DECLARATORY JUDGMENT



F. Jane Hustead, Guardian ad Litem, etc., et al. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., No. 23169 (W. Va. June 17, 1996) (Workman, J.):

Rejecting an attempt by a guardian ad litem to challenge, post-judgment, through a declaratory judgment action, the settlement of cases in behalf of infant plaintiffs, the Court held (1) when a court approves a settlement by entry of a judgment order pursuant to W. Va. Code § 56-10-4, the judgment, if unappealed, becomes final and subject to the doctrine of res judicata; (2) although R. Civ. P. 60(b) permits collateral attack on a final judgment, it is available only when one of the enumerated circumstances stated therein is present; (3) a declaratory judgment cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal; and (4) in determining whether a declaratory judgment action should be heard, the court must decide (i) whether the claim involves uncertain and/or contingent events that may not occur, (ii) whether the claim is dependent upon facts, (iii) whether there is adversarialness among the parties, and (iv) whether a declaration would settle the underlying controversy.





Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General of West Virginia v. Honorable Gaston Caperton, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of West Virginia, et al., No. 22011 (W. Va. May 19, 1994) (Brotherton, C.J.): 191 W.Va. 528, 446 S.E.2d 921:

Affirming a lower court ruling, the Court held that the Attorney General is not a "person" within the meaning of the declaratory judgment statute and may not bring an action for declaratory relief in his official capacity.



Colene C. McCormick v. Vondon Ray McCormick, Jr., et al., No. 19484 (W. Va. November 29, 1990) (Neely, C.J.): 184 W.Va., 399 S.E.2d 469:

Where wife brought declaratory judgment action against husband and his business partners in order to determine the validity of a buy-sell agreement, the Court held that a declaratory judgment action brought by a divorcing spouse to challenge the validity or construction of business contracts that threaten to impair the value of marital property will not be dismissed solely on the grounds that a separate divorce proceeding is pending.