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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2006 Term
___________
No. 32769
___________
DWIGHT L. MATHENA, ROGER SULLIVAN,
PATRICK W. FEW, JACK GRIMES, JR.,
KENNETH BENNETT, JEFFREY L. WOLFE,
KENNETH POWELL, STEVEN COGAR,
JASON LAWSON, and EUGENE BLAKE,
Petitioners Below
JASON LAWSON and EUGENE BLAKE,
Appellants
v.
WILLIAM S. HAINES, Warden,
Huttonsville Correctional Center,
Respondent Below, Appellee
________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Randolph County
Hon. John Henning, Judge
Case No. 01-C-39
AFFIRMED, IN PART, AND REVERSED, IN PART
________________________________________________________
Submitted: May 10, 2006
Filed: June 26, 2006
Jason E. Huber, Esq. Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.
Forman & Huber, LC Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia John H. Boothroyd
Attorney for Appellants
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Appellee
JUSTICE STARCHER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE MAYNARD concurs, in part, and dissents,
in part, and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit
court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the
final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying
factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de
novo review.
2. Under West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, prisoners have a
Constitutional right to meaningful access to our courts subject to reasonable limitations
imposed to protect courts from abuse.
3. “Under West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, the right of self-
representation in civil proceedings is a fundamental right which cannot be arbitrarily or
unreasonably denied.” Syllabus Point 1, Blair v. Maynard, 174 W.Va. 247, 324 S.E.2d 391
(1984).
4. “The fundamental right of self-representation recognized in West
Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17 may not be denied without a clear showing in the record
that the pro se litigant is engaging in a course of conduct which demonstrates a clear
intention to obstruct the administration of justice. Syllabus Point 1, Blair v. Maynard, 174
W.Va. 247, 324 S.E.2d 391 (1984).
5. Where a circuit court is faced with a potential abuse of process by a
prisoner or a prisoner's threat to abuse the judicial process, the circuit court may, subject to
the following, enter an order imposing reasonable limitations on the prisoner's right to access
the court. Prior to the entry of such an order, the circuit court must provide the prisoner an
opportunity to show cause why such a limitation should not be imposed. If the record
demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the administration of justice, the circuit court may
impose limitations on the prisoner's right of access. Any order limiting a prisoner's access
to the courts must be designed to preserve his right to adequate, effective, and meaningful
access to our courts. The circuit court's order imposing such a limitation must include such
findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate for meaningful appellate review.
Starcher, J.:
Appellants Jason Lawson and Eugene Blake appeal from an order entered by
the circuit court of Randolph County enjoining appellant Eugene Blake from filing any
motions, letters, or communication to the circuit clerk or the circuit court unless such
documents are signed by an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of West Virginia.
Appellants Lawson and Blake include in their petition for appeal the issues which were
included in the underlying conditions and medical care habeas corpus petition. Appellants
Lawson and Blake also appeal the ruling of the circuit court relating to prison conditions and
medical care issues raised in the underlying habeas corpus case. For the reasons set forth
below, we reverse, in part, and affirm, in part.
I.
Facts & Background
On January 11, 2001, Patrick W. Few, Dwight L. Mathena, Roger Sullivan,
Jack Grimes, Kenneth Bennett, Jeffery L. Wolf, and Kenneth Powell filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Logan County. On the same date the circuit court of
Logan County entered an order transferring the case from Logan County to Randolph
County. (See footnote 1) On February 13, 2001, Dwight L. Mathena, Steve Cogar, Jason Lawson, Eugene
Blake, and Patrick Few filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of
Mercer County. Also, on that same day the circuit court of Mercer County entered an order
transferring the case from Mercer County to Randolph County. All petitioners were inmates
in the Huttonsville Correctional Center.
On June 6, 2001, Eugene Blake was transferred from the Huttonsville
Correctional Center to the Mount Olive Correctional Center.
On August 23, 2001, after the circuit court of Randolph County reviewed the
two cases _ from Logan and Mercer Counties, entered an order consolidating the cases.
On October 25, 2001, the circuit court of Randolph County entered an order
stating that the petition for writ of habeas corpus was correctly filed pursuant to W.Va. Code,
53-4A-2 (1967), and that appropriate funds should be deducted from the petitioners'
accounts to cover the cost of filing fees, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 25-1A-3 (2000). (See footnote 2)
On February 13, 2002, respondent William S. Haines filed a Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. Upon review of respondent's motion, the
circuit court entered an order giving the petitioners thirty days to provided the court with
proof that they had exhausted their administrative remedies as provided in W.Va. Code, 25-
1A-2 (2000); otherwise, the cases would be dismissed. Only petitioners Cogar and Powell
responded to the court.
On March 21, 2002, the circuit court ordered the dismissal of the claims of
petitioners Mathena, Sullivan, Few, Grimes, Bennett, Wolf, Powell, and petitioners Jason
Lawson and Eugene Blake, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (See footnote 3) On April 23,
2002, the circuit court ordered the dismissal of the claims of the remaining petitioner
Cogar.
Petitioner Powell protested his dismissal, arguing that because of the nature
of the issues in his complaint he did not have to exhaust administrative remedies; however,
on review the circuit court, again, dismissed the claims of petitioner Powell on June 17,
2002.
All of the original petitioners' claims were dismissed by the circuit court, including the claims of Jason Lawson and Eugene Blake. Only Powell petitioned this Court
to reverse the circuit court's dismissal; his petition for appeal was refused by this Court on
July 18, 2003.
Some time later appellant Blake was transferred back to the Huttonsville
Correctional Center. After his return Blake sent a letter dated August 10, 2004, to the
Randolph County Circuit Clerk questioning the removal of $16.50 from his personal account
for filing fees in the now-dismissed habeas corpus case. Appellant Blake included in his
letter the following statement: “Hopefully, it will not be necessary for me to flood your
office with additional motions and litigations concerning this case.” (See footnote 4)
In response to Blake's letter to the circuit clerk, the circuit court entered an
order on August 26, 2004, enjoining appellant Blake from “filing any motions or sending
any letters to the Clerk of this Court unless such documents are signed by an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State of West Virginia.” (See footnote 5)
Subsequently, appellant Blake, in an apparent attempt not to violate the court's
order by sending motions or letters to the circuit clerk's office, mailed subsequent filings
directly to the circuit court. (See footnote 6) In response, the circuit court issued another order dated
November 19, 2004, which expanded the earlier August 26 order, enjoining appellant Blake
from “. . . any further communications with this court” unless such documents were signed
by an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of West Virginia. (See footnote 7)
In addition to the issues relating to appellant Blake's letters to the circuit clerk
and the circuit court, both appellants Lawson and Blake include in their petition for appeal
the issues which were included in the underlying conditions and medical care habeas corpus
petition.
It is from the August 26 and November 19, 2004 circuit court orders that the
appellants appeal. (See footnote 8)
In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court in
a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the final
order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying
factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de
novo review. See State ex rel. Postelwaite v. Bechtold, 158 W.Va. 479, 212 S.E.2d 69
(1975) (findings of facts reviewed by “clearly wrong” standard); also see Phillips v. Fox,
193 W.Va. 657, 661, 458 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1995) (citing Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va.
263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995)) (ultimate decision by abuse of discretion standard; factual
findings by clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law subject to a de novo review).
III.
Discussion
Appellants argue that the circuit court's orders enjoining appellant Blake from
filing any motions, letters, or communication to the circuit clerk or the circuit court unless
the motions, letters, or communications are signed by an attorney violates constitutional
standards of guaranteed access to courts and procedural and substantive due process rights.
The right of access to our courts is one of the basic and fundamental principles
of jurisprudence in West Virginia. We need look no further than our own State's
Constitution for guidance. West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, states as follows:
The courts of this State shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law; and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay.
That prisoners have a right to access to courts is axiomatic in our
jurisprudence:
Prisoners have a constitutional right to adequate, effective, and
meaningful access to the courts. This right stems from
principles of due process and equal protection, as well as from
state law. The right is not absolute, however, and reasonable
limitations may be imposed to facilitate penal administration
and protect the courts from abuse.
72 C.J.S. Prisons § 103.
The right of inmate access to courts was discussed in Hickson v. Kellison, 170
W.Va. 732, 736, 296 S.E.2d 855, 859 (1982), citing to Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97
S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) wherein our Court stated that, “It is clear that from a
constitutional standpoint arising out of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
considerations that a right of meaningful access to courts is required.”
Hickson was a mandamus case in which the plaintiffs, inmates in a county jail,
claimed conditions at the jail violated certain constitutional and statutory rights. Hickson involved claims of denial of access to courts due to jail officials denial of postage, telephone
and access to library materials. In the instant case the issue of access is based upon
limitation on the appellant's right to act pro se placed upon the appellant by the circuit court.
We believe that the fundamental principle as discussed in Hickson is applicable to the facts
of this case.
Under West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, prisoners have a Constitutional
right to meaningful access to our courts subject to reasonable limitations imposed to protect
courts from abuse.
While access to courts is a recognized fundamental right, it is also a commonly
recognized principle that such right of access is not without limitations. See 72 C.J.S.
Prisons § 103, supra.
This Court acknowledged that limitations may be imposed on the right of
access to courts in State ex rel. James v. Hun, 201 W.Va. 139, 141, 494 S.E.2d 503, 505
(1997), (per curiam) wherein we stated that the “. . . right of meaningful [inmate] access to
the courts is not completely unfettered.” James was a mandamus case in which this Court
upheld a division of correction's policy of limiting possession of legal documents when
challenged as infringing on the right of meaningful access to courts. While the limitations
in James were institutional limitations, we believe that the same principles apply whether
they are imposed by the institution or by judicial authority.
The principle of judicial limitations on the access to courts is illustrated in the
case of Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984). In Franklin, the inmate by 1980
had filed and paid fees in thirty-seven cases. The lower court granted Franklin an in forma
pauperis status for the cases, and permitted him to file an additional forty-nine actions. In
an effort to curtail filings by Franklin, the lower court ultimately entered an order limiting
Franklin to six in forma pauperis filing per year. While the Ninth Circuit Court found thatsix filings per year should be adequate access, the court also stated:
An order limiting a prisoner's access to the courts must be
designed to preserve his right to adequate, effective, and
meaningful access, Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822, 97 S.Ct. At 1495, while protecting the court from abuse. We agree with the district
court that six free filings per year should be adequate access, but
we cannot be certain that it will. If a request is made for the
filing of additional cases beyond the number prescribed by the
court, Franklin must be afforded an opportunity to make a
showing that the limitation to six filings is prejudicial because
inclusion of these claims by amendment of his existing claims
is not possible. If such a showing is made, the district court must
amend its order. This will avoid the constitutionally
questionable conclusive presumption that all of Franklin's
subsequent submissions are frivolous or malicious.
Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1231, 1232.
In In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 215 U.S.App.D.C. 393 (D.C.Cir. 1981) (per
curiam), Green filed between 600 and 700 complaints in federal and state courts in a single
decade. Green had been granted in forma pauperis status. He was characterized by the court
as the “most prolific prisoner litigant in recorded history.”
In Green, the court's limiting order required Green to pay all filing fees and
to post a cash deposit as security for costs. On review, the D.C. appellate court directed the
district court to vacate the limiting order, and enter an order requiring that Green not file any
civil action without leave of court _ forcing a review of prospective filings. Further, the
appellate court required that Green certify that the claims he wished to present were new
claims never before raised and disposed of on the merits.
The appellate court, citing to Bounds, supra, stated that “. . . prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts,” but that the right of access is neither absolute nor
unconditional. Green, 669 F.2d at 785, 215 U.S.App. D.C. at 399. The court also observed
that the district court's limiting order was not designed to distinguish whether or not each
claim was a new non-frivolous claim. Further, the court noted that the limiting order was
over-inclusive by requiring Green to pay a filing fee, because if Green was without necessary
funds, the limiting order had the effect of denying Green access to the court.
In the instant case, by requiring appellant Blake to have an attorney for all filings and correspondence with the court, Blake's pro se status becomes much the same as
Green's with respect to financial barriers.
Finally, this Court addressed the right of pro se representation in Blair v.
Maynard, 174 W.Va. 247, 324 S.E.2d 391 (1984). In Syllabus Point 1 of Blair v. Maynard,
174 W.Va. 247, 324 S.E.2d 391 (1984) we held:
Under West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, the right of self-
representation in civil proceedings is a fundamental right which
cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied.
In Syllabus Point 2 of Blair we also held:
The fundamental right of self-representation recognized in West
Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17 may not be denied without a
clear showing in the record that the pro se litigant is engaging
in a course of conduct which demonstrates a clear intention to
obstruct the administration of justice.
Blair was a civil case being tried by a jury in which the plaintiff was appearing pro se. The court declared a mistrial following improper statements by the pro se plaintiff.
The circuit court informed the plaintiff that the case would be set for a new trial only after she had an attorney to assist her. On petition for mandamus this Court reversed, citing to West Virginia Constitution, art. III, § 17.
In Blair we also stated that:
This Court recognizes that “[t]he proper scope of the court's
responsibility [to pro se litigants] is necessarily an expression of
careful exercise of judicial discretion and cannot be fully
described by specific formula.” ABA Commission on Standards
of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating to Trial Courts,
§ 2.23 Conduct of Cases Where Litigants Appear Without
Counsel (Commentary) (1976). Each case presents a wholly
different set of circumstances which require careful attention so
as to preserve the rights of all parties. Nevertheless, the
fundamental right of self-representation recognized in West
Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17 may not be denied without a
clear showing in the record that the pro se litigant is engaging
in a course of conduct which demonstrates a clear intention to
obstruct the administration of justice.
Blair, 174 W.Va. at 253, 324 S.E.2d at 396.
In the instant case, the only factor cited by the circuit court supporting the
entry of the order limiting appellant Blake's access to court is the statement in the August
10, 2004 letter that, “Hopefully, it will not be necessary for me to flood your Office with
additional motions and litigations concerning this case.”
Blake's letter, which was not artfully worded, was trying to determine the
legality of the removal of $16.50 from his inmate account. While we believe that Blake's
“offending” statement may be subject to the interpretation given by the circuit court, it is not
the only interpretation which could be made. For example, in frustration of having his
institutional account subject to the removal of the $16.50, Blake may have thought it might
be necessary to engage in extensive litigation to resolve the matter. We disagree with the
circuit court's conclusion that such a statement, standing alone, provides a sufficient basis
to conclude that the statement constitutes an implied threat to “abuse the legal process.”
Furthermore, we believe that an implied threat, without more would not provide a sufficient
basis to enter a valid limiting order as discussed infra.
Considering
the record as a whole we cannot say as required by Blair, supra, that appellant Blake was engaged in a course of conduct which demonstrated a clear
intention to obstruct the administration of justice. Furthermore, drawing from the reasoning
in Bounds, supra, Franklin, supra, and Green, supra, we hold that where a circuit court is
faced with a potential abuse of process by a prisoner or a prisoner's threat to abuse the
judicial process, the circuit court may, subject to the following, enter an order imposing
reasonable limitations on the prisoner's right to access the court. Prior to the entry of such
an order, the circuit court must provide the prisoner an opportunity to show cause why such
a limitation should not be imposed. If the record demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct
the administration of justice, the circuit court may impose limitations on the prisoner's right
of access. Any order limiting a prisoner's access to the courts must be designed to preserve
his right to adequate, effective, and meaningful access to our courts. The circuit court's order
imposing such a limitation must include such findings of fact and conclusions of law
adequate for meaningful appellate review.
Finally, appellants also appealed issues relating to conditions of confinement
and medical care that were part of their original habeas corpus petitions. We find that those
issues were dismissed as to all appellants earlier by the circuit court, and that only one of the
petitioners timely appealed the circuit court's decision on those issues.
(See footnote 9) The dismissal of the
original habeas corpus cases, therefore, became final when this Court refused that appeal.
IV.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.
See
State ex rel. McLaughlin v. Vickers, 207 W.Va. 405, 533 S.E.2d 38 (2000) for
requirements for transferring habeas corpus cases from the originating county to the county
of incarceration.
Footnote: 2 Relevant text of the October 25, 2001, order reads as follows:
. . .
The Court having reviewed the case file, notes that the Petition
was correctly filed pursuant to West Virginia Code § 53-4A-2.
It is further noted that this is a petition based upon conditions of
confinement. Therefore, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 25-
1A-3, it is noted that an invoice was previously completed and
transmitted to the appropriate party at the Huttonsville
Correctional Center and the appropriate funds should be
deducted from the Petitioners' account in accordance with the
West Virginia Code. . . .
“It is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that:
1 1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was correctly
filed without pre-payment of fees, pursuant to West
Virginia Code § 25-1A-3.
2. That an invoice shall be sent to the appropriate party at
Huttonsville Correctional Center.
. . .
Footnote: 3 Following is the text of the appellant Blake's August 10, 2004 letter:
Dear Mr. Riggleman:
Last week, the Trustee Clerk at the Huttonsville
Correctional Center advised me that your Office had just sent an
Order to remove sixteen dollars and fifty cents ($16.50) from
my personal account for a litigation that had been filed back in
the year 2000. The said money was removed from my personal
account without any prior notification from your Office, the
Court or the Trustee Clerk.
The question at this point in time, would be to whether or
not that case is still an active case on the docket of the Court?
If I recall, there were a number of persons listed as petitioners.
It was my understanding that the case had been dismissed
some years back for Failure to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies. But since your Office has recently sent an Order to
the Trustee Clerk here at Huttonsville for a fee, I've learned that
such an act has automatically activated the case, in light of
certain other actions pending before the Court.
Personally speaking, up to the point that your Office sent
that Order to the Trustee Clerk, here at Huttonsville Correctional
Center to remove money from my personal account, it was my
sole desire to only complete my prison sentence and not get
involved with any form of legal litigations or seek any form of
legal remedy. But the Order has cast shadows upon such
thoughts.
But unfortunately, dispite[
sic] these complexities, as the
case may be, it is now necessary for your Office to fully advise
me of the relative position of this case. Hopefully, it will not be
necessary for me to flood your Office with additional motions
and litigations concerning this case.
Thanking you most kindly for all your time and
consideration that will now be necessary for your Office to fully
up-date me on this legal matter. Hopefully, I shall receive a
response within the next ten (10) days. Again Thank You.
Respectfully yours,
[Eugene Blake]
Eugene Blake
Footnote: 5 The text of the August 26, 2004 order by the circuit court is as follows:
On August 11, 2004, a letter from Petitioner, Eugene Blake, was
received by the Clerk of this Court. In this letter, the Petitioner
addresses the matter of $16.50 being removed from his personal
account. The Petitioner further makes an implied threat to the
Clerk of this Court, stating, “Hopefully, it will not be necessary
for me to flood your Office with additional motions and
litigations concerning this case.”
It is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that:
1. The letter shall be FILED in Case Number 01-C-39.
2. The fees assessed to the Petitioner were pursuant
to this Court's Order entered October 25, 2001, in
the above-styled case.
3. Because of his implied threat to “flood” the
Clerk's office “with additional motions and
litigations concerning this case,” Petitioner is
further enjoined from filing any motions or
sending any letters to the Clerk of this Court
unless such documents are signed by an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State of West
Virginia.
The Clerk shall FORWARD a copy of this Order to the
Petitioner, pro se; and to William S. Haines, Warden of
Huttonsville Correctional Center.
Entered this 26
th day of August, 2004.
Footnote: 6 Included in the case file are a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel in Behalf of
Petitioner Eugene Blake, a Motion to Certify Action as Class Action and to Certify
Petitioners' Subclasses, and corresponding letters of transmittal; all are stamped with a
September 22, 2004 date.
Footnote: 7 Following is the complete text of the November 19, 2004, circuit court order:
On August 26, 2004, this Court entered an Order enjoining
Petitioner Blake from filing any motions or sending any letters
to the Clerk of this Court unless such documents are signed by
an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of West
Virginia. Subsequently, Petitioner Blake sent a letter to this
Court along with a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel and
a Motion to Certify Action as Class Action and to Certify
Petitioners' Subclass, within Civil Action No. 01-C-39. The
Court notes that Petitioner Blake has a Constitutional right to
have access to the court system. However, the Court also notes
that he has neither a right to “flood [the] Office with additional
motions and litigations concerning this case nor a right to
threaten to “flood the Office with additional motions and
litigations concerning this case.” In fact, threats to abuse the
legal process such as the ones Petitioner Blake has made can
result in legal sanctions. Based upon the foregoing, this Court
hereby
ORDERS that Petitioners Motions be DENIED. The
Court further ORDERS that its Order of August 26, 2004 remain
in full force and effect and that the August 26, 2004 Order be
expanded to include any further communications with this
Court. This Court would advise Petitioner Blake that he may
appeal this case should he so desire. The address of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is: West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, 1900 Kanawha Blvd. East, Building 1 Room
E-317, Charleston, WV 25305.
The Clerk shall FORWARD a copy of this Order to the
Petitioners, pro se; and to William S. Haines, Warden of
Huttonsville Correctional Center.
Entered this 18th day of November, 2004.
Footnote: 8 Both appellants Lawson and Blake signed the petition for appeal.
Footnote: 9
We further decline to address the issue of the applicability of W.Va. Code, 25-1-8
(1998) to persons incarcerated prior to the adoption of the statute.