JUSTICE STARCHER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
2. W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 [2000], as it pertains to West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) records, does not authorize the expungement of records of substantive determinations and actions by the DMV that did not result as a matter of law from the fact of a DUI criminal arrest, charge, or conviction.
Starcher, Justice:
In the instant case we
reverse in part a circuit court's order that expunged DMV administrative
records of a driver's license suspension.
The DMV challenges portions of two orders that were entered on September 8 and September 30, 2003, by the Circuit Court of Ohio County. The two orders, entered pursuant to W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 [2000]: (1) expunged all criminal records relating to an arrest of the appellee for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”); and (2) expunged all administrative records of a driver's license suspension that was imposed on the appellee by the DMV for the conduct by the appellee that led to the DUI arrest. (See footnote 1)
W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 [2000] states:
(a) Any
person who has been charged with a criminal offense under the laws of this state
and who has been found not guilty of the offense, or against whom charges have
been dismissed, and not in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense, may
make a motion in the circuit court in which the charges were filed to expunge
all records relating to the arrest, charge or other matters arising out of the
arrest or charge: Provided, That any person who has previously been convicted
of a felony may not make a motion for expungement pursuant to this section. The
term records as used in this section includes, but is not limited to, arrest
records, fingerprints, photographs, index references or other data whether in
documentary or electronic form, relating to the arrest, charge or other matters
arising out of the arrest or charge. Criminal investigation reports and all records
relating to offenses subject to the provisions of article twelve, chapter fifteen
of this code because the person was found not guilty by reason of mental illness,
mental retardation or addiction are exempt from the provisions of this section.
(b) The
expungement motion shall be filed not sooner than sixty days following the order
of acquittal or dismissal by the court. Any court entering an order of acquittal
or dismissal shall inform the person who has been found not guilty or against
whom charges have been dismissed of his or her rights to make a motion for expungement
pursuant to this section.
(c) Following
the filing of the motion, the court may set a date for a hearing. If the court
does so, it shall notify the prosecuting attorney and the arresting agency of
the motion and provide an opportunity for a response to the expungement motion.
(d) If
the court finds that there are no current charges or proceedings pending relating
to the matter for which the expungement is sought, the court may grant the motion
and order the sealing of all records in the custody of the court and expungement
of any records in the custody of any other agency or official including law-enforcement records. Every agency with records
relating to the arrest, charge or other matters arising out of the arrest
or charge, that is ordered to expunge records, shall certify to the court
within sixty days of the entry of the expungement order, that the required
expungement has been completed. All orders enforcing the expungement procedure
shall also be sealed.
(e) Upon
expungement, the proceedings in the matter shall be deemed never to have occurred.
The court and other agencies shall reply to any inquiry that no record exists
on the matter. The person whose record is expunged shall not have to disclose
the fact of the record or any matter relating thereto on an application for employment,
credit or other type of application.
(f) Inspection
of the sealed records in the court's possession may thereafter be permitted by
the court only upon a motion by the person who is the subject of the records
or upon a petition filed by a prosecuting attorney that inspection and possible
use of the records in question are necessary to the investigation or prosecution
of a crime in this state or another jurisdiction. If the court finds that the
interests of justice will be served by granting the petition, it may be granted.
The DMV does not challenge the
portion of the circuit court's expungement orders that pertains to records of
the appellee's arrest and criminal DUI charge; consequently we do not disturb
the court's orders in that regard. We observe that the statutory predicates for
the unchallenged circuit court order expunging the appellee's arrest and criminal
charge records are not factually disputed; the criminal DUI charges against the
appellee were dismissed two days after his arrest.
The issue before this Court therefore
is whether W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 [2000] authorizes a court to expunge records
of driver's license suspensions or other substantive administrative actions by
the DMV; and if so, to what degree and under what circumstances. (See
footnote 2)
Arguably, the records of the appellee's DMV administrative license suspension could fall within the broad “relating to” or “arising out of” ambit of this language _ because the DMV's administrative license suspension proceedings for the appellee were triggered by and thus “arose out of” and are “related to” the appellee's arrest for DUI and DUI criminal charge. See W.Va. Code, 17C-5A-1(b) & (c) [2004].
However, the DMV contends that the “other matters,” “relating to,” and “arising out of” language in W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 [2000] is so broad that its application in a given case must be subject to a reasonableness analysis and limited by the principle of statutory construction that eschews absurd results. (See footnote 3) The DMV further argues that the general language of W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 (2000) does not authorize a court to expunge records of a legally separate administrative process based on the negation of “related” criminal charges.
This Court has clearly recognized that the two “tracks” of criminal and civil drivers' license-related proceedings that arise out of an incident where a person is accused of DUI are separate. But they are also interrelated _ to the point that due process requires that the results of related criminal proceedings must be given consideration by the DMV in the DMV's administrative process. See Choma v. West Virginia DMV, 210 W.Va. 256, 260, 557 S.E.2d 310, 314 (2001).
In formulating a reasonable interpretation of this broad statutory language in the context of the instant case, we have the benefit of the opinions of several other courts that have addressed the issue of whether and to what degree criminal DUI arrest and charge record expungement extends to records of related drivers' license suspensions.
In Commonwealth v. M.M.M., 779 A.2d 1158 (Pa.Sup. 2001), the court held that a criminal records expungement order did apply to civil driver's licensing records maintained by the state Department of Transportation (“DOT”) _ but only to records of DOT administrative actions that were based as a matter of law on criminal convictions. (See footnote 4)
In an earlier case, however, Conroy v. Comm. DOT, 97 Pa. 344, 509 A.2d 941 (1986), the Pennsylvania court held that a criminal record expungement order did not apply to the record of a DOT administrative license suspension that was based on a driver's refusal to take a breath test, and not on the fact of a criminal conviction.
In a Nevada case, State v. DMV, 110 Nev. 46, 867 P.2d 397 (1994), the court considered a records expungement statute similar to W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 (2000). The court held that “the statute does not operate to expunge the outcome of a separate civil, administrative [driver's license] proceeding, even when a decision from that proceeding concerns a matter arising from the same events as the sealed arrest.” 110 Nev. at ___, 867 P.2d at 400.
We believe that the reasoning of these cases is sound. If the Legislature had wanted to so intertwine the criminal and civil aspects of DUI law as to automatically void related administrative driver's license suspensions when DUI criminal charges are dropped or unproven, the Legislature could have clearly done so _ but it did not. We are unwilling to read such a specific intent into the general language of W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 (2000).
We conclude that W.Va. Code,
61-11-25 [2000], as it pertains to West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”)
records, does not authorize the expungement of records of substantive administrative
determinations and actions by the DMV that did not result as a matter of law
from the fact of a criminal DUI arrest, charge, or conviction.
Dunlap v. Friedman's, Inc., 582 S.E.2d 841, 848, 213 W.Va. 394, 401 (2003) (Davis, J., dissenting).
We agree that W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 (2000) uses such broad language that a literal reading and application of the statute could, in hypothetical situations, yield absurd results. A person could be arrested for speeding and then discovered to have stolen property in the car. The charge of speeding could be dismissed and the person charged and convicted of receiving stolen property. In such a situation, would W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 [2000] authorize a court to expunge records of the stolen property conviction simply because it “arose from” or “related to” the speeding charge that was dismissed? Obviously not _ this would be an absurd result.
W.Va. Code, 61-11-25 [2000] cannot be sensibly read to authorize the expungement of literally all “arising out of” or “related to” records.