F. Jane Hustead, Guardian ad Litem, etc., et al. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., No. 23169 (W. Va. June 17, 1996) (Workman, J.):
Rejecting an attempt by a guardian ad litem to challenge, post-judgment, through a declaratory judgment action, the settlement of cases in behalf of infant plaintiffs, the Court held (1) when a court approves a settlement by entry of a judgment order pursuant to W. Va. Code § 56-10-4, the judgment, if unappealed, becomes final and subject to the doctrine of res judicata; (2) although R. Civ. P. 60(b) permits collateral attack on a final judgment, it is available only when one of the enumerated circumstances stated therein is present; (3) a declaratory judgment cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal; and (4) in determining whether a declaratory judgment action should be heard, the court must decide (i) whether the claim involves uncertain and/or contingent events that may not occur, (ii) whether the claim is dependent upon facts, (iii) whether there is adversarialness among the parties, and (iv) whether a declaration would settle the underlying controversy.
Andrew Haba, Janet Lowry Haba, as Administrators of the Estate of Andrew J. Haba v. The Big Arm Bar and Grill, Inc., et al., No. 22706 (W. Va. March 1, 1996) (Albright, J.):
Affirming the award of summary judgment where an earlier trial involving slightly different parties resulted in the allocation of more than fifty percent fault to the plaintiffs' decedent arising from the same accident, the Court held that (1) in the absence of a claim of inadequate representation, parties who resist consolidation of separate actions involving identical factual issues are bound by factual determinations made in those separate actions and are estopped from relitigating those issues and (2) where a jury has determined a party's comparative fault in relation to all persons whose negligence contributed to a particular event, and such party's negligence exceeds the combined negligence of other persons involved in the event, such party is barred from recovering damages in a subsequent action.
State of West Virginia v. Susan Miller, No. 22571 (W. Va. May 18, 1995) (Cleckley, J.): 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114:
Rejecting a claim that the State was collaterally estopped from a criminal prosecution following the defendant's successfuly employee grievance arising from the same incident forming the basis for the criminal prosecution, the Court held (1) collateral estoppel will bar a claim if four elements are met: (i) the issue previously decided is identical, (ii) the previous decision is final, (iii) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party in the prior action or is in privity with a party in the prior action, and (iv) the party against whom the doctrine is involved had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action; (2) relitigation of an issue is not precluded by collateral estoppel if the procedures in the earlier action were designed to achieve a prompt, simple, and inexpensive determination of small claims; and (3) collateral estoppel does not apply to a subsequent action applying a different legal standard or employing substantially different procedural rules, even if the other elements are satisfied.
Leroy M. Rashid and Richard C. Rashid v. Schenck Construction Company, Inc., and Schenck & Associates, Inc., a Kentucky corporation, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Intervenor, No. 21300 (W. Va. April 23, 1993) (Brotherton, J.): 190 W.Va. 363, 438 S.E.2d 543:
Where developer filed suggestion against contractor's bonding company after the contractor's default, the Court held (1) an arbitration agreement, when it is part of a general contract, can be incorporated into a bond, by reference, to the general contract; (2) a suggestion action may be a proper method to collect on a performance bond obligation if the surety is liable or indebted to the judgment debtor; and (3) although a surety is collaterally estopped from relitigating matters decided in an arbitration proceeding under such circumstances, the surety may raise whatever other defenses that may be available in subsequent enforcement proceedings.
Mildred Walden v. Jay M. Hoke and Fredrick G. Staker, III, No. 21277 (W. Va. April 23, 1993) (Brotherton, J.): 189 W.Va. 222, 429 S.E.2d 504:
Affirming the dismissal of a malpractice action premised upon joint representation in an earlier divorce proceeding in which the trial court rejected an identical attack on a property settlement agreement, from which the plaintiff did not appeal, the Court held that although it is improper for a lawyer to represent both the husband and wife at any stage of a divorce proceeding and to prepare an answer for the defendant even if the divorce is simple and uncontested, a litigant cannot relitigate an issue in a malpractice action previously decided in the earlier proceeding from which the alleged malpractice arose.