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2. “'In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo.' Syl. Pt. 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).” Syllabus Point 2, Corliss v. Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 W.Va. 535, 591 S.E.2d 93 (2003).
3. “'Interpretations of statutes by bodies charged with their administration are given great weight unless clearly erroneous.' Syl. Pt. 4, Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First W. Va. Bancorp., 166 W.Va. 775, 277 S.E.2d 613 (1981).” Syllabus Point 3, Corliss v. Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 W.Va. 535, 591 S.E.2d 93 (2003).
Per Curiam:
This
case is before this Court upon appeal of a final order of the Circuit Court of
Putnam County entered on November 19, 2004. In that order, the circuit court
reversed a decision of the Putnam County Planning Commission (hereinafter “the
Commission”) that granted a variance to Helene and Sherman Bennett which
would have allowed them to subdivide their residential property. In this appeal,
the appellants and respondents below, the Commission and the Bennetts, (See
footnote 1) contend that the circuit court abused its discretion
by reversing the decision of the Commission.
This
Court has before it the petition for appeal, the entire record, and the briefs
and argument of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the circuit
court abused its discretion, and accordingly, we reverse the final order and
remand this case to the circuit court with directions to enter an order reinstating
the Commission's decision that granted the subdivision variance.
In 2002,
the Bennetts decided to seek approval to divide their lot into two parcels. (See
footnote 3) They proposed that the first parcel would consist of
the property upon which their existing home is located and which fronts the main
street in Maplewood Estates. The second parcel, which they intended to give to
their granddaughter so she could build a house next to them, would be the part
of the property that could be accessed from Linden Road. The Bennetts sought
permission to use Linden Road from the East Maplewood Estates Homeowners Association.
Eventually, after filing a lawsuit, they reached an agreement with the East Maplewood
Estates Homeowners Association through court-ordered mediation. The Bennetts
were given the right to use Linden Road upon certain express conditions. The
agreement was limited to the Bennett lot.
Thereafter,
the Bennetts filed an application for approval to subdivide their lot with the
Putnam County Office of Planning and Infrastructure. The application was denied,
however, because Putnam County adopted subdivision regulations in the 1980s which
require any newly subdivided parcel to be accessed by a forty-foot right of way.
The Bennetts were advised to seek a variance from the Commission with respect
to the width of the right of way.
On January 30, 2004, the Bennetts filed an appeal application requesting a variance from the forty-foot right of way rule pursuant to Article 1400.13 of the Putnam County Subdivision Regulations which provides, in pertinent part:
Where
the Planning Commission finds that extraordinary hardships or practical difficulties
may result from strict compliance with these regulations and/or the purposes
of these regulations may be served to a greater extent by an alternative proposal,
it may approve variances to these subdivision regulations so that substantial
justice may be done and the public interest secured, provided that such variance
shall not have the effect of nullifying the intent and purpose of these regulations,
and further provided the Planning Commission shall not approve variances unless
it shall make written findings based upon the evidence presented to it that all
of the following conditions are met:
a. The granting of the variance
will not be detrimental to the public safety, health, or welfare or injurious
to other property.
b. The conditions upon which
the request for a variance is based are unique to the property for which the
variance is sought and are not applicable generally to other property.
c. Because of the particular
physical surroundings, shape of topographical conditions or the specific property
involved, a particular hardship to the owner would result, as distinguished from
a mere inconvenience, if the strict letter of these regulations are carried out.
d. The variances will not in
any manner vary the provisions of any other regulations, ordinances or plans
adopted by the County.
e. In approving variances, the
Planning Commission may require such conditions as will, in its judgment, secure
substantially the objections of the standards or requirements of these regulations.
f. A petition for any such variance
shall be submitted in writing by the subdivider. The petition shall state fully
the grounds for the application and all of the facts relied upon by the petitioner.
After due notice was given to nearby property owners, a full hearing was conducted
with regard to the Bennett variance application on February 24, 2004, and March
23, 2004. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission granted the variance
to the Bennetts.
Subsequently,
the Maplewood Estates Homeowners Association, the petitioner below and appellee
herein, filed a petition for appeal from that order with the Circuit Court of
Putnam County. (See footnote
4) The appellee contended that the subject property was not unique
as defined by the Putnam County Subdivision Regulations and that the Bennetts
would not suffer a hardship if the requested variance was denied. By order dated
November 19, 2004, the circuit court reversed the decision of the Commission
and denied the Bennetts the variance. This appeal followed.
“In
cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative
agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate
disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion
standard and reviews questions of law de novo.” Syl. Pt. 2, Muscatell
v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).
Syllabus Point 2, Corliss v. Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals,
214 W.Va. 535, 591 S.E.2d 93 (2003). With these standards in mind, we now consider
the parties' arguments.
The
appellants contend that the circuit court abused its discretion by reversing
the decision of the Commission. The appellants argue that the findings of the
Commission were not plainly wrong because they were supported by substantial
evidence. The appellants further assert that the circuit court erroneously substituted
its judgment for that of the Commission. We agree.
This
Court has explained that “the plainly wrong standard of review is a deferential
one, which presumes an administrative tribunal's actions are valid as long as
the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Conley v. Workers'
Compensation Division, 199 W.Va. 196, 199, 483 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1997). See
also Syllabus Point 3, In re: Queen, 196 W.Va. 442, 473 S.E.2d 483
(1996); Frymier-Halloran v. Paige, 193 W.Va. 687, 695, 458 S.E.2d 780,
788 (1995). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re Queen,
196 W.Va. at 446, 473 S.E.2d at 487. A factual finding that is supported by substantial
evidence is conclusive. Id. Consequently, “[n]either this Court nor
the circuit court may supplant a factual finding of [the Commission] merely by
identifying an alternative conclusion that could be supported by substantial
evidence.” Id.
In this
case, the circuit court found that the Commission was plainly wrong with regard
to two of its findings: first, that the subject property is “unique” and
secondly, that a hardship to the owners would result if the variance was not
granted. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we believe that there was substantial
evidence supporting the Commission's findings.
The circuit
court concluded that the Commission's finding that the property was “unique” was
plainly wrong because the Bennett lot is one of four lots that borders Linden
Road. In that regard, the circuit court stated that, “Tract 17 is not one
of a kind or even two of a kind, but one of four bearing the same characteristic,
i.e., frontage on two streets in two different subdivisions.” (See
footnote 5) Thus, the court concluded that the Commission's finding
that the property was unique was not supported by the evidence.
While
it is true that the Bennett lot is not the only lot in Maplewood Estates which
borders Linden Road, it is the only lot that has legal access to Linden Road.
It is this fact, which was disregarded by the circuit court, that led the Commission
to conclude that the subject property is unique. The Commission also noted that:
The
definition of “uniqueness” that has always been adhered to by the planning
commission staff and the commission is if it is
a lot that otherwise meets all other requirements of the ordinance but fronts
on a street established before the ordinance was adopted that is in and of
itself unique and meets that requirement.
The appellee
argues that although the Bennetts have a legal right to use Linden Road, their
lot is not unique because the owners of the other three lots that border Linden
Road could easily obtain permission to use the road. We disagree. Aa set forth
above, the Bennetts had to file suit against the East Maplewood Estates Homeowners
Association in order to obtain the right to use Linden Road. The agreement they
reached was limited to their lot only and thus, at the time the variance was
requested, the Bennetts were the only Maplewood Estates property owners who had
the right to use Linden Road. As such, we believe there was substantial evidence
supporting the Commission's finding that the Bennett lot is unique pursuant to
the Putnam County Subdivision Regulations especially in light of the Commission's
prior interpretation of the uniqueness requirement. As we explained in Syllabus
Point 3 of Corliss, “'Interpretations of statutes by bodies charged
with their administration are given great weight unless clearly erroneous.' Syl.
Pt. 4, Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First W. Va. Bancorp.,
166 W.Va. 775, 277 S.E.2d 613 (1981).”
Likewise,
we find that there was substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding
that the Bennetts would suffer a hardship if the variance was not granted. In
that regard, there was uncontroverted evidence that absent the variance, the
Bennetts would be deprived of the use of a significant portion of their property
which otherwise met all the requirements for subdivision. Furthermore, the
Commission found that there was a hardship because the Bennetts were elderly
and in poor health and were conveying the property to their granddaughter so
she could build a house close by and care for them. The Commission explained
that, “Other variances for the width of the right-of-way have been previously
approved by the Planning Commission for the division of property between family
members if they meet the other requirements of the subdivision regulations.”
Given
the Commission's interpretation of the hardship requirement, we find that the
circuit court abused its discretion by concluding that the Bennetts had to show
that the effect of complying with the subdivision regulations was a hardship
in relation to the physical attributes of the land and that such evidence was
vacant from the record. The Bennetts clearly satisfied the requirements for a
subdivision variance pursuant to the Putnam County Subdivision Regulations as
interpreted by the Commission. The circuit court improperly substituted its own
judgment for that of the Commission.
Reversed and Remanded with Directions.