663 S.E.2d 623
JUSTICE DAVIS and JUSTICE BENJAMIN, deeming themselves disqualified, did not
participate in the decision of this case.
JUDGE KING and JUDGE JOHNSON sitting by temporary assignment.
2. “A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).
3. “Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.” Syllabus Point 2, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).
4. “The circuit court's function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Syllabus Point 3, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
5. “The Medical Professional Liability Act, W.Va.Code, 55-7B-4(a) [1986]
... requires an injured plaintiff to file a [medical] malpractice claim against a health care
provider within two years of the date of the injury, or 'within two years of the date when such
person discovers, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered such
injury, whichever last occurs [.]'” Syllabus Point 1, in part, Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc.,
199 W.Va. 706, 487 S.E.2d 901 (1997).
Per Curiam:
This case is before this Court upon appeal of a final order of the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County entered August 22, 2006. In that order, the circuit court granted
summary judgment in favor of the appellee and defendant below, Dr. Richard C. Rashid,
M.D., finding that the appellant and plaintiff below, R. Brooks Legg, Jr., D.D.S., filed his
medical malpractice complaint against Dr. Rashid beyond the statute of limitations period.
Based upon the parties' briefs and arguments in this proceeding, as well as the relevant
statutory and case law, we are of the opinion that the circuit court did not commit reversible
error and accordingly, affirm the decision below.
In January 1997, Dr. Rashid performed ALK surgery on Dr. Legg's left eye.
Upon removing his eye patch the next day, Dr. Legg realized immediate loss of vision in that
eye. Due to the fact that his vision was so poor, Dr. Rashid performed a second procedure
two weeks later intended to give Dr. Legg his desired vision correction. Following the
second procedure, Dr. Legg received no significant improvement and had difficulty wearing
a contact lens in his left eye. According to Dr. Legg, it was then that Dr. Rashid informed
him that further procedures would be necessary to correct his vision; however, the necessary
procedures were not yet available in the United States. Dr. Rashid said that he did not know
when the procedures would be available.
In the spring of 2001, Dr. Legg consulted with Dr. Michael Harris who
informed him that he was unable to fit a contact lens in Dr. Legg's left eye due to corneal
irregularities caused by the surgeries he underwent in January 1997. Then, in December
2002, Dr. Legg consulted Dr. Lee Wiley, who explained to him that before the cornea can
be measured for surgical correction, the patient must stop wearing contact lenses for one to
two months to allow the cornea to revert to its natural curvature. Dr. Legg states that this
information was not disclosed to him by Dr. Rashid prior to his 1997 eye surgery. Moreover,
Dr. Legg maintains that he had not worn his contacts for a period of only seventy-two hours
prior to surgery and that Dr. Rashid failed to have him remove his hard-contact lens for a
longer period of time consistent with the standard of care for performing an
ALK.
On June 9, 2005, Dr. Legg filed a lawsuit against Dr. Rashid alleging damages
arising from the surgical procedures performed by Dr. Rashid in January 1997. On August
22, 2006, the circuit court granted summary judgment in Dr. Rashid's favor concluding that
the action had been filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations provided by W.Va. Code
§ 55-7B-4(a). This appeal followed.
Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of
the evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.
With these principles in mind, we now consider the parties' arguments.
Dr. Legg states that summary judgment was not proper in this case and points
to Syllabus Point 5 of Gaither v. City Hospital, 199 W.Va. 706, 487 S.E.2d 901 (1997),
wherein this Court stated that “[t]he question of when plaintiff knows or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence has reason to know of medical malpractice is for the jury. Syllabus
Point 4, Hill v. Clarke, 161 W.Va. 258, 241 S.E.2d 572 (1978).” Dr. Legg then cites
Syllabus Point 3 of Miller v. Monongalia County Board of Education, 210 W.Va. 147, 556
S.E.2d 427 (2001), which holds that “[f]raudulent concealment requires that the defendant
commit some positive act tending to conceal the cause of action from the plaintiff, although
any act or omission tending to suppress the truth is enough.”
Dr. Legg asserts that throughout the years, Dr. Rashid made him believe that
his vision problems were temporary and could be improved by a cutting-edge, computer-
assisted surgery when it became available. Consequently, Dr. Legg states that the circuit
court committed error in granting summary judgment to Dr. Rashid based upon the erroneous
belief that the medical malpractice action filed by Dr. Legg was time-barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.
Conversely, Dr. Rashid states that Dr. Legg was aware of his injury as soon as
the bandages were removed from his eye on January 14, 1997, and that he had no reasonable
basis to believe that his injury was caused by anything other than the treatment. As such, Dr.
Rashid maintains that the statute of limitations began to run on that day and expired on
January 14, 1999, and Dr. Legg's June 9, 2005, filing of a claim against him, which was
more than six years later, was well outside of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Dr.
Rashid maintains that under the facts and circumstances of this case, summary judgment was
proper.
Dr. Rashid further asserts that Dr. Legg was incorrect when he stated that the
statute of limitations was tolled “until at least July 2003, when Dr. Legg learned from [Dr.
Wiley] that the pre-operative procedure of Dr. Rashid was the source of the unsuccessful
procedure performed in 1997.” In that regard, Dr. Rashid states that the appointment with
Dr. Wiley was actually on December 10, 2002, and not in July 2003 as claimed by Dr. Legg.
Thus, as the circuit court pointed out in its order, Dr. Legg's “consultation [with Dr. Wiley]
occurred in December, 2002, more than two years prior to the filing of his Complaint,” which
makes it clear that Dr. Legg was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations
regardless of whether Dr. Rashid's actions tolled the statute.
At the outset, we note that our review here is simply limited to determining
whether the circuit court properly granted summary judgment. In Syllabus Point 3 of Painter, supra, we stated: “The circuit court's function at the summary judgment stage is not
to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but is to determine whether there
is a genuine issue for trial.” 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755. Having reviewed the entire
record, we find that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment because the
evidence shows that Dr. Legg filed his medical malpractice action beyond the statute of
limitations as provided by W.Va. Code § 55-7B-4(a). (See footnote 1)
As we have explained,
[t]he Medical Professional Liability Act, W.Va.Code,
55-7B-4(a) [1986] ... requires an injured plaintiff to file a
[medical] malpractice claim against a health care provider
within two years of the date of the injury, or 'within two years
of the date when such person discovers, or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered such injury,
whichever last occurs [.]'
Syllabus Point 1, in part, Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc., 199 W.Va. 706, 487 S.E.2d 901
(1997). Ordinarily, the applicable statute of limitation begins to run when the actionable
conduct first occurs, or when an injury is discovered, or with reasonable diligence, should
have been discovered. W.Va. Code § 55-7B-4. The discovery rule recognizes “the inherent
unfairness of barring a claim when a party's cause of action could not have been recognized
until after the ordinarily applicable period of limitation.” Harris v. Jones, 209 W.Va. 557,
562, 550 S.E.2d 93, 98 (2001). “[U]nder the 'discovery rule,' the statute of limitations is
tolled until a claimant knows or by reasonable diligence should know of his claim.”
Syllabus Point 2, in part, Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc., 199 W.Va. 706, 487 S.E.2d 901
(1997).
There are two common situations when the discovery rule may apply. The first
occurs when “the plaintiff knows of the existence of an injury, but does not know the injury
is the result of any party's conduct other than his own.” Gaither, 199 W.Va. at 713, 487
S.E.2d at 908 (modifying Hickman v. Grover, 178 W.Va. 249, 358 S.E.2d 810 (1987)). In Gaither, this Court held that a question of fact existed as to when Mr. Gaither first “became
aware” that the hospital's negligence, as opposed to his own negligence, might have resulted
in the amputation of his leg. We explained that: “We find nothing in the record to indicate
that the appellant had any reason to know before January 1993 that City Hospital may have
breached its duty and failed to exercise proper care, or that City Hospital's conduct may have
contributed to the loss of his leg.” 199 W.Va. at 715, 487 S.E.2d at 910.
The second situation may occur when an individual “does or should reasonably
know of the existence of an injury and its cause.” Gaither, 199 W.Va. at 713, 487 S.E.2d
at 908. In footnote 6 of Gaither, this Court lists instances where “causal relationships are so
well-established [between the injury and its cause] that we cannot excuse a plaintiff who
pleads ignorance.” These instances include a patient who, after having a sinus operation,
lost sight in his left eye, and a patient who, after undergoing a simple surgery for the removal
of a cyst, was paralyzed in both legs. Gaither, 199 W.Va. at 712, 487 S.E.2d at 907 (internal
citations omitted). In such instances, when an individual knows or should reasonably know
of the injury and its cause, the injured party must “make a strong showing of fraudulent
concealment, inability to comprehend the injury, or other extreme hardship” for the discovery
rule to apply. 199 W.Va. at 713, 487 S.E.2d at 908 (quoting Cart v. Marcum, 188 W.Va.
241, 245, 423 S.E.2d 644, 648 (1992)).
As discussed, Dr. Legg argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the
statute of limitations began to run on January 14, 1997, instead of July, 2003. The circuit
court, however, rejected Dr. Legg's argument as it explained:
In the case at bar, [Dr. Legg] expressly admits
immediately recognizing his injury the day after his surgery in
January 1997. There is no allegation of fraudulent concealment
by the defendant and the Court finds no evidence thereof. The
plaintiff was specifically informed by Dr. Rashid that his
condition will not improve without further surgical procedures
which were not available in this country and no time frame was
given in which they would become available. [Dr. Legg] was
further advised by Dr. Harris of the relationship between the
January 1997 surgeries and plaintiff's difficulty wearing contact
lenses. As noted in Gaither, when an injury occurs of such a
character that the plaintiff cannot reasonably claim ignorance of
the existence of a cause of action, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to prove entitlement to the benefit of the discovery rule.
The plaintiff herein has not carried that burden.
The circuit court further explained:
[Dr. Legg] argues that under Dr. Rashid's care he was
told to leave his contact lenses out for only a few days prior to
his surgery, which is contrary to the information provided in his
consultation with Dr. Wiley. It is this event, according to the
plaintiff, which is the earliest date when the statute of
limitations begins to run. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, that consultation occurred in December 2002, more than
two years prior to the filing of his Complaint. Secondly, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has been clear that
where the adverse results of medical treatment are so
extraordinary that the patient is immediately aware that
something went wrong, the statute of limitations will begin to
run even though he may not be aware of the precise act of
malpractice. Harrison v. Seltzer, 165 W.Va. 366, 371, 268
S.E.2d 312, 315 (1980).
Dr. Legg's own testimony was that on the day after his January 13, 1997,
surgery, that he “immediately realize[d] that the [procedure] had not corrected his vision, and
had in fact greatly diminished his vision when he removed the bandage from his eye on
January 14, 1997.” Dr. Legg testified as follows:
Q. Tell me what you recall about removing the eye patch the
next morning.
A. I couldn't even see the door. It was really terrible vision.
Really, really terrible. And I had patients scheduled for
the following day, and I thought I was going to have a
heart attack.
Q. What had you been told to expect when you removed
your eye patch?
A. A little blurriness, a little double vision, maybe some
haloing, that sort of thing; but I should be able to see
patients the following day.
. . .
Q. ...before ALK, of course, your vision was terrible; right?
A. Right.
Q. But you could, without your contact lenses, read in bed?
A. Yes.
Q. With both eyes?
A. Yes.
Q. After the ALK you could no longer do that?
A. No. No, I could not.
Q. After the flip flop, (See footnote 2) you still could no longer read?
A. Still could no longer.
Q. But now you have double vision?
A. I had double vision after the ALK.
Q. So you had that also after the ALK?
A. Yes. That's what I'm trying to tell you. The positions
changed...
Dr. Legg further testified:
Q. So after the ALK, you had no usable vision in your left
eye. Is that a fair statement?
A. If I would shut my right eye, you wouldn't want me
looking at your teeth. I will tell you that.
Q. Well but I want to be more precise.
A. Yes. Terrible, terrible vision.
. . .
Q. So then you have two weeks after the ALK the flip flop
procedure...
A. Right.
Q. ...Which was intended to enhance your vision to where
you had expected it would be after the ALK?
A. Right.
Q. And what you're saying is it did not improve the vision
at all?
A. No useful improvement.
. . .
Q. So there was an immediate deterioration of your vision
after the surgery?
A. Yes.
Q. And it didn't improve after the enhancement?
A. It's as bad today as it was then.
The treatment that Dr. Legg received from Dr. Rashid in January of 1997 was
such a failure that Dr. Legg should have recognized that his condition was directly related
to Dr. Rashid's alleged malpractice on the day after his surgery. We stated in Gaither, supra,
that “we do not go so far as to require recognition by the plaintiff of negligent conduct.” 199
W.Va. at 714, 487 S.E.2d at 909. Instead, we explained that “once a patient is aware, or
should reasonably have become aware, that medical treatment by a particular party has
caused a personal injury, that statute begins.” Id. We further recognized that “in some
circumstances causal relationships are so well established that we cannot excuse a plaintiff
who pleads ignorance.” Id. at 712, 487 S.E.2d at 907. Also, in Gaither, we explained that
“the statute of limitations will begin to run once the extraordinary result is known to the
plaintiff even though he may not be aware of the precise act of malpractice.” (Citation
omitted).
In Gaither, this Court noted that “[i]n the great majority of cases, the issue of
whether a claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of fact for the jury.” 199
W.Va. at 714, 715, 487 S.E.2d at 909, 910. While many cases will require a jury to resolve
the issue of when a plaintiff discovered his or her injury, including the related issue of
whether the plaintiff was reasonably diligent in discovery of his or her injury, the issue can
also be resolved by the court where the relevant facts are undisputed and only one conclusion
may be drawn from those facts. See Harrison v. Davis, 197 W.Va. 651, 660, 478 S.E.2d 104,
113 (1996) (upholding trial court's decision that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in discovering injuries); Cathedral of Joy Baptist Church v. Village of Hazel Crest,
22 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 1994); Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill.2d 146, 52 Ill.Dec. 6, 421
N.E.2d 869, 874 (1981).
Because Dr. Legg admits that he was immediately aware of his eye injury and
resulting loss of vision, the question of whether he acted with reason, under the facts of this
case, was properly a legal question for the trial court to resolve. In fact, Dr. Legg stated that
he immediately recognized that the procedure “had in fact greatly diminished his vision.”
Thus, given the specific facts of this case, we believe that the two-year statute of limitations
began to run on that date and it expired on January 14, 1999, more than six years prior to Dr.
Legg's June 9, 2005, filing of a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Rashid. (See footnote 3)
Moreover, even if we were to give Dr. Legg the benefit of the doubt with
regard to whether or not he should have known about the alleged malpractice by January 14,
1997, the record still reveals that according to his own deposition testimony, Dr. Legg knew,
or reasonably should have known, of Dr. Rashid's alleged negligence at a minimum by the
spring of 2001, which was still well beyond the two-year statute of limitations period given
his June 9, 2005, filing of the medical malpractice action against Dr. Rashid.
Dr. Legg explains that he was last treated by Dr. Rashid during the fall of 2000,
whereby he set up an appointment during the spring of 2001 with Dr. Michael Harris. Dr.
Legg's testimony regarding his visit with Dr. Harris is as follows:
Q. Did Dr. Harris ever fit you with...
A. Dr. Harris was never able to fit my left eye. The right
eye was perfect. He did great on it, but the left eye he
could never get the lens to seat.
Q. Did he ever explain to you why that was?
A. Yes. The cornea was so irregular it wouldn't seat.
Q. What would cause that?
A. The surgery, the ALK surgery [by Dr. Rashid] and the
flip flop surgery. Corneal surgery, I should say.
Q. He actually told you that?
A. Well, yes, he did.
Finally, assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Legg's discussion with Dr. Harris was not sufficient evidence to show that he knew, or reasonably should have known, of Dr. Rashid's alleged negligence, then we are faced with Dr. Legg's consultation with Dr. Lee Wiley in December 2002. Dr. Legg maintains that his visit with Dr. Wiley, wherein he claims that he learned that the pre-operative procedure of Dr. Rashid was supposedly the source of his unsuccessful 1997 procedure, occurred in July 2003. However, as the circuit court noted, “In December 2002, [Dr. Legg] consulted Dr. Lee Wiley in Morgantown, West Virginia who explained to [him] that before the cornea can be measured for surgical correction, the patient must stop wearing contact lenses for one to two months to allow the cornea to revert to its natural curvature.” Likewise, Dr. Wiley testified as follows during his deposition:
Q. ...what was done for the patient [Dr. Legg] during the
initial exam and initial visit of December '02?
A. I performed a topography measurement, which is a
measurement of the corneal curvature, and determined
that there was kind of an unusual irregular astigmatism
in the left eye, and then postulated that that can be due to
a variety of things including potentially a change in the
curvature of the cornea induced by chronic contact lens
wear.... [Dr. Legg] opted to come back after having
stopped the lens for several weeks for me to redo some
measurements.
Q. So the plan of December 10th [2002] was to do what for
this patient?
A. Basically, refer him to [Dr.] Charleton, because his
original question to me on our initial visit was could I
perform a laser treatment to correct the vision in the left
eye. That was a question he had for me.
Usually we won't provide any information
concerning laser vision correction until someone's been
out of contacts for quite some time, because we know
contact lenses can alter the curvature and the refractor
status of the eye. So, typically we ask people to be out of
the hard lenses for quite some time. Usually it's a month
or two for hard contact lenses. Usually it's several weeks
for soft contact lenses.
Clearly, Dr. Legg knew, or reasonably should have known, of Dr. Rashid's
alleged negligence prior to July 2003, the date on which Dr. Legg claims the two-year statute
commenced. We therefore find that based upon the information in the record, Dr. Legg's
filing of a lawsuit against Dr. Rashid was barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly,
we find that summary judgment in favor of Dr. Rashid was appropriate.
Affirmed.