The
rights of such minor child must be considered in light of today's contemporary
conditions and modern concepts of fairness. In the realm of automobile accident
cases we cannot brush aside or ignore the almost universal existence of liability
insurance. Where liability insurance exists the domestic tranquillity argument
is no longer valid, for, in fact, the real defendant is not the parent, but the
insurance carrier.
159 W.Va. at 590, 224 S.E.2d at 723. Syllabus point two of Lee states: “An
unemancipated minor may maintain an action against his parent for personal
injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligence of
said parent and to that extent the parental immunity doctrine is abrogated
in this jurisdiction.”
By 1978, this Court had determined that the
defense of interspousal immunity was no longer available in suits between spouses. Coffindaffer
v. Coffindaffer, 161 W.Va. 557, 567-68, 244 S.E.2d 338, 344 (1978). In Sitzes
v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W.Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679 (1982), this
Court reviewed the changes which had been instituted and observed “that
the trend in this State was decidedly in favor of the abolishment of common law
immunities.” 169 W.Va. at 702, 289 S.E.2d at 682.
In Paul v. National Life, 177 W.Va.
427, 352 S.E.2d 550 (1986), this Court accentuated that “comity does not
require the application of the substantive law of a foreign state when that law
contravenes the public policy of this State.” 177 W.Va. at 433, 352 S.E.2d
at 556 (citing Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W.Va. [106], 188 S.E. 766 (1936)).
The Paul Court recognized the “strong public policy of this State
that persons injured by the negligence of another should be able to recover in
tort.” Id. The Court also declared “that automobile guest passenger
statutes violate the strong public policy of this State in favor of compensating
persons injured by the negligence of others.” Id. at 434, 352 S.E.2d
at 556. Based upon that recognition of public policy, the Paul Court specifically
stated that “we will no longer enforce the automobile guest passenger statutes
of foreign jurisdictions in our courts.” Id.
Subsequent to the Paul decision, this
Court addressed the existence of a named insured exclusion clause in Dairyland
Insurance Company v. East, 188 W.Va. 581, 425 S.E.2d 257 (1992), and held
as follows at syllabus point two:
A
named insured exclusion endorsement is invalid with respect to the minimum coverage
amounts required by the West Virginia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law,
West Virginia Code §§ 17D-1-1 to 17D-6-7 (1991 & Supp. 1992). Above
the minimum amounts of coverage required by West Virginia Code § 17D-4-12
(1992), however, the endorsement remains valid.
In arriving at that conclusion, this Court endorsed the reasoning of a federal
district court in Kansas to the effect that a named insured clause and a household
exclusion clause are invalid for the same reason: they both thwart the purpose
of legislative enactments ensuring coverage for automobile accident liability
up to certain statutory limitations. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Gengelbach, No. 91-2048-O, 1992 WL 88025 (D. Kan. March 3, 1992).
The Gengelbach court relied upon the following logic from Halpin
v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 823 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1992):
The
plain purpose of the 1986 amendment [the enactment of the Missouri Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Law] is to make sure that people who are injured on
the highways may collect damage awards, within limits, against negligent motor
vehicle operators. This protection extends to occupants of the insured vehicle
as well as to operators and occupants of other vehicles and pedestrians. The
purpose would be incompletely fulfilled if the household exclusion clause were
fully enforced. . . . We believe that the legislature had a purpose of requiring
motor vehicle liability policies to provide coverage coextensive with liability,
subject to the statutory limits. We should give effect to the pervasive purpose
even though the method of expression may be inartistic.
823 S.W.2d at 482 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, this State has consistently emphasized
a strong public policy of ensuring protection of the innocent victims of automobile
accidents. (See footnote
2) As was explained by the
Washington court in Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb, 643
P.2d 441 (Wash. 1982), exclusions such as the household exclusion should be
void because they “exclude[ ] from protection an entire class of innocent
victims for no good reason.” 643 P.2d at 444.
The
family or household exclusion clause strikes at the heart of this public policy.
This clause prevents a specific class of innocent victims, those persons related
to and living with the negligent driver, from receiving financial protection
under an insurance policy containing such a clause. . . .
This
exclusion becomes particularly disturbing when viewed in light of the fact that
this class of victims is the one most frequently exposed to the potential negligence
of the named insured. Typical family relations require family members to ride
together on the way to work, church, school, social functions, or family outings.
Consequently, there is no practical method by which the class of persons excluded
from protection by this provision may conform their activities so as to avoid
exposure to the risk of riding with someone who, as to them, is uninsured.
Id.; see also Lewis v. West Am. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 829,
835 (Ky. 1996), (holding that household exclusion clauses in policies of automobile
liability insurance are contrary to public policy).
Based upon this Court's specific statements disapproving of application of any principle which serves to thwart the public policy and legislative intent to ensure protection of victims of automobile accidents, I do not believe that the household exclusion in the Ohio policy should be enforced in the courts of this State.