1.    “'Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.' Syllabus point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).” Syllabus point 2, Coordinating Council for Independent Living, Inc. v. Palmer, 209 W. Va. 274, 546 S.E.2d 454 (2001).

    2.    “When a provision of a municipal ordinance is inconsistent or in conflict with a statute enacted by the Legislature the statute prevails and the municipal ordinance is of no force and effect.” Syllabus point 1, Vector Co. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 155 W. Va. 362, 184 S.E.2d 301 (1971).

    3    “'“When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.” Syllabus point 5, State of West Virginia v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).' Syllabus point 1, VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 375 S.E.2d 196 (1988).” Syllabus point 3, Webster County Commission v. Clayton, 206 W. Va. 107, 522 S.E.2d 201 (1999).

    4.    “'It is well established that the word “shall,” in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation.' Syllabus Point 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Public Employees Insurance Board, 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982).” Syllabus point 1, E.H. v. Matin, 201 W. Va. 463, 498 S.E.2d 35 (1997).

    5.    The plain statutory language of W. Va. Code § 8-24-55(3) (1969) (Repl. Vol. 1998) requires a board of zoning appeals to “[h]ear and decide special exceptions to the terms of [a zoning] ordinance upon which the board is required to act under the ordinance.”

    6.    “'While on appeal there is a presumption that a board of zoning appeals acted correctly, a reviewing court should reverse the administrative decision where the board has applied an erroneous principle of law, was plainly wrong in its factual findings, or has acted beyond its jurisdiction.' Syllabus point 5., Wolfe v. Forbes, [159] W. Va. [34], 217 S.E.2d 899 (1975).” Syllabus point 3, Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 159 W. Va. 73, 219 S.E.2d 324 (1975).

    7.    When a board of zoning appeals decides special exceptions to the terms of a zoning ordinance, the board shall issue written findings of fact to permit a reviewing court to ascertain whether the board's decision complies with the standards set forth therefor in the subject ordinance.

Davis, Justice:

    The appellant herein and respondent below, Common Council of the City of Beckley [hereinafter referred to as “the Council”], appeals from an order entered October 25, 2000, by the Circuit Court of Raleigh County. In that order, the circuit court ruled that the Council had acted in derogation of the governing statutory law, W. Va. Code § 8- 24-55(3) (1969) (Repl. Vol. 1998),See footnote 1 ¹ when it set aside the decision of the City of Beckley Board of Zoning Appeals [hereinafter referred to as “the Board”] to grant a conditional use permit to the appellee herein and petitioner below, American Tower Corporation [hereinafter referred to as “ATC”], to build a radio antenna tower. The Council appeals the circuit court's ruling, and contends that it did not act improperly when it denied ATC the conditional use permit it had requested. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the record designated on appeal, and the pertinent authorities, we conclude that the circuit court correctly decided that the Zoning Ordinance for the City of Beckley improperly vested decision-making authority in the Council instead of reserving such power to the Board as required by W. Va. Code § 8-24-55(3). However, because the Board failed to make written findings of fact when it approved ATC's conditional use permit, we are unable to evaluate the correctness of that tribunal's ruling. Accordingly, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the October 25, 2000, order of the Raleigh County Circuit Court and remand this case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

    One week later, on December 15, 1999, the City issued a stop work order which required ATC to immediately halt construction of its previously approved tower project. Thereafter, the Council conducted a public hearing, on February 8, 2000, during which it heard public comments regarding ATC's proposed construction of a radio antenna tower as described in its earlier conditional use permit application. Following concerns voiced by numerous citizens as to the effects of the tower on the health of nearby residents;

the appearance and resale value of surrounding property; and the possibility that the tower's operation might interfere with medical procedures at a nearby hospital and diagnostic clinic,See footnote 3 ³ the Council voted unanimously to refuse ATC's application request.

    ATC then appealed the Council's decision to the Circuit Court of Raleigh County,See footnote 4 ⁴ on March 9, 2000, wherein it filed a petition for writ of certiorari.See footnote 5 ⁵ Following a hearing, the lower court, ruling in favor of ATC, determined, by order entered October 25, 2000, that

        1. The action taken by the Respondent [the Council] was void because the portion of the ordinance that authorized it is contrary to statute.

    . . . .

        2. The action of the City Council is ineffective because it is not based on the comprehensive plan or the ordinance.

    . . . .

        3. The action of City Council is not effective because it is contrary to the Federal Telecommunications Act.

    . . . .
From this decision of the circuit court, the Council appeals to this Court.

(“In reviewing the judgment of a lower court this Court does not accord special weight to the lower court's conclusions of law, and will reverse the judgment below when it is based on an incorrect conclusion of law.”). Mindful of this standard of review, we proceed to consider the parties' arguments.

    [h]ear and decide applications for conditional uses, as defined and required in this chapter; such findings and recommendations shall be made to the council of the city within thirty (30) days after a decision. Upon receipt of such report or decision, the council either shall by resolution approve and confirm said decision, with or without changes, whereupon the application for conditional uses as applied for may be issued; or shall refuse to approve and confirm said decision[.]

Beckley, W. Va., Zoning Ordinance art. I, § 15-6(G)(2) (June 25, 1996) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this language, the Council accepted the Board's initial approval of ATC's conditional use permit as a recommended decision and proceeded to determine anew the propriety of issuing the permit, ultimately denying the same.

    Both the quoted ordinance language and the Council's actions in accordance therewith differ from the corresponding statutory provision, which directs that a “board of zoning appeals shall . . . [h]ear and decide special exceptions^[See footnote 9 ^{9 ]} to the terms of the ordinance upon which the board is required to act under the ordinance^[See footnote 10 ^{10 ]}[.]” W. Va. Code § 8-24-55(3) (1969) (Repl. Vol. 1998) (emphasis and footnotes added). According to this mandatory language, the Board, and not the Council, is the entity responsible for rendering a final decision as to whether ATC's requested permit should be allowed.

    Given the disparity between these two provisions, we must determine which law dictates the scope of authority extended to a board of zoning appeals to decide whether to grant or deny a conditional use permit. In this regard, the Legislature has firmly announced that “[a]ny ordinance provision which is inconsistent or in conflict with any provision of this chapter shall be of no force and effect.” W. Va. Code § 8-1-6 (1969) (Repl. Vol. 1998). For the purposes of such a determination, the phrase “inconsistent or in conflict with” has been defined as

    mean[ing] that a charter or ordinance provision is repugnant to the Constitution of this State or to general law because such provision (i) permits or authorizes that which the Constitution or general law forbids or prohibits, or (ii) forbids or prohibits that which the Constitution or general law permits or authorizes[.]
W. Va. Code § 8-1-2(b)(9) (1969) (Repl. Vol. 1998).

    This Court, also, has considered the disparity that may occur between a zoning ordinance and a statutory provision, and succinctly observed “[t]hat municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to legislative acts is a principle so fundamental that citation of authorities is unnecessary. Equally fundamental is the legal principle that where an ordinance is in conflict with a state law the former is invalid.” Vector Co. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 155 W. Va. 362, 367, 184 S.E.2d 301, 304 (1971) (citations omitted). Considering the Legislature's prior resolution of such discrepancies and well-established legal principles, we held that “[w]hen a provision of a municipal ordinance is inconsistent or in conflict with a statute enacted by the Legislature the statute prevails and the municipal ordinance is of no force and effect.” Syl. pt. 1, id., 155 W. Va. 362, 184 S.E.2d 301.See footnote 11 ¹¹ Thus, it is apparent that the language of W. Va. Code § 8-24-55(3) prevails to the extent that § 15-6(G)(2) of the Beckley Zoning Ordinance conflicts therewith by authorizing the Council, rather than the Board, to decide conditional use applications.

    The pertinent language of § 8-24-55(3) directs that a “board of zoning appeals shall . . . [h]ear and decide special exceptions to the terms of [an] ordinance.” (Emphasis added). Ordinarily, when this Court interprets an act of the Legislature, we give the statutory language effect when its meaning is plain.

        “'When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.' Syllabus point 5, State of West Virginia v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).” Syllabus point 1, VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 375 S.E.2d 196 (1988).
Syl. pt. 3, Webster County Comm'n v. Clayton, 206 W. Va. 107, 522 S.E.2d 201 (1999).See footnote 12 ¹² In the above-quoted statutory language, the Legislature has enumerated certain powers and duties that it has vested in boards of zoning appeals, employing the word shall to designate the mandatory nature of this ascription of authority. “'It is well established that the word “shall,” in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation.' Syllabus Point 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Public Employees Insurance Board, 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982).” Syl. pt. 1, E.H. v. Matin, 201 W. Va. 463, 498 S.E.2d 35 (1997).See footnote 13 ¹³ In other words, “[g]enerally, 'shall' commands a mandatory connotation and denotes that the described behavior is directory, rather than discretionary.” State v. Allen, 208 W. Va. 144, 153, 539 S.E.2d 87, 96 (1999) (citations omitted). Therefore, we hold that the plain statutory language of W. Va. Code § 8-24-55(3) (1969) (Repl. Vol. 1998) requires a board of zoning appeals to “[h]ear and decide special exceptions to the terms of [a zoning] ordinance upon which the board is required to act under the ordinance.” Insofar as the Beckley Zoning Ordinance vested this power in the Council rather than in the Board it is invalid, and the Council's final decision denying ATC's application for a conditional use permit was erroneous. Accordingly, the circuit court's ruling in this regard is affirmed.See footnote 14 ¹⁴

    Despite this ruling, however, the circuit court's decision must nevertheless be reversed, in part, as we remain uncertain as to the propriety of the Board's initial decision to grant ATC's requested permit. Ordinarily,

        “[w]hile on appeal there is a presumption that a board of zoning appeals acted correctly, a reviewing court should reverse the administrative decision where the board has applied an erroneous principle of law, was plainly wrong in its factual findings, or has acted beyond its jurisdiction.” Syllabus point 5., Wolfe v. Forbes, [159] W. Va. [34], 217 S.E.2d 899 (1975).

Syl. pt. 3, Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 159 W. Va. 73, 219 S.E.2d 324 (1975). However, on the appellate record presently before us, we cannot assess the correctness of the Board's initial determination as there are no written findings of fact regarding its decision to grant a conditional use permit to ATC.

    On prior occasions, we have counseled boards of zoning appeals regarding the prudence of rendering a written decision:

        In order for this Court to determine whether the conditional use sought by the applicant before the Board violated any of the conditions required before the granting of such a conditional use, the Board must make written findings of fact. [Harding, 159 W. Va.] at 82, 219 S.E.2d[ at 329-30]. Such facts determine whether the particular conditional use applied for is consistent with the spirit, purpose and intent of the ordinance. Id.[, 159 W. Va.] at 83, 219 S.E.2d [at 330].

In re Skeen, 190 W. Va. 649, 651, 441 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1994) (emphasis added). Moreover,

    [w]ithout such findings it would not be possible for the circuit court upon certiorari or this Court upon writ of error to determine whether the conditional use sought by the applicant before the board violated any of the conditions required before the granting of such a conditional use. In other words, these review procedures would be worthless if it could be said that written findings are not necessary, for there would be nothing to review.

Miernyk v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 155 W. Va. 143, 148, 181 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Syl. pt. 2, Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 159 W. Va. 73, 219 S.E.2d 324 (1975). We concur with these admonishments, and now clarify this procedure by holding that when a board of zoning appeals decides special exceptions to the terms of a zoning ordinance, the board shall issue written findings of fact to permit a reviewing court to ascertain whether the board's decision complies with the standards set forth therefor in the subject ordinance.See footnote 15 ¹⁵ Due to the absence in the appellate record of a written statement of the factual basis for the Board's decision, we remand this case to that tribunal for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. In this regard, we are mindful that “[w]hen a reviewing court has determined that there was reversible error in an administrative decision and the cause is remanded without restrictions to the administrative body, that tribunal is vested with discretion to decide whether to conduct a reconsideration merely or a full rehearing.” Syl. pt. 5, Harding, 159 W. Va. 73, 219 S.E.2d 324. Accordingly, we leave to the Board to determine the nature and scope of remand proceedings appropriate in this case.See footnote 16 ¹⁶

                Affirmed, in part; Reversed, in part; and Remanded.