JUSTICE MCGRAW dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.

        2.    “The concept of 'rehabilitative [spousal support]' generally connotes an attempt to encourage a dependent spouse to become self-supporting by providing [spousal support] for a limited period of time during which gainful employment can be obtained.” Syllabus point 1, Molnar v. Molnar, 173 W. Va. 200, 314 S.E.2d 73 (1984).

Per Curiam:

        Cassandra L. Campbell (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Campbell”), appellant/petitioner below, appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Mineral County. The circuit court denied her petition for appeal of a divorce decree issued by the Family Court of Mineral County. Here, Ms. Campbell challenges the amount and duration of rehabilitative spousal support that she was awarded under the divorce decree. After a review of the briefs and record on appeal, we affirm the Circuit Court of Mineral County.

        In June 2002, Ms. Campbell filed for a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. During the divorce proceedings it was determined that Ms. Campbell had a gross monthly income of $1,475.00. Mr. Smith had a gross monthly income of $4,320.00. Ms. Campbell requested spousal support. Accordingly, she presented evidence that she was going to further her education by obtaining a bachelor's degree and master's degree. There was evidence that Ms. Campbell would incur costs of $14,170.00 to complete her education, and an additional $19,266.00 for education related expenses. It was also determined that it would take Ms. Campbell eleven years to complete her education.

        In granting a divorce to the parties, the family court judge found that Ms. Campbell was entitled to rehabilitative spousal support. Ms. Campbell was awarded $632.00 per month for five years as rehabilitative spousal support. Further, custody of the two minor children was awarded to Ms. Campbell. Mr. Smith was ordered to pay a total of $790.00 per month for child support. However, the parties have acknowledged that subsequent to the issuance of the divorce decree custody of the children was transferred to Mr. Smith. Thus, he was no longer obligated to pay child support to Ms. Campbell.   (See footnote 2) 

        Ms. Campbell filed a petition for appeal with the circuit court on the issue of spousal support. Ms. Campbell argued that the amount and duration of spousal support were insufficient. The circuit court denied the petition for appeal and affirmed the family court's resolution of those issues. From this ruling, Ms. Campbell now appeals.

Syl. pt. 2, Lucas v. Lucas, 215 W. Va. 1, 592 S.E.2d 646 (2003). Further, in the single syllabus of Nichols v. Nichols, 160 W. Va. 514, 236 S.E.2d 36 (1977), this Court held that “[q]uestions relating to [spousal support] . . . are within the sound discretion of the court and its action with respect to such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused.” Based upon this standard of review, we address the merits of Ms. Campbell's appeal.

        This Court has held that “[a]bsent a finding of a statutory bar to [spousal support] or a finding of substantial fault or misconduct on the part of the spouse seeking [spousal support], the determination of awarding [spousal support] is to be based on 'the financial position of the parties.'” Banker v. Banker, 196 W. Va. 535, 541, 474 S.E.2d 465, 471 (1996) (quoting Hickman v. Earnest, 191 W. Va. 725, 726, 448 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1994)). Under W. Va. Code § 48-6-301(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2001),   (See footnote 4)  there are 20 items that must be considered in determining the amount of spousal support to be awarded.   (See footnote 5)  The family court's order indicates that it considered the factors listed under the statute.

        This Court has previously noted that spousal support “may not be awarded solely for the purpose of equalizing the income between spouses.” Pelliccioni v. Pelliccioni, 214 W. Va. 28, 34, 585 S.E.2d 28, 34 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Stone v. Stone, 200 W. Va. 15, 19, 488 S.E.2d 15, 19 (1997) (per curiam)). Although the evidence presented indicates that some disparity of income exists between the parties, this disparity is not so great as to warrant disturbing the family court's decision on the amount of spousal support. Our ruling on this issue is heavily impacted by the fact that the two children have been placed in the custody of Mr. Smith. Therefore, Mr. Smith's net income also includes the child support payments that were initially provided to Ms. Campbell.   (See footnote 6) 

        An important factor concerning rehabilitative spousal support, is that such an award should be for a limited time. See Gooch v. Gooch, 212 W. Va. 869, 575 S.E.2d 628 (2002) (allowing spousal support for five years); Sanney v. Sanney, 204 W. Va. 240, 511 S.E.2d 865 (1998) (allowing spousal support for two years); Botkin v. White, 202 W. Va. 184, 503 S.E.2d 273 (1998) (allowing spousal support for twelve months); Stone v. Stone, 200 W. Va. 15, 488 S.E.2d 15 (1997) (allowing spousal support for four years); Bosworth v. Bosworth, 199 W. Va. 278, 483 S.E.2d 861 (1997) (allowing spousal support for twelve months). We have held that “[t]he concept of 'rehabilitative [spousal support]' generally connotes an attempt to encourage a dependent spouse to become self-supporting by providing [spousal support] for a limited period of time during which gainful employment can be obtained.” Syl. pt. 1, Molnar v. Molnar, 173 W. Va. 200, 314 S.E.2d 73 (1984). See also W. Va. Code § 48-8-105(a) (2001) (Supp. 2004) (“The court may award rehabilitative spousal support for a limited period of time[.]”).

        The prior decisions of this Court clearly show that, as a general matter, rehabilitative spousal support should initially be limited in duration. In the present case, we have found no compelling facts to depart from this general rule. See Durnell v. Durnell, 194 W. Va. 464, 460 S.E.2d 710 (1995) (allowing former wife rehabilitative spousal support for ten years where former husband was earning almost $600,000 per year in private medical practice). Therefore, under the facts of this case we do not believe that the lower courts abused their discretion in limiting rehabilitative spousal support to Ms. Campbell to five years. However, we will note that our decision does not preclude Ms. Campbell from seeking an extension or modification of spousal support in the future. See W. Va. Code § 48-8-105(b) (“The court may modify an award of rehabilitative spousal support if a substantial change in the circumstances under which rehabilitative spousal support was granted warrants terminating, extending or modifying the award or replacing it with an award of permanent spousal support.”). We have previously “indicated that modification of rehabilitative [spousal support] may become a necessity where the dependent spouse is unable to meet the rehabilitative plan[.]” Wood v. Wood, 190 W. Va. 445, 455, 438 S.E.2d 788, 798 (1993) (finding former spouse was entitled to an extension of rehabilitative alimony after she earned college credits to become a teacher but was only able to find work as a substitute teacher). See also Luff v. Luff, 174 W. Va. 734, 329 S.E.2d 100 (1985) (ordering an extension of rehabilitative spousal support where former spouse's health had deteriorated and she was unable to find gainful employment).