Factual Background: On May 8, 2005, Jennifer Boniey was a passenger on an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) operated by Brian Kuchinski. While riding on a wooded trail, the ATV crashed and Ms. Boniey was injured. The ATV was uninsured by Mr. Kuchinski. Ms. Boniey sought insurance coverage under two State Farm auto policies under which she was an additional insured both of which had uninsured motorist coverage. The State Farm policies contained exclusions for an ATV from the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle when the ATV is operated off-road. The Circuit Court of Brooke County found the policy language to be clear and unambiguous but found the attempt to exclude uninsured motorist coverage for the ATV in this case violated the spirit of West Virginia Code §33-6-31.

Legal Background: The parties filed motions for summary judgment before the circuit court. The motions asked the circuit court judge to decide whether the exclusion of an off-road ATV from uninsured motorist coverage under the insurance policy is enforceable or is invalid under the uninsured motorist statute, West Virginia Code §33-6-31. The Circuit Judge held that the ATV was not properly excluded from coverage under the uninsured portion of the State Farm policy. State Farm appealed. The issue presented on appeal is: Did the Circuit Court err when it held that an ATV exclusion in an uninsured motorist policy violates the spirit and intent of West Virginia Code §33-6-31, in that the uninsured motorist statute is inapplicable when a motor vehicle is operated off-road?

Appellant’s Argument: The appellant, Sate Farm, argues that West Virginia’s uninsured motorist statute does not apply when an ATV is operated off public roads, such as in this case, when the accident did not occur upon a public road or highway. Appellant argues that the Legislature intended different standards to apply to vehicles for use mainly off highways, than those designed for the highway. They argue that the circuit court erred in concluding that where the ATV was being operated was of no consequence, and that the rules of the road govern operation of an ATV when it is operated on a public highway, and that the rules governing uninsured motorist coverage are designed to apply to machinery operated on public highways. State Farm argues that an ATV does not meet the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle when it is operated off public roads, therefore the exclusion under the uninsured motor vehicle policies is valid and enforceable and no insurance coverage is available to the Appellee. Appellant asks that the Court reverse the order of the circuit court.

Appellee’s Argument: Appellee argues that the ATV is a motor vehicle and that since the Legislature did not elect to specifically exclude an ATV from the uninsured motorist statute, there should be coverage under the uninsured policy of insurance. Appellee asks the Court to affirm the order of the circuit court.

• Circuit Court Order
• Appellant's Brief
• Appellee's Brief
• Reply Brief

2.  State of West Virginia v. Gary Wayne Kent,  34153 

Appellant’s Argument: Appellant challenges his conviction on double jeopardy grounds. He argues that when the jury in his first trial found him guilty of first degree murder, deliberate and premeditated, they implicitly acquitted him of felony murder. He argues that the subsequent trial and conviction of felony murder is a violation of double jeopardy principles. He asks the Court to reverse his conviction for first degree, felony murder.

Appellee’s Argument: The State argues that premeditated and felony murder are alternative means of committing the same offense, and that double jeopardy principles do not bar the defendant from being retried for the same offense after a successful appeal. The appellant was previously found guilty of first degree murder, deliberate and premeditated, not felony murder, and therefore double jeopardy principles do not bar a retrial for first degree murder under either the deliberate and premeditated or felony murder theory. The State asks the Court to affirm the conviction and sentence.

• Circuit Court Order
• Appellant's Brief
• Appellee's Brief

3.  Ryan Strick v. Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, 34135

Factual Background: An officer stopped the vehicle being driven by Ryan Strick because the driver's side tail light of the vehicle was not working. The tail light on the passenger's side of the vehicle was working. After stopping the vehicle, the officer detected an odor of alcohol, found the driver’s eyes to be bloodshot, and his speech to be slurred. Mr. Strick failed the field sobriety tests. He refused to take the Intoximeter test. Mr. Strick was arrested for first offense driving under the influence of alcohol. The subject of this appeal, however, is not his criminal proceeding, but the administrative matter involving the suspension of his driver’s license.

Legal Background: Ryan Strick appeals from the Kanawha County Circuit Court Order that upheld the administrative order by the Division of Motor Vehicles suspending his privileges to operate a motor vehicle in this State for one year, based upon his first offense of driving under the influence. The issue raised on appeal is whether the arresting officer lacked any required suspicion necessary to initiate a traffic stop, which led to appellant’s arrest for driving under the influence, and ultimate suspension of his driver’s license.

Appellant’s Argument: The appellant argues that the arresting officer lacked the reasonable grounds, or required suspicion, necessary to initiate the traffic stop the evening of his arrest because it is not illegal to operate a vehicle with only one tail light. He argues that because there was no reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, the decision to suspend his driver’s license should be reversed and his license should be reinstated.

Appellee’s Argument: The Appellee argues that the reasonable suspicion standard for the criminal context of such a case is not applicable to administrative proceedings. Administrative license revocation proceedings and criminal driving under the influence of alcohol proceedings are two separate and distinct proceedings. Administrative license revocation proceedings are civil in nature, resulting in an administrative sanction, not a criminal penalty. Appellee asks this Court to affirm the order of the circuit court.

• Circuit Court Order
• Appellant's Brief
• Appellee's Brief
• Reply Brief

4.  State of West Virginia v. Paul Newcomb,  34142

Factual Background: The victim of this crime and the wife of Paul Newcomb were involved in an affair at the time of the victim’s death. Appellant, Paul Newcomb, and the victim had previously been involved in an altercation. However, the charges related to that incident were dismissed. On the night of the murder, in April 2006, Paul Newcomb went to the victim’s home and an altercation ensued. The victim was stabbed to death. A short time later Appellant was arrested and charged with the murder.

Legal Background: This is the appeal of the criminal case tried before a jury in the Circuit Court of Logan County. Paul Newcomb was convicted of first-degree murder and received a sentence of life in prison, without a recommendation of mercy, meaning he will not be eligible for parole. He claims that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to strike certain jurors for cause. He also says certain statements, as well as the murder weapon, should have been excluded. He asks the Court to reverse the conviction and grant him a new trial.

Appellant’s Argument: The appellant argues that he was denied a fair trial because two specific jurors were not stricken, or removed. One of the jurors indicated that she would tend to believe police officers who testified over those who were not police officers. Another juror illustrated prejudice or bias that tended to show a predisposition. Both jurors were allowed to remain on the jury and decide the case. The Appellant also argues that certain statements he made to the emergency medical services worker, who was also a police officer, should not have been admissible at trial because they were made before he was read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. He likewise argues that the knife admitted as the murder weapon at trial should not have been admitted into evidence because he disclosed the location of it before he was read his rights. He asks for a new trial with the protections of Miranda v. Arizona and fair and impartial jurors.

Appellee’s Argument: The State argues that there was no error in allowing the two jurors to hear and decide this case because it was clear upon questioning that the jurors could make decisions free from any bias once the law was explained to them. The State denies that there were any issues with the admission of the statements made to the emergency medial services worker because he was not acting in the role of a police officer at the time the statements were made and they were not made in response to any questioning, but were blurted out by the appellant. The State asks that the conviction and sentence be affirmed.

• Circuit Court Order
• Appellant's Brief
• Appellee's Brief