650 S.E.2d 119
The appellant, Denver A. Youngblood, Jr. (hereinafter Mr. Youngblood), was
convicted in the Circuit Court of Morgan County of first degree sexual assault, second degree
sexual assault, indecent exposure, two counts of brandishing a weapon, and wanton
endangerment with a firearm. The circuit court sentenced Mr. Youngblood to 26 to 60 years
imprisonment. The order of conviction and sentence was affirmed by a majority of this Court
in State v. Youngblood, 217 W. Va. 535, 618 S.E.2d 544 (2005) (Davis, J. and Starcher, J.,
dissenting). However, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Youngblood v.
West Virginia, ___ U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 2188, 165 L. Ed.2d 269 (2006), vacated the judgment
of the majority, and remanded the case for consideration of whether the State's failure to turn
over an evidentiary note violated the disclosure requirement of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed.2d 215 (1963). After carefully considering the supplemental
briefs and the record submitted on appeal, and listening to the rearguments of the parties, the
circuit court's conviction and sentencing order is reversed and this case is remanded for a
new trial on all charges. (See footnote 1)
Q. Do you know the individual that was stopped talking to Mr.
Youngblood?
A. I believe it was his mother.
Q. So you approached the car?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Was there any other officer with you that night?
A. Yes, ma'am, Officer Barney.
. . . .
Q. And you approached the vehicle?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. What did you do?
A. I talked to the driver, which is the Defendant. He had another male
passenger on the front passenger side of the car. There was three females in the
car. Basically, I has asked if they had come from that area and if they were the
callers and what was going on and if they knew anything about it.
Q. Do you know what their response was?
A. I got the response of, you know, they weren't the ones that called
and they didn't know what was going on.
. . . .
Q. You asked the three girls in the back were they the ones that called
the police or the ones that needed help?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. And each of them said no?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did it appear to you that these girls were scared?
A. Looking back on it, no, not that I remember and that is why we
thought that it was not part of what was occurring.
Q. Were they winking at you or trying to give you secret signals?
A. Not that I noticed.
Q. Doing anything to try to signal you?
A. Not that I noticed.
Q. But based upon your recollection everybody appeared to be fine.
A. Yes.
The two officers and Mr. Youngblood's mother left the scene. Thereafter Mr.
Youngblood drove to Mr. Pitner's home. While at Mr. Pitner's home it was alleged that Mr.
Youngblood once again forced Katara to perform oral sex on him. This encounter was also
not witnessed by the other three individuals present in the home. Shortly thereafter the
women were driven to Hagerstown, Maryland and left there.
After the three women were dropped off, Katara went home. However, Wendy
and Kimberly were taken to a sheriff's office by Wendy's mother. (See footnote 7) Wendy and Kimberly
informed the police that Mr. Youngblood gave them alcohol and carried a gun. (See footnote 8) After
statements were taken from Wendy and Kimberly, the police contacted Katara and took a
statement from her. Subsequent to the investigation Mr. Youngblood was indicted in 2001
on sexual assault and other charges involving Katara, and on weapon charges involving
Wendy and Kimberly. A jury convicted Mr. Youngblood of all charges and he was
sentenced accordingly by the trial court. (See footnote 9)
Subsequent to his conviction and sentence, Mr. Youngblood filed a motion for
a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The evidence in question was a note that
was found at the home where Mr. Pitner resided. The note was found by the owner of the
home, Patricia Miles. (See footnote 10) The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. At that
hearing Ms. Miles informed the court that the officer who investigated the case against Mr.
Youngblood read the note and told her to throw it away. As discussed more fully in this
opinion, the note contained language that could reasonably be interpreted as showing that
Mr. Youngblood engaged in consensual sex with Katara_which was his defense at trial. The
trial court ultimately denied the motion for a new trial on the grounds that the note only had
impeachment value and that the investigating officer's knowledge of the note could not be
imputed to the prosecutor.
In Mr. Youngblood's initial appeal to this Court, the majority of the Court
found that the trial judge was correct in denying his motion for new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence. The majority opinion did not address the issue in the context of a Brady violation. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated
the judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the Brady issue.
The trial court denied Youngblood a new trial, saying that the note
provided only impeachment, but not exculpatory, evidence. The trial court did
not discuss Brady or its scope, but expressed the view that the investigating
trooper had attached no importance to the note, and because he had failed to
give it to the prosecutor the State could not now be faulted for failing to share
it with Youngblood's counsel.
A bare majority of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, but
without examining the specific constitutional claims associated with the
alleged suppression of favorable evidence. Justice Davis, dissenting in an
opinion that Justice Starcher joined, unambiguously characterized the trooper's
instruction to discard the new evidence as a Brady violation. The dissenters
concluded that the note indicating that Youngblood engaged in consensual sex
with Katara had been suppressed and was material, both because it was at odds
with the testimony provided by the State's three chief witnesses (Katara,
Kimberly, and Wendy) and also because it was entirely consistent with
Youngblood's defense at trial that his sexual encounters with Katara were
consensual.
. . . .
Youngblood clearly presented a federal constitutional Brady claim to
the State Supreme Court, as he had to the trial court. And, as noted, the
dissenting justices discerned the significance of the issue raised. If this Court
is to reach the merits of this case, it would be better to have the benefit of the
views of the full Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on the Brady issue. We, therefore, grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of
the State Supreme Court, and remand the case for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Youngblood, 126 S. Ct. at 2189-2190 (internal citations omitted).
In view of the opinion issued by the United States Supreme Court, we believe
that three issues must be resolved: (1) whether the prosecution's disclosure duty under Brady includes evidence that is known only to police investigators, (2) whether the disclosure
requirement under Brady includes disclosure of favorable impeachment evidence, and (3)
whether the suppressed evidence violated the disclosure requirement of Brady. In resolving
these three issues we do not believe that this Court is precluded from also considering the
issues on independent State constitutional grounds under our decision in State v. Hatfield,
169 W. Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982). This is particularly so because in Mr.
Youngblood's original brief and supplemental brief he argued both State and federal
constitutional grounds for a new trial. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-397
(Minn. 1990) (“It is unnecessary to rest our decision on the [federal case that the United
States Supreme Court asked us to consider on remand,] when the Minnesota Constitution
alone provides an independent and adequate state constitutional basis on which to decide.”); Pelliccioni v. Schuyler Packing Co., 356 A.2d 4, 6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (“[S]tate
courts, after a United States Supreme Court remand, are free to alter--subject only to the
state's jurisprudence--prior decisions in the case on state law so long as the altered decision
is consistent with the federal Supreme Court's ruling on the federal question presented and
remanded.”); Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 251-252 (1991) (“The
[United States] Supreme Court has specifically directed us to consider the case in light of Milkovich, and we comply with that direction, as courts throughout the Nation have done in
similar circumstances. But that does not compel us to ignore our prior decision or the
arguments fully presented on remand that provide an alternative basis for resolving the
case.”).
Our review of the three issues will be in the context of the trial court's ruling
denying Mr. Youngblood's post-trial motion for a new trial based upon a violation of Brady and Hatfield. As a general matter we have held that “[a] trial court's order denying a
defendant's motion for a new trial is entitled to substantial deference on appeal.” State v.
Cooper, 217 W. Va. 613, 616, 619 S.E.2d 126, 129 (2005). A claim of a violation of Brady and Hatfield presents mixed questions of law and fact. Consequently, the “circuit court's
factual findings should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard and . . . questions of
law are subject to de novo review.” State v. Kearns, 210 W. Va. 167, 168-169, 556 S.E.2d
812, 813-814 (2001). Accord United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 303 (3rd Cir. 2006); United States v. Jernigan, 451 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 431
F.3d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 989 (11th Cir.1997);
United States v. Hughes, 33 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rivalta, 925
F.2d 596, 598 (2nd Cir. 1991).
It is not relevant under Brady and Hatfield that the police, rather than a
prosecutor, had knowledge of material evidence that was favorable to a defendant. The
United States Supreme Court addressed this point in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115
S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995):
[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police. But whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting
this obligation, the prosecution's responsibility for failing to disclose known,
favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable.
The State of Louisiana [in this case] would prefer . . . [a] more lenient
rule. It pleads that some of the favorable evidence in issue here was not
disclosed even to the prosecutor until after trial, and it suggested . . . that it
should not be held accountable under . . . Brady for evidence known only to
police investigators and not to the prosecutor. To accommodate the State in
this manner would, however, amount to a serious change of course from the Brady line of cases. In the State's favor it may be said that no one doubts that
police investigators sometimes fail to inform a prosecutor of all they know.
But neither is there any serious doubt that procedures and regulations can be
established to carry [the prosecutor's] burden and to insure communication of
all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it. Since,
then, the prosecutor has the means to discharge the government's Brady responsibility if he will, any argument for excusing a prosecutor from
disclosing what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to
substitute the police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as
the final arbiters of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials.
Kyles, 514 U.S. 419 at 437-38, 115 S.Ct. 1555, at 1567-68 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). (See footnote 12) The decision in Kyles stands for the proposition that “it is proper to impute to the
prosecutor's office facts that are known to the police and other members of the investigation
team.” United States v. Wilson, 237 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir. 2001). See also Powell v. United
States, 880 A.2d 248, 254 (D.C. 2005) (“The government also concedes that the prosecutor's
lack of actual knowledge, and therefore any bad faith, is not relevant to the Brady analysis.
As the government points out in its brief, the MPD and the FBI were part of the government
team and their knowledge is imputed to the prosecutors.”). Archer v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187,
1203 (Fla. 2006) (“To comply with Brady, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of
any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case and
to disclose that evidence if it is material.”); Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Iowa
2003) (“This test does not mean, however, that evidence unknown to the individual
prosecutor is not considered suppressed. . . . Regardless of whether the prosecutor actually
learns of the favorable evidence, the prosecution bears the responsibility for its disclosure.”); State v. Jones, 891 So. 2d 760, 775 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he State is not necessarily
absolved of its responsibilities under Brady simply because the prosecution does not possess
or have knowledge of evidence, because the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police.”); Thomas v. State, 131 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo. 2006) (“We have applied Brady to hold that the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence . . . encompasses evidence
known only to police investigators and not to the prosecution.”); In the final analysis, “[t]he
prosecutor cannot get around Brady by keeping [him]/herself in ignorance.” United States
v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1997);
In view of the foregoing we hold that a police investigator's knowledge of
evidence in a criminal case is imputed to the prosecutor. Therefore, a prosecutor's disclosure
duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and State v. Hatfield, 169 W. Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982), includes disclosure of evidence
that is known only to a police investigator and not to the prosecutor. To the extent that the
trial court found that the investigating police officer's knowledge of the note could not be
imputed to the prosecutor, such ruling was error.
There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999).
“This Court has incorporated into West Virginia jurisprudence the principles
set forth in Brady and Agurs.” State v. Salmons, 203 W. Va. 561, 572, 509 S.E.2d 842, 853
(1998). We initially adopted Brady as part of our State constitutional due process in syllabus
point 4 of State v. McArdle, 156 W. Va. 409, 194 S.E.2d 174 (1973), where it was held that
“[a] prosecution that withholds evidence on the demand of an accused, which, if made
available would tend to exculpate him, violates due process of law.” McArdle was modified
in State v. Hatfield, 169 W. Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982), in response to Agurs, for the
purpose of removing the requirement that material exculpatory evidence had to be requested.
It was said in syllabus point 4 of Hatfield that “[a] prosecution that withholds evidence which
if made available would tend to exculpate an accused by creating a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt violates due process of law under Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia
Constitution.”
As to the issue of disclosure of impeachment evidence, this Court has reversed
several convictions on the basis of the State's failure to disclose favorable impeachment
evidence. See State v. Kearns, 210 W. Va. 167, 556 S.E.2d 812 (2001); State ex rel. Yeager
v. Trent, 203 W. Va. 716, 510 S.E.2d 790 (1998); State v. Hoard, 180 W. Va. 111, 375
S.E.2d 582 (1988); State v. Hall, 174 W. Va. 787, 329 S.E.2d 860 (1985). (See footnote 14) However, we
have never formally recognized this issue under the due process clause of our State
constitution. We do so today and hold that there are three components of a constitutional due
process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215
(1963), and State v. Hatfield, 169 W. Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982): (1) the evidence at
issue must be favorable to the defendant as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3)
the evidence must have been material, i.e., it must have prejudiced the defense at trial. (See footnote 15)
Having determined that favorable impeachment evidence is a component of Brady and Hatfield, it is clear that the trial court committed error in finding that failure to disclose the note was irrelevant because it merely had impeachment value.
During the trial Katara testified that Mr. Youngblood forced her to perform oral
sex on him on two occasions. There was no evidence that Mr. Youngblood performed a
sexual act on Katara. During the testimony of Kimberly and Wendy they both stated that
Katara never informed them of any sexual act occurring between Mr. Youngblood and
herself. The note that was found at Ms. Miles' home was inconsistent with the testimony of
either Kimberly or Wendy. (See footnote 19) The note, addressed to Mr. Pitner, stated the following:
This is for Joe! Only!
IMPORTANT
You can read it if you want!
How do you like what we did to your house!
You just got played!
In the long Run, you was the one who got f*****!
Throw everything away in your medicine cabinet!
Milk does a body good with TIDE!
F*** you a**holes!!!!!
I hope they kick you out
Katara said Thanks for eating her p**** Denver [Mr. Youngblood]
Hope you love the pictures
Clean the microwave
I Brushed my a** with all of yall's tooth Brushes!
Don't eat the ice cream because it has my p**** smell all in it!
Don't ever talk sh** about me because pay backs are a b****!!!
You smoked my boogers B****!
(Emphasis added).
Clearly this note suggests that Katara told Kimberly or Wendy that Mr.
Youngblood performed oral sex on her_and that she was grateful for this. Mr. Youngblood
could have used this evidence during the trial not only to impeach Kimberly or Wendy, but
to also explore a variety of questioning that logically flows from the statement allegedly
made by Katara to Kimberly or Wendy. (See footnote 20) Consequently, the note was favorable
impeachment evidence to Mr. Youngblood. See United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308,
1317 (11th Cir. 1997) (“An analysis of the taped conversations provides favorable evidence
to the defense, in terms of impeachment evidence and contradictions of the trial testimony
of the government's key witness.”).
(2) The evidence was suppressed by the State. We have already determined
that evidentiary knowledge by the police is imputed to the State. Consequently, the facts of
this case clearly show that the State suppressed the note by abandoning it and attempting to
have it destroyed. (See footnote 21)
During the investigation into the charges against Mr. Youngblood, Trooper
A.T. Peer went to the home of Ms. Miles. Trooper Peer had a search warrant and informed
Ms. Miles that he needed to search her house for evidence pertaining to the charges against
Mr. Youngblood. (See footnote 22) After Trooper Peer concluded his search he left the home. Two days
later Ms. Miles discovered that some of her food and household items had been tampered
with during that time that Mr. Youngblood and the others were at her home. Ms. Miles
stated that she also found the note in her telephone notebook. After Ms. Miles read the note
she called Trooper Peer. Subsequently Trooper Peer came back to Ms. Miles' home. Ms.
Miles gave the following testimony regarding Trooper Peer and the note:
Q. Is that the note that you presented to Trooper Peer when he came to
your house?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. On the second time?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Did you actually give it to him or let him look?
A. I gave him the notebook. It was in the notebook, it wasn't like this,
it was in the notebook. I actually gave it to him and he read it and he said just
throw everything away. I said, just throw everything away. My nephew, Joe
Pitner, was incarcerated and I kept the note, I never threw the notebook way
with this paper, I put it underneath my cabinet.
Ms. Miles' testimony about Trooper Peer's review of the note and instructions to throw it
away were corroborated by her daughter, who was present at the time:
Q. Do you have any idea whether or not Trooper Peer read that note?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. You know?
A. I was standing there when he read it.
Q. Okay. He read it out loud?
A. No, he didn't, he read it to himself.
. . . .
Q. Was there discussion about throwing things away or throwing
articles away?
A. He told her just to go ahead and throw the milk away and throw the
notebook away.
Q. Do you recall hearing that?
A. Yes.
During Trooper Peer's post-trial testimony he did not deny reading the note,
nor instructing Ms. Miles to throw it away. Instead, Trooper Peer alleged that he had no
recollection of the incident. (See footnote 23) Contrary to the State's position, neither Brady nor Hatfield yield to a claim of failed recollection. The uncontradicted recollection of events by Ms.
Miles and her daughter provide the type of testimony that Brady and Hatfield must yield to.
The testimony of Ms. Miles and her daughter inform this Court that the State
was in possession of the note and ordered that it be destroyed. We are deeply troubled by
the State's conduct in this matter. This issue is not a fleeting matter of possible inadvertence.
The record in this case shows that Trooper Peer personally obtained the search warrant,
specifically seeking evidence of the alleged sexual assault. The record also clearly shows
that when Trooper Peer obtained the search warrant he knew the name of the complaining
witness, Katara, and the defendant, Mr. Youngblood. Thus, when Trooper Peer returned to
Ms. Miles' home and read the note containing the first name of Katara and Mr. Youngblood,
and a reference to sexual conduct between the two, we must, in the absence of any rebuttable
evidence, presume that he knew the note was evidence involved with his investigation. (See footnote 24) Consequently, we believe the evidence supports finding that the State suppressed the note
by failing to keep it and ordering its destruction.
(3) The evidence was material. Our final inquiry is whether or not the
suppressed note was material to Mr. Youngblood's defense. (See footnote 25) That is, was the defense
prejudiced by the failure to disclose the note. The State argues that the note was not material
and could not have changed the outcome of the trial in any way. We disagree.
This Court has recognized, along with the United States Supreme Court, that
“'[t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'” State v. Fortner, 182 W. Va. 345, 353, 387 S.E.2d 812, 820 (1989) (quoting United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985)). Additionally,
it has been said that “a showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in
the defendant's acquittal.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S. Ct. at 1565. All that is required
is a “showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435, 115 S. Ct. at
1566. Finally, the suppressed evidence “must be evaluated in the context of the entire
record.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S. Ct. at 2402.
In this case the record shows that Mr. Youngblood drove Katara and the other
passengers to two different residences. At the first residence, Mr. Youngblood's home,
Katara alleged that he forced her to perform oral sex on him. Immediately after this incident
Mr. Youngblood and Mr. Pitner left the residence. Although Mr. Youngblood and Mr. Pitner
were gone, Katara allegedly did not inform Wendy or Kimberly that she was forced to
engage in sexual conduct with Mr. Youngblood. Further, all three women left the residence
and went to a nearby house and called 911 to seek assistance in getting home. No mention
was made to the 911 operator, nor the owner of the home, that Katara was forced to perform
a sex act on Mr. Youngblood. All three women returned to Mr. Youngblood's home.
Thereafter Mr. Youngblood and Mr. Pitner returned and all five individuals drove off
together en route to Mr. Pitner's home. While driving to Mr. Pitner's home, Mr.
Youngblood's mother stopped him and engaged in a brief conversation. At no time during
this incident did Katara state that she was the victim of sexual assault. Further, two police
officers arrived on the scene in response to the 911 call. Katara and the other two women
denied having called 911. More importantly, Katara never informed the police that she was
forced to engage in a sexual act with Mr. Youngblood. Eventually all five individuals ended
up at Mr. Pitner's home. While at the residence Mr. Youngblood again allegedly forced
Katara to perform oral sex on him. Subsequently, the women were taken to and abandoned
in Hagerstown. Immediately after being dropped off at Hagerstown, Katara left without
telling Wendy or Kimberly that she was the victim of a sexual assault. The police became
involved after Wendy's mother took her and Kimberly to a sheriff's office to complain that
Mr. Youngblood gave the two women alcohol and that he had a gun. Insofar as Katara was
also with the women during this incident, the police contacted her. It was during the
investigation of the complaint of contributing to the delinquency of a minor that Katara first
mentioned that she was the victim of a sexual assault.
The above facts must be considered along with the following key points. Mr.
Youngblood's defense to the sexual assault charges was that he and Katara engaged in
consensual sex. (See footnote 26) Katara testified at trial that Mr. Youngblood forced her to perform oral sex
on him twice. Katara failed to testify that oral sex was performed on her. Katara testified that
she did not inform Wendy nor Kimberly about the forced sex. Both Wendy and Kimberly
testified that Katara did not inform them that she was sexually assaulted.
For the purposes of this opinion, the note contains three critical pieces of
evidence that the jury did not hear. (See footnote 27) First, the note clearly suggests that Katara informed
either Wendy or Kimberly that she engaged in sexual conduct with Mr. Youngblood, which
would be inconsistent with Wendy or Kimberly's testimony and the testimony of Katara.
Second, contrary to Katara's testimony, the note suggests that Mr. Youngblood performed
oral sex on her. Finally, the note suggests that Katara was pleased with the oral sex
performed on her, i.e., that the sexual conduct was consensual. (See footnote 28) Insofar as the note was
suppressed, the jury was never able to assess the credibility of each of the State's three key
witnesses, through effective questioning that would have naturally flowed from the
introduction of the note through its author. This is particularly crucial because the State's
case was weak, in light of evidence showing that Katara had an opportunity to flee and
protect herself after the first alleged sexual assault when she went to a nearby house, and
when two police officers stopped and spoke with her. In view of all the evidence in the case,
we believe that there is a reasonable probability that, had the note been disclosed to the
defense, the result of this proceeding would have been different. (See footnote 29) See State v. Kearns, 210
W. Va. 167, 169, 556 S.E.2d 812, 814 (2001) (“In view of the clear contradictory nature of
the non-disclosed statement and [the] potential impact of its revelation to the jury . . . on the
assessment of the credibility of the [victim's] testimony, this Court believes that the State's
withholding of the statement did violate the appellant's constitutional rights[.]”); State v.
Hall, 174 W. Va. 787, 791, 329 S.E.2d 860, 863 (1985) (“Viewing the record as a whole, we
conclude that the jury's verdict might have been different had the jury been allowed to hear
Green's prior inconsistent statement.”). Therefore, we find that the State's failure to turn
over the note violated Brady and Hatfield. (See footnote 30) Thus, the trial court erred in denying Mr.
Youngblood's motion for a new trial.