Ralph R. Young, Jr., and Marion M. Young v. Sheryl Sodaro, No. 22349 (W. Va. February 21, 1995) (McHugh, J.): 193 W.Va. 304, 456 S.E.2d 31:
Where promissory note in question did not contain a prepayment clause, the Court held that under the rule of perfect tender in time, a debtor, absent statutory or contractual language to the contrary, has no right to prepay a promissory note secured by a deed of trust prior to the date of maturity.
N. Joe Rahall v. Nicholas Tweel, No. 20102 (W. Va. November 1, 1991) (Miller, C.J.): 186 W.Va. 136, 411 S.E.2d 461:
Reversing a trial court decision that a party who signs a promissory note, but receives no direct benefit, is an accommodation party, and not liable to the principal, the Court held (1) a party's status on commercial paper is determined solely from the face of the instrument under W. Va. Code § 41-1-101, et seq., with any ambiguity resolved in favor of the party's status as an endorser; (2) because a party's status on commercial paper can be determined from usage or custom, a signature in the lower right hand corner of an instrument may be deemed an intent to sign as the maker of a note or the drawer of a draft; (3) although the accommodation status of a party may be established by parol evidence against the party accommodated, parol evidence is not admissible, under W. Va. Code § 46-3-415(3), against a holder in due course without notice of the accommodation; and, (4) the party asserting status as an accommodation party has the burden of proof, with the factors to be considered including the party's stated purpose in signing the note, the party's involvement in negotiating the financing, the purpose of the loan, whether the party received any benefit from the transaction, and whether the party's signature was necessary to secure the loan.