do so was revoked. He believes two prior convictions
for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in the State of Ohio cannot support the West
Virginia citation. We disagree.
The appellant was driving a 1974 Chevrolet Camaro in the Parkersburg area
on April 1, 2000. He was stopped by Officer Todd A. Davis for squealing his tires. Officer
Davis learned that the appellant's Ohio operator's license was revoked for driving under the
influence of alcohol. He had two DUI convictions, one in 1988 and one in 1993. The
appellant did not seek reinstatement of his driving privileges. Officer Davis issued the
appellant a citation for “[u]nlawfully operat[ing] a motor vehicle in this state when his
privilege to do so has been lawfully revoked for Driving Under the Influence[]” in violation
of W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3.
A bench trial was held in magistrate court on June 21, 2000. The magistrate
determined the appellant was guilty of the charge and sentenced him to six months in jail and
fined him $100. The appellant appealed to circuit court, requesting that the charge be
dismissed. He argued that a foreign license revocation cannot support a charge in West
Virginia for driving while revoked for DUI. The circuit court held a hearing on August 18,
2000. Upon hearing arguments from counsel, the court denied the motion and imposed the
same sentence. The circuit court affirmed the magistrate court decision in an order entered
on September 21, 2000. A stay of execution pending appeal was granted. It is from this
order that the appellant appeals.
The appellant requests that we construe W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3 in his favor and
remand for an order of dismissal. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is
clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo
standard of review.” Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459
S.E.2d 415 (1995).
W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3 (1999) states in pertinent part:
We do not believe the appellant's interpretation of this code section was
envisioned by the Legislature. Such an interpretation would allow every individual who has
received one or multiple DUI conviction(s) in other states which results in a revocation of
the privilege to drive in another jurisdiction to lawfully operate a vehicle on West Virginia's
roads and highways. Meanwhile, an individual whose driving privilege has been suspended
under subsection (a) because of traffic tickets issued “by this state or any other jurisdiction”
would not be allowed to lawfully operate a vehicle on West Virginia's roads and highways.
Surely the Legislature did not intend to prohibit those whose license are revoked for speeding
from driving on our highways while at the same time permit those whose license are revoked
for drunk driving to continue to drive.
We recognize that license revocation laws are intended to protect the innocent
public. This Court previously stated, “The purpose of the administrative sanction of license
revocation is the removal of persons who drive under the influence of alcohol and other
intoxicants from our highways.” Shell v. Bechtold, 175 W.Va. 792, 796, 338 S.E.2d 393, 396
(1985) (citation omitted) (per curiam). In Shell, the question presented was whether a
municipal court conviction for DUI could be used to enhance the administrative sanction of
driver's license revocation. Shell possessed a West Virginia driver's license and was twice
convicted for DUI, once in municipal court in Huntington, West Virginia, and once in
Florida. Florida notified West Virginia that Shell's driving privilege was revoked for six
months. The commissioner of the West Virginia DMV issued an order revoking Shell's
driver's license for ten years. Shell appealed. On appeal, this Court held that “[a] DUI
conviction in another state is ground for license revocation.” Id., 175 W.Va. at 795, 338
S.E.2d at 395 (citations omitted).
Moreover, West Virginia is a member of the Driver License Compact, W.Va.
Code §§ 17B-1A-1 to 2. “Under the Driver License Compact, each state is required to treat
a conviction in a sister state in the same manner as it would an in-state conviction.” 7A Am.
Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 154 (1997). This premise was stressed in Shell
wherein the Court stated, “As a member of the interstate Driver License Compact and by
virtue of Article IV, Code, 17B-1A-1, the DMV is required to treat out-of-state convictions
in the same manner as it would in-state convictions.” Shell, 175 W.Va. at 795, 338 S.E.2d
at 395-96. We must, therefore, treat the Ohio convictions as if they were in-state
convictions.
(See footnote 1)
The appellant acknowledges that West Virginia DUI convictions would support
the charge. He nonetheless avers that if the Legislature intended DUI convictions from other
jurisdictions to support a conviction for driving while revoked in West Virginia, subsection
(b) would repeat the words which are found in subsection (a), that is, “revoked by this state
or any other jurisdiction[.]” One could certainly argue the opposite viewpoint; if the
Legislature intended only West Virginia DUI convictions to support this charge, subsection
(b) would begin with the phrase, “Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any public
highway of this state at a time when his or her privilege to do so has been lawfully revoked
for driving under the influence of alcohol” in West Virginia.
The Legislature chose to use neither phrase but clearly stated that a person who
drives a vehicle on the public highways of this state when the privilege to do so has been
lawfully revoked for driving under the influence of alcohol is guilty of driving on a revoked
license. That is exactly what the appellant did. He drove a vehicle on a public highway in
this state when his privilege to do so had been lawfully revoked for DUI.
It is commonly understood that “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and
without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of
interpretation.” Syllabus Point 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
Also,
We do not believe the Legislature intended to exclude DUI convictions from
other states and allow only West Virginia DUI convictions to support convictions for driving
while revoked for DUI. The fact that the appellant's license was revoked by our sister state
of Ohio is of no consequence. We must treat the conviction in the same manner as it would
be treated if the appellant had instead lost the privilege to drive in West Virginia. There is
no question if that were the case, he would be convicted of driving while revoked for DUI.
The appellant is guilty of a misdemeanor. The circuit court committed no error by affirming
the magistrate court decision.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Wood County
is affirmed.
No. 29700
Attorney General
Williamstown, West Virginia
Allen H. Loughry, II, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Appellee
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRAW concurs and reserves the right to file a concurring opinion.
2. “Where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain
meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” Syllabus Point 2,
State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
3. “'“'A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the
spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a
part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all
existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common,
and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation
of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith.' Syllabus
Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va 659, 63 S.E.2d 385 (1908).” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel.
Simpkins v. Harvey, 172 W.Va. 312, 305 S.E.2d 268 (1983), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in State ex rel. Hagg v. Spillers, 181 W.Va 387, 382 S.E.2d 581 (1989).'
Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Hall v. Schlaegel, 202 W.Va. 93, 502 S.E.2d 190 (1998).” Syllabus
Point 11, Rice v. Underwood, 205 W.Va. 274, 517 S.E.2d 751 (1998).
On appeal, the appellant makes essentially the same allegation he argued
below. He contends the circuit erred by finding that a foreign license revocation can be used
in West Virginia to support a charge for driving while revoked for DUI. He admits W.Va.
Code § 17B-4-3 makes it a crime to drive a motor vehicle in this state with a suspended or
revoked license but believes W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3(b) does not apply to him because, unlike
W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3(a), it does not contain the words “by this state or any other
jurisdiction[.]” He maintains that only West Virginia DUI convictions can be used to support
a conviction for driving while revoked for DUI in this jurisdiction. The State argues that the
appellant incorrectly interprets W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3(b) to recognize only in-state
convictions for DUI. We agree.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (d) of
this section, any person who drives a motor vehicle on any public
highway of this state at a time when his or her privilege to do so has
been lawfully suspended or revoked by this state or any other
jurisdiction is, for the first offense, guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor
more than five hundred dollars; for the second offense, the person is
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined
in jail for a period of ten days and, in addition to the mandatory jail
sentence, shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than
five hundred dollars; for the third or any subsequent offense, the person
is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
confined in jail for six months and, in addition to the mandatory jail
sentence, shall be fined not less than one hundred fifty dollars nor more
than five hundred dollars. (Emphasis added).
(b) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any public
highway of this state at a time when his or her privilege to do so has
been lawfully revoked for driving under the influence of alcohol,
controlled substances or other drugs, or for driving while having an
alcoholic concentration in his or her blood of ten hundredths of one
percent or more, by weight, or for refusing to take a secondary chemical
test of blood alcohol content, is, for the first offense, guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined in jail for
six months and in addition to the mandatory jail sentence, shall be fined
not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars;
for the second offense, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be confined in jail for a period of one year and,
in addition to the mandatory jail sentence, shall be fined not less than
one thousand dollars nor more than three thousand dollars; for the third
or any subsequent offense, the person is guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less
than one year nor more than three years and, in addition to the
mandatory prison sentence, shall be fined not less than three thousand
dollars nor more than five thousand dollars. (Emphasis added).
“'“A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord
with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of
which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators
who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable
to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and
intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in
the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms
are consistent therewith.” Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va.
659, 63 S.E.2d 385 (1908).' Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Simpkins v. Harvey,
172 W.Va. 312, 305 S.E.2d 268 (1983), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in State ex rel. Hagg v. Spillers, 181 W.Va. 387, 382
S.E.2d 581 (1989).” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Hall v. Schlaegel, 202
W.Va. 93, 502 S.E.2d 190 (1998).
Syllabus Point 11, Rice v. Underwood, 205 W.Va. 274, 517 S.E.2d 751 (1998).
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1