Here
the intention of the Legislature is clear, and that should be the end of the
matter. The Legislature has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1)
authorizes the suspension of a person's driver's license when mandatory revocation
is required upon conviction. Code § 17B-4-3 [1999] eliminated
the revocation of the person's driver's license for an additional year for
the first offense driving on a suspended license for administrative reasons.
[Mr. McKinney] was convicted of Driving Suspended for Administrative
Reasons within the contemplation of Code § 17B-4-3(a). Therefore,
the Commissioner has revoked [Mr. McKinney's] license for an additional year
even though [Mr. McKinney] was convicted of an offense that precludes a mandatory
revocation. Accordingly, the Final [DMV] Order was violative of Code § 29-5-4(g)(2)
in that it was issued in excess of the statutory authority of the agency.
While the majority chooses to ignore the
significance of the language “upon conviction” that appears in both
of the statutes under consideration, that language should play a critical and
determinative role in determining whether administrative revocation is warranted.
As with any criminal offense, it is the criminal conviction that triggers the
applicable civil penalty at issue here. Only by circumventing the critical significance
of the actual conviction's role to the invocation of administrative sanctions
under the legislative scheme at issue can the majority reach the result that
a conviction for an offense for which mandatory revocation is required is not
necessary for license suspension under West Virginia Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1).
The analysis employed by the majority to reach its result is unquestionably tortured
and certainly effectuates an absurd result. See Charter Commun. v. Community
Antenna Serv., Inc.., 211 W.Va. 71, 77, 561 S.E.2d 793, 799 (2002) (recognizing
that “[i]t is the 'duty of this Court to avoid whenever possible a construction
of statute which leads to absurd, inconsistent, unjust or unreasonable results'”)
(quoting State v. Kerns, 183 W.Va. 130, 135, 394 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1990)).
The misguided result adopted by the majority
has far reaching ramifications for the prosecutors of this state. What this Court
began in Stump v. Johnson, __ W.Va. __, __ S.E.2d__, No. 32651 (filed
July 7, 2005), in preventing prosecuting attorneys from entering into plea agreements
that impact upon the authority of the Department of Motor Vehicles with regard
to administrative license revocation proceedings has now been ratcheted up another
notch. The practice of resolving numerous violations of the state's motor vehicle
laws through plea agreements will likely end when affected citizens recognize
that despite their entry of a plea to an offense that does not carry a mandatory
license revocation they will still lose their license. (See
footnote 4) An additional impact of the majority's decision will
be an unwelcome increase in the number of DUI and DUI suspension cases that prosecutors
are essentially powerless to resolve through any type of plea agreements. Thus,
it is not hard to see that the logical extension of the majority's ruling is
to effectively tie the hands of prosecutors with regard to disposing of such
cases.
Based on the foregoing, I respectfully concur,
in part, and dissent, in part, from the majority's opinion.
I am authorized to state that Justice Starcher
joins in this separate opinion.