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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September 2001 Term
____________
No. 29642
____________
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL B. EVANS,
Defendant Below, Appellant.
______________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mingo County
Honorable Michael
Thornsbury, Judge
Civil Action 00-F-21
REVERSED AND REMANDED
______________________________________________________
Submitted: November 6, 2001
Filed: November 28, 2001
Darrell V. McGraw
C.
Michael Sparks, Esq.
Attorney General
Williamson,
West Virginia
Heather D. Foster
Attorney
for Appellant
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Appellee
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
1. The
action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of
its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears
that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion. Syllabus Point 10,
State v. Huffman, 141 W.Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955).
2. When
a prior conviction constitute(s) a status element of an offense, a defendant
may offer to stipulate to such prior conviction(s). If a defendant makes an
offer to stipulate to a prior conviction(s) that is a status element of an offense,
the trial court must permit such stipulation and preclude the state from presenting
any evidence to the jury regarding the stipulated prior conviction(s). When
such a stipulation is made, the record must reflect a colloquy between the trial
court, the defendant, defense counsel and the state indicating precisely the
stipulation and illustrating that the stipulation was made voluntarily and knowingly
by the defendant. To the extent that State v. Hopkins, 192 W.Va. 483,
453 S.E.2d 317 (1994) and its progeny are in conflict with this procedure they
are expressly overruled. Syllabus Point 3, State v. Nichols,
208 W.Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310 (1999).
Per Curiam:
The
instant case is before this Court on an appeal from the Circuit Court of Mingo
County. The appellant, Samuel B. Evans, was charged with felony offenses of
third offense driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of
W.Va. Code, 17C-5-2 [1996],
(See footnote 1)
and third offense driving while suspended for driving under the influence
(DWS/DUI) in violation of W.Va. Code, 17B-4-3 [1999].
(See footnote 2)
The appellant appeals his conviction
on both charges.
I.
On
March 31, 2000, Mr. Evans, the appellant, was convicted by a jury of both third
offense DUI and third offense DWS/DUI. On May 23, 2000, the trial court sentenced
the appellant to two consecutive sentences of
not less than 1 year nor more than 3 years in a state correctional facility,
and fined him $3,000.00 on the third offense DWS/DUI charge.
The appellant appeals from his
convictions contending that because he stipulated to his prior convictions,
under the principles stated in State v. Nichols, 208 W.Va. 432,
541 S.E.2d 310 (1999),
and State v. Dews,
209 W.Va. 500, 549 S.E.2d 694 (2001),
the trial court committed
error in allowing the State to relate the appellant's prior convictions to the
jury.
We reverse the appellant's conviction
for third offense driving under the influence of alcohol and his conviction
for third offense driving
while his license was revoked for driving under the
influence of alcohol,
and remand the case for a new trial.
II.
On
March 14, 2000, at a pretrial hearing, appellant's counsel agreed to stipulate
to the predicate prior offenses necessary to prove the elements of third offense
DUI and third offense DWS/DUI. Appellant's
trial began on March 28, 2000. During opening statements, the prosecuting attorney
told the jury that the appellant had prior convictions for driving under the
influence of alcohol and for driving while his license was suspended.
Additionally, substantive evidence of the appellant's prior offenses was placed
before the jury through the testimony of the arresting officer, and during the
cross-examination of the appellant. The
jury found the appellant guilty of both third offense DUI and third offense
DWS/DUI.
Under
West Virginia law, it is well-established principle that generally [t]he
action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of
its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears
that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion. Syllabus
Point 10, State v. Huffman, 141 W.Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955).
In accord, Syllabus Point 6, State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43, 311
S.E.2d 412 (1983).
In
State v. Nichols, this Court addressed the admission of prior convictions
that are status elements of offenses, holding that:
When a prior conviction constitute(s)
a status element of an offense, a defendant may offer to stipulate to such prior
conviction(s). If a defendant makes an offer to stipulate to a prior
conviction(s) that is a status
element of an offense, the trial court must permit such stipulation and preclude
the state from presenting any evidence to the jury regarding the stipulated
prior conviction(s). When such a stipulation is made, the record must reflect
a colloquy between the trial court, the defendant, defense counsel and the
state indicating precisely the stipulation and illustrating that the stipulation
was made voluntarily and knowingly by the defendant. To the extent that State
v. Hopkins, 192 W.Va. 483, 453 S.E.2d 317 (1994) and its progeny are in
conflict with this procedure they are expressly overruled.
Syllabus Point 3, State v. Nichols,
208 W.Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310 (1999).
In
Nichols, this Court recognized that stipulated-to prior convictions
that are status elements of a charge shall not be placed before the jury because
of their inherently prejudicial nature. Nichols
requires a colloquy between the trial court, the defendant, the prosecutor,
and the defense counsel to discuss the exact nature of the status element
stipulations, and to assure that the stipulations are knowingly and voluntarily
made by the defendant. At no point
prior to or during the appellant's
trial did any of the parties mention State v. Nichols, which was handed
down on December 3, 1999, nearly 3 months prior to the
appellant's trial.
Although the appellant
has not asserted plain error, [t]his Court's application of the plain
error rule in a criminal prosecution is not dependent upon a defendant asking
the Court to invoke the rule. We may, sua sponte, in the interest of justice,
notice plain error. Syllabus Point 1, State v. Myers,
204 W.Va. 449, 513 S.E.2d 676
(1998). Plain error occurs
when there is (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial
rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Syllabus
Point 7, State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). The admission
of the appellant's
prior
DUI and DWS/DUI convictions was an error that seriously affected the fairness
of the appellant's criminal
trial. (See
footnote 3)
We therefore find that the jury was improperly informed of the appellant's
prior convictions, and that this was plain error.
III.
For
the foregoing reasons, Mr. Evans' convictions for third offense driving under the influence and third
offense driving while his license was revoked for driving under the influence
of alcohol are reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the principles enunciated in State v. Nichols, supra,
and State v. Dews,
209 W.Va.
500, 549 S.E.2d 694 (2001).
W.Va.
Code, 17C-5-2
[1996] provides that:
(d) Any person who:
(1) Drives
a vehicle in this state while:
A (A) He
is under the influence of alcohol; or
B (B) He
is under the influence of any controlled substance; or
C (C) He
is under the influence of any other drug; or
(D) He
is under the combined influence of alcohol and any controlled substance or any
other drug; or
(E) He has an alcohol concentration
in his or her blood of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight;
. . . .
(k) A
person violating any provision of subsection . . . (d), . . . of this
section shall, for the third or any subsequent offense . . . be guilty of a
felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary
for not less than one nor more than three years, and the court may, in its discretion,
impose a fine of not less than three thousand dollars nor more than five thousand
dollars.
We note that this Code section was amended in 2001, but no substantive changes
were made that would affect this appeal.
Footnote: 2
W.Va.
Code, 17B-4-3(b)
[1999] states:
Any person who drives a
motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at a time when his or her
privilege to do so has been lawfully revoked for driving under the influence
of alcohol, controlled substances or other drugs, or for driving while having an alcoholic
concentration in his or her blood of ten hundredths of one percent or more,
by weight, or for refusing to take a secondary chemical test of blood alcohol
content, is, . . . for the third or any subsequent offense, the person is
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than three years and, in
addition to the mandatory prison sentence, shall be fined not less than three
thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.
Footnote: 3
We
note that Mr. Evans' prior Kentucky conviction was offered by the State as a
predicate offense without establishing that the prior Kentucky offense could
be utilized as a status element. For an out-of-state conviction to be utilized
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 17(C)- 5-2(k), the State must prove that the facts underlying
the out-of-state conviction would have supported a conviction under West Virginia
law. On remand should the State choose to use the evidence of the Kentucky conviction,
it should comply with the standards established in State v. Hulbert, 209 W.Va.
217, 544 S.E.2d 919 (2001). In State v. Hulbert, this Court held that:
[a] trial court that is considering
whether an out-of-state conviction can be used for sentence enhancement purposes
should have before it the foreign statute under which the prior conviction was
obtained to ascertain whether the foreign law contains the same elements as
the West Virginia statute at issue, or, if the foreign statute differs from
ours, to determine whether, despite any variances, the foreign conviction may
still be the basis for punishment enhancement in West Virginia. Once the trial
court determines, as a matter of law, that it is necessary to prove the factual
predicate under which the foreign judgment was obtained in order to demonstrate
that such predicate is sufficient to support a conviction under West Virginia
law, the State retains the burden of proving that conduct.
209 W.Va. at 227, 544 S.E.2d at 929 (2001).