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2. Pursuant
to W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1) (1997), the West Virginia Division of Motor
Vehicles is authorized to suspend the driver's license of any person without
preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence
that the licensee committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of a driver's
license is required upon conviction, regardless of whether the licensee is convicted
of the offense.
3. The
purpose of this State's administrative driver's license revocation procedures
is to protect innocent persons by removing intoxicated drivers from the public
roadways as quickly as possible.
Maynard, Justice:
Appellant
F. Douglas Stump, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles,
appeals the November 17, 2004 order of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County that
reversed an administrative driver's license revocation. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse the circuit court's order.
(a) The division is hereby authorized to suspend the driver's license of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee:
(1)
Has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of a driver's license
is required upon conviction[.]
Plainly, this statute indicates that the Division is authorized to suspend
a person's driver's license when it has sufficient evidence that the person
committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of a driver's license is
required upon conviction.
The second
statute is W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3 (2004), relied upon by the circuit court
in reversing McKinney's license revocation for driving while revoked for DUI,
which provides in part,
(a)
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (d) of this section, any person
who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at a time when
his or her privilege to do so has been lawfully suspended or revoked by this
state or any other jurisdiction is, for the first offense, guilty of a misdemeanor
. . . .
(b)
Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at
a time when his or her privilege to do so has been lawfully revoked for driving
under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or other drugs, or for
driving while having an alcoholic concentration in his or her blood of eight
hundredths of one percent or more, by weight, or for refusing to take a secondary
chemical test of blood alcohol content, is, for the first offense, guilty of
a misdemeanor . . . .
(c)
Upon receiving a record of the first or subsequent conviction of any person under
subsection (b) of this section upon a charge of driving a vehicle while the license
of such
person was lawfully suspended or revoked, the division shall extend the period
of such suspension or revocation for an additional period of one year and after
the date such person would otherwise have been entitled to apply for a new
license. Upon receiving a record of the second or subsequent conviction of
any person under subsection (a) of this section upon a charge of driving a
vehicle while the license of such person was lawfully suspended or revoked,
the division shall extend the period of such suspension or revocation for an
additional period of one year from and after the date such person would otherwise
have been entitled to apply for a new license.
Subsection (c) of this statute indicates that license revocation is mandated
only upon a second or subsequent conviction for driving while revoked for administrative
reasons. The question before this Court is which of these two statutes applies
to McKinney.
The Commissioner
argues that W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1) applies. According to the Commissioner,
this code section authorizes the Division to suspend a person's driver's license
upon a showing of sufficient evidence that the person has committed an offense
for which mandatory revocation of a driver's license is required upon conviction.
According to the Commissioner, McKinney's driver's license was not suspended
for driving while revoked for administrative reasons. Rather, the Division had
sufficient evidence in its records (See
footnote 2) that McKinney drove a vehicle while his license was revoked
for DUI. Further, asserts the Commissioner, according to W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3(c),
a first
conviction for driving while revoked for DUI requires extending the license
suspension for an additional year. Therefore, the Commissioner concludes that
the Division had the authority, pursuant to W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1),
to suspend McKinney's license.
This
Court agrees with the Commissioner that the Division had the authority to suspend
McKinney's driver's license after it received evidence that he drove a vehicle
while his driver's license was revoked for DUI, even though McKinney was not
actually convicted of driving while revoked for DUI. When this Court is called
upon to determine the meaning of a statute, we are guided by the principle
that “[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent
is plain the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such a
case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.” Syllabus
Point 1, State ex rel. Fox Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension, 148
W.Va. 369, 135 S.E.2d 262 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Booth v. Sims, 193
W.Va. 323, 456 S.E.2d 167 (1995). Applying this principle to W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1)
leads us to conclude that this code section is clear and unambiguous, and the
Legislature's intent when it enacted the statute is plain. Therefore, we hold
that pursuant to W.Va. Code § 17B-3- 6(a)(1) (1997), the West Virginia
Division of Motor Vehicles is authorized to suspend the driver's license of
any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other
sufficient evidence that the licensee committed an offense for which mandatory
revocation of a driver's license is required upon conviction, regardless of
whether the
licensee is convicted of the offense. We see no reason why the clear language
of W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1) should not be applied in this case.
The facts
below show that the Division had sufficient evidence that McKinney drove while
his driver's license remained revoked for DUI. Also, pursuant to W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3(c),
driving while revoked for DUI is an offense for which mandatory revocation of
a driver's license is required upon conviction. Accordingly, pursuant to W.Va.
Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1), the Division was authorized to suspend McKinney's
license for driving while revoked for DUI.
McKinney
posits several arguments to support his contention that W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1)
does not apply to him. First, he reads § 17B-3-6(a)(1) to authorize suspension
only upon actual conviction of an offense for which mandatory revocation of a
driver's license is required. He points out that he was convicted of driving
while suspended or revoked for administrative reasons, an offense for which mandatory
revocation is not required under W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3(c). We believe that
McKinney plainly misreads § 17B-3-6(a)(1). This code section requires only
that the Division have sufficient evidence that the licensee committed an offense “for
which mandatory revocation of a driver's license is required upon conviction.” It
does not require sufficient evidence that the licensee actually was convicted
of such an offense before license revocation is authorized.
Also, “[i]t
is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute should be construed
as a whole, so as to give effect, if possible, to every word, phrase, paragraph
and provision thereof[.]” Syllabus Point 9, in part, Vest v. Cobb, 138
W.Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953). To give effect to W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1),
it must be read to provide for something other than mandatory revocation for
a first conviction for driving while revoked for DUI because this is clearly
provided for in W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3(c). In other words, to read W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1)
as urged by McKinney would be to find that the Legislature enacted a completely
redundant statutory provision. This we decline to do.
McKinney
next avers that W.Va. Code § 17B-4-3(c) shows a legislative intent to authorize
a license suspension only upon the second or subsequent conviction for driving
while revoked for administrative reasons. Although this may be true, McKinney
ignores the fact that his license was not suspended because of his conviction
for driving while suspended or revoked for administrative reasons but because
the Division had sufficient evidence that he drove while revoked for DUI. For
this same reason, we reject McKinney's argument that it would be irrational to
presume that the Legislature intended to lessen the penalty for driving while
suspended for administrative reasons under § 17B-4-3(c) while retaining
the more severe penalty for the same offense in § 17B-3-6(a)(1). Again,
McKinney received a “more severe” penalty under § 17B-3-6(a)(1)
for driving while revoked for DUI and not for driving while revoked for administrative
reasons.
In addition,
McKinney contends that to apply § 17B-3-6(a)(1), as the Division did herein,
renders the code section inconsistent with § 17B-4-3(c). This is incorrect.
West Virginia Code § 17B-4-3(c) applies in cases where a person is convicted
of driving while suspended or revoked for administrative reasons and the Division
does not have sufficient evidence that he or she committed an offense for which
mandatory revocation of a driver's license is required upon conviction. On the
other hand, W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1) applies where there is sufficient
evidence that a person committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of
a driver's license is required upon conviction regardless of the offense for
which that person is actually convicted. There simply is no conflict between
the two code sections. (See
footnote 3)
Finally,
we are confident that our holding in this case is consistent not only with the
clear statutory language of W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1) but also with the
Legislature's intention in enacting the license revocation statutes. The
purpose of this State's administrative driver's license revocation procedures
is to protect innocent persons by removing intoxicated drivers from the public
roadways as quickly as possible. This Court recently reiterated in State ex
rel. Stump v. Johnson, 217 W.Va. 733, ___, 619 S.E.2d 246,
256 (2005) (See footnote
4) the fact that “the administrative driver's license revocation
procedures of the Commissioner are meant to protect the public from persons
who drive under the influence of alcohol.” Citing Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168
W.Va. 593, 599, 287 S.E.2d 166, 169 (1981) (finding “[t]he intent of the
West Virginia traffic laws which provide that the commissioner of motor vehicles
revoke the licenses of dangerous drivers is protection for the innocent public”); State
ex rel. Ruddlesden v. Roberts, 175 W.Va. 161, 164, 332 S.E.2d 122, 126
(1985) (recognizing “[t]he drunk driving laws of this State are hardly
remedial in nature. They are regulatory and protective, designed to remove
violat[or]s from the public highways as quickly as possible”); Shell
v. Bechtold, 175 W.Va. 792, 796, 338 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1985) (stating “[t]he
purpose of the administrative sanction of license revocation is the removal
of persons under the influence of alcohol and other intoxicants from our highways
. . . The revocation provisions are not penal in nature . . . and should be
read in accord with the general intent of our traffic laws to protect the innocent
public”) (internal citations omitted); Johnson v. Commissioner, 178
W.Va. 675, 677, 363 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1987) (indicating that “[t]he administrative
sanctions of license revocation is intended to protect the public from
persons who drive under the influence of alcohol”); and State ex rel.
Hall v. Schlaegel, 202 W.Va. 93, 97, 502 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1998) (opining
that “[t]he purpose of the administrative sanction of license revocation,
as we stated in Shell v. Bechtold, 175 W.Va. 792, 338 S.E.2d 393 (1985),
'is the removal of persons who drive under the influence of alcohol and other
intoxicants from our highways.' Id. at 796, 338 S.E.2d at 396. This
objective of removing substance-affected drivers from our roads in the interest
of promoting safety and saving lives is consistent 'with the general intent
of our traffic laws to protect the innocent public'”).
We believe
that the purpose of speedily removing intoxicated drivers from our public roadways
would be greatly frustrated if the Division's revocation powers were totally
dependent on the discretion of local prosecutors in choosing how to charge drunk
drivers and whether to accept pleas to lesser charges _ a discretion based primarily
on the exigencies of the criminal justice system, not the protection of innocent
drivers. While this Court understands the concern that our holding herein will
interfere with the ability of prosecutors to dispose of drunk driving cases with
plea bargains, thus potentially overloading trial court dockets, we deem this
concern subordinate to our duty to apply statutory law as the Legislature plainly
intended. We also believe this concern to be subordinate to the substantial legislative
policy of protecting innocent persons from dangerous drunk drivers.
For
the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the Division had the authority,
under W.Va. Code § 17B-3-6(a)(1), to revoke McKinney's driver's license
for driving while revoked for DUI. Accordingly, the November 17, 2004, order
of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County reversing the Division's administrative
driver's license revocation is reversed.
Reversed.