663 S.E.2d 606
As part of Ms. Carney's investigation on Mr. Harmon's behalf, (See footnote 5) Ms. Carney spoke
to Carmella Blankenship and Valerie Friend. Both women (See footnote 6) told Ms. Carney that Mr.
Harmon was not present at the murder of Ms. Collins. (See footnote 7) Two additional leads which came
to light through the interviews conducted by Ms. Carney were that the police were allegedly
involved in the drug trafficking under investigation and that State Trooper Nelson was
rumored to have had a sexual relationship with the murder victim _ Ms. Collins.
Claiming that Appellants had hindered their investigation into the murder of Ms.
Collins by deceiving and intimidating a material witness, Alola Boseman, with false and
defamatory statements about lead investigators First Sergeant D.M. Nelson, Trooper First
Class A.S. Perdue, and First Lieutenant C.E. Akers, the State filed charges against Ms.
Carney and Ms. Jarvis for obstructing a police officer and conspiracy to obstruct a police
officer. As additional grounds for the indictment that was issued against Appellants on
grounds of obstruction, the State alleged that they temporarily relocated a material witness
_ Carmella Blankenship _ and that they unlawfully entered the residence where Valerie
Friend had been living whereupon they removed and concealed certain evidentiary items.
On September 8, 2006, a jury returned a verdict of guilty against Appellants on both
of the charges: obstruction and conspiracy to commit obstruction. (See footnote 8) By order entered on
October 26, 2006, the trial court sentenced Appellants to a definite term of one year of
confinement at the Southwest Regional Jail for each of the two charges, to be served
concurrently. Crediting Appellants for forty-five days of home confinement already served,
the trial court suspended the jail sentences and placed Appellants on probation for a term of
three years. Under the terms of their probation, Appellants were required to serve a total of
120 days of electronic home confinement (60 days for each of the two offenses for which
they were convicted); fulfill 200 hours of community service; and complete a higher
education class in criminal justice/procedure.
Through this appeal, Appellants seek a reversal of their respective convictions for
obstruction of a police officer and conspiracy to commit obstruction. (See footnote 9)
Any person who by threats, menaces, acts or otherwise, forcibly or
illegally hinders or obstructs, or attempts to hinder or obstruct, any law-
enforcement officer, probation officer or parole officer acting in his or her
official capacity is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars or confined in
the county or regional jail not more than one year, or both.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
The evidence the State relied upon initially to obtain an indictment (See footnote 10) and later to
convince the jury that Appellants were guilty of obstruction was that they had hindered the
police investigation into the Collins' murder by removing Ms. Blankenship from Mingo
County and delaying a police interview; that Appellants made derogatory remarks about the
police to Ms. Boseman that affected her ability to trust them; and that Appellants committed
trespass and removed certain items having relevance to this case from the house where Ms.
Friend resided prior to the murder. Before we examine these evidentiary items to determine
whether such conduct supports the statutory offense of obstructing a police officer, we find
it useful to review those cases in which we have previously applied West Virginia Code §
61-5-17.
In State v. Johnson, 134 W.Va. 357, 59 S.E.2d 485 (1950), this Court examined the
statutory terms “forcibly or illegally” and stated that such terms as “used in the statute clearly
mean any unlawful interference with the officer in the discharge of his official duties,
whether or not force be actually present.” Id. at 360, 59 S.E.2d at 487. In Johnson, we
considered whether an individual who assists a prisoner in attempting to escape from the
lawful custody of a police officer has committed the offense of obstruction under West
Virginia Code § 61-5-17. In rejecting the need for the use of force (See footnote 11) or a specific act
directed against the police officer, we explained that the key to the obstruction offense was
the “direct interference with the officer in the discharge of his official duties.” 134 W.Va.
at 360, 59 S.E.2d at 487.
As we explained in State v. Jarvis, 172 W.Va. 706, 310 S.E.2d 467 (1983), the key to determining whether conduct effected without force constitutes the offense of obstruction under West Virginia Code § 61-5-17 is whether the conduct at issue is illegal. Addressing whether the defendant's act of fleeing after the police informed him that he was under arrest qualified as obstruction, we elucidated:
[I]f his flight had not been illegal, there would not have been a violation of the
statute. The statute only reaches conduct that unlawfully hinders, obstructs or
opposes an officer in the lawful exercise of his official duty. Courts in
applying similar statutes have recognized that a person does not violate the
law by doing what he has a lawful right to do, regardless of whether it
obstructs or hinders a police officer.
Id. at 709, 310 S.E.2d at 470 (emphasis supplied).
Where force is not involved to effect an obstruction, the State contends that the
resulting obstruction itself is sufficient to establish the illegality required by West Virginia
Code § 61-5-17. This argument fails because, as this Court held in Wilmoth v. Gustke, 179
W.Va. 771, 373 S.E.2d 484 (1988), lawful conduct is not sufficient to establish the statutory
offense at issue. In that case, the defendant owner of the Parkersburg Mall asked a law
enforcement officer to leave the mall premises because the officer's issuance of a traffic
citation to a third party was congesting traffic. Id. at 772, 373 S.E.2d at 485. In overturning
the obstruction conviction that resulted from the mall owner's request, we held:
A person upon witnessing a police officer issuing a traffic citation to
a third party on the person's property, who asks the officer, without the use of
fighting or insulting words or other opprobrious language and without forcible
or other illegal hindrance, to leave the premises, does not violate W.Va. Code,
61-5-17 [1931], because that person has not illegally hindered an officer of
this State in the lawful exercise of his or her duty. To hold otherwise would
create first amendment implications which may violate the person's right to
freedom of speech. U.S. Const. amend. I; W.Va. Const. art. III, § 7.
Wilmoth, 179 W.Va. at 771, 373 S.E.2d at 484, syllabus.
After deciding in Wilmoth that lawful speech will not support an obstruction charge,
we later examined whether silence in response to police questioning can amount to the
statutory offense at issue. In Srnsky, we held that the mere refusal to identify oneself to a
law enforcement officer does not constitute obstruction under West Virginia Code § 61-5-
17(a). 213 W.Va. at 421, 582 S.E.2d at 868. Only when such silence occurs after the police
officer has indicated why the individual's name is being sought in relation to official police
duties or in connection with an express statutory directive can non-speech amount to the
offense of obstruction set forth in West Virginia Code § 61-5-17(a). See Srnsky, 213 W.Va.
at 421, 582 S.E.2d at 868 and syl. pt. 4.
Having set forth the parameters of what qualifies as a statutory obstruction _ forcible
or illegal conduct that interferes with a police officer's (See footnote 12) discharge of official duties _ we
proceed to examine whether the conduct relied upon by the State to secure convictions
against Appellants fell within the statutory elements of West Virginia Code § 61-5-17(a).
The first category of evidence relied upon by the State was that Appellants had effected the
temporary removal of a witness _ Ms. Blankenship _ from Mingo County. Acknowledging
that Ms. Blankenship cooperated with the police a few days later than originally scheduled,
the State nonetheless insists that Appellants hindered the police investigation by encouraging
Ms. Blankenship to come to Charleston for a few days.
In explanation of their actions, Appellants testified that after interviewing Ms.
Blankenship, they offered to provide a very frightened individual shelter outside of Mingo
County. After taking her to a hotel in Charleston, they notified the authorities as to her
location. (See footnote 13) There was no evidence adduced at trial that the temporary removal of Ms.
Blankenship from Mingo County was for the purpose of preventing her from speaking to
the police. And, as mentioned above, Ms. Blankenship did in fact meet with the police upon
her return to Mingo County several days later.
The fact that the police were allegedly hindered in their investigation by the delay of
a matter of days in conducting an interview of Ms. Blankenship does not constitute the type
of conduct that is typically viewed as obstruction for purposes of West Virginia Code § 61-5-17(a). First and foremost, there was no illegality as to the physical act of removing Ms.
Blankenship from the county as there was no court order requiring her to remain in Mingo
County. There is also no evidence that Appellants were seeking to hinder or obstruct the
police in their investigation through their relocation of Ms. Blankenship. Consequently, we
do not view the evidence concerning Appellants' role in the short-term unavailability of Ms.
Blankenship for interviewing purposes as sufficient to sustain a conviction under West
Virginia Code § 61-5-17(a).
The second type of evidence the State relied upon to prove its obstruction case
involved certain pejorative statements about the police that Appellants allegedly made to
another potential witness _ Ms. Boseman. (See footnote 14) With regard to the statements allegedly made
by Appellant Carney, Ms. Boseman testified that Ms. Carney told her she might be killed by
the police; (See footnote 15) that Troopers Nelson, Perdue and Akers had been sexually intimate with Ms.
Collins, and that, consequently, these same troopers were involved in attempting to cover
up the Collins' murder; and that Trooper Nelson had impregnated Ms. Collins. (See footnote 16) As to
statements allegedly made by Appellant Jarvis, Ms. Boseman stated that she had indicated
that Trooper Nelson was trying to cover up some of the facts of the Collins' murder because
he was sexually involved with the victim; that she had taken Ms. Blankenship into her own
home to protect her from the police; and that she had offered to similarly allow Ms.
Boseman to stay with her in her home. (See footnote 17)
As a consequence of these statements allegedly made by Appellants, the State
complained that they had to win back the trust of Ms. Boseman. The investigating officers
testified that they had to keep reassuring Ms. Boseman that they were not criminals and that
she could trust them. Despite this contention, a review of the record demonstrates that Ms.
Boseman's communications with Appellants did not deter her willingness to cooperate with
law enforcement authorities in connection with the Collins' murder investigation. (See footnote 18)
Challenging the State's reliance on the statements as proof of obstruction, Appellants
argue that the speech at issue falls within the protections of the First Amendment. As we
discussed in Wilmoth, constitutionally protected free speech cannot be relied upon as a basis
for establishing the offense of obstruction. 179 W.Va. at 774, 373 S.E.2d at 487. “[A]
person does not violate the law by doing what he has a lawful right to do.” Jarvis, 172
W.Va. at 709, 310 S.E.2d at 470. And, as we made clear in Jarvis, not every hindrance to
a police investigation rises to the level of a colorable offense under West Virginia Code §
61-5-17(a).
Because Ms. Boseman continued to cooperate with law enforcement officials (See footnote 19) after
having spoken with Appellants, we cannot conclude that the statements attributed to
Appellants served to obstruct or hinder the investigation of the Collins' murder. According
to the testimony of Trooper Akers, Ms. Boseman told him that Appellant Carney never
asked Ms. Boseman not to talk to the police. Given the protected nature of the speech
involved, as well as the clear lack of any showing that such speech served to statutorily
hinder the investigation at issue, we do not find the evidence of the statements Appellants
allegedly made to Ms. Boseman sufficient to establish the offense of obstruction under West
Virginia Code § 61-5-17(a).
The final category of evidence that the State relied upon to establish its case of
obstruction was an alleged unlawful entry into the house where Ms. Friend had been
residing prior to the Collins' murder and the removal and concealment of items from that
residence. The State argued that the items removed _ a map, film, and film canisters _ were
tainted and had no value upon their removal from the house.
As to the unlawful entry, Appellants established that the entry in question was not
illegal as the owner of the house, Mr. Burton, admitted Appellant Jarvis (See footnote 20) to the house.
After being admitted to the house, Appellant Jarvis testified that she removed a Bible; two
pieces of paper from the internet about witchcraft; two cameras; and two film canisters.
These items, as confirmed by the testimony of Trooper Nelson, were turned over to the
United States Attorney's office by Mr. Clifford. Confirming that the removed items had no
significance to the Collins' murder, Trooper Nelson surmised that the film, which turned out
to be blank, (See footnote 21) was what the State might have been interested in examining. As Trooper
Perdue made clear, however, there was no evidence that either of the Appellants had
tampered in any way with the materials removed from the house.
Trooper Nelson provided the only potential connection of the materials removed
from the house to the murder investigation. He testified that among the items removed was
a map with directions from the Matewan area to the Belfry area where a shovel related to the
case was ultimately discovered. Appellant Carney denied that she removed any such map
from the house. Even assuming, arguendo, that the map was among the items removed from
the house, Mr. Burton's house was not cordoned off as part of any police investigation; the
police had never searched Mr. Burton's house; and they never had probable cause to obtain
a search warrant for the house. Consequently, the removal of the items in issue, which were
obtained through lawful entry and then provided to the authorities, does not constitute
evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for obstruction under West Virginia Code § 61-5-
17(a).
Having concluded that the State failed to introduce evidence upon which a jury could
properly find Appellants guilty of obstructing a police officer in his official capacity in
violation of West Virginia Code § 61-5-17(a), we conclude that the convictions must be
reversed. Because the conspiracy convictions were predicated on the offense of obstructing
a police officer, (See footnote 22) those convictions must also be reversed given our conclusion that the
obstruction convictions are not sustainable. Accordingly, the orders of the Circuit Court
of Mingo County sentencing Appellants in connection with the obstruction and conspiracy
to commit obstruction of a police officer are hereby reversed.