Counsel for the Petitioner
Counsel for the Speaker
John F. Rist, III, Esquire (
WVSB 3119
)
Thomas A. Heywood, Esquire (
WVSB 1703
)
Rist, Higgins & Associates
Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love
PLLC
1800 Harper Road
Post Office Box 1386
Beckley, West Virginia 25801
Charleston, West Virginia 25325-1386
(304) 255-1400
(304) 347-1702
Counsel for the Governor
Ancil G. Ramey, Esquire (
WVSB 3013)
Michelle E. Piziak, Esquire (WVSB 7494)
Steptoe & Johnson
Post Office Box 1588
Charleston, West Virginia 25326-1588
(304) 353-8112
No senator or delegate, during the term for which he shall have
been elected, shall be elected or appointed to any civil office of
profit under this State, which has been created, or the
emoluments of which have been increased during such term,
except offices to be filled by election by the people. . . .
West Virginia Constitution, Article VI, Section 15
The petitionsSee footnote 1
1
filed before the Court raise an important constitutional question, the
resolution of which will affect all future Governors, Legislators, Justices, public office holders,
voters and citizens of West Virginia.
Speaker Kiss respectfully requests that this Court render a prompt and final decision
in this matter. The validity of a gubernatorial appointment to the highest court of our State hangs
in the balance. The composition of this august and supreme bench remains incomplete and uncertain
unless and until this matter is resolved. The leadership of the West Virginia House of Delegates is
and will be inevitably affected by the Court's decision in this matter. The rights and powers of the
various co-equal branches of government -- and of the citizens who elect office holders to each
branch of government -- will be forever affected by the action of this Court in this case.
For these reasons and others discussed below, Speaker Kiss respectfully submits that
prompt and considered action on the question presented is an urgent and compelling matter for our
polity, and therefore for this Honorable Court.
Speaker Kiss has reviewed the filings of petitioners in this matter, and the law of the
case. So that the position of the Speaker is made known to the Court in light of the present
proceedings, Speaker Kiss offers this response. Speaker Kiss is prepared to file such other or further
response as the Court may direct, suggest or request, in the event a rule to show cause is issued.
Respondent Kiss believes that the law of the case has been thoroughly researched, reviewed and presented in the responses filed by The Honorable Cecil H. Underwood, Governor of West Virginia. Respondent Kiss concurs with and adopts as his own the Governor's analysis and arguments surrounding the constitutional provision in question. Respondent Kiss offers this filing to highlight particular arguments and considerations in light of the law of the case.
Respondent Kiss adopts the statement of facts set forth in the response of The
Honorable Cecil H. Underwood, Governor, as his own. Respondent Kiss respectfully submits that
the relevant facts are not in dispute.
1. Article VI, § 15 of the West Virginia Constitution -- the Emoluments
Clause -- Contains a Clear and Unambiguous Exception for Elective
Offices.
No senator or delegate, during the term for which he shall have been
elected, shall be elected or appointed to any civil office of profit under
this State, which has been created, or the emoluments of which have
been increased during such term, except offices to be filled by
election by the people. . . .
Article VI, § 15 of the West Virginia Constitution (emphasis supplied).
Respondent Kiss respectfully submits that the question before this Court _ while
profound in its implications _ is a simple one: what is meant by the exception highlighted above?
Respondent Kiss further submits that the meaning of this clause is plain and unambiguous: elective offices are excepted from the general prohibition of the Emoluments Clause. The meaning of the clause is apparent on its face. The application of simple rules of grammar and construction lead to the same conclusion. Every other court in the land that has
considered a like exception in the Emoluments Clause of its state's constitution has reached the same
conclusion: elective offices are excepted from the general prohibition.
The starting point of the analysis is an examination of the plain meaning of the text
in light of ordinary rules of grammar. See, e.g., Keatley v. Mercer County Bd. of Educ., 200 W.Va.
487, 490 S.E.2d 306 (1997) (“In examining statutory language generally, words are given their
common usage and 'courts are not free to read into the language what is not there, but rather should
apply the statute as written.'”).
What is meant by the clause “except offices to be filled by election by the people?”
Plainly, certain offices are excluded from the operation of the prohibition that precedes the clause.
What kind of “offices” are excluded? Those which “are to be filled by election by the people.”
Does the clause except persons or candidates to be elected by the people? No, it
does not -- it excepts offices. Does the clause except elections from the operation of the prohibition?
No, it does not -- it excepts offices. The word “offices” is the object of the exception. The phrase
“to be filled by election by the people” modifies “offices.” The test, purely and simply, is whether
the office in question is an office “to be filled by election by the people.” Once the question whether
a particular office is to be filled by election by the people is answered, the inquiry is concluded.
What kind of office is the office of Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals? The
office of Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals is an office to be filled by election by the people.
This question is definitively answered by the West Virginia Constitution itself, which provides in
pertinent part as follows:
The justices shall be elected by the voters of the State for a term of
twelve years, unless sooner removed or retired as authorized by this
article.
West Virginia Constitution, Article VIII, § 2 (emphasis supplied).
Respondent Kiss respectfully submits that the question as to whether the position to
which he has been appointed on an interim basis is excepted from the Emoluments Clause is
definitively answered by the Constitution itself. Because the office of Justice of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals is an office to be filled by election by the voters, appointment or election
to such office is excepted from the Emoluments Clause.
Cardinal rules of constructionSee footnote 2
2
lead to the same and inescapable conclusion. The
fundamental rule of construction is to discern and effect the intent of the framers. Again, where that
intent is apparent from the plain text itself, the inquiry ends. Respondent Kiss respectfully suggests
that the plain meaning of the exception to the Emoluments Clause reveals the intent of the framers.
Sitting legislators are prohibited generally from feathering a nest for themselves while in office.
However, an exception for certain offices exists. Elective offices are excepted. Why? Because the
ultimate safeguard against potential nest feathering -- the vote of the people -- serves as a check, a
check not present with respect to an office that is not subject to the vote of the people on a periodic
basis. See Robert M. Bastress, The West Virginia Constitution, at 140, where Professor Bastress
notes as follows:
The exception, for “offices to be filled by election by the people,”
recognizes that popular election to the office would ensure full public
scrutiny and, ultimately, approval.
The intent -- and logic -- of the framers is clear and discernible. That intent must be given effect.
Other fundamental rules of construction support the conclusion that the office of Justice _ as an elective office under our constitutional structure _ is excepted from the general prohibition of the Emoluments Clause. Those rules include the rules of construction cited above (the plain meaning of the language must be given effect), and the rules cited below (constitutional and provisions relating to eligibility for office shall be construed in favor of eligibility). Because the
standard and fundamental rules of construction compel the conclusion that elective offices are
excepted by the clause in question, that construction must be placed on the language in question.
It is not only logic, grammar and basic rules of statutory construction which compel
the conclusion that the elective office of Justice is exempted from the prohibition of the Emoluments
Clause. Case law from other jurisdictions -- which squarely addresses the question presented --
corroborates and reaffirms the conclusion. A case relied upon by the Robb Petitioners -- Warwick
v. Chance, 548 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1976) -- provides critical insight into the nature of the West Virginia
exception in question.
The analysis in Warwick opens with a survey of the law of the various states, and quite
correctly points out that the Emoluments Clauses of the various states fall into two distinct categories:
(a) those prohibitions which are absolute; and (b) those prohibitions which provide an exception for
elective offices. Alaska's Emoluments Clause contains an absolute prohibition; hence the result in
that case. As the Court in Warwick specifically notes, West Virginia's Emoluments Clause
contains an exception for elective offices. Id. at 388, n. 4 (“Some states specifically exempt
elective offices. See, for example . . . West Virginia Constitution art. VI, s 15 . . . .”).
Understood against the backdrop of the constitutions of the various states (viz., there
are two distinct and discernible types of Emoluments Clauses -- those which provide an exception
for elective office, and those which do not), the purpose, meaning and effect of the West Virginia
exception is beyond question: the exception specifically exempts elective offices.
The case law of those jurisdictions which have an exception for elective offices in their
Emoluments Clause provides uniform, clear and compelling precedent on the question facing this
Court. The analysis and logic of those decisions is irresistible.
In Opinion of the Justices, 278 Ala. 38, 38-39, 181 So.2d 105, 106-107 (1965), the
Supreme Court of Alabama concluded as follows:
If the section ended just before the word “except,” no member of the Legislature could ever be appointed, during his term, to any
office created by the Legislature of which he was a member. But the
words, “except such offices as may be filled by election by the people”
must have some meaning. The only reasonable conclusion is that
excepted from the rule of Section 59 is an appointment to an office
which “may be filled by an election by the people.”
Similarly, in Carter v. Commission on Qualifications of Judicial Appointments, 14
Cal.3d 179, 93 P.2d 140 (1939), the California Supreme Court of Appeals considered the very
question now before this Court, and concluded as follows:
If the section as originally adopted had any other meaning than
the exception removed elective offices from the operation of the
prohibitory clause, the inclusion of the exception was meaningless and
surplusage, for the section would then mean that legislators were
ineligible for appointment except when they obtained their offices by
election. . . . Some meaning must be ascribed to the excepting clause
and when we seek to ascertain it, the reasonable, if not the only logical
conclusion is that the exception had the effect of describing the kind
and character of the offices thereby removed from the operation of the
prohibitory clause and not the method which the offices were to be
filled.
Id. at 186, 93 P.2d at 142.
For all the foregoing reasons, Respondent Kiss respectfully submits that the exception
to the Emoluments Clause clearly permits his appointment to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.
2. If This Court Finds the Exception in the Emoluments Clause to be
Ambiguous, the Provision Must be Construed in Favor of Eligibility.
Should this Court conclude that the exception in question contains some ambiguity,
however slight, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the permissibility of the appointment.
Fundamental and long-standing principles of the jurisprudence of our democracy so require.
As articulated by one of numerous authorities on this point, “Without doubt, a strong public policy exists in favor of eligibility for public office, and the constitution, where the language and context allows, should be construed so as to preserve this eligibility.”Oceanographic Comm. of
Washington v. O'Brien, 74 Wash. 2d 904, 914, 447 P.2d 707, 712 (1968). See also 63C Am. Jur. 2d,
Public Officers and Employees § 53 (1997); State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W. Va. 513,
223 S.E.2d 607 (1976); State of Nevada Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Lau, 110 Nev. 715, 720, 877 P.2d
531, 535 (1994); Sears v. Bayoud, 786 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. 1990); Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207,
1211 (Utah 1980); Viera v. Slaughter, 318 So.2d 490, 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Scharn v. Ecker,
88 S.D. 255, 218 N.W.2d 478 (1974); Oliver v. City of Shreveport, 169 So.2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 1964)
67 C.J.S. Officers § 11, page 126; Gilbert v. Breithaupt, 60 Nev. 162, 165, 104 P.2d 183, 184 (1940).
Accordingly, unless this Court concludes that the exception in question unambiguously
fails to exempt elective offices from the general prohibition of the Emoluments Clause, fundamental
jurisprudential considerations mandate a ruling in favor of the validity of the appointment and the
eligibility of the appointee to office.
The Robb Petitioners assert that the office of Supreme Court Justice temporarily ceases
to be an “office to be filled by election by the people” when a vacancy occurs with less than two years
left in an unexpired term. Their argument appears to be that because the Constitution directs the
Governor to fill such a vacancy by appointment for the remainder of the unexpired term, no
election will be held during this period, and therefore the office temporarily ceases to be elective.
An elective office remains an elective office, regardless whether the office is filled
from time to time by appointment for occasional unexpired terms. Evidence of this fact is found in
West Virginia Code § 3-10-3, which provides in pertinent part:
Any vacancy occurring in the office of secretary of state, auditor,
treasurer, attorney general, commissioner of agriculture, United States
senator, judge of the supreme court of appeals, or in any office
created or made elective, to be filled by the voters of the entire state, or judge of a circuit court, shall be filled by the governor by
appointment.
(Emphasis supplied.) This section of the West Virginia Code provides expressly that from time to
time , elective offices shall be filled by appointment. The office is nevertheless an elective office, in
fact explicitly so as a matter of law.
Ample authority from other jurisdictions supports the common sense conclusion that
the fact that there can be (and logically, periodically will be) interim appointments to elective offices
from time to time, does not transform such elective offices into appointive offices. Representative
cases from other jurisdictions on this fundamental proposition of law include
Helmer v. Briody, 759 F. Supp. 170, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“the question of whether an office is
elective or appointive must depend on the office itself, not the individual occupying that office”;
office held to be elective, despite fact that office holder in question was appointed); Matheson v.
Ferry, 657 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1982) (“The critical question is whether the basic nature of the office
is elective or appointive. It is not permissible to make an artificial division of the term of an office
into an interim part and elective part. . . . A judge does not serve two different types of terms.”)
Carter v. Commission of Qualifications of Judicial Appointments, 14 Cal.3d 179, 186, 93 P.2d. 140,
144 (1939) (“[T]he exception had the effect of describing the kind of character of the offices, thereby
removed from the operation of the prohibitory clause and not the method by which the offices were
to be filled.”).
Petitioners' construction implies the existence of words, phrases or limitations in the
exception clause of the Emoluments Clause which simply are not in the text. The exception in Article
VI, § 15 does not say: “except offices to be filled by election by the people in an election to be held
during any unexpired term.” The exception contains no reference whatsoever to the timing of
elections. Whether or not an office is one “to be filled by election by the people” is in no way made
dependent on how quickly such election occurs, or whether the election occurs during an unexpired
term or at the end of it.
The office of Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is a post or
position, not a term. Petitioners' argumentSee footnote 3
3
contemplates that the “office” to which Respondent Kiss
has been appointed was created on August 31, 1999, the date on which Justice Workman's resignation
became effective, and will cease to exist when the oath of office is taken by the person elected to the
Court in the next general election. The period of time referred to by the Robb Petitioners is not an
office -- it is a term. The office of Supreme Court Justice was created by the framers of our
Constitution. Moreover, such office was created as an elective office, and will remain an elective
office unless and until changed by constitutional amendment.
If the Governor fills a vacancy on the Court by appointment for the remainder of an
unexpired term, what happens next? The office will be filled by election by the people at the end
of the term. Accordingly, the office is and always remains an “office to be filled by election by the
people,” even while temporarily held by an appointee.
Petitioners maintain that Article VIII, § 7 “distinguishes between Supreme Court
vacancies filled by election, and unexpired terms filled only by appointment.” Robb Petition at
12 (emphasis supplied). The only distinction Respondent can discern is that in the latter case, the
election to fill the vacancy will occur at the end of the unexpired term rather than during it. Despite
this lack of any real difference, Petitioners assert that when a vacancy on the Court leaves an
unexpired term of less than two years, the office is temporarily transformed from an elective office
into an appointive one -- but only until the unexpired term ends. However, such transformation
apparently does not occur when a vacancy on the Court creates an unexpired term of greater than two
years. This bizarre proposition, if adopted, could produce some truly nonsensical and incongruous
results.
If a vacancy on this Court arises with less than two years left in an unexpired term, it
will always be filled by election in less than two years. This is not always true, however, if the
unexpired term left by a vacancy is greater than two years. In such a case, an appointee could occupy
the office for longer than two years before it is filled by election. See, e.g., State ex rel. Robb v.
Caperton, supra.
Consequently, the “distinction” Petitioners attempt to create is at best a distinction
without a difference, and, at worst, one that undercuts rather than supports their argument. It would
make no sense to hold that the office of Supreme Court Justice is an “office to be filled by election
by the people” when a vacancy leaves an unexpired term of more than two years, but is not such an
office when a vacancy leaves an unexpired term of less than two years. In the latter case, the office
may be filled by an election sooner than in the former case.
To the extent that Petitioners' argument assumes that the office of Supreme Court
Justice ceases to be an “office to be filled by election by the people” whenever a vacancy is filled by
temporary appointment, regardless of how many years remain in the unexpired term, their
construction renders the Article VI, § 15 exception virtually hollow.
Under such a construction, it is hard to conceive of a situation in which a sitting
legislator could ever be appointed to an elective office, the salary of which was increased during his
or her term as legislator. If the framers of the Constitution had indeed intended to prohibit temporary
appointment to elective offices generally, why would they provide, as the Emoluments Clause does,
that “No [legislator] . . . . shall be . . . appointed to any civil office. . ., except offices to be filled by
election by the people?” As one considers the practical effect and logic of such a construction, one
is lead to the same conclusion reached by the Alabama and California Supreme Courts when faced
with this very question: the only reasonable construction of the exception is that it excepts elective
offices, period.
The office of Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals is made an elective office by
the Constitution. It does not cease to be an elective office when a vacancy occurs and someone is
appointed temporarily until an election to fill the office can be held. The office of Justice remains
at all times an “office to be filled by election by the people,” and is included in the Article VI, § 15
exception for such offices. Consequently, Governor Underwood may lawfully appoint Speaker Kiss
to the post recently vacated by Justice Workman.
Currently the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has before it two separate
petitions, the Rist Petition, Case No. 99-2497, and the Robb Petition, Case No. 99-2562. Both of
these petitions seek a writ of mandamus directing the Governor to discharge a nondiscretionary duty
in accordance with the law and to appoint a qualified person to the Supreme Court of Appeals. See
W.E. Long Company-Independent Bakers' Coop. v. Burdett, 147 W. Va. 177, 126 S.E.2d 181 (1962)
(a writ of mandamus will issue to require the discharge by a public official of a nondiscretionary
duty). The Governor has already appointed an individual to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, which appointment Petitioners claim violates Article VI, Section 15 of the West Virginia
Constitution. Accordingly, an actual case or controversy exists as to the legality of this appointment,
rendering the matter ripe for adjudication.
If the Governor had not yet appointed Respondent Kiss to the Supreme Court, but was
only contemplating doing so, the Petitioners might have an argument that this matter is not yet ripe.
However, because the Governor has made his appointment, the issue whether such appointment was
proper is fully ripe for adjudication. It is not necessary that Respondent Kiss actually assume the
office before this Court can determine whether the appointment of Respondent Kiss was proper.
The Robb Petitioners assert a lack of adversarial standing in the Petition brought by
John F. Rist, III. Respondent Kiss agrees with the Governor's prior response that the filing of the
Robb Petition renders moot any such objection, since this petition is unquestionably adversarial in
nature.
Assuming arguendo that at least one of the petitions is in the nature of a “friendly,” non-adversarial lawsuit, this Court has in many instances agreed to hear and rule upon such cases in circumstances where certain anticipated or contemplated actions have not yet occurred.
Less than one year ago, in State ex rel. West Virginia Deputy Sheriff's Association,
Inc. v. Sims (No. 25212 W. Va. 1998), this Court considered the issues of both friendly lawsuits and
advisory opinions, and recognized and reiterated important, long-standing exceptions to the general
principle that the Court will avoid issuing advisory opinions. In Sims, this Court quoted Alsop v.
McCartney, 159 W. Va. 829, 228 S.E.2d 178 (1979), as follows:
Experience dictates that there are occasions on which courts must
undertake something in the nature of advisory opinions. We have
done this in cases involving elections because of the expense attendant
upon campaigns and the deleterious effect on representative
government which uncertainty in elections causes. State ex rel.
Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W.Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607 (1976).
State ex rel. Deputy Sheriff's Association, supra, at 4.
The filing of the Robb Petition has clearly brought true adversaries into this dispute.
In any event, the standards set out in Sims and Alsop regarding advisory opinions have been met or
exceeded, and therefore this matter is properly before the Court.
If Respondent Kiss were forced to resign as Speaker and take up the duties of Justice
before the issue of his appointment could be considered, the potential deleterious effects would be
many and serious. Should Respondent Kiss assume the post of Justice, that action would immediately
place the remaining four members of this Court in a situation where the qualifications of Respondent
Kiss to sit as a co-equal member of this Court would be challenged but unresolved. The Court would
find itself in a quandary as to whether and how to conduct its business, and as to the effect of any
decisions it might make before resolution of the question. Among the questions which would arise
are whether Justice Kiss could or should hear cases and, if not, whether the Court through its Chief
Justice would have the constitutional authority to appoint someone else on a temporary basis for the
duration of this dispute.
In addition, were Speaker Kiss forced to resign from the Legislature in order to test his appointment to this Court, one possible result would be the possible permanent removal of Respondent Kiss from the House of Delegates, both as a member and as Speaker. While these results
may or may not rise to the level of deleterious effects on representative government with which this
Court was concerned in Alsop, they would to a very real extent work a political injustice on the voters
of Raleigh and Summers Counties, if not the entire State.See footnote 4
4
If this Court determines that the Alsop exception conditions are not met in this case,
or in the event this Court determines that Alsop is not applicable because this litigation is a true “case
and controversy,” there is nevertheless ample West Virginia authority that the matter is ripe for
adjudication in the circumstances.
For example, in State ex rel. Sowards v. County Commission of Lincoln County, 196
W. Va. 739, 474 S.E.2d 919 (1996), a suit was filed challenging the eligibility of a deputy sheriff to
run for the office of circuit clerk, because the deputy sheriff had not tendered his resignation as deputy
sheriff. In Sowards this Court did not reject such suit as unripe because the deputy sheriff had not
resigned. Rather, recognizing the fundamental right of every citizen to seek public office, this Court
issued an opinion on the merits, refusing to remove the deputy sheriff's name from the ballot despite
his failure to resign.
Likewise, in State ex rel. Zickefoose v. West, 145 W. Va. 498, 116 S.E.2d 398, 403-04
(1960), this Court rejected similar arguments regarding the prematurity of a suit challenging the
eligibility of a candidate for office. The Court clearly affirmed mandamus as a proper remedy to
determine, prior to the actual election, whether the Respondent was eligible to be elected to the
position at issue.
In many other instances, this Court has undertaken to issue opinions prior to the
consummation of all actions or events which might have further crystallized the specific dispute or
controversy. When the potential for delaying a final adjudication of the dispute presented the
possibility of deleterious effect on representative government, or when the possibly wasteful
expenditure of an enormous effort or resources could be avoided by prompt adjudication in advance,
the Court has elected to hear the case. See State ex rel. School Building Authority v. Marockie, 198
W. Va. 424, 481 S.E.2d 730 (1996); State ex rel. Gainer v. The West Virginia Board of Investments,
194 W. Va. 143, 459 S.E.2d 531 (1995); State ex rel. Marockie v. Wagoner, 190 W. Va. 467, 438
S.E.2d 810 (1993); State ex rel. Department of Employment Security v. Manchin, 178 W. Va. 509,
361 S.E.2d 474 (1987); Vanscoy v. Neal, 174 W. Va. 52, 322 S.E.2d 37 (1984); State ex rel. City of
Charleston v. Coghill, 156 W. Va. 87, 207 S.E.2d 113 (1973).
This matter is ripe for adjudication. The matter is openly adversarial at this time; that
the Rist Petition might be considered friendly is of no moment to the analysis in light of the clearly
adversarial nature of the Robb Petition. Alsop and Sims make clear that the requirement of ripeness
does not require consummation of all anticipated or contemplated acts or events. In the circumstances
of this case, the logic of Sowards and Zickafoose is compelling and dispositive: neither respondent
Underwood nor Respondent Kiss need do anything more to bring this issue into sharp, adversarial
focus. The issue is joined, and requires prompt and final resolution.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. KISS, SPEAKER OF THE WEST
VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES
By Counsel
_____//s//___________________________
Thomas A. Heywood, Esquire (
WVSB 1703
)
Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love
PLLC
Post Office Box 1386
Charleston, West Virginia 25325-1386
(304) 347-1702
October 8, 1999
I, Thomas A. Heywood, do hereby certify that I have caused a copy of the hereto
attached Response of Robert S. Kiss, Speaker of the West Virginia House of Delegates to be
served upon:
John F. Rist, III, Esquire
Rist, Higgins & Associates
1800 Harper Road
Beckley, West Virginia 25801
Petitioner, Pro Se
Ancil G. Ramey, Esquire
Michelle E. Piziak, Esquire
Steptoe & Johnson
Post Office Box 1588
Charleston, West Virginia 25326-1588
Counsel for the Honorable Cecil H. Underwood,
Governor of the State of West Virginia
Sean P. McGinley, Esquire
DiTrapano, Barrett & DiPiero
604 Virginia Street
Charleston, West Virginia 25301
Lonnie C. Simmons, Esquire
Law Offices of P. Rodney Jackson
410 Washington Street, East
Suite 307
Charleston, West Virginia 25301
Counsel for Petitioners in Collateral Proceeding
by placing the same in the regular United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this 8th day of October,
1999.
__________//s//________________
Thomas A. Heywood (
WVSB 1703
)
LIT.LIT.0065119