The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
2. The jurisdiction of equity to reform written instruments, where there
is a mutual mistake, or mistake on one side and fraud or inequitable conduct on the other,
if the evidence be sufficiently cogent to thoroughly satisfy the mind of the court, is fully
established and undoubted. Syllabus Point 2, Nutter v. Brown, 51 W. Va. 598, 42 S.E. 661
(1902).
3. Such equitable remedy [of a court to reform a written instrument] is
not absolute, but depends upon whether the reformation sought is essential to the ends of
justice. Syllabus Point 2, Buford v. Chichester, 69 W. Va. 213, 71 S.E. 120 (1911).
4. A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is
clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not
desirable to clarify the application of the law. Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety
5. There are two forms of implied easements: an easement implied by
necessity (which in West Virginia is called a 'way of necessity'), and an easement implied
by a prior use of the land (also called an easement implied from a 'quasi-easement').
Syllabus Point 3, Cobb v. Daugherty, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 35015, April
19, 2010).
6. To establish an easement implied by necessity (which in West Virginia
is called a 'way of necessity'), a party must prove four elements: (1) prior common
ownership of the dominant and servient estates; (2) severance (that is, a conveyance of the
dominant and/or servient estates to another); (3) at the time of the severance, the easement
was strictly necessary for the benefit of either the parcel transferred or the parcel retained;
and (4) a continuing necessity for an easement. Syllabus Point 4, Cobb v. Daugherty, ___
W. Va. ___, ____ S.E.2d ___ (No. 35015, April 19, 2010).
7. To establish an easement implied by a prior use of the land, a party
must prove four elements: (1) prior common ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) severance (that is, a conveyance of the dominant and/or servient estates to another; (3)
the use giving rise to the asserted easement was in existence at the time of the conveyance
dividing the property, and the use has been so long continued and so obvious as to show that
the parties to the conveyance intended and meant for the use to be permanent; and (4) the
easement was necessary at the time of the severance for the proper and reasonable enjoyment
1.
That this matter shall be dismissed.
Pursuant to the agreement, by deed dated September 11, 2003, the LeFevers conveyed all
right, title, and interest in and to the 4.22 acres to Mr. Firriolo by fee simple general warranty
deed with no reservation or exceptions. Mr. Firriolo now owned record title to both the
14.33 acre tract and the 4.22 acre tract which was subject to the parties' unrecorded
settlement agreement.
1. The lawsuit was predicated on a mutual mistake of fact
in that both parties acted under the belief that an express right of
way over the 14.33 acre tract existed as to the 4.22 Acre Parcel
of real estate.
This Court reviews the circuit court's final order and
ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We
review challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
The general rule governing the doctrine of equitable
estoppel is that in order to constitute equitable estoppel or
estoppel in pais there must exist a false representation or a
concealment of material facts; it must have been made with
knowledge, actual or constructive of the facts; the party to
whom it was made must have been without knowledge or the
means of knowledge of the real facts; it must have been made
with the intention that it should be acted on; and the party to
whom it was made must have relied on or acted on it to his
prejudice.
Syllabus Point 6, Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 141 W. Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891
(1956). The circuit court found in its November 26, 2007, order that the LeFevers committed
no fraud or inequitable conduct in executing the settlement agreement with Mr. Firriolo, and
we find nothing in the record to the contrary. While Mr. Frye and Ms. Chiapella claim that
the LeFevers' conveyance of a fee simple deed for the 4.22 acres to Mr. Firriolo and the
LeFevers' failure to record the settlement agreement constitute wrongful conduct, the
evidence does not indicate that Ms. Chiapella relied on Mr. Firriolo's fee simple deed to the
4.22 acres in her purchase of the 14.33 acre parcel. To the contrary, the evidence indicates
that Ms. Chiapella relied on the representations made by Mr. Firriolo about the availability
of the 4.22 acre parcel. Moreover, Ms. Chiapella was not without knowledge that Mr. Frye's
purchase of the 4.22 acres was contingent on Mr. Firriolo obtaining a release of the right of
first refusal granted the LeFevers with regard to the 4.22 acre parcel. In addition, in accord with the circuit court's finding, First American contends
that any implied easement owned by the LeFevers was extinguished by the doctrine of
merger when Mr. Firriolo obtained title to both the 4.22 acres and the 14.33 acres as a result
of the September 11, 2003, settlement agreement between the LeFevers and Mr. Firriolo.
Specifically, the circuit court concluded as a matter of law that [e]ven assuming, arguendo, that the Original Easement or any other easement existed after February 6, 1990, which the
Court has concluded was not the case, the 14.33 Acre Tract and 4.22 Acre Tract merged
under the ownership of Thomas Firriolo and, therefore, any easement in existence was
extinguished pursuant to the doctrine of merger as of September 11, 2003. (See footnote 10)
To establish an easement implied by necessity (which in
West Virginia is called a way of necessity), a party must prove
four elements: (1) prior common ownership of the dominant and
servient estates; (2) severance (that is, a conveyance of the
dominant and/or servient estates to another); (3) at the time of
the severance, the easement was strictly necessary for the benefit
of either the parcel transferred or the parcel retained; and (4) a
continuing necessity for an easement.
Syllabus Point 4, Cobb. With regard to establishing an easement implied by prior use, we
held:
January 2010 Term
____________
No. 34705
____________
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee
v.
THOMAS FIRRIOLO, EVAN LEFEVER AND BETH LEFEVER,
AND ANNE P. CHIAPELLA,
Defendants Below
EVAN AND BETH LEFEVER,
Appellants
______________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan County
The Honorable Thomas W. Steptoe, Jr., Judge
Civil Action No. 05-C-94
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
_____________________________________________________
AND
_____________
No. 34714
_____________
THOMAS FIRRIOLO,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee
v.
EVAN LEFEVER AND BETH LEFEVER,
Defendants Below, Appellants
and
ANNE CHIAPELLA AND JOHN FRYE,
Intervenors Below, Appellees
________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan County
The Honorable Thomas W. Steptoe, Jr., Judge
Civil Action No. 01-C-8
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
_____________________________________________________
Submitted: April 13, 2010
Filed: June 18, 2010
William B. Carey, Esq.
Berkeley Springs, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellants Evan
and Beth LeFever Braun A. Hamstead, Esq.
Hamstead & Associates
Martinsburg, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellees Anne Chiapella
and John Frye
Ryan J. King, Esq.
Blumling & Gusky
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Attorney for Appellee First American
Title Insurance Company
1. The general rule governing the doctrine of equitable estoppel is that
in order to constitute equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais there must exist a false
representation or a concealment of material facts; it must have been made with knowledge,
actual or constructive of the facts; the party to whom it was made must have been without
knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts; it must have been made with the
intention that it should be acted on; and the party to whom it was made must have relied on
or acted on it to his prejudice. Syllabus Point 6, Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 141 W. Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956).
Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).
of the dominant estate. Syllabus Point 6, Cobb v. Daugherty, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d
___ (No. 35015, April. 19, 2010).
Per Curiam:
This is an appeal of two consolidated cases. In case number 34705, First
American Title Insurance Company (First American), appellee, brought a declaratory
judgment action in which it sought a declaration that a 14.33 acre tract of land owned by
Anne Chiapella is not encumbered by an easement. By order dated April 30, 2008, the
Circuit Court of Morgan County granted summary judgment on behalf of First American.
The appellants, Evan and Beth LeFever, who purport to have an easement across the 14.33
acres for the benefit of an adjoining 4.22 acre parcel, appeal this order.
In case number 34714, Thomas Firriolo moved to have a settlement agreement
with the appellants, Evan and Beth LeFever, reformed on the basis of the parties' mistaken
belief that the LeFevers had an express easement across the 14.33 acre tract once owned by
Mr. Firriolo and now owned by Ms. Chiapella. By order dated November 26, 2007, the
Circuit Court of Morgan County reformed the settlement agreement on the basis of mutual
mistake of fact after finding that the LeFevers do not have an express easement across the
14.33 acre parcel. The LeFevers now challenge the manner in which the circuit court
reformed the settlement agreement. After careful examination of the record and the parties'
arguments, this Court reverses the orders appealed by the LeFevers, and we remand these
cases to the circuit court for proceedings as directed by this Court in this opinion.
The pertinent facts of this case began in 1988 when a parcel of land was
divided for sale. The appellants herein, the LeFevers, purchased a 4.22 acre tract of land
which was landlocked. (See footnote 1) For purposes of ingress and egress to a public road, the LeFevers
were granted an express easement across an abutting 14.33 acre-tract of land that was
purchased by Fred Orr. The easement was 20 feet wide and described with particularity in
the deed to Mr. Orr's property.
A few years later, at the request of Mr. Orr, the LeFevers agreed to relocate the
easement. Pursuant to the relocation agreement Mr. Orr hired a surveyor to lay out the new
easement and a lawyer to draft two deeds, one to extinguish the original easement and one
to create a new easement at the location agreed upon by the parties. The deed extinguishing
the original easement was a quit-claim deed acknowledged and recorded on February 6,
1990, wherein the LeFevers released all of their right, title, and interest in and to the original
easement to Mr. Orr. A second deed to the LeFevers creating a new easement at a different
location was never recorded. Because the deed creating the new easement was not recorded,
the record title showed that there was no easement to the 4.22 acres, thus land locking the
parcel. Mr. Orr and Mr. LeFever both thought there was an easement across the 14.33 acres.
The fact that there was no deed for the new easement was not discovered until several years
later when litigation was instituted concerning the location of the LeFevers' easement across
the 14.33 acre tract.
By deed dated and recorded on February 6, 1990, Fred Orr conveyed all of his
right, title, and interest to the 14.33 acre tract to Robert L. and Hermina P. Dunker. The deed
conveyed from Mr. Orr to the Dunkers continued to reserve the original easement released
by the LeFevers in the February 6, 1990, quit-claim deed.
In March of 2000, the Dunkers conveyed all right, title, and interest in the
14.33 acres to appellee herein, Thomas Firriolo. The deed conveyed by the Dunkers to Mr.
Firriolo continued to reserve the original easement previously released by the LeFevers and
provided that the conveyance was made expressly subject to a 20 foot wide right-of-way for
ingress and egress to the 4.22 acre tract owned by the LeFevers and contained the description
of the original easement.
Mr. Firriolo subsequently sued the LeFevers in the Circuit Court of Morgan
County to enforce an alleged new agreement between Mr. Firriolo and the LeFevers
regarding the relocation of the LeFever's original easement, reserved in Mr. Firriolo's deed,
across the 14.33 acre parcel. (See footnote 2) This suit was dismissed by the circuit court after the LeFevers
and Mr. Firriolo reached a settlement agreement. This agreement was set forth in the circuit
court's dismissal order of December 16, 2003. The terms of the agreement were as follows:
2.
That the Plaintiff, Thomas Firriolo, shall this day pay
unto the Defendants the sum of $9,500.00 to purchase
the 4.22 acres owned by the Defendants, Evan and Beth
LeFever which adjoin the property of the Plaintiff situate
in Timber Ridge District, Morgan County, West Virginia.
The parties acknowledge that such payment has been
made this day.
3.
The Defendants, Evan and Beth LeFever, shall this day
execute a general warranty deed for the 4.22 acres
subject of this agreement, conveying same to the
Plaintiff, Thomas Firriolo. The parties to this agreement
acknowledge that has been done this day.
4.
The parties further agree that the Plaintiff, Thomas
Firriolo shall have a period of up to two (2) years to sell
the subject 4.22 acres by private sale, with or without a
realtor. If Mr. Firriolo has not found a purchaser within
such two (2) year period, (i.e. by September 15, 2005),
then the LeFevers may repurchase the subject property
for $9,500.00.
5.
Upon obtaining a contract for the purchase of the 4.22
acres, the Plaintiff, Thomas Firriolo, shall immediately
communicate such contract to the Defendants, Evan and
Beth LeFever, by United States, Certified Mail, and the
Defendants shall have thirty (30) days from the receipt of
such communication of the terms of the contract to
approve or disapprove of the sale, in writing. Should the
Defendants, Evan and Beth LeFever fail to respond to
such notice within thirty (30) days of their receipt of such
notice then it shall be deemed that they approve of the
terms of the proposed contract.
6.
Should the Defendants, Evan and Beth LeFever, approve
of such sale, the matter shall proceed to closing.
Following the closing of such transaction, the parties
shall split equally the cost of any real estate sales
commission. Thereafter, the Defendants shall be entitled
to any net proceeds from the sale that exceed $9,500.00.
7.
Should the Defendants, Evan and Beth LeFever
disapprove of such sale, the Plaintiff, Thomas Firriolo,
may at his option (a) require the Defendants, Evan and
Beth LeFever, to purchase back the 4.22 acres for the
sum of $9,500.00 or (b) proceed to obtaining another
buyer, as long as such is done within the contemplated
two (2) year period of this settlement agreement.
8.
The parties agree that both parties may seek redress and
pursue enforcement of this agreement before the Circuit
Court of Morgan County, West Virginia, should the
terms of this agreement not be followed.
On October 21, 2003, Mr. Firriolo executed and delivered a deed in fee simple
conveying all right, title, and interest in and to the 14.33 acre parcel to Anne Chiapella. This
deed continued to reserve and was expressly made subject to the original 20-foot-wide
easement serving the 4.22 acre tract conveyed to the LeFevers in the October 31, 1988, deed.
In connection with the purchase of the 14.33 acre parcel, Ms. Chiapella purchased a title
insurance policy from First American Title Insurance of America. The title policy
specifically excepted the original 20-foot-wide easement from coverage.
During Ms. Chiapella's negotiation to purchase the 14.33 acre tract, John Frye,
appellee herein and a companion of Ms. Chiapella's, attempted to purchase the 4.22 acre tract
from Mr. Firriolo. Mr. Firriolo drafted a contract for sale of the 4.22 acre tract to Mr. Frye
which indicated that the sale was contingent upon Seller being able to obtain a release of
that certain right of first refusal granted unto Evan LeFever and Beth LeFever concerning the
subject property. Ms. Chiapella purchased the 14.33 acres with the expectation that she
would also eventually own the 4.22 acre parcel. However, the sale of the 4.22 acre tract to
Mr. Frye was not completed because the LeFevers did not approve of the sale.
In October 2005, the LeFevers filed a motion pursuant to Rule 70 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure in the suit between Mr. Firriolo and the LeFevers
containing the settlement agreement. They requested that the circuit court appoint a
commissioner as a substitute for Mr. Firriolo to reconvey to them the deed to the 4.22 acres.
The reason for the LeFevers' motion was Mr. Firriolo's refusal to reconvey the 4.22 acre
parcel upon the expiration of the settlement agreement. (See footnote 3)
Shortly thereafter, it was discovered that the 1990 quit claim deed was recorded
in which the LeFevers released the express easement across the 14.33 acre parcel for the
benefit of the 4.22 acre parcel, but that a second deed creating a new easement in a different
location on the 14.33 acre parcel was never recorded. There is no evidence as to whether this
deed was executed or lost. It is undisputed that a second deed with a new easement was to
have been executed and recorded. Thereafter, First American filed an action for declaratory
judgment on November 7, 2005, in which it sought a declaration that there were no valid
easements encumbering the 14.33 acre parcel now owned by Ms. Chiapella. (See footnote 4)
As a result of the discovery that no deed was recorded granting the LeFevers
a new express easement in 1990, Mr. Firriolo filed a motion in the circuit court to reform his
September 11, 2003, settlement agreement with the LeFevers. The basis for this motion was
a mistake of fact and alleged fraud on the part of the LeFevers. (See footnote 5) According to Mr. Firriolo,
the LeFevers falsely represented to him that an easement existed over the 14.33 acre tract
when the LeFevers knew that they had released the easement.
By order dated November 26, 2007, the circuit court ruled on Mr. Firriolo's
motion to have the settlement agreement reformed. The court found as follows in pertinent
part:
2. Mr. LeFever was not the title owner of the 4.22 acre tract
at the time Mr. Firriolo and Mr. LeFever were discussing the
right of way through Mr. Firriolo's barn, although he believed
that he was at the time and therefore, the Court finds that fraud
was not committed on Mr. LeFever's part in that regard.
3. The contract between Mr. Firriolo and Mr. LeFever[]
should be reformed in order to properly exercise the equitable
authority of the Court in this matter.
4. Based on the evidence presented at this juncture, the
Court finds that no fraud or inequitable conduct occurred
between the Plaintiff and Defendants Evan and Beth LeFever as
far as the original transaction is concerned.
5. Legal title to the 4.22 acre tract is vested in Thomas
Firriolo who shall, convey the parcel to John Frye (See footnote 6) upon the
tender from Dr. Frye of the sum of $26,000, in cash or its
equivalent within thirty (30) days of this date. Should Dr. Frye
purchase the 4.22 acre tract from Mr. Firriolo, the first $9,500
of the purchase price shall go to Mr. Firriolo and the balance to
the LeFevers. (Footnote added).
Subsequently, by order dated April 30, 2008, the circuit court granted summary
judgment on behalf of First American in its declaratory judgment action. The court made the
following conclusions of law in relevant part:
20.
The February 6, 1990 Quit Claim Deed from Evan
LeFever to Fred Orr extinguished the Original Easement.
21.
Because no subsequent easement was recorded and there
has been no judicial determination that a subsequent
easement by necessity or any other easement was created,
there was no easement servicing the 4.22 Acre Tract at
the time Ms. Chiapella purchased the 14.33 Acre Tract.
22.
As of September 11, 2003, Defendant Firriolo owned
both the 14.33 and 4.22 Acre Tracts in Fee Simple as
evidenced by the respective deeds.
23.
In West Virginia, the doctrine of merger provides that
when the owner of a dominant estate acquires the fee
simple title to the servient estate, an easement
appurtenant to the dominant estate is extinguished.
24.
Furthermore, the law of West Virginia establishes that no
owner can use one part of his or her estate adversely to
another part of his estate.
25.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Original Easement or
any other easement existed after February 6, 1990, which
the Court has concluded was not the case, the 14.33 Acre
Tract and 4.22 Acre Tract merged under the ownership
of Thomas Firriolo and, therefore, any easement in
existence was extinguished pursuant to the doctrine of
merger as of September 11, 2003.
26.
At the time Chiapella purchased the 14.33 Acre Tract,
there were no easements across the 14.33 Acre Tract to
the 4.22 Acre Tract.
27.
[Omitted by the circuit court.]
28. On September 11, 2003, the date Firriolo became the
owner of the 4.22 acre tract, there were no valid
easements effecting [sic] either the 4.22 acre tract or the
14.33 acre tract as a result of [the] LeFevers' February 6,
1990 Quit Claim Deed.
The instant appeal involves the challenge by the LeFevers to the November 26,
2007, order of the circuit court, in case number 34714, and their challenge to the April 30,
2008, order of the circuit court, in case number 34705. This Court consolidated the two
cases for consideration and decision.
In case number 34714, this Court is called upon to review the circuit court's
decision that reformed the settlement agreement between the LeFevers and Mr. Firriolo. This
Court's standard of reviewing the circuit court's order is as follows:
Syllabus Point 4, Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W. Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996).
In case number 34705, the circuit court granted First American's motion for
summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action. In Syllabus Point 1 of Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994), this Court held that [a] circuit court's entry of
summary judgment is reviewed de novo. We will apply these standards in reviewing the
circuit court's orders appealed by the LeFevers.
This Court will first consider the LeFevers' assignment of error in case number
34714 with regard to the circuit court's November 26, 2007, order. In this assignment of
error, the LeFevers assert that the circuit court's reformation of their settlement agreement
with Mr. Firriolo was inequitable to them. It is the position of the LeFevers that the court's
mandated conveyance of the 4.22 acres to Mr. Frye is unfair because Mr. Firriolo acted
improperly in contracting to sell the land to Mr. Frye when he had no right to do so. Also,
the sales contract signed by Mr. Frye for the purchase of the 4.22 acre parcel expressly
indicated that Mr. Firriolo's sale of the 4.22 acres was contingent on the approval of the
LeFevers. Therefore, conclude the LeFevers, it cannot be said that Mr. Frye did not have
knowledge that the LeFevers had some type of legal interest in the property.
Mr. Frye and Ms. Chiapella counter that equitable estoppel should bar the
LeFevers from exercising any legal right to the 4.22 acres. According to Mr. Frye and Ms.
Chiapella, the LeFevers concealed material facts concerning their claim to the 4.22 acres
when they delivered a deed to the parcel to Mr. Firriolo which purported to convey the
property to him in fee simple. Further, the LeFevers failed to properly record the settlement
agreement as expressly mandated by the circuit court its dismissal order. Finally, there was
reliance on the LeFevers' actions in that Ms. Chiapella purchased the 14.33 acre tract with
the understanding that Mr. Frye would purchase the 4.22 acre tract, convey it to Ms.
Chiapella, and thereby extinguish any easement encumbering the 14.33 acre parcel.
We find that the circuit court erred in reforming the settlement agreement to
vest legal title in the 4.22 acre tract to Mr. Firriolo and in directing Mr. Firriolo to convey the
tract to Mr. Frye in exchange for $26,000. The facts adduced below do not support Mr.
Frye's and Ms. Chiapella's equitable estoppel argument. This Court has indicated:
This Court has held, concerning the reformation of contracts, that [t]he
jurisdiction of equity to reform written instruments, where there is a mutual mistake, or
mistake on one side and fraud or inequitable conduct on the other, if the evidence be
sufficiently cogent to thoroughly satisfy the mind of the court, is fully established and
undoubted. Syllabus Point 2, Nutter v. Brown, 51 W. Va. 598, 42 S.E. 661 (1902).
However, [s]uch equitable remedy [to reform a written instrument] is not absolute, but
depends upon whether the reformation sought is essential to the ends of justice. Syllabus
Point 2, Buford v. Chichester, 69 W. Va. 213, 71 S.E. 120 (1911). We find that the circuit
court's reformation of the settlement agreement between the LeFevers and Mr. Firriolo was
not essential to the ends of justice. First, it was not essential to the ends of justice with
regard to Ms. Chiapella because she did not rely on the LeFevers' conduct when she
purchased the 14.33 acres based on her belief that she could also purchase the 4.22 acre
parcel. In addition, the reformation of the contract was not essential to the ends of justice
with regard to Mr. Firriolo. Even though Mr. Firriolo entered into the settlement agreement
with the mistaken belief that the LeFevers had an express easement across his 14.33 acre
parcel, at the end of the two-year duration of the agreement, Mr. Firriolo could receive back
his $9,500.00 upon his reconveyance of the 4.22 acres to the LeFevers. Thus, there was no
prejudice to Mr. Firriolo as a result of the mistake of fact. For these reasons, we find that
there was no sound reason for the circuit court to reform the settlement agreement to deprive
the LeFevers of their ownership of the 4.22 acre tract and to order that the tract be conveyed
to Mr. Frye.
Therefore, this Court reverses the November 26, 2007, order of the circuit
court, and we remand for the circuit court to direct the reconveyance of the 4.22 acres to the
LeFevers upon their payment to Mr. Firriolo of $9,500.00 pursuant to the September 11,
2003 settlement agreement of the parties. (See footnote 7)
This Court will next address alleged error raised by the LeFevers with regard
to the circuit court's April 30, 2008, order in case number 34705. It is the position of the
Lefevers that the circuit court erred in ruling that they have no implied easement across the
14.33 acres. (See footnote 8)
Mr. Frye and Ms. Chiapella assert that any easement owned by the LeFevers
was extinguished by the doctrine of merger because Ms. Chiapella now possesses both the
4.22 acres and the 14.33 acres as a result of the circuit court's November 26, 2007, order.
However, because this Court above reversed the circuit court's November 26, 2007, order
and directed that the 4.22 acre parcel be reconveyed to the LeFevers pursuant to the terms
of the September 11, 2003 agreement between the LeFevers and Mr. Firriolo, we find that
the doctrine of merger as it relates to the merger of title to both the 4.22 acres and the 14.33
in Ms. Chiapella is rendered moot. (See footnote 9)
We reject the position that the merger of the two tracts under the ownership of
Mr. Firriolo extinguished any implied easement then in existence. As noted above, after title
to both the 4.22 acre tract and the 14.33 acre tract merged under the ownership of Mr.
Firriolo, he subsequently sold the 14.33 acre tract to Ms. Chiapella. This constitutes a
severance of the merged tracts leaving the 4.22 acre tract landlocked. Moreover, this Court
has determined in case number 34714 that the 4.22 acre tract is to be reconveyed to the
LeFevers. As a result, the LeFevers should now have the opportunity to prove that they
possess an implied easement across the 14.33 acre tract. However, before the circuit court
can declare whether a valid easement encumbers the 14.33 acre parcel, the court must make
further inquiry of the facts which are necessary to apply our law on implied easements.
Having found that the circuit court's reasons for granting summary judgment
to First American were in error, we find it necessary to reverse the circuit court's April 30,
2008, order and to remand for the circuit court to determine whether the LeFevers have an
implied easement across the 14.33 acre tract owned by Ms. Chiapella. In this Court's recent
opinion in Cobb v. Daugherty, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 35015, April 19, 2010),
we clarified our law on implied easements. This Court explained in Cobb that [t]here are
two forms of implied easements: an easement implied by necessity (which in West Virginia
is called a 'way of necessity'), and an easement implied by a prior use of the land (also called
an easement implied from a 'quasi-easement'). Syllabus Point 3, Cobb. We indicated
further that,
To establish an easement implied by a prior use of the
land, a party must prove four elements: (1) prior common
ownership of the dominant and servient estates; (2) severance
(that is, a conveyance of the dominant and/or servient estates to
another; (3) the use giving rise to the asserted easement was in
existence at the time of the conveyance dividing the property,
and the use has been so long continued and so obvious as to
show that the parties to the conveyance intended and meant for
the use to be permanent; and (4) the easement was necessary at
the time of the severance for the proper and reasonable
enjoyment of the dominant estate.
Syllabus Point 6, Cobb. We remand for the circuit court to make the necessary findings of
fact and to apply this Court's law on implied easements as set forth in Cobb in determining
whether Ms. Chiapella's 14.33 acre parcel is encumbered by an implied easement for the
benefit of the LeFevers' 4.22 acre parcel. (See footnote 11)
For the reasons stated above, this Court reverses the November 26, 2007, order
of the Circuit Court of Morgan County in case number 34714, and we remand with directions
to the circuit court to direct the conveyance of the 4.22 acres to the LeFevers upon the
payment of the LeFevers $9,500.00 to Thomas Firriolo pursuant to the parties' September
11, 2003 settlement agreement.
This Court reverses the April 30, 2008, order of the Circuit Court of Morgan
County in case number 34705, and we remand to the circuit court with directions that the
circuit court determine whether the LeFevers have an implied easement across Ms.
Chiapella's 14.33 acres for the benefit of the LeFevers' 4.22 acres under our law on implied
easements articulated in Cobb v. Daugherty, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 35015,
April 19, 2010). (See footnote 12)
Case No. 34714 - Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Case No. 34705- Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Footnote: 1
Footnote: 2
Footnote: 3
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of
land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any
other specific act and the party fails to comply within the time
specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of
the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the
court as a special commissioner and the act when so done has
like effect as if done by the party. On application of the party
entitled to performance, the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment
or sequestration against the property of the disobedient party to
compel obedience to the judgment. The court may also in
proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal
property is within the State, the court in lieu of directing a
conveyance thereof may enter a judgment divesting the title of
any party and vesting it in others and such judgment has the
effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
Footnote: 4
Footnote: 5
Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was
made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made
has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances,
the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he
bears the risk of the mistake.
Syllabus Point 2, McGinnis v. Cayton, 173 W. Va. 102, 312 S.E.2d 765 (1984).
Footnote: 6
Footnote: 7
Footnote: 8
Footnote: 9
A deed, absolute on its face, can be declared a mortgage,
and the right to redeem may be established by parol evidence.
A court considers several factors, including the intention of the
parties; the existence of a debt to be secured; the circumstances
under which the conveyance was made; [and] whether the
grantor remained in possession[.]
Dishman v. Jarrell, 165 W. Va. 709, 711, 271 S.E.2d 348, 349-350 (1980) (citations
omitted). Similarly, in the instant case, the evidence indicates that it was fully understood
by the LeFevers and Mr. Firriolo that Mr. Firriolo was taking title to the 4.22 acres under
certain conditions. Specifically, the fact that Mr. Firriolo placed in the contract for the sale
of the 4.22 acres to Mr. Frye that the sale was contingent on the LeFevers' right of first
refusal, as well as the fact that he moved to have the circuit court reform the agreement
based on a mutual mistake of fact indicates that he understood that the conveyance of the
4.22 acres was made subject to the terms of his agreement with the LeFevers.
Footnote: 10
Footnote: 11
Footnote: 12