Jessica Dunn and Jason Dunn, et al. v. Kanawha County Board of Education, et al., No. 22550 (W. Va. May 19, 1995) (Fox, J.): 194 W.Va. 40, 459 S.E.2d 151:
Where manufacturer in product liability case entered into good faith settlement with the plaintiffs, the Court held that in a multiparty product liability case, a good faith settlement between the plaintiff(s) and the manufacturer does not extinguish the right of the nonsettling defendant(s) to seek implied indemnity when the liability of the nonsettling defendant(s) is predicated solely on a theory of strict liability.
Gregory F. Johnson, a minor, by Karen C. Johnson, his next friend v. General Motors Corporation and Andrew J. Johnson v. General Motors Corporation, No. 21611 (W. Va. November 23, 1993) (McHugh, J.): 190 W.Va. 236, 438 S.E.2d 28:
Where a product liability defendant sought to set-off the amount of plaintiffs' settlement with the tortfeasor and with undersinsurance proceeds, the Court held (1) when a plaintiff seeks to recover damages on a theory of crashworthiness against the manufacturer of a motor vehicle, and the manufacturer request the jury to apportion damages between the first and second collisions, and the jury does so, the prior settlements between the plaintiff and other defendants will not be set-off from the jury verdict, and (2) underinsured or uninsured proceeds are a collateral source and are not to be set-off against any verdict.
Drema Taylor, George Taylor, and Erie Insurance Company, a corporation v. Ford Motor Company, a Delaware corporation, and Blackburn Ford Sales, Inc., a West Virginia corporation, No. 19879 (W. Va. July 23, 1991) (Miller, C.J.): 185 W.Va. 518, 408 S.E.2d 270:
In a crashworthiness suit dismissed under the two-year statute of limitations, the Court affirmed, holding that for product liability cases based on an alleged breach of express or implied warranties, the applicable statute of limitations is the two-year provision of W. Va. Code § 55-2-12, rather than the four-year provision of W. Va. Code § 46-2-725.
Denzil R. Yost v. Frank Fuscaldo, d/b/a Frank's Tire and Supply Company; R. L. Taylor Machinery, Inc., a corporation; Farrel Company; Emhart Machinery Group, a corporation; and Curtis Richardson, d/b/a Richardson's Services, No. 19908 (W. Va. July 18, 1991) (Brotherton, J.): 185 W.Va. 493, 408 S.E.2d 72:
Where plaintiff, who had lost his hand in a rubber milling machine, brought an action against the assembler of the machine on the theory that the machine should have been modified to include a more readily accessible safety bar, the Court affirmed a directed verdict for the assembler, holding that although an assembler with specialized skill or competence, or who represents himself or herself to possess specialized skill or competence, has a duty to recognize a risk of unreasonable harm to those who will use the assembled product, the principle of strict liability in tort is not applicable unless the unsafe condition was so obvious and egregious that no reasonably competent assembler would have left the product in that condition.
Yvette Blankenship v. General Motors Corporation, No. 19949 (W. Va. June 27, 1991) (Neely, J.): 185 W.Va. 350, 406 S.E.2d 781:
In a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the Court adopted the crashworthiness doctrine, holding that a cause of action against an automobile manufacture exists where it is alleged that a manufacturing defect "enhanced" injuries sustained by an occupant as a result of a collision. The Court further held that, in order to recover, a plaintiff need only show that a design defect was a factor in enhancing the plaintiff's injuries, with the manufacturer bearing the burden of allocating the plaintiff's injuries between the accident and the defect. Finally, the Court held that, in crashworthiness cases, whenever there is a split of authority in other jurisdictions on an issue upon which the Court has not spoken, trial courts should presume that the Court would adopt the rule most favorable to the plaintiff.
Mary W. Anderson and Rebecca S. Anderson v. Chrysler Corporation, a corporation, and Country Club Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a corporation, No. 19666 (W. Va. March 15, 1991) (Miller, C.J.): 184 W.Va. 641, 403 S.E.2d 189:
Reversing the award of a directed verdict to an automobile manufacturer and dealer against purchasers whose car was destroyed by a fire which started under the dashboard shortly after its wiring harness had been replaced, but whose expert evidence consisted solely of a volunteer firefighter who testified about the characteristics of electrical fires, but who was not permitted to give an opinion concerning the origin of the dashboard fire, the Court held that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of strict liability, even though the precise nature of the defect cannot be identified, as long as the evidence shows that a malfunction of the product occurred that would not ordinarily happen in the absence of a defect, and that there was no abnormal use of the product nor a reasonable secondary cause for the malfunction.